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".••if things were quite different from what 
they actually are - if there were for instance 
no characteristic expression of pain,of fear, 
of joy; if rule "became exception and exception 
rule; or if "both "became phenomena of roughly 
equal frequency - this would make our normal 
language-games lose their point."
(Philosophical Investigations,! §11*2)
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In the planning of this thesis I have, with apologies, slightly 
deviated from normal practice. The numbered notes containing 
references to relevant literature have been supplied together at 
the end of the text; but certain other notes, with asterisks, are 
given in the text at the foot of the page where they occur. This has 
has been done in view of the fact that these latter notes are more 
important to the body of the text and need prompt attention.
Among the many philosophers whose writings have influenced me and 
helped me to formulate the arguments of this essay are particularly 
Shoemaker, Wiggins and Williams, Despite my qualified disagreements 
with their conclusions, their original and stimulating works have 
supplied much of the elements of my own view that is going to be 
presented.
One single philosopher whose writings on the topic have helped me 
to see the present problem in its right light is Professor R.G.Swinburne. 
Besides this, I am grateful to him for his constant, hard-working and 
helpful supervision of my work, without which the present work could 
not have taken shape. I am, however, entirely responsible for whatever 
errors and inadequacies are contained in this work. I am also grateful 
to Dr.Brian Smart through his writings and also through direct 
discussions with him on the topic. Dr.Smart and Prof.J.L.Mackie deserve 
my special gratitude for their valuable suggestions after examining the 
earlier version of the thesis.
I am obliged to the Commonwealth Scholarships Commission in the 
U.K. for the generous grant to enable me to go and work at Keele, and also
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to the authorities of the Utkal University ( India) for granting 
me the necessary leave. My thanks axe also due to Mrs Kathleen Hampton 
for typing the first draft of this thesis and to Mr. Varghese Marzelin 
for typing the second draft.
Utkal University,
Bhubaneswar (India) Prafulla K.Mohapatra
April 1979
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AN ABSTRACT
The problem of personal identity, as I propose to discuss herein, 
is the problem of what, if anything, makes a person the same person at 
different times. It is a problem because although many things about 
a person go on changing - his physical features as well as his psycho­
logical features - through time, this normally does not affect our saying 
that a later person is the same person as an earlier person (This talk 
of's later person' being the same person as ' an earlier person' in terms 
of which the problem is raised and discussed, as it usually is, need not 
be contradictory or otherwise pleonastic} for they are only a shorthand 
device for the expressions 'a person picked out at a later time' and 
•a person picked out at an earlier time',) Is there, then, something 
unchanging about a person which is the bearer of his identity through 
time ? Various answers have been suggested to this question from 
John Locke's time up to date, though hardly any answer has been satis­
factory» In the present work, I want to consider why there should be a 
problem - which, to many, is a very special problem - about the identity 
of persons ifnone so special seems to be there about that of most 
other things, and to critically assess the various answers suggested,
I will also try to find out what made different philosophers give 
different - often conflicting - answers to the problem, and thereby, to 
point out why these answers were unsatisfactory. By way of such critical 
assessment, there will emerge my answer to the problem which I will claim 
to be free from the difficulties and limitations inherent in the ones 
I examine.
Incidentally there is another form in which the problem can be 
raised and this is the problem of synchronous identity,This involves 
the interesting issue of whether two (or more) contemporaneously
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identifiable selves are one and the same self. I shall not here 
be concerned with this aspect of the problem since it forms a separate 
problem from that of re-identity of persons which is chosen as the 
subject of my thesis.
In the interest of clarity and convenience chronology may not be 
strictly adhered to - though every attempt will be made to stick to it 
as far as possible.
The thesis will divide into three parts dealing, roughly, with 
the nature and source of the problem, how it has been looked at and 
dealt with by different philosophers and what a proper analysis of 
the problem will amount to. These three parts, in turn, will spread 
over five chapters.
The first chapter will be an introduction in which the problem 
will be stated and the nature and source of it will be clearly brought 
out. The peculiarity of the problem of personal identity, it will be 
pointed out, is due to a more intimate connection between the concept 
of a person and the criteria for the identity of persons, and also 
to the fact that persons are self- knowers. It will then be maintained 
that an approach to the par problem will be on the right line if it is 
taken as a problem of specifying the criteria for making personal 
identity judgments - and not as an attempt to define personal identity si­
nce, it will be argued, no satisfactory non-trivial definition of the 
latter is possible.
I shall then go on to consider, in the next two chapters, the way 
the problem presented itself to the traditional philosophers and the 
way it has been looked at in recent writings. Some possible connections 
and distinctions between the different views will be uncovered. The 
detailed scheme of these two chapters give the philosophers whose
views are being considered. I will not pretend that the list is in any 
way exhaustive, but I do hope that it presents the major links in the 
chain. Other writers and commentators will be given due attention in 
the course of the text. One major distinction between the traditional 
approach and the contemporary approach will be brought out in the 
following way: whereas in the former the problem was looked at (so 
I will argue) pre-eminently as one of definition, in the latter the 
question generally has turned on the problem of specifying the criteria 
to be used in making personal identity judgments. This difference in 
approach will be shown to explain the relative clarity of the contem­
porary literature and the somewhat vague and even paradoxical nature of 
most traditional answers.
After having thus shown that our problem is one of criteria,
I shall set myself to the natural task of reviewing the status of the two 
main criteria of personal identity, namely similarity of memory claims 
(with or without that of personality and character) and bodily continuity 
(which includes spatio-temporal continuity). This will be my concern in 
the 4th chapter. Attempt will be made to show that bodily isjootiry 
identity is an independent and the primary criterion of personal identity 
But bodily identity, I shall contend, should not be taken in so rigid 
a sense as Williams, for example, has taken it but that it should be 
qualified to take the spatio-temporal continuity of whatever may be the 
physical basis of what I shall call* the personal faculties'. Such 
lines have recently been suggested, notably by Wiggins, Shoemaker 
and Parfit, in some form or other. by imagining the possibility of 
brain (and/or split brain) transplants. But I will argue that cases of 
brain transplants show, not that memory continuity or "psychological 
continuity" - to the exclusion of bodily identity - is the criterion
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of personal identity as these philosophers seem to think, but that 
such possibilities can be so interpreted as to preserve bodily 
continuity as the necessary condition of personal identity. On the 
other side, arguments will be given to substantiate the well known 
b s claim that memory cannot be an independent criterion of personal
identity and that it has to depend, for its successful applicantion,
\ \on the bodily identity criterion. This will oblige me to examine the 
alleged possibility of disembodied existence, for if such existence is 
possible for persons this would supply a good reason for memory being 
an independent criterion. My attempt will be to argue against such 
possibility. My argument will not be designed to show that this idea is 
logically incoherent or straightforwardly nonsense, but to k show that 
it is unreasonable and, more particularly, that it des not show, what 
it purports to show, that memory is the sole (or even the primary) 
criterion of personal identity.
In the last chapter, I will consider some cases where the two 
criteria are said to conflict and where, consequently, there seems to 
be no right answer to the problem; judging the extent of the bearing 
of these "puzzle cases" on personal identity I shall argue that these 
cases create no conceptual problem and so justify no plea for revising 
our present concepts of a person and personal identity. I shall then 
state the importance of personal identity and discuss critically why 
it is that we demand all-or-nothing answers to personal identity 
questions and why it is that such answers are not possible in some cases.
P A R T  - I
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION-
Section (i)t The Problem
Problems of philosophy usually arise out of attempts to explain some 
facts of common experience. Phenomena that are otherwise taken for granted 
appear to be bewildering and paradoxical when a rationale for them is asked 
for. It appears as if we have no right to say what we do say about them. 
Things that so commonly pass as brute facts often become matters of inter­
pretation, depending on how one wants to describe them. And how one 
wants to describe a phenomenon is quite often guided - consciously or 
unconsciously - by the basic philosophical assumption or assumptions of the 
philosopher who describes them. But a proper method of philosophising 
should consist in explaining the phenomena without any preconceived notions 
whatsoever and yet in keeping the explanations as near to the facts as 
possible. Any basic philosophical assumption, far from being wrong or 
incorrect, may be the right theory and may have great explanatory value; 
but the philosopher's task is to show that it is so - rather than assume 
it and explain the phenomena by its means. My purpose in the present work 
is to pose the problem of personal identity, expose the motives of the 
different philosophers underlying their answers to the problem and to 
propose what I hope to be a proper philosophical explanation of the problem 
in the sense just indicated. In the present part (i.e. in the first 
chapter) I shall confine myself mainly to the first of these tasks and 
defer the two others primarily to the two subsequent parts of the proposed 
thesis.
It is a very common experience with all of us that we recognise our 
relatives, friends and acquaintances. We also are commonly able to say 
whether or not a particular person is the (earlier) person he says he is. 
This process of recognition or reidentification of persons involves a
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lapse of time during which some changes - often a great deal - might, and
do, come over the persons. The changes relate to the physical as well as
the psychological features of persons, for example: my memory, character
and personality have changed considerably. I now remember a lot more
than I did at any earlier time, I have also forgotten many things which I
did remember earlier; my character too has undergone some changes - my way
of approach towards things and people have changed, some of these changes
are quite considerable and some not; as regards my personality, I have
been adding something to this possibly with every increase of experience
and learning - in some sense, the changes in my personality have been
remarkable (evident from the contrast between the rustic manners as a school
boy and the somewhat refined ways of an urbanized youth). On the physical
side, my body has obviously grown bigger and stronger, my complexion and
appearance have changed considerably; and if the theory that in every seven-
years period (or so) all the molecules of a human body are replaced by
different ones is true, then there is not a single particle of matter now
in my body which was there in (or is common to) the body with which I
touched ground or even the body which I am said to have had ten years back.
These are obvious things that have happened to me and do happen to all
persons. Yet we do say, and beleive, that persons remain the same over
periods of time. Reflecting this, a recent writer describes the problem of
personal identity as the problem of trying "to justify a practice which
seems at first sight to be strange, and even paradoxical. This is the
practice of talking about people as single beings in spite of the fact that
they are constantly changing, and over a period of time may have changed 
1completely". As I have said, the "practice" referred to is very common 
indeed; it is not merely a "practice of talking" but a practice that 
carries with it a strong conviction about the nature of persons and personal 
identity. The conviction is that persons are single beings and that a
person continues to "be the same person throughout (what we call) his 
life time. We can easily notice that this way of putting the problem
involves two distinct issues. One concerns the nature of persons - 
whether persons are, as they are commonly supposed to be, single 
and unitary beings and if so, what is the principle of this unity.
This can be called the problem of the unity of persons or, simply,the 
Unity question. The second issue involved here concerns the nature of 
the Identity of persons through time - what makes (or makes us say, as 
we will maintain later on) a later person to be the same person as any 
earlier person. This problem has been described by some as the "Identity 
question" ; but I shall refer to this as the Reidentity question, so 
as tdi keep it distinct from another area of "identity" with which the 
present problem is not concerned.^ The existence at all of these 
problems is due to the fact, noted above, that all observable features 
which we call the features of a single person are subject to change 
and so one is tempted to ask, what makes (us say) these features the 
features of one person rather than those of many different(or perhaps, 
succeeding) persons ? Perhaps this is also backed by the argument, 
often advanced, that even the inner states of consciousness and experi­
ences of a person are logically distinct and that some of them could 
occur to one without the others occurring at all. This has supplied 
the rationale to the question* what makes a set of experiences the 
experiences of a particular person rather than some-one else’s ?
Because of this reason the unity problem has often been described as
4the problem of co-personality of experiences. In order not to be 
presumptuous I prefer to call it the problem, simply, of co-personality 
for the phenomenon of change and the fact of logical distinctness, as 
described above, can and do apply equally to the other (physical as 
well as psychological) features of persons, and to describe the problem 
of Unity as that of co-personality of experiences(alone) would, I think,
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be tendentious in that it might lead us to be already working within the 
confines of a sort of Cartesianism. However, whether we take the problem 
as that of co-personality (of experiences and other features) or as that of 
reidentity (of persons), the problem is seen to be rooted in.the supposed 
paradox, noted above, that everything about a person is subject to change 
and yet that the person is believed to be the same.How can a thing go on 
changing and yet remain the same ? In other words, the question arose out of 
the view that the ideas of sameness and change are incompatible .(But for 
this the question of unity or co-personality of experiences would seem to be 
of questionable relevance to the problem of personal identity. As I see it, 
the only relevance it seems to have is due to the fact that it anticipates 
some unchanging principle, being in relation to which the different experi­
ences are supposed to belong to the same person, and this 'unchanging something' 
was then easily supposed to be the bearer of personal identity. We shall 
shortly see, though, that this supposition was mistaken). The problem for 
those who fell into this way of thinking, then, was, what it is that remains 
unchanged about a person that makes them the single beings they are supposed 
to be and makes them the same throughout(what is called) their life-time ?
And this 'something unchanged', if any, was naturally to be other than the
*observable physical and psychological features which are known to be ever 
changing.The question, thus expressed in terms of a 'something unchanged', 
had the pretensions of addressing itself to the question of personal identity 
in both of its aspects of unity and reidentity. For if there is something 
unchanged which makes the different physical and psychological features belong 
to a single person then, it was naturally thought, it is the persistence of *
* Let us take "psychological features" in' the wider sense to include the 
making of memory claims and displaying particular types of personality 
and character, which are observable phenomena. This is compatible with 
saying that remembering and having particular types of character and 
personality may be private and unobservable - a different matter.
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that thing which would make a later person the same person as an 
earlier person. Such wan thought to he the importance of this unchanged 
something that in the absence of a proof of its presence, not only were 
persons described as mere bundles of perceptions”, the identity ascribed 
to them over time was dismissed as only a ”flctitious one”. But an 
enquiry into the nature of this "something unchanged" would make us see 
the dubiousness of such a supposition. The concept of a substantive self 
or soul has been often invented to meet the requirement of this "some­
thing unchanged". It was supposed, on the one hand, to constitute the 
essence of a person by virtue of which the different experiences( and 
other features) of a person are called or become hla experiences and 
features, and, on the other hand, it was thought to be the bearer of his 
personal identity. However, the concept of a soul, as thus understood, 
though widely entertained, has hardly passed for an intelligible concept. 
Hume, among others, pleaded the privilege of the sceptic as regards its 
nature and existence. But whether or not the soul exists, and whatever 
emotional appeal and intimate feel it may have, it, being essentially 
private and unobservable, cannot make us say that a person is the same 
person as the earlier person he claims to be or as the person we think 
him to be. It cannot, i.e., be our justification for making identity 
judgments about persons. That it cannot be our justification for making 
such judgments about persons other than ourselves is fairly clear. For 
all that one can count on when one says that a person(other than one­
self) is the same or is not the same as any earlier person is the 
conjunction or disjunction of certain physical and/or psychological 
features or continuities which are observable phenomena. And obviously 
none of these phenomena can be the soul since not only are they observable 
but are changeable which the soul is claimed not to be. ^  will not do 
to say that the conjunction or disjunction of those features are due to
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the presence or absence of the soul which nevertheless reamins 
unchanged while these features (its features ? ) go on changing} 
saying this would not be solving the problem at issue but only
5swapping it "for one of exactly the same form but less tractable"^
For our original problem was: what makes a person the same person 
as an earlier person when he changes radically in respect of 
observable features ? and now the problem would be replaced by : 
what makes a soul the same soul when it has changed so radically ? 
Only the problem has now become the problem of identity of some­
thing less tractable since persons are usually - unless defined 
as souls or as something non-physical - supposed to be observable.
It is, thus, the difficulty of knowing the soul, if such is there, 
that makes it fall fax short of being our justification for saying 
that a person is the same person as the person he claims, or is 
claimed, to be. Perhaps, this difficulty is not encountered in the 
case of the identity of oneself. It is often claimed by advocates 
of the soul-theory that the soul is known, in one's own case, 
by means of introspection, and that it is this knowledge that 
gives one the strong conviction that one has of one's ± own identity. 
This conviction was referred to by Reid as the conviction that 
"needs no philosophy to strengthen it and no philosophy can weaken 
it either"**. Well, this may be so, but what is not obvious is
that this conviction is justified by the fact that the presence of 
the soul is known by means of introspection. At least it was not 
obvious to one person; his name was David Hume, who only "stumbled 
upon some perception or other" but never could "catch himself",
-  7 -
whenever he tried to introspect. What this proves is the fact that the 
knowledge of the soul by means of introspection is something not uni­
versal and that the fact that it is universal cannot be demonstrated. 
Now, even if it were true that the knowledge of the soul is the justi­
fication of one's own identity, its failure to be so in the case of 
other persons is enough reason for its unhelpfulness to the solution 
of the problem of personal identity. For it is in the latter case that 
there is a problem at all. There is, strictly speaking, no problem as 
to whether or not one is oneself the same person as the person one 
remembers being at earlier times. I do not need any justification for 
my identity through time. There is a problem about personal identity 
and a need to justify identity - judgments about persons when there is 
the possibility that both types of answers - an affirmative and a 
negative answer - are forthcoming to the identity question. Identity 
questions about other persons admit of both these answers - some­
times they axe answered truly in the affirmative and sometimes truly 
in the negative, and even when one such question is answered truly in 
the one way the possibility of answering it in the other way is still 
open, and makes perfect sense. But in one's own case, by contrast, it 
does not make good sense - it would indeed be self-stultifying - to say
that one is not the same person as the person "he" used to be five years 
*back. And the answer to the identity question in one's own case is
*We may ignore the fact that one can and does say of oneself that one 
Is a changed person now, and the like. For, as will be generally agreed, 
ia x this way of talking refers not to the cessation of a period 
(followed by the appearance of another person), but to the change 
of personality - which certainly is a different matter.
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usually always in the affirmative. Hence the problem at stake is not 
about one's own identity (I shall reserve the expression "self-identity" 
to refer to this identity hereafter). This is not to deny that one can, 
in certain peculiar circumstance^, wonder if one is the person one thinks 
onself to be i.e. one can wonder who one is. As a result of amnesia or 
total loss of memory I may well wonder whether I am P.K.M. But who I am 
will, in that case, be determined, not by me but by others so that the 
problem here is strictly not one of self- identity but has the logical 
status of the other identity issue. I would, in this case, be depending 
on the testimony of others who, in their turn, would be using the evide­
nce of my bodily and/or psychological features in telling me who I am.
And so, the "knowledge of self-identity" which I would thus be acquiring 
would be logically indistinguishable from that of other-identityj for 
others would be following the same method in telling me who I am as I 
would in saying who they are. Thus, if this (other-identity) is virtually 
all the problem is about and if the soul-theory of personal identity is 
no solution to this, then it follows that the concept of the soul is 
not particulary suited to the solution of the problem at stake. Hor will 
it do to say that it suits the case of what I have called self-identity 
alone; for that would be tantamount to saying that one means two different 
things by saying that a person Pg time tg is the same person as the 
earlier P 1 a M  t_ j, according to whether or not Pg is oneself.
x The soul theory of personal identity owes its existence and 
plausibility largely to the view, as we have seen above, that the 
ideas of sameness and change are incompatible, and to the consequent belief that 
what we are identifying,or supposing the presence of,when we say that a person
* I owe this particular argument directly to Professor Swinburne.
is the same as some earlier persons is something that has remained 
unchanged though other observable things about the person have gone on 
changing. We have seen the difficulties of the concept of a soul in 
meeting the requirement of being the justification for making personal 
identity judgments. Our discussion pointed to the fact that the soul's 
failure to meet this requirement was due primarily to its being unobservable 
since, being so, it could not be shown to be unchangeable (or even to be 
changeable). But the failure of the soul-theory in the described respect 
need not oblige one to deny that there is such a thing as personal identity, 
The theory that persons remain the same through time is not incompatible 
with an outright 'no-soul' doctrine. One may totally reject the idea of a 
substantive soul or self and yet, pace Hume, believe in the identity of 
persons over time. Can it, then, be that the latter is because of the 
presence of some feature of persons, yet undiscovered and other than the 
soul, which remains the same when a person is said to be the same and is 
different when persons are said to be different? Such indeed would be a 
theory acceptable to those who do not believe in the soul and yet do want 
to maintain that something must remain unchanged in order to account for 
personal identity. But this secular version of the soul-theory fares no 
better than its original counterpart. This theory can only succeed by 
establishing the existence of an unchanged feature of persons which can be 
observed. But it will be a bad scientific hypothesis to expect such a 
thing to exist, for it is a general fact of nature that every phenomenal 
thing is subject to change.
Moreover, what seems to be a likely error of the theories of the above 
type is that, side by side taking the ideas of sameness and change to be 
incompatible (an error which will be exposed shortly afterwards) they have 
treated the questions 'what is personal identity5?, 'what makes a person 
the same person as an earlier person?' as if they were straightforwardly
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empirical questions. Being strongly motivated against something being 
changeable and remaining the same, the inventors of these theories have, 
perhaps, cherished the idea that there is something yet undiscovered which, 
if it could be discovered by means of laborious scientific investigation, 
would answer our question. But that the present issue is not straight­
forwardly empirical* in this sense, and cannot be so decided is strongly 
suggested from the following consideration. If it were a straightforwardly 
empirical question in the described sense, then the appearance of unfavour­
able facts would have disinclined - if not logically compelled - us from 
applying the expression "same person" to the cases to which we do apply it. 
But we have seen that enough unfavourable facts are already there though 
they have done nothing to shake the conviction with which we use the 
expression and treat persons as continuous beings. It is not that we treat 
persons in this way because of any ignorance of facts; we do so treat them 
despite our full knowledge of the facts - which is that persons are 
"constantly changing and over a period of time may have changed completely" 
in respect of all their observable features.
The look the present question has of being straightforwardly empirical 
is due, perhaps, to the fact that the question is often asked in the form 
of a "what is ...?" question that is typical of the philosopher’s way of 
asking questions. For, thus asked, the question does not always make it 
clear as to what is being asked. There are at least two senses in which a 
"what is ...?" question may be taken. It may be taken to be a question 
about the word or phrase ("personal identity" or "same person") or it may be
*By our denial that the present question can be straightforwardly empirical 
should, however, be understood nothing more than the claim that this 
question is not to be decided by discovering some further facts about 
personal identity than what already are available to us. In particular, 
this must not be taken to mean that our question is a non-empirical or 
verbal one. Quite to the contrary, we do maintain in this thesis that 
the empirical fact that persons do display similarities in respect of 
physical and psychological features over time is highly relevant - indeed 
indispensable - to the solution of the issue.
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taken to be a question about the thing the words stand for or signify.
When asked as a thing question it may often be considered a boring enter­
prise to answer the question by pointing at the thing or phenomenon in 
question (though this is one of the ways of answering this question, 
e.g. when we point at a flash of lightning in the sky in answer to a child's 
query 'what is lightning?'); what is demanded is often a great deal about 
the nature, function and cause - in a word, explanation - of the thing or 
phenomenon (e.g. an explanation like, 'lightning is a form of electric 
discharge caused or generated by such-and-such factors under such-and-such 
circumstances, etc). In any case "what is ...?" questions, taken in the 
second sense are straightforwardly factual or empirical questions which can 
be (and are supposed to be) answered by referring to discovered (or 
discoverable) features the thing in question may have. That our question 
about personal identity is not an empirical question in this sense has just 
been shown. Is it then a question about the words "personal identity"? 
i.e. is it a question concerning the meaning of "same person". Here again, 
there is an essential ambiguity which must be considered in order that we 
may understand What is being asked.
7There are various ways in which meaning-questions can be taken. t But 
for our present purpose it will be worthwhile to consider two senses. First 
there is the rather trivial sense in which the question "what is (or what 
is the meaning of) personal identity"? can be taken to be a question about 
the literal meaning of the phrase "same person". But clearly, the problem 
does not involve a request for an answer to this. That we know this is 
evident from the familiar fact that we apply the phrase to the cases of the 
right sort (e.g. I and the P.K.M. you saw last week) and that we do not 
apply it to the wrong sort of cases (e.g. P.K.M. and the Professor of 
Philosophy at the University of Keele). Secondly, there is the strict 
sense in which a meaning-question can be taken as a request for a definition
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so that our question can be answered only by supplying a definition of the
phrase "personal identity". In this sense, an answer to our question can
be given by specifying a phenomenon, or a set of phenomena, in the presence
of which - and only in its presence - the phrase "same person" can be
applied. It will be argued in this chapter (and substantiated later on)
that no strict and satisfactory definition of 'personal identity' can be
given. By a "strict" definition I take it to be one that obeys the
conditions just outlined, by a "satisfactory" definition I mean one that
is not trivial. For example, if the word "same" is defined as "not
different" (see for example, the Concise Oxford Dictionary) that is an 
8extremely trivial definition and fairly worthless as a definition. For 
it explains nothing since, if we follow t]fiismethod of defining words, 
"different" would only be defined, and equally trivially, as "not the same". 
Similarly, if "personal identity" is defined as the "sameness of a rational 
being"^ , this will be a trivially worthless definition in the same sense, 
and more particularly so when "rational being" is synonymous with, at least 
implied by*the definition of "person" (i.e. "thinking, intelligent being..") 
even by the same author. (And is not Reid's claim that "continuous uninter-i'
10rupted existence is .... necessarily implied in identity" - if taken as 
a definition of identity - a trivial definition in the above sense?) Thus, 
if any definition has to do the trick it has to be a non-trivial definition 
of "personal identity" which I think is not possible. However, I will argue 
for this only after examining some attempts at defining this concept.
A very general way of expressing a definition of "personal identity" 
may be to express it in terms of the same body and/or of same memory and 
character etc. The immediate difficulty with such a definition is that we 
cannot»strictly speak of same memory and character etc but only of 
(qualitatively) similar memory and character, which points to the fact that 
they are different and changeable over time. "Same body" is more in use
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and is used to signify the numerical identity of a particular body that a 
person is supposed to have. But we have seen that what is called the same 
body is also subject to change and cannot, it might be argued, be called 
the same. It might thus appear that any attempt to define "personal 
identity" in terms of the sameness of body and/or memory and character etc 
would virtually result in defining the concept out of existence. For if the 
definiens is subject to change, how can the definiendum be the same? This 
is in fact the paradox, referred to earlier, that would not allow a defini­
tion of "same person" to succeed before it is itself disallowed. However, 
the difficulty - if it is a difficulty - is not so much a difficulty of 
defining "personal identity" as it is of finding out a same something in 
terms of which a definition could be formulated; and the latter difficulty 
is due to the fact that the ideas of sameness and change are incompatible.
We have already seen that although change in the relevant sense is an 
undeniable fact, yet the problem of personal identity (and that of identity 
in general, as we shall see later in this chapter) is not one of finding 
out something unchanged to justify our practice of making identity judgments 
about persons. It seems therefore that the belief that "sameness" and 
"change" are incompatible ideas must be ill-founded.
What seems to have provided an inspiration to this view is a super­
ficial lexical fact that one of the meanings of "same" (in some dictionaries) 
is "not changed"; and since dictionaries provide explicit definitions 
(i.e. definitions in terms of synonyms), this fact might have created the 
illusion of thinking that "same" and "not changed" are synonymous with each 
other. But although "not changed" may be one ofthe meanings* of "same", it 
would be a bad dictionary indeed that treats the two expressions as exact 
synonyms. For in actual usage the idea of change is allowed for, and
#More will be said about this in the next section of the present Chapter.
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incorporated in, most substantive concepts. It is of course true that in 
some cases those two ideas yield a contrast as, for example, in the two 
conjunctions, "same note" and "succession of different notes" wherein the 
latter, involving change of notes, is incompatible with the former.But 
there are also hosts of other cases where obviously there is no such 
contrast; as, for example, "same tune" and "succession of different notes", 
wherein the former, far from being incompatible with the latter, is under­
stood in terms of it^. Indeed "the same throbbing feeling"(a mental state) 
might consist in the succession of different mental states. Hence to insist, 
on grounds of apparent opposition between "same" and "different", that a 
mind cannot be the same mind at different times because it is a successio 
of different mental states or that a body cannot be the same body at 
different times because it is a succession of different physical states is 
to ignore the importance of the use of substantive concepts only in conjun­
ction with which "same"and "different" have a use at all. This important 
fact was recognised by Locke who claimed that the concept of identity 
per se is incomplete the that what makes us say that a given entity is the 
same depends upon what sort of entity it is; and in recent writings the incre­
asing importance of this fact is certified by the emphasis on the "same what?" 
question. The dogma that sameness and change are incompatible is thus exposed 
and the fly is shown the way out of the fly-bottle»there is no longer any 
room for misgivings against ascribing unit and across-time identity to 
persons and things despite the changes that so obviously but innocuously 
infect them, for as we saw, certain changes are incorporated in many(perhaps 
most) substantive concepts. And our concept of a person is one such sub­
stantive of which it is perfectly harmless to say that it applies to a 
single being which continues to be the same at different times despite the 
described changes infecting all his observable features.Ascription of 
across-time identity to persons will not be incoherent - not certainly on
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this score - though what changes are allowed for, and what not, in order 
for the sameness of a person to be retained is a further issue. It will 
be generally agreed that not all types of changes are allowed for by the 
concepts which do incorporate change into their meaning. For example, 
my bicycle may still be the same bicycle if some of its parts are replaced 
by new ones, but what if all its parts are replaced? Perhaps it will still 
continue to be the same bicycle if all its parts are replaced gradually 
over a period of time, but what if the parts are replaced all at a time? 
Similarly, a person may continue to be the same person with one or, 
perhaps, several parts of his body lost or replaced by ''foreign" parts 
by means of transplants or plastic surgery. Very few, though certainly 
not all - would doubt that he won't be the same person if all (literally 
all) the physical parts of his body are replaced by plastic surgery for 
in that case we would not be having a person in the first place. But what 
if what is counted (because of its causal role in the exercise of memory 
and consciousness) as the most vital part, the brain, is replaced by 
another? What, in particular, if after the replacement of the new brain 
the person displays not only a total lack of "old" memories and character 
etc but also the exercise of totally new ones? Further, we accept a person 
to be the same person despite the alleged changes on the ground that the
15changes are "slow" and "gradual" , but what if the changes are abrupt 
and total in some cases?
Thus, the problem of identity of a substantive turns out to be the 
problem of specifying what type(s) of changes are to be allowed for in 
order that across-time identity may be truly or justifiably ascribed to 
things coming under the substantive. And what changes (and what not) are 
to be allowed for depends on the nature of the concept and is largely a 
matter of specifying the criteria for the identity of things in question.
It certainly is not the problem of how at all to ascribe sameness to
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anything since everything supposedly is subject to change.This latter, 
it should by now be clear, is a spurious problem since the assumption 
on which it is based (i.e. that sameness and change are incompatible) 
is seen to be just mistaken. Consequently, the idea of a substantive 
soul - or, for that matter, anything unchanged - which was invented to 
answer this question can now be seen to be an unnecessary hypothesis, 
designed to solve a problem that does not exist. Now that the facts 
of the matter have been laid bare, there is for us no need or finding 
out some unchanging thing in terms of which to define 'personal identity'. 
All that matters is, in what sense the features of persons - changeable 
as they are - can be of help in giving an account (defining or otherwise) 
of personal identity. Although I want to maintain that the problem is one 
of specifying the criteria for the identity of persons, it is nevertheless 
useful and instructive to consider if any attempt at defining personal 
identity succeeds.
Any attempt at defining personal identity, in order to get started, 
must take into account one or several or all the features that characterise 
a person. This will not mean any — even incautious — step towards blurring 
the distinction between being a person and being the same person. But 
unless some, if not all, features of being a person are included in an 
account of personal identity we will not know what is being judged to be 
the same. For as we have seen "same" is incomplete and cannot be used in 
the first place, without a substantive concept conjoined to it. And since 
it is not obvious which, if any, of the characteristics of persons will do 
the trick, there seems to be no alternative but to examine the nature and 
role of all the characteristics (that seem to be essential to being a 
person) in defining or giving an account of personal identity. The charac­
teristic features of a person fall into two broad categories* bodily or
\physical and mental or psychological. Each of these sets of features is 
subject to change - though we have seen that this need not deter or detain 
us. It will do the trick if the changes are suitably qualified so as to 
enable us reasonably to make personal identity judgments on the basis of 
these characteristics. The qualifications that are usually made is thqt 
the changes in the mental and the physical features of persons are slow 
and gradual and uninterrupted. This is otherwise expressed in the notions 
of bodily continuity and the continuity of memory and character. These 
continuities, jointly or severally, can and do serve as the justification 
for making identity - judgments about persons. But though these continui­
ties are our justification for ascribing identity to persons, it will be 
presently seen that any attempt to define "personal identity” in terms of 
these continuities can hardly succeed.
There have, in fact, been certain theories* which have apparently 
taken the problem as a problem of definition and have tried to define 
personal identity in terms of the one or the other or both of these 
continuities. The most acceptable and workable interpretation of these 
continuities has been in the following manner: bodily continuity has been 
interpreted to include spatio-temporal continuity such that a body is the 
same body as the body B2 if they are connected by a spatio-temporal path at 
each point on which there is a body which is somewhat similar - in appearance 
and constitution - to its immediately preceeding and succeeding bodies 
which are on the same spatio-temporal line. Continuity of memory and 
character has also been spelt out in a similar manner. Since memory and 
character cannot be conveniently talked of without reference to the persons 
whose memory and character they are, it is best to state the nature of this
»Professor Swinburne calls them the ''empiricist theories" iii'5 gagST------
"Personal Identity" Proceedings of the Avistotelean Soc-fpty (pas hereafter) 
1974. The present chapter owes a great deal to this paper.
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continuity via what according to the memory theorists constitutes the 
sameness of a person. Thus, P2 at "the same person as at Jb^
(assuming there to he a considerable time-gap between t^  and t2), "if there 
is a series of persons Pn at times _tn intermediate between and such 
that the memories of each person include almost all those of any person 
slightly earlier in the series and each person is very similar in
character to any member in the series existing at a temporally proximate1
moment".^ With these sort of interpretation of the two continuities, 
the empiricist theories have felt comfortable to define personal identity 
in terms of the one or the other or both of these continuities. Two rival 
theories of personal identity have emerged as a result of emphasising one 
of these continuities to the exclusion of the other. The relative merits 
and demerits of these theories we will have occasion to judge in later 
chapters. But as attempts to define personal identity in terms of either 
or both of these continuities the weakness of such theories will be 
fairly manifest
I have said earlier that something can be the definition of something
else if in the presence of the former, and only in its presence, the
latter can have application. Neither bodily continuity alone nor memory-
and-character continuity alone is competent to supply a definition of
personal identity in this sense: the belief in a person’s survival of his
(bodily) death and continuing in a disembodied state^though less common,
is not logically impossible, and equally possible is the idea of
reincarnation.* The former points to the possibility that there can be
personal identity without there being bodily continuity and the latter to
the possibility that there may be no personal identity despite there being
a continuous body which might possibly be "inhabited" by a different person
as soon as or soon after "deserted" by the original person. On the
*1 will not, however argue for these forms of personal survival and the 
later sections of the present thesis will bring out some serious 
limitations of these ideas.
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psychological side, there are the fairly frequent and normal phenomena
that a person should lose his memory and/or radically change his character
and personality and yet remain the same person as before; and it is also
possible that two or more contemporaneous persons may make the memory-
claims* and display the personality and character that fit the life of a
third, non-contemporaneous person and yet, for well-known reasons, this
cannot be a case of these (contemporaneous) persons being the same person
’ 1,5'
as they claim to be. These actual and possible cases show that neither 
bodily continuity nor memory-and-character continuity can be a necessary 
condition of personal identity and also that neither is a sufficient 
condition. It needs scores of philosophical arguments to show that the 
possible cases referred to above are not cases of personal identity (or" 
non-identity as the case may be), and so the foregoing should be enough 
to damage any claim to analyse or define personal identity in terms of 
(one/the other/both) these continuities.
Now because of what has been said above, an empiricist theory which 
may attempt to analyse personal identity in terms of both bodily and 
memory-and-character continuity will do no better either. In order for 
such a theory to succeed (i) each of the continuities has to be a defining 
characteristic and hence a necessary condition of personal identity and 
(ii) both together (and not one alone) would have to be sufficient 
condition. But each of these continuities has been seen not to be 
necessary, so condition (i) is violated. And as regards (ii), it has been 
shown that neither bodily continuity nor memory-and-character continuity 
is a sufficient condition of personal identity (by imagining respectively
*It will not do to object here that 'making the memory claims of' is not 
the same thing as 'having the memory of'. For it is in terms of the 
former that a definition of personal identity can be formulated at all: 
to define it in terms of the latter would be inevitably circular.
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the conceptual possibilities of a body being "deserted" by its original 
"occupant" and soon after being incarnated by another person and that a 
later person may start off by making memory claims (and displaying 
character and personality) similar to that of an earlier person who, on 
independent historical grounds, could be seen to have been a different 
person). How, in order to see that both these continuities together 
cannot be the sufficient condition either, we have only to imagine a com­
bination of these two possibilities, i.e. a person, A, may die and his 
death may be (it is possible to imagine) instantly followed by another 
person, B, having exactly similar psychological features as A's taking 
over the latter's body. And what this possibility will show is that even 
in the presence of both bodily continuity and memory continuity there could 
be no personal identity. Thus will condition (ii) be violated. It will 
follow that a definition of personal identity even in terms of both the 
described continuities together will not succeed. And from this, together 
with what has been said in the last paragraph, it will follow that no 
empiricist theory of personal identity can succeed. For a theory of that 
sort will succeed only by defining personal identity in terms of one or the 
other or both of the described continuities and this is an impossible task.
There has been another serious recent attack"*^ on the efficiency of 
the empiricist theories on the ground that " because there are imaginable 
'circumstances where any criterion (memory or bodily continuity, PKM) gives 
no clear result, there are imaginable circumstances where any empiricist 
theory of personal identity would give no answer as to whether Pg is the 
same person as an earlier P^" and that "the answer that they are the same 
is as near to the truth as the answer that they are different"; and 
certainly, Swinburne rightly implies, we would not want to say a thing like 
that about personal identity. The "imaginable circumstances" are the 
numerous puzzle cases that abound in the literature of personal identity.
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And this criticism further substantiates my contention that the empiricist 
theories cannot solve the problem of personal identity. (Moreover, if a 
theory claims to be a theory of definition, how can it succeed without 
the definition it proposed applying to all cases - real or imaginary?
How else it is a definition?) My treatment of the empiricist theories 
makes it clear that the failure of these theories is due not tb :the fact 
that they count on bodily continuity and contuity of memory and character 
for the solution of the present problem - as we shall see, these contin­
uities are perfectly alright as our evidence or criteria, and as a matter 
of fact these seem to be the only things we can fall- back upon - but to 
the fact that they wanted to define personal identity in their terms, which 
we have seen to be impossible. And I cannot see how else it can be defined, 
since these continuities are the only notions in which our understanding 
of the concept of personal identity seems to consist. As Swinburne rightly 
points out,^- we get to understand the meaning of the phrase "same person” 
by being shown clear cases of persons who are, and of persons who are not, 
the same; and in all such cases we are provided with the presence or
i
absence of one or the other or both of these continuities or similarities. 
There seems to be nothing else which would acquaint us with the notion of 
personal identity; if there were any it would have been shown to us, - 
otherwise the meaning of the phrase "same person" could not be taught to 
us and no one could have learnt its meaning. But if there is nothing else 
but the continuities in question and since the latter are incapable of 
definint personal identity, then it seems to follow that the notion of 
"personal identity" cannot be defined. This is the element of truth in 
the claim, notably made by Butler and Reid, that personal identity is 
something ultimate and unanalyzable.18'
As we have seen, a similar conclusion is reached by Swinburne. But 
the conclusion needs to be rather carefully interpreted. As Professor
,19Mackie has rightly implied 5 Swinburne's conclusion that personal
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identity is unanalyzable goes hand in hand with, and indeed issues from, 
the idea that our ordinary concept of a person is "something whose unity 
is in itself unequivocal" (id p 193). And he, like me, agrees with 
Swinburne (and quotes him with expressed approval) that the observable 
continuities delineated above are the only means of our understanding and 
coming to know the meaning of personal identity, but that these continuities 
are not what we mean by "personal identity". Yet Mackie complains that 
Swinburne's conclusions that personal identity is something ultimate and 
unanalyzable does not follow. By examining the status of those contin­
uities, severally and jointly, and by showing that there is nothing else in 
terms of which personal identity could be defined, I have argued that the 
conclusion is inevitable. What, then, is Mackie’s problem? If I have 
understood him rightly, his problem is absolutism: he believes that the 
Butler-Swinbume type of theory is committed to the belief in a spiritual 
substance whose persistence must account for the identity of a person 
through time.* This sort of commitment is not entirely unusual; as I shall 
argue in the next chapter, Butler, at least, expressedly espoused such an 
assumption. But I am not sure if such a commitment is logically binding. 
Swinburne, in a way3implicitly contends that the relevant continuities are 
all there is to our understanding of personal identity ("of what is at 
stake" op cit', p 24l), and also that the latter is "observable only by
observing these" (op cit, p 240). But saying this does not commit oneself
ies
to saying that we observe two things: these continuiy and personal identity 
which is the continuity of some spiritual or non-physical or absolute 
substance. To take the help of an analogy, we observe the team spirit of 
Stoke City Football Club by observing the "potters” playing; but that is
*See esp Thid p.194 "Have we not come back", Mackie asks, "precisely to 
the notion which, dressed up in the philosophical terminology of 
spiritual substances, Locke so rightly rejected and set aside?"
-25  -
not to say that we observe the former besides observing the latter (though
we may still insist that "team spirit" means something more than the
players playing in the way they do). In view of this Mackie’s problem of
how the ultimate identity of persons can be observed only by'observing
the relevant continuities need not be worrying at all, nor is it anything
"obscure" to say this, nor is Swinburne bound to say that the identity of
persons is the identity of something ghostly or spiritual*. It can be
said with perfect propriety that a table is observable only by observing
all its observable features, and yet that "table" does not mean only the
observable feature of a table; but saying this does not entail that table
is some unknowable material substratum which is what we mean by the word
"table". I conclude, therefore, that the belief in a spiritual substance
does not inevitably follow from the theory, which Swinburne maintains and
I subscribe to , that personal identity is indefinable. The belief,
though, in a spiritual substance, instead of following from the contention
that personal identity is unanalyzable, will lead to the latter - which, I
believe, is Butler’s way of reasoning, at least in part. On the contrary,
I have maintained (see pp7_8 above) that this belief in a spiritual
substance issues from the insistence that there must be something unchanged
to account for our ascriptions of identity to persons. We have seen this
to be a mistaken belief and that it is unnecessary to the belief in, and
ascription of, identity to persons. The fact rather is that we talk of
personal identity and make personal identity judgments on the basis of
bodily continuity and/or the continuity of memory and character etc, but
that we also can, and do, meaningfully ascribe identity to persons even
in the absence of one or the other of these continuities. This much is
■»Perhaps the use of the expression "ultimate" is slightly misleading here; 
but this expression may very well be understood as a synonym for its 
accompanist "unanalyzable" - as indeed Swinburne tells me that he meant 
to use it in this way.
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the spirit of the claim that personal identity means something more than 
those continuities and so cannot be analysed in their terms. And since 
these continuities are all that is there to our understanding the meaning 
of personal identity, it follows that the later is indefinable.
The offshot of our discussion has been that the question "what
is personal identity ?" cannot be taken either as a question about the
literal meaning of the phrase "same person1* or as a question about the
definition of personal identity. For while the former would be unnecessary
(because every user of our language knows how to use the phrase in its
normal context and hence is in no doubt about its literal meaning), the
latter is seen to be unfruitful(because of the impossibility of defining
the notion). This difficulty can be expressed by saying that though we
know what it means for a person to be the same person as an earlier
p we cannot say (cannot state in the form of a definition) what personal 
»
identity is . In other words, although we know, and can say, when two 
non-contemporaneous persons are, or are not, the same, we cannot say what 
exactly makes them the same person. In the face of this difficulty, the 
only important way of investigating the nature(which by no means is giving 
a definition) of personal identity would be to consider how we know that 
two non-contemporaneous persons are (or are not) the same. We know that a 
person is the same person as an earlier person on the basis of evidences, 
and bodily continuity and/ or the continuity of memory and character etc 
are our evidences. Under all normal circumstances the conjunction and 
disjunction of there continuities help us (are our justification) in deciding 
which cases are, and which not, cases of personal identity. In different types 
of situations judgments of personal identity can be made, and in fact are 
made, without much difficulty by carefully balancing the evidences against
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each other. But if the situations are sufficiently different, or are
imagined to be so different, the problem of how to make identity-judgments
becomes more serious and presents more serious difficulties? the question
then becomes not what are our evidences, but what are the ''criteria!
evidences" or, simply the criteria for making judgments of personal identity.
Different interpretations have been given of the notion of "criterion" and
I will discuss them and suggest mine in Ch 3 Sec. i. For our present
purpose a criterion can be roughly described as a state of affairs the
existence of which is always or necessarily evidence for the truth of the
judgement of which it is a criterion. In sufficiently different situations,
therefore, such as the so-called puzzle cases, the questions of personal
identity are particularly about these evidences which are criteria! for
the truth of personal identity. It is these situations which raise the
problem more conspicuously than ordinary situations(the problem hardly
ever occurs to us in ordinary situations)? I believe that most of these
situations help raising the problem in a clearer perspective, since it is
precisely with this motive that the puzzle situations are brought into
existence in the literature of personal identity. And it is the existence,
or at any rate the possibility of such situations which, I think, brings
the truth to light - which is that our problem is a problem of specifying
the criteria of personal identity - and not a problem of defining it, since
these possible situations most palpably resist any attempt at defining in
terms of any prospective definien available to us. Thus Shoemaker*"The
problem of self-identity", (by which he means personal identity), "is often
characterised as the problem of specifying the criteria of personal 
20identity." The word "often" in this quotation is misleading since it may 
suggest that on some occasions the problem may be not about criteria, but 
possibly about the meaning or definition of "personal identity". But
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taking the problem in this sense, we saw, is either unnecessary or 
unfruitful; and if one is not clear about this, one would be confused 
even before beginning to find any solution. My contention therefore, is 
that our approach to the problem would be on the right lines if it is taken 
as a problem of specifying what criterion or criteria should be used to 
make and judge statements of personal identity. Shoemaker notes that in 
recent discussions of the literature the questions"How is the identity of 
<jl»s known ?M and "In what does the identity of $'s consist ? are often
O  4reduced to the single question "what axe the criteria of <J)- identity ?", 
This is true particularly of our contention about the nature of the problem 
of personal identity, though this remark, being a remark about the general 
problem of identity, leads us on directly to consider the distinctive 
feature, if any, of the problem of personal identity, as against the 
identity of other material objects. This will be our concern in the 
following section.
'Section (ii) - A Special Problem
The problem of personal identity, as it has been stated in sec (i),
,and as it has been generally considered therein, is a problem that can as 
well be raised about the identity of material things. This may have the 
effect of lending support to a not very uncommon view that persons are not 
essentially different from mere material things and that there is no essen­
tial difference between personal identity and the identity of those material 
things.* There seem to have been two possible reasons for the last view to 
be plausible. One reason, which makes only a negative point and which con- 
conerBsthe nature of identity, seems to have been that invariance is often 
thought to be the standard of identity or of sameness in all cases. We have 
seen that some philosophers - most notably Hume - have insisted that in 
order for anything to be called the same it has to remain unchanged from one 
time to another. For these philosophers, "being the same" and "being un­
changed" are synonymous. Thus, after having reasoned that everything that is 
supposed to last beyond a moment is a "bundle" or "collection" of rapidly 
changing perceptions and hence is not entitled to be called the same at diff-
ierent times, Hume says that "the same method of reasoning should be continued' 
to show that the identity ascribed to persons (which he calls 'the mind of 
man') "is of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal 
bodies". In other words, identity is to be ascribed - or rather denied -
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*The expression "material things", as it will be used throughout, will be 
understood to mean not only tables and stones but also animals and organisms 
- to include, in fact, all observable things except persons. This will, 
thus, be a very broad use of the expression "material things", and as our 
treatment of "person" in this section would indicate, the latter will also 
come under that description. So that when I consider persons vis-a-vis 
material things, the latter strictly should be understood to mean other 
material things. I do not, at any rate, intend to suggest that persons are 
non-material or non-physical things, and nothing that will be said about the 
distinction of persons from "material things" would commit us to that idea. 
My purpose simply will be to try and show that the nature and identity 
conditions of persons differ in important respects not only from those of 
mere material things like tables and stones but even from thoffiof animals. 
Furthermore, although the arguements in following will be more often con­
cerned with showing the relevant contrast between persons and mere material 
things, a subtle distinction will also be indicated between persons and
animals.
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to both persons and other material things in the same sense. For the 
ultimate outcome of Hume's reasoning was that the identity which we 
ascribe to persons as well as to material things is "only a fictitious 
one". Of course Hume's thesis stands or falls along with his basic 
assumption that things that change cannot be really the same, and we have 
already seen that this thesis is mistaken. Penelhum has argued that Hume's 
error lay in thinking that invariance is the standard of identity in all
O
cases whereas, in fact, it is the standard only in a few cases. This 
criticism draws force from the way the expression "the same" is used. In 
most cases it is used despite the object undergoing changes (e.g. 'the same 
bicycle', 'the same church', and the like). We have seen that in such 
cases changeability is incorporated in the concept under which the object 
in question is grouped. In the few cases in which "the same"is used in 
the sense of "being unchanged" are the cases where unchangeability is a 
part of the meaning of the concept. For example, we say of a musical note 
that it is the same note only when it has not changed; if there is any 
change, we have a different note but no longer the same note. But if 
this is so, that is because the concept is defined#partly at least, as 
unchangeable. But then the statement "It is the same x (where 'x' is 
defined in terms of unchangeability) is not an identity-statement in the 
sense in which we are considering such statements, and the 'sameness' (and 
'difference') of x is irrelevant to the problem of identity. For we have 
said that the identity with which we are concerned is concerned with the 
reidentification and persistence of things through time and change. In 
this sense, a statement like 'I saw the same flash of lightning as the 
one you saw' does not even imply identity, though it is an identity- 
statement in another sense (see note 3 to the previous section). It 
follows therefore that "being the same" and "being unchanged" are not 
synonymous which they have to be in order for Hume's thesis to stand, and
-  29 -
that where they are synonymous the ••sameness" Is irrelevant to the problem 
of reidentity. Consequently, Hume»s claim that 'identity* has the same 
sense (i.e. of being only a fictitious one)when applied - if applied at all . 
to both persons and other material things loses ground. And if the 
supposed synonym was Hume’s ground for claiming that identity as applied 
to both these cases "is of a like kind", then he was clearly mistaken.
However, our criticism of Hume has not shown what, if any, is the 
difference between personal identity and the identity of material things 
though it is common to feel that there is a difference. But something 
has emerged from this criticism to the effect that invariance is a part 
of the meaning of certain concepts and not of others and, hence, that in 
what sense "the same" is used would depend on the thing to which it is 
applied.This principle, though extremely crucial to the issue at stake,may 
not seem to be particularly helpful because of the way it has issued from 
the foregoing.For it was shown that where invariance is a part of the 
meaning of the concept sameness and difference of these sorts of things 
are irrelevant to the problem of identity so that it might(which though,
I hope, is very unlikely) be tought that since there are two sorts of 
things, one that does not allow changeability into its concept and the 
other that does, and since it is only in the latter case that 'sameness' 
is relevant to the problem of identity, then"sameness" has the same sense 
when applied to this class of things. But we have already said in the last
that although change is allowed for by most of our concepts yet not all 
types of change are allowed indiscriminately by all these concepts,* 
and what changes will be allowed for a thing to be the same thing 
depends upon the thing in question. This, in fact, is the spirit of 
the principle that emerged - or, rather re-appeared - this gives us 
an important clue to understanding the supposed distinction 
by concentrating on the nature of the things to which
we apply the words "same" and "different". But before that, let us consider 
the second reason which seems to have led to the idea that there is no dis­
tinction between personal identity and the identity of material things.
This reason, which concerns the nature of persons and material things 
rather than that of identity, is that there is a sense in which persons 
are material things. Certain things are said about material things which 
are also said about persons. For example, we say of a person that he is 
sueh-and«-such feet high, weighs such-and-such pounds, is located in 
physical space and the like. One can even say though it may be slightly 
unnatural and strenuous way of speaking, that a person is soft or hard 
(not meaning soft-hearted or hard-minded). There is, further, the apparent 
unknowability - of "other minds" which has a tendency to make us treat 
behaviouristically somewhat as we treat the ordinary material things. We 
also say of a person such things ass he was removed to the hospital, that 
I pushed him away etc,which are analogous to: thetable was removed to 
the next room, I pushed the chair away and the lila Such analogous ways 
of talking about both persons and material things make it appear that there 
is no essential difference between the two and, accordingly, that the way 
we make and judge statements of personal identity cannot be any different 
from the way we make and judge statements of the identity of material 
things. Thus Reid for example said "Our judgments of the identity of the 
objects of sense seem to be formed much upon the same grounds as our 
judgments of other persons beside ourselves. ^ (my emphasis). Reid's 
remark is revealing of two different facts. On the one hand, it points 
to the fact that there seems to be no difference between persons and 
material things (which, in turn, was thought to be responsible for there
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being no difference between personal identity and the identity of other 
things), because of similar ways of talking about both persons and 
material things and because of apparent lack of knowledge of other persons 
except in physical and behavioural terms. On the other hand, it suggests 
implicity that there must be a difference - we feel that there is - in our 
own case, at least. Keeping this latter point for later consideration, 
it is not difficult to see why it is that we say similar things in both 
cases and how it is that saying similar things in both cases has done 
nothing to make (or make us think) persons the same type of things as 
material things. Obviously, we do say such things about persons as we 
say about the material things because persons have bodies which are 
material things after all. But if from this one is inclined to reason 
that persons are merely material things then one would be doing the odd 
job of deducing "(Ji's are ijr's" from "(ji’s have Moreover, equally
obviously, certain other things are also said about persons which are 
not said - which it makes no sense to say - about material things, and 
animals which we have agreed to discuss under the heading of other material 
things. For example, we say only of persons that they think, know arith- 
matic and solve philosophical problems. This is due to the fact that 
persons have minds; and in whichever terms the latter may be interpreted, 
this is what makes the psychological attributes (or what Strawson has 
called the P-predicates) ascribed to persons and makes persons distinguished 
from the other material things - in the broad sense which we have given 
to the latter expression. If a lion or a stone could do what only a person 
can do, we would try to attribute this somehow to a mind somewhere or, if 
we cannot possibly do that, leave it as something mysterious - which is 
certainly not to explain it.^ The essentialness of having a mind to 
persons explains why it is that "what is a person?" and "what is a mind?", 
"In what does personal identity consist?" and "In what does the identity
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of the mind of a man consist?" are often equated. As I have said above
it is odd to deduce "<})'s are iji's" from "(|>'s have |'s", and this is as
true of the claim that persons are bodies as of the rival claim that
persons are minds. Yet the distinctively essentialness of having minds 
has
to persons y .■* - apparently camouflaged this oddity and has been rather
over-emphasised to make Cartesianism or near-Cartesianism more plausible
than in fact it is. At least one obvious error of the last mentioned
theories seems to be that from "x is essential to jr" they have, in effect,
5inferred "only x is essential to jr". But the latter, clearly, does not 
follow from the former; for may it not be that x is one of the essential 
properties of ¿i Being equiangular is essential for something to be an 
equilateral triangle, but it does not follow from this that only being 
equiangular will make an equilateral triangle. (Can a rectangle or a 
square be an equilateral triangle?) This is to forget - if only one 
can - that the latter is also essentially a triangle. There seems no 
nriroa facie reason why similar reasoning cannot be accorded to the case 
of mind's being essential to a person. For while this is no doubt true, 
it is not incompatible with something else - perhaps 'having a body' is 
that - being also essential to a person. Now, if the philosophical 
tendency to identify persons with their minds were justified it would 
not only show the essentialness of having a mind to persons, it would 
also show the body to be inessential. As a matter of fact this tendency 
has such natural and familiar appeal that though disembodied persons 
are often thought to be possible, mindless persons are hardly conceived 
at all. However, admitting that minds are essential (in being the 
distinguishing feature) to being persons does not commit us to such a 
radical position. The fact rather is that persons and material things
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are both bodied,* but whereas material things have bodies only (let us 
ignore the awkwardness of saying this - though "having a body" can 
strictly be said to have a different sense^ when applied to material 
things from the sense it has when applied to persons), persons are 
distinguished by the fact that they have minds. As Strawson has so 
succinctly expressed this "among the htings we ascribe to ourselves are 
things of a kind we also ascribe to material bodies to which we should
7not dream of ascribing others of the things that we ascribe to ourselves"1 
(emphasis added).
Now, an important consequence of the fact that persons have minds, 
which shows the distinction between persons and material things to be veiy 
fundamental, is the fact that persons are self-knowers. Not only are we 
persons, we know that we are. What it is to know that we are persons and 
what relevance it has on the nature of personal identity? Consideration 
of this question will lead us to the understanding of the nature and 
peculiarity of the problem of personal identity.
To know that I am a person is to know that I think, reason, intend, 
remeber etc to mention only a few. Obviously, I am not though, not
*For the present purpose, it will do, i hope, £o"T>ear in mind that it is '5‘ 
general fact of nature that persons are bodied beings and that we get to 
know persons (and the meaning of the word "person") as bodied beings. We 
say of such a thing (who, besides being whatever else, is a bodied being), 
and what is like one, that he is a person; and we are taught the meaning 
of "person" by being shown one or several of these beings. But for this,
I cannot see how one can say that something (what things?) is a person and 
how the meaning of the word could be taught to anyone. Any otherwise 
account of persons will not be our concept of a person and will belong, 
at best, to some other area of discourse. This may not prove the 
impossibility (logical) of theare being disembodied persons; but it 
certainly suggests that the latter concept of a person would be an 
extended (and so secondary) version of our normal concept. I shall return 
to this question in Ch 4 sec (iii) to show that this extension of the 
normal concept of a person is not justified.
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reasoning and the like; I am something (or someone) which (who) thinks,
reasons, intends and remembers. But I do not do these things only once
in my life; I do these many times. None of these is continuous and
uninterrupted throughout the whole course of our life. I have different
thoughts, intentions, memories etc. at different times; even if on a
number of occasions I have qualitatively the same (strictly similar)
are
thoughts and intentions and memories, they are,/likely to be, interrupted 
by other thoughts, intentions or memories, in between these occasions.
(It would be a very strange world if people there were having the same 
(numerical) thought or memory uninterruptedly for all times). Yet these 
different and many activities I call mine. It is not that I only call 
them mine, I know them to be mine. What makes me call them mine or what 
makes them mine is my continued existence or, if you like, the fact that 
these activities are performed by me who continues throughout the opera­
tions of all of them at different times. Moreover, as Reid has pointed
Oout, I cannot reason without it being true that the antecedents have been 
seen or done by me (by the one who reasons), nor can I remember anything 
without the conviction that I, the rememberer, existed when the thing 
remembered occurred. Thus, the knowledge that I am a person carries with 
it the belief about and the capacity to know my personal identity, (if 
this is true of me because I am a person and, hence, a self-knower, this 
is true of others as well, since others are persons and so self-knowers.) 
And this, in a very important sense, makes personal identity constitutive 
of the concept of a person. Locke for example, defined "person” as "a 
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places"^ (my emphasis), thus making the knowledge of one's personal 
identity - (self-identity) a part of the definition of a "person". As
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Locke’s definition of "person" is quite a plausible one, it is also
plausible to say, as the definition suggests, that there is an intimate
connection between the concept of a person and the idea of one’s personal
identity; that if there is a person he is capable of knowing of his
identity through time. This cannot be true of other material things.
A stone or a dog (certain reservation about the latter follows shortly) 
it
does not know - makes no sense to say that it knows - anything about 
itself or its identity across time. If it is argued that dogs and perhaps 
some other animals behave in ways which suggest that they know certain 
things, my first response is that that "knowledge" is too vague and 
dubious to be worth the name, Wittgenstein said something to the effect 
that though a dog can be said to know, e.g»>that his master is at the 
door, no behaviour of it could possibly show or even suggest that he knows 
that his master will come the day after tomorrow.^ Instinctive behaviours 
can hardly bear any title to knowledge. How far it will be anything 
unnatural to say that instinctive behaviours are more or less like natural 
singns ? (Compare our saying that it is going to rain at the sight of 
lowering black clouds and our saying that the master is at the door by 
seeing the dog behave in a characteristic way.)
It might, however, appear that what the foregoing and what in parti­
cular the remark of Wittgenstein proves is that although a dog can be 
said to know certain things, it cannot be said to know certain other,more 
complicated, things. But if, for this .v; reason, one wants to say that the 
dog does not know anything even where he can be said to know something 
then one would be throwing the baby away along with the bath water - as 
James had complained against Hume.^ For it is admittedly true that some 
characteristic animal behaviour do strongly suggest that they know certain 
things at least, although ± no behaviours of theirs are particularly 
suited to singnify the possession of higher order knowledge by them.
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X an prepared to concede this though I am in no fear that this concession
will affect my position which is that persons are distinguished from
animals and inanimate things('material things' - as I have called them)
hy virtue of the fact that they are selfknowers. And it can hardly be
12denied that self-knowledge is knowledge of a very high order , which no 
animal behaviour is suited to testify. Lack of evidence may be no proof 
of non-existence, but the availability of evidence is certainly a privi­
lege where two rival classes of things are concerned. The evidence of 
self-knowledge could be available in the case of personsQself-consciou- 
sness in one's own case and self-conscious behaviour in the case of 
other persons), and not in the case of animals - not to mention the 
inanimate things.
Let us now see how the results of the foregoing can be utilised to 
bring out the special nature of personal identity as distinct from the 
identity of material things. And since persons are distinguished by the 
fact of self-knowledge, the best way to approach the issue would be by 
considering the way personal identity is known and the way the identity of 
material things is known. As we consider this, it will appear onece again 
that it is the nature and possibility of self-knowledge that makes all the 
difference.
Ve have seen that persons are self-knowers and that this means that
they know of their own identity through time. But equally, they also know
.!
the identity of the many material things around them. What, then, is it 
that makes the former knowledge so peculiar and the problem of personal 
identity - not merely self-identity - so special ? To come to an answer 
to this question we will start with how we come to know of a material 
thing that it is the same thing as the one we saw earlier. We always 
count on certain similarities which we normally take to indicate its 
continuity in space and time. This means that spatio-temporal continuity
is taken to be the criterion of identity in this case. This criterion
is always taken to be a necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition of
13the identity of material things. Once this condition is satisfied no 
further evidence is normally required. And with certain reservations 
(to be clear in course of what follows), this seems to be also true of 
the identity of persons other than ourselves. Under all normal circum­
stances we count on certain similarities namely, these of physical 
appearance and of memory and character (sdmetimes the former alone, some­
times both) which are normally taken to be there because of the spatio- 
temporal continuity of a human body. Doubts may, however, be raised as 
to whether and how memory-and-character similarity can be taken to be due 
to the spatio-temporal continuity of the body. To this it may here 
suffice to reply that memory is taken to be a criterion largely because 
of the fact that there is such a thing as real memory i.e. if all the 
memory claims that persons made were deceptive and if none of them ever 
pointed to the identity of the rememberer with the witness of the past 
event that is remembered then memory would never be a criterion of personal 
identity. It is this general fact that some (in fact most) memories are
real and hence point to the identity of the rememberer with the witness
. .. .presumption
of the remembered event that creates in us the natural c/, ‘ p. that
any memory claim may be real memory and hence the person making it may be 
identical with the witness of the putatively remembered thing. But a real 
memory there could be only if the person remembering the thing was 
physically present when the event occurred. Similarly, if character 
continuity is ever taken to be a criterion of personal identity it is 
because persons do behave in similar manner and do display similar traits 
of personality over a period of time; but this means that persons are 
physically observed over a period of time (Shoemaker deals with this point 
more elaborately in his Self-Knowledge And Self-Identity - Ch 5 secs 9 and
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10). If, on the contrary, it could be otherwise established that the body 
of the person was not present when the remembered event occurred then, 
even if the remembered event did in fact occur and the person's 'memory 
report' fits .the latter fact with excellent accuracy, the identity of the 
person will be extremely suspect.
It may be objected that the foregoing does not show that these
criteria (similarity of memory etc and of physical properties) cannot be
used independently of spatio-temporal continuity. I am not sure if this
objection could be true against the use of the physical criteria. The
possible explanation may be found in the cases - if such cases are
admissible - of disembodied persons. In such cases the spatio-temporal
continuity (of the body) being ex hypothesi inapplicable the only usable
criterion of identity would be the continuity (or similarity) of memory
and character. Admitting the possibility and the plausibility of such
cases, I have said already that these cases would be an extension of the
normal cases and thus are parasitic upon them.* But in the normal cases,
we have seen, that the similarity of memory and character serve as a
criterion of identity in so far as it is supposed to be the evidence of
spatio-temporal continuity as iH relevant in the case of persons. And
this fact that these criteria do serve as our criteria of identity because
might have
they normally indicate spatio-temporal continuity tos inclined many to 
think that personal identity and the identity of material objects is known 
in the same way.
Thus, we saw, some philosophers have said, that our knowledge of the 
identity of material things and that of the identity of other persons
*But see Ch4 secs iii and iv for a fuller argument for this.
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beside ourselves are based much upon the same grounds. We emphasised the
qualification “beside ourselves" and promised to discuss its significance
later. In the light of the further discussions thereafter, I think it
will be proper and helpful to discuss this point. As we said, this phrase
was apparently used by Reid to indicate that there must be a difference
between our knowledge of personal identity and that of the identity of
material things. But since there seems to be nothing in the way the
identity of other persons is known to show any difference, the difference
was thought to lie in the way we know our own identity. This has an
important element of truth - as important as to stress the difference - and
we will soon try to make it explicit. But let us cast a quick glance at
the suggestion that there is nothing in our knowledge of other persons to
show the difference, for this seems to be not only .misleading but also an
act of oversimplification. It is noteworthy that Reid probably did see
that there is a difference here, although he was not able to say what it
is. This can be read into his remark that our knowledge of the identity
of material things and that of other persons are based much upon the same
grounds, - he did not say (nor mean, I take it) exactly upon the same
grounds; and I will try to show that it was not merely an accident or a
slip that he did not say that. For at least one way in which the difference
can be brought out is by pointing to the fact that although our knowledge
of the identity of material things and that of the identity of other
persons are apparently based on the same grounds, yet these grounds are
normally decisive enough in the one case while they are hardly ever
decisive in the other. This is explained by the familiar fact that while
condition
spatio-temporal continuity is largely accepted as the necessary/ftoxtclttaifift 
of the identity of material things, its like status in the case of (other) 
persons identity is highly controversial in the literature of personal 
identity. And although this criterion is often enough in the one case,
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it is often thought to be not enough in the other. That is to say, if 
a certain material thing is observed to be continuously present from 
one time to another, it leaves us in no conceivable doubt that it is one 
and the same thing, and there is nothing else which could make this 
identity suspect. On the contrary, though the observed spatio-temporal 
continuity of a living human body makes us fairly sure that the person in 
question is the same throughout that period, yet there are certain other 
conditions (e.g. the absence of a possible incarnation of another person 
in that body) which, if not satisfied or taken for granted, would make the 
supposed identity open to doubt and may supply a reason for thinking that 
it might be a case of non-identity as in the putative case of "bodily- 
transfer”. This, I should think, is a conceptual difference, a difference 
that issues from what 'person' means and what 'an (ordinary) material 
object' means. "The spatio-temporally continuous table is the same table" 
is an analytic statement, whereas "the spatio-temporally continuous body 
is the body of the same person" is not; and hence the spatio-temporal 
continuity of the body would not, unlike the other case, be a conceptual 
guarantee of personal identity. Thus it is that the very same ground is 
adequate •» at least generally so - in the one case and yet is not so adequate 
in the other. But if this is so then it seems to follow not only that our 
knowledge of identity in each case, if based on spatio-temporal continuity, 
is different (well-grounded in the one case, but less so in the other), but 
also that there must be a difference between the nature of identity in the 
two cases. But since it is not easy to see what the difference is from 
the case of other persons, it seems natural to suppose that the real nature 
of personal identity is to be sought, not in this case but in one's own 
case. It is an admitted fact that our knowledge of the identity of material 
things (and of other persons) is always grounded on some evidence or 
criteria, and that we have to use some criterion or criteria to know that
14
a later x is the same x as an earlier x (where 'x' is an ordinary material 
object or a person other than oneself). But it has been argued that our 
knowledge of our own identity is not and cannot be based on any criteria, 
and hence that this knowledge and the nature of self identity is not 
affected by the imperfections and inadequacies ;of the criteria. This 
point has been made by the arguement that the most direct way of knowing 
personal (self) identity is by remembering* one's own past history and 
that our memory of our own past is not, and cannot be, based on any 
criteria of personal identity. The argument has two steps. The first step 
is that our knowledge of our own identity (self-identity) is based on or, 
rather, revealed in, the first-person memory statements that we could 
make. The truth of this step hardly needs any proof. For it is a necessary 
truth that if the memory statement is genuine then the rememberer is the 
same person as the earlier person who witnessed what is remembered. But 
even when the statement is not genuine, it does not affect the purport of 
this step of the argument. For in that case, either the memory statement 
is sincerely made or it is not. If it is not, then the person making it 
knows that he is not the same as the one who witnessed the thing "remembered^ 
but if it is a sincere memory statement then as long as it has not been 
shown to him that he is mistaken, the rememberer is in no doubt about his 
identity with the earlier person. The fact is that our sincere memory 
statements carry with them the conviction of our own identity; this 
conviction is not, and cannot, be shaken by the fact that some of our
♦Since what is at issue here is he. one knows one's own identity through 
time, 'remembering' here should be taken in the standard sense in whlST 
it is a necessary or conceptual truth that if a person remembers an event 
then he must have been a witness to that event or must have had direct 
knowledge of it, whence it follows that remembering one's own bast is 
reassuring of one's own identity. p sx 13
-42  -
memory statements may be, and sometimes are, mistaken, just as the fact
that our senses sometimes deceive us is no reason that they are never to
be trusted. Indeed, Shoemaker has argued that it is a necessary fact that
our sincere memory-statements are generally true and that generally they
15are made only when they are true. This is of course compatible with the
possibility ' of any particular memory-statement being mistaken. But having
been obtained from the general case (of genuine memory statements), the
knowledge of self-identity is reflected in all sincere memory-statements.
Indeed, whether or not one truly remembers, it remains logically true that
to claim that one remembers doing x _is to claim that one is the same person
as the person who did x. Now to the second step in the argument. It is
that the first-person memory statements are not grounded on criteria. This
16point has been convincingly made by Shoemaker by considering the way in
which first-person memory-statements are made and known. I will state the
situation as briefly and faithfully as is required for my present purpose
(which is to bring out the distinctive feature of personal identity).
In the first place, when I make a memory statement about my past, this
statement is not grounded on the bodily identity criterion of personal
identity; nor, from my point of view, is any consideration of my body
relevant to the truth of my statement. It is true that others will need
to use, and do use, my bodily continuity in order to be satisfied that I am
truly remembering and hence that my statement is true; but I, who is in no
doubt about the latter, need no such criterion. Shoemaker went on to sayj
"from my point of view, it seems inessential that the body I have now be
the body I had when I took the walk. If I remember going for a walk then I
17did go for a walk, no matter what my present body was doing at that time". 
This is certainly too strong a way of putting the matter; for it is
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arguable whether I would be as confident that I did go for a walk if I am 
given reason to believe that my "present body" was in the study at the 
time when I remember to have gone for a walk, and thus my bodily non­
identity may be relevant to showing the falsity of my memory statement.
But once again this does not affect the purpose of the argument that when
I do make a sincere memory statement and do believe that I remember what 
I claim to remember, I do hot use and do not need to use the bodily identity 
criterion of personal identity to make sure that I really remember. Cases 
of my making sincere but false memory statements may be cases of my falsely 
believing that I am the same person as the earlier person who witnessed 
the "remembered" thing. But the issue at stake here is not, whether I am
the same person but how do I know that I am the same person. And how I
know is the same both where I am the same person and where I only think 
that I am; and this consists in my being able to make sincere memory- 
statements in the first-person which does not,and need not, use the bodily 
criterion of personal identity. In the second place, I cannot be said to 
use any inner criterion to know that my statement is true. Por what this 
supposed inner criterion could be but my memory? If so, do I have to 
remember that I remember that I went for a walk? But this breeds the 
further problem of how this second memory is to be evidenced and thus 
inevitably pushes the problem backwards ad infinitum. The fact, however, 
is that I use no criterion as I need none to convince me of the truth of 
my memory statement (and consequently, of my own identity), although, as 
we saw, others may use some criterion (that of my bodily identity) to show 
that I am (or I am not) mistaken*. But as far as I am concerned, the
♦This, however, cannot be taken to show that the knowledge of one’s own 
identity can be grounded on criteria. Por as I have shown before (see 
section i ppT-' 6»)this will not, strictly, be a case of knowing self- 
identity bum like knowing other identity.
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truth of my statement is apparently evident to me by the very fact of the 
statements being made by me. For it is a necessary truth about the first- 
person memory statements in particular and the first-person psychological 
statements in general that they are generally true when they are made 
sincerely or rather that they are generally sincerely made when they are 
true. Generally (unless, for example, I am lying) I make a memory state­
ment only when it is true that I do remember, much as I generally (unless, 
for example, I am pretending or play-acting) say that I am in pain only 
when I am in pain. The possibilities mentioned in the brackets in each 
case may justify others, as in fact they do, in looking for some criteria; 
but they certainly do not affect me, as long as I am sincere and confident 
in making these statements. There will of course be cases of my mis- 
remembering; but as long as they have not been shown to be so the stqte of 
my knowledge in that case is exactly like the state of my knowledge in the 
genuine cases and as such is non-criterial. Now, if the first-person 
memory statements are thus not grounded on criteria and if the knowledge 
of self-identity is based on, or expressed in these statements, then it 
follows that the knowledge of one's own identity is not grounded on 
criteria. What 'shows' to a person that he is identical with someone who 
existed in the past and did such-and-such things is nothing - not at least 
necessarily anything - that is criterial evidence for his identity with 
that earlier person, it is the very consciousness of that identity which 
operates in his memory of his past. Thus it is that self-identity 
(personal identity of one's own) is known in self-knowledge. And since, 
as we have seen, the real nature of personal identity is supposed to lie 
in self-identity, and not in other identity, personal identity has not 
unreasonably been thought to be very different from the identity of other 
material things and has posed a special problem. Not unreasonably, because 
if one is justified in holding that this speciality is true of one's own
identity then one must he prepared to say that this is true of everybody 
else, for everyone else, like oneself,' is a person, a self-knower and can 
have non-criterial knowledge of his own identity. It is this "privileged 
access" which every person has to his own identity that has led some
4 0philosophers to treat personal identity as "real" and "perfect"identity 
and the lack of this access had led them to describe the identity of 
material things as "imperfect" and "a question of words"(but see Appendix 
1 no*).
In the previous section of this chapter, I tried to show, though on
different grounds from the foregoing, that personal identity cannot be
defined. And presumably, it is largely because of considerations like
the foregoing that Reid and Butler were led to declare that the concept
of personal identity is indefineable. By this Shoemaker takes them to mean
that there are no criteria for personal identity in the above sense and
that one’s knowledge of one’s own identity, expressed in memory judgements,
19can not be grounded on criteria. While Shoemaker seems to be generally 
right in so interpreting their view, I do not think that this interpretation 
gives quite a complete understanding of their intentions. For at least from 
something that Reid says it seems rather more likely that "indefineable" 
is the description which he wanted to apply to the notion of identity as 
such and not - not at least explicitly - to the notion of personal 
identity alone. This seems clear from the following*
"Identity in general I take to be a relation between a 
thing which is known to exist at one time, and a thing which 
is known to have existed in another time ..."
"If you ask for a definition of identity, I confess
I can give none, it is too simple a notion to admit
20of a logical definition" (My emphasis )
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It is needless to point out that personal identity is not "identity 
in general" and that persons are not the only "things"; hence I think a 
more faithful interpretation of Reid should have been that what is indefin­
able is "identity in general" and "personal identity", ■ being an instance 
of identity, rather what Reid calls "perfect identity'^ is even more 
reasonably so. Again, if as Shoemaker thinks being non-criterial were 
Reid's sole, or even a strong, reason for saying that personal identity 
is indefineable, he would be prepared to say, for the sake of consistency, 
the same thing about the identity of material things. But as we see, while 
he says that "identity in general" (which certainly includes the identity 
of material things) is indefineable, he would undoubtedly deny that the 
identity of material things is non-criterial as well. It seem3 therefore 
that while Shoemaker may be right in attributing to Reid the view that 
being non-criterial makes personal identity "real" and "perfect" identity 
he is certainly wrong in thingking that this was Reid's reason for. saying 
that personal identity is indefineable; for if this were his reason then 
Reid would not have said what he said in the above passage. On the contrary 
what was his reason is the fact that the notion of identity (and hence of 
personal identity which is a specis - a special specis - of identity) is 
"too simple a notion to admit of a logical definition". Simple predicates 
are indefineable but not necessarily non-criterial ("identity" when applied 
to material things, and other persons is not). Thus we can say either that 
Reid did not say what Shoemaker thinks he said, namely that personal iden­
tity is indefineable because it is non-criterial or that he reserved the 
predicate "indefineable" for personal identity alone (in which case Shoemaker 
would be right in interpreting Reid in the way he did). But since the 
latter is counter-lextual,and hence false^it follows that Shoemaker was 
wrong (partly though) in his interpretation of Reid.
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I have said in section (i) that the problem of personal identity is 
not one of definition but one of criteria, (indicentally my sympathy with 
the view that personal identity is non-criterial in the above sense need 
not oblige me to give up my original position nor upset it in any way.
For in that sense only my own identity as known by me is non-criterial, 
but not the identity of other persons. But hardly is the problem a problem 
about my own identity - though, as we have seen, the nature of this 
identity helps me in understanding the nature and distinctive feature of 
personal identity. But why it helps me is the fact that as long as I am 
capable of remembering I can never doubt my own identity - the notion of 
this is ’’fixed and precise" (Reid) for me. But the problem which I face 
and hold to be a problem about criteria is the problem of the identity of 
other persons. And this is not solved by discovering or being told that 
self-identity is non-criterial). Perhaps this is also true of the problem 
of the identity of material things for as we have just seen, it is plausible 
to say that the identity of the latter is also indefinable. But the 
difference I want to maintain lies in the fact that in an important sense 
the criteria of personal identity are more central to, and constitutive of, 
the concept of a person, whereas this is not true of.the relation of the 
criteria for the identity of material things and the concept of the 
relevant material things. This I hope to bring out in the remaining part 
of this chapter. And once this is done this will make more plausible the 
claim that identity as applied to persons and to material things are not 
only applied to different subjects but also in different senses - although, 
I hope, the grounds for this claim has by now been made fairly apparent.
This claim was most explicitly expressed by Butler's distinction
between what he calls the "looseand popular sense" and the "strict and
21philosophical sense" of identity. He thinks that identity when applied
to material things is applied in the former sense, and when applied 
to the case of persons it is applied in the latter sense. His position
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■- ' - can be roughly explained thus: a tree at
present is called the same tree as the plant "it" was fifty years ago.
But in the course of this long lapse of time 'it1 has undergone serious
changes of its parts and elements that compose it; and possibly there is
not a single particle of matter in it now which was there in the plant.
"And if they have not one common particle of matter they cannot be the
same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word same". ^  If we
ascall it the same tree,/we certainly do, this is the loose and popular 
sense of the word "same."*
It may seem probable from the abov<% particular^ from Butler's remark 
just quoted»that identity is ascribed to material things only in a "loose 
and popular" sense because it is ascribed to them in spite of constant 
changes that affect them. If just this was Butler's reason for making the 
distinction between the two senses of identity then he was certainly 
mistaken. For we have already seen in the last section that identity is
*It may be said (I owe this point to Professor Swinburne) that this 
distinction which Butler makes is a distinction between two different 
criteria of sameness rather than between two senses of the word "same", 
this is quite true, for certainly when we apply the word "same" to 
material objects and to persons we do not mean two things by that word. 
The difference in both cases is the difference of what conditions 
are to be satisfied in order for the word "same" to apply. And this, 
in effect, is the difference between two sorts of criteria for the 
application of "same" in each case. However, though putting the 
distinction in this way is less misleading than the way in which Butler 
put it, yet the purpose and outcome of Butler's distinction is substan­
tially the same. For we shall see that his distinction aimed at and 
established the fact that there are two different kinds of criteria 
of identity as applied to the two different cases.
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also ascribed to persons despite such obvious changes. We have seen that 
this problem of how to ascribe sameness to things which are subject 
to change is a pseudo problem being based on the mistaken assumption 
that the ideas of sameness and change are incompatible. This very 
likely fact that this mistaken assumption might have largely inspired 
Butler to make the distinction seems to have escaped the notice of 
Chisholm who saw «an element of truth” in Butler»s distinction.2^
However the assumption is mistaken and the distinction would be ill- 
founded in as much as it was based on this assumption. Therefore the 
"element of truth" has to £ be found out in some other, more serious 
factor. For I think that the distinction Butler pointed to is substan­
tially correct though the reason he may seem to have given for this 
distinction is mistaken. As Chisholm saw it and as Butler expressed it, 
the distinction is due to the fact that the identity ascribed to 
material things is often a matter of words (Butler) or a matter only 
of decision(Chisholm) whereas personal identity can never be a matter of 
decision, and any attempt to make it a matter of decision in any otherwise 
compelling circumstances can succeed only at the cost of making a signi­
ficant change in the concept of a person.
This way of putting the distinction is less misguided and more 
helpful in understanding the peculiarity of personal identity. We have 
just suggested that material objects' constantly changing is no reason 
for saying that their identity is to be described as «loose and popular”, 
nor, for that reason, will it be a matter of decision.For if this were the 
reason then even personal identity would not escape this charge(See. S6c.i )
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What then, is the reason for the distinction and what is the reason for our 
thinking that the distinction is substantially correct? To this purpose 
let us travel along the path which Ch_isholm takes since, I hope, this 
would show us the reason.
Ch'isholm explains this distinction by means of his example of the 
U.S.S. South Dakota - which is but a different version of the well-known 
case of the '‘Ship of Theseus". It is supposed to be a ship whose wooden 
planks are replaced, one at a time, by aluminium ones so that one day it 
becomes totally made of aluminium. We would still call it the same ship - 
the U.S.S. South Dakota. But we are also asked to imagine that all the 
original wooden planks, without any alteration or damage to them, are 
simultaneously being reassembled into another ship. Now the question isi 
which of the two ships, the wooden one or the aluminium one, is the U.S.S 
¡south Dakota? For the 'continuity of form' criterion demands that it is the 
aluminium one, while the 'identity of parts' criterion demands that it 
should be the wooden one, because "after all, it is made up of the very
same parts, standing in the very same relations There is, strictly
25speaking, nothing to choose between the two criteria of identity here 
(see note 25 now). Hence, Chisholm argues, the question is not; v/hich of 
the two is the same ship?, but, which of the two is to be counted as the 
same ship?, and this is a question to be decided by a court of law or by 
the appropriate authority by deciding upon an answer. But although it 
would not be very unnatural whatever decision is taken, yet any decision 
they take would be fairly "defeasible" and can be quite naturally 
challenged and superseded by another decision by a superior court or 
authority. By contrast, when we say that a later person is the same as 
an earlier person, Chisholm says we do not do it by any decision. In 
this sense, he says, the criteria of.ship-identity is "a matter only of 
convention" and this is not true of personal identity. But it may well
be asked, why can't this be true of personal identity? Let us imagine
a somewhat analogous change to happen to a person. Suppose a person
A, is found one day to have undergone serious and total change of memory,
character and personality. The A-body person (the person who now speaks
from the body that, prior to the change, was A's) is found to possess all
the opposite characteristics from what A used to have. He is found
further to make memory claims which, when checked, do not at all tally
with what A had been doing so far. Is this person the same person as A
or a different person? We will not know what to say; the 'continuity of
memory' criterion demands that he must be a different person, whereas the
'bodily identity' criterion demands that he is not a different person.
And here again there seems to be nothing to choose between the two
criteria. But we will have to say something - whether or not he is the
same person as the earlier. And whatever we say, will it not amount to
our adopting, without sufficient reason, one criterion to the total
exclusion of the other? Hence, will it not then be a matter of decision
and does it not make the criterion of personal identity equally a matter
only of convention? The defence of Ch::isholm's view comes not from
Chisholm himself - not from him explicity - but from Shoemaker in his
26"comments" on Chisholm's paper. After attacking Ch.isholm on the same 
score - though on a slightly different ground,Shoemaker points out 
that when we adopt a convention in calling one of these ships the same as 
the original, we do not change the meaning of "ship" significantly. As 
he rightly argues, "it would not be natural to say that British judges 
mean something different by 'ship' from what the American judges mean 
simply because,what is imaginable, British Courts rule that the wooden
ship is the U.S.S. South Dakota while the American Courts rule that the
28Aluminium ship is the U.S.S. South Dakota." And he substantially agrees 
with Cb isholm's intentions that there would be a significant change in
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the meaning of "person" if we adopt the convention of calling him the 
same person only by virtue of his having the same body or, alternatively, 
if we decide to say that he is a different person only by virtue of his 
having different memories and character, for in the former case what, in 
effect, we would be judging to be the same is a continuing body - which is 
tantamount to saying that a person is a mere body; and in the latter case 
what we would be judging to be different (non-identical) is something not 
- at least not essentially - bodily since it is judged to be different 
despite the observed spatio-temporal continuity of the body - and this is 
tantamount to saying that a person is something not essentially bodily.* 
Thus, by taking the decision one way or the other we would be subscribing 
either to a materialistic concept of a person or to a cartesian concept.
In either case we would be making a significant change in the meaning 
of "person". For the normal concept of a person is that to which both a 
set of M .predicates and a set of P-predicates (of Strawson) are ascribed. 
We get to know the meaning of "person" by being shown things (or beings) 
who have both the characteristics, who shake hands with us and greet us - 
by being told not only that they are tall or short, fat or slim, but 
also that they are intelligent or dull, thoughtful or unthinking. These 
two sorts of characteristics - physical and psychological - are each 
essential but,neither is sufficient to the concept of a person. This 
fact about the nature of the concept of a person led Shoemaker rightly 
to say that "the concept of a person is to a considerable extent defined 
or constituted by the criteria of personal identity .... and any attempt
*The materialists and the Cartesian mentalists, who obviously mean 
different by the concept of a person, tend unsurprisingly to adhere to 
opposing”criteria of personal identity.
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to make a substantial change in the criteria (by deciding to adopt one
criterion to the total exclusion of the other^as we saw, FKM) is likely
to succeed only in changing the meaning of the word person i.e. making
it express a different concept from what it does now"* ’'The suggestion
is that the criteria of personal identity are much more central to the
concept of a person than are the criteria of ship-identity to the
29concept of a ship".
The suggestion seems reasonable enough and the ground on which the 
suggestion is based seems equally reasonable. It is significant that this 
ground is peculiar to the case of persons and personal identity and that it 
cannot be generalised. In other words, not every concept is determined by 
the criteria for its identity. For not every word would express a 
different concept if we adopt a diffemt criterion of identity. For as 
suggested by Ch isholm and shown by Shoemaker we will mean little 
different by "ship" if we adopt the one criterion or the other of "same 
ship" by taking as we must in the case described, a decision. This is 
largely true of material things. But we saw by analysing the concept of 
a person that a decision in favour of one criterion to the exclusion of 
the other would make a significant change in the concept of a person. 
Wiggins said "it is the sole peculiarity of persons that it is more than 
usually odd to call it a decision of ours to employ this sortal?^
The oddity is due not only to the fact, just noted, that the criteria of 
personal identity are more central to the concept of a person, but also 
to the fact noted earlier, that persons are self-knowers. Let us see how. 
With a view to making Ch isholm's case plausible, I imagined a case where 
a person undergoes serious changes. In that case, I tried to show that 
since there would seem to be nothing to choose between the two competing 
criteria, of bodily continuity and continuity of memory and character, 
each pointing in opposite directions, application (or otherwise) of
sameness in that case would appear to be equally a matter of decision.
But the appearance is deceptive, for although we may be persuaded to think 
that taking a decision is the only resort yet there is a sense in which 
we could be wrong about our decision. For there would be at least one 
person who can supply a good reason to prove us wrong; it is the person 
himself whose identity is in question. Since he is a person and hence 
q self-knower and can have the most direct (non-criterial) knowledge of 
who he is, our decisions are of no use to him. For him the question of 
his identity is not "a question of words" in any s e n s e . O n  the contrary 
whatever decision we take it has always a danger of being wrong by a shrug 
of his shoulder. But once again, if this is true of him because he is a 
person and hence a self-knower, it is also true of all of us as we are 
also persons and each of us has this "privileged access" to our own selves 
(But see Appendix 1). Thus it is because of the concept of a person, the 
fact that to be persons is to be self-knowers>that it is odd to say that 
the criteria of personal identity is a matter of decision. This also adds 
to the ground for saying that the concept of a person is more intimately 
connected to the criteria of personal identity.
Of course by claiming that persons are self-knowers it is not denied 
that people could be sometimes unsure of,even wrong aboutjtheir own 
identity^ but what is important is that they can be, and generally are, 
right about it. It is this fact that people can make identity-judgments 
about themselves and are in a position to make them without using any 
criteria and without needing any justification of their judgments, and 
further that they can be,and generally are,right about them, which cons­
titutes an important difference between the identity of persons and that 
of other material things, and accounts for there being a special problem 
about the former.
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Chapter 2
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Prologue
So far I have exposed the nature of the problem of personal 
identity and proposed to discuss the problem in its aspect of reidentity 
or diachronous • identity of persons. An important outcome of our discussion 
of the problem - especially in the first section of the previous chapter - 
has been that the problem involves two distinct questions. To owe a formul­
ation of Professor Swinburne,(See his 'Personal identity' PAS 1974)» the 
first question isiwhat does it mean to say that a person Pg at time tg 
is the same person as the person at time t^ ?( I shall refer to this 
as the "meaning - question"); and the second question is*'what evidence 
can we have that a person Pg at time tg is the same person as the person
p at time t. ? (to be referred to as the "criterion - question" ). Anyone — 1
asking the first question will be satisfied only by being provided with 
a definition of personal identity. But someone asking the second question 
need not look for a strict definition, and will be satisfied with the 
criteria for determining the sameness of persons at different times. An 
answer to the first question - if one could be found at all - would, of course, 
answer the second, since the defining feature(s) of x will provide the 
most satisfactory criterion (criteria) of x - occurrence; the x reverse, 
though, is not true. But, as I have shown in the previous chapter, no 
satisfactory non-trivial definition of personal identity can be possible
and, for this reason, it has been suggested, any attempt at defining
♦ TTny what is required, I maintain, is not just any evidence, butonly 
what are the criteria! evidences of personal identity.
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personal identity will not be on the right lines towards a solution 
of the problem at stake. I have therefore emphasised that our problem 
properly is one about the k criteria of personal identity; and while 
the problem must be thus understood the specification of the requisite 
criteria need not, and will not, be affected by the unavailability or 
impossibility, of a definition of personal identity.
Now, although the two questions noted above are thus distinct
and the understanding of their distinction thus important, this has
not been often realised. As I shall show in this chapter, most traditional
theorists (some contemporary writers not excluded) have not merely made
no clear distinction between the two questions but, taking the problem
as one of meaning, some of them have tried to define personal identity
in terms of what can only be a criterion thereof. In fact, it seems to
me that this feature ( of non-distinction of theMmeaning-question" and
the "criterion-question " and taking the problem in the sense of the
former)constitutes a distinctive mark ±ofthe problem. I cannot pretend,
of course, that this feature is entirely absent in contemporary writings
on the subject, but I do hope to bring out in the subsequent chapter*
that the tendency there is largely to keep the questions apart, though
I shall also contend that this tendency did not obtain full possession
of the minds of all contemporary writers. Meanwhile my concern in the
present chapter will be to analyse some important traditional answers
to bring out the described weakness inthem. And I shall show in the
process that taking the probslem in the sense of the "meaning - question"
are
inevitably leads to solutions that sxa either mystical or otherwise 
strange. My analysis of these theories will also help to unearth the basic 
philosophical assumptions of the respective philosophers that led to the 
peculiar solutions they gave to the problems.
Section (i) Locke and Hume: the memory theorists
The first philosopher ever to have realised the importance of the 
problem of personal identity and to have given a systematic account of it 
vas John Locke. His treatment of the problem occupies the 27th chapter 
of Book II of his Essay. He seems to have thought a theory of personal 
identity to be of importance for the purpose of moral accountability. For 
him person is a "forensic" term (26)* and personal identity is the founda­
tion of "all the rights and justice of reward and punishment"(l8). It is 
of course obvious to any theory of justice and moral accountability that 
no person should be punished (or rewarded) for what another person did 
and that reward and punishment should go to the person w’ho did the actior 
in question. Some even have claimed that it is logically impossible to 
punish someone for something he did not do - though you may inflict pain 
in himf And so it is imperative on such theories to establish that the 
person who is going to be punished or rewarded for a certain action is 
the same person who did the action. But although something like a "foren­
sic" consideration might have made Locke realise the importance of the 
problem of personal identity, he seems to have gone far beyond the problem 
of establishing who is who to the much deeper problem of the meaning of 
personal identity. His concern seems to be not simply, what evidences we 
can have (or how do we know) that a later person is the same person as an 
earlier person, but, what makes the later person the same person as the
¿Bracketed numerals throughout this section refer to the sections in 
Chapter 27 of Bk II of Locke's Essay.
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earlier person. The identity of a person may be established on evidences; 
but it would be absurd to say that these evidences make a person the same 
person, as an earlier person or that they constitute the meaning of "same 
person" (our discussions inthe;first section of the last chapter has 
made this considerably clear; and more will be said on this in Ch 4 sec 
(i).) And whereas the availability of relevant evidences may solve the
"forensic" problem, it cannot solve the problem of the meaning of personal 
identity.
That Locke was concerned with the meaning of personal identity would 
be fairly clear from a careful reading of his chapter on "Identity and 
Diversity"2. It was noted in the last chapter (section i) that "identity" 
is an incomplete term which needs to be conjoined with a substantive in 
order to be applied. And what would be the nature of identity, and how it 
would be determined, depends largely on the nature of the substantive 
concept to which it is applied. Once again, Locke was first to realise 
this vital point and to insist that "such as is the idea .... such must be 
the identity" (see esp (7)). Accordingly, and very justly, Locke’s account 
of personal identity was based on his notion.of a person. Sy: "a person" 
he means "a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and 
can,-consider itself as. Itself, on the same thlnkjn^ thine. In different- 
times and ¿laces".3 The first part of this quotation (not emphasised) 
constitutes Locke’s definition of a person and the rest (under emphasis) 
gives his notion of personal identity, which he in other words describes as 
the "sameness of a rational being". A rational being can consider "itself 
as itself in different times and places" - can know of Its identity 
through time, says Locke, "only by means of that consciousness which is 
inseparable from thinking and essential to it"(9). And not only that a 
person knows his identity by means of what Locke calls "consciousness" ' 
but also that "in this (consciousness, Pm) alone consists personal
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identity” (9» emphasis mine). It seems clear from what has just "been said 
above that Locke, like Reid and Butler (vide Chapter 1 sec ii), takes 
self-identity as the paradigm case of personal identity, but unlike them, 
he takes ••consciousness” as constituting personal identity. Unfortunately, 
however, Locke’s use of the word ’’consciousness” is not unambiguous, and 
there are at least two different senses in which it can be taken. At 
some places, Locke used «consciousness” in such a way that it may easily 
be taken as ’'self-consciousness", e.g."a being... that can consider itself 
as itself .... does so by that consciousness which is inseparable from 
thinking."(my emphasis). This is how Flew quoted^ Locke to show the same 
point; and thus quoted Locke certainly seems to have used "consciousness” 
in the sense of self~ -consciousness. But here a phrase is missing from this 
quotation which I think is very significant for the problem of personal 
identity, which I have^aken to be that of reidentification (see j the *■ -
abstract:,'»); and that missing phrase is: "in different times".With this 
phrase inserted, as it originally was, after the phrase under emphasis, 
"consciousness" would mean - partly at least - memory.For what sort of 
consciousness it is - if not remembering one’s earlier selves - by which 
one considers oneself as oneself at different times ? However, I will 
not dispute the claim that the above sense (of self-consciousness) can 
be read into Locke’s use of ’consciousness’ at some places; as a matter 
of fact there are clearer evidences(and happier passages) to show that 
e.g. "consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that that 
makes everyone to be what he calls ’self' and thereby distinguishing 
himself from all other thinking beings". (9)» But what seems to me to 
be more plausible is that when taken in this sense "consciousness” can 
serve Locke at best as giving a part of the meaning of "persons", but 
can never be of any help or relevance to that of personal identity - 
unless it involves or means "memory" in some way. And j suggest
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that this was Locke's intention when he claimed that consciousness makes 
personal identity. This .. is evident from: "as far as this consciousness 
ft».n be extended backwards to any past action or thought so far reaches 
the identity of that person" (9»emphasis mine), and from "it (consciousness, 
FKM) is but a present representation of a past action" (23) and more 
explicitly from "could we suppose any spirit wholly stripped of all
its memory or consciousness of past actions......... "(2 5>emphasis mine).
But we have seen that memory, as it concerns personal identity, is only 
a criterion of personal identity and could not serve as (even) a necessary 
conditions for it. Yet to Locke, it was not merely something that 
established the accross - time identity of persons but something that 
entails that identity - something in which personal identity consists.
In his famous prince/cobbler case (15)» Locke says, for example, "should 
the soul of a prince carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's
past action, enter and inform the body of a cobbler....... he would
he the same person with the prince"(emphasis added). Thus it is that, 
for Locke, what is important in making the cobbler - body - person the 
same as the prince is the memory ("consciousness of the prince's past 
life" ) of the prince - his soul being not enough, presumably because 
Locke was not quite convinced about its nature and existence, (cf 10)
Locke followed this principle to whatever strange consequences it led 
him to go. He was, for example, prepared to say that "if Socretes and 
the present Mayor of Queensborough agree ( in respect of consciousness, 
PKM)» they are the same person" and even that "if the same Secretes 
waking and sleeping do not partake the same consciousness, Socretes 
waking and sleeping is not the same person" and what is still worse,
"to punish Socretes waking for what sleeping Socretes thought, and waking 
Socretes was never conscious of, would be no more of right than to punish
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one twin for what the brother twin did" (1$>) These consequences are 
strange ( and Locke himself is found to be struck by the strangeness 
of his consequences), but inevitable if one is to hold, like Locke did, 
that the identity of a person must follow the destination of his memory 
and other mental characteristics.
We noted in the beginning that Locke emphasised the importance of 
a theory of personal identity so that rewards and punishments may go to 
the right persons? presumably this was one of the motives for Locke's 
analysing personal identity in terms of consciousness or memory. For 
usually, consciousness of having done the action is an important ground 
for ascribing responsibility to a person - thereby implying that this 
person is the same person as the one who committed the crime. But (what 
seems to be) Locke's mistake was to overlook the fact that this is 
neither the only means of establishing the identity of a person nor 
is the only ground for ascribing responsibility. On the contrary, we are 
often prepared to take up responsibility for many of our forgotten deeds, 
if we could be made to believe that we did do these. And 1 where consci­
ousness of guilt is the sole ground for ascr^Sn-g responsibility it 
does not follow that it makes the same person or that the lack of it 
makes a person numerically different. Locke, who seems to be convinced 
that consciousness makes the same person (and conversely), invokes the 
example of human laws which do not punish the mad man for the sober man's 
actions and the sober man for what the mad man did (20) to argue that 
these laws (and by implication, lack of consciousness or memory) make 
them two different persons. But this is utterly absurd. For in the first 
place these laws can at best be said to treat them as two persons, but 
not to make them two persons. Secondly, we do not mean two different 
things by the pronoun "the" when we say that he committed the crime, but
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that he should not "be punished now since he is completely mad. And it 
can never be disputed that our reference here is to the one and the 
same person who committed the crime and who, on extraneous grounds, 
is pleaded to be exonerated. Moreover, what one can plausibly argue here 
is that what this example proves - if it does prove anything - is that 
it is not the person as such but the person with a particular 
and chax^ t £g that is the recipient of rewards or punishments. And pace 
Locke, instead of "person" being a forensic concept, "personality" and 
"character" should be more plausibly so.
The weakness of Locke's theory that consciousness makes personal 
identity became conveniently obvious to post-Lockean critics. First there 
is the famous objection of Butler5 that consciousness presupposes personal 
identity and therefore cannot be said to constitute it, without begging 
the question. To say that one is conscious of some past action (that is 
what we have seen Locke's use of "consciousness" to mean as relevant to 
personal identity) is to presuppose that one is the person who both did 
the action and who is now remembering the doing of it. But it is this 
very identity of oneself with the person who did the action that is in 
question, and which consciousness is supposed to constitute* If consci­
ousness or memory is taken in the strong sense, there seems to be no 
escape from Butler's objection. If, on the other hand, it is taken in 
the weak sense of apparent memory (viz, honest but false memory and which 
currently is described as q-memory*), the charge may be avoided» but then 
Locke's definition of personal identity would run into the difficulty of 
allowing not only that the victim of what is called paramnesia is the
* When it does not mean what is called genuine q-memorv. But t.h-ta "i aa+ ~~ 
being q-remembering one's own experiences would be indistinguishable* 
from memory in the strong sense, and hence cannot escape Butler's objection
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same person whose actions he putatively remembers, but also that two 
(or more) contemporaneous persons claiming to remember what a third, 
long since dead,person did would be identical with the latter without, 
lor well known reasons, being identical with each other. 6 Locke is aeen 
to be perplexed by the puzizling consequences issuing from the extreme 
openness of «memory«. Yet unwilling to give up memory as the defining 
feature of personal identity he was reduced to appealing to the goodness 
of God to prevent such untowaxdness from occurring $ cf 13 ), Secondly, 
besides difficulties of this type there is the other difficulty arising 
out of the possibility of amnesia or loss of memory. This is expressed 
by the well known case of the gallant officer7 who was flogged at school, 
took the enemys standard as a young officer and was later on made a 
general. It is conceivable that the officer who took the standard remen^ 
bared, at the time of taking the standard, having been flogged, but that 
the general did not remember the flogging though he did remember having 
taken the enemy's standard. By the logic of transitivity of identity, if 
the officer who took the standard is the same person as the school boy 
and if the general is the same person as the young officer (each pair 
must be identical on Locke's definition), then the general must be the 
same person as the school boy. Yet, on Locke's very same definition, the 
general cannot be the same person as the boy since his consciousness is 
not "extended backwards" to what had happened to the boy. This is 
another inescapable predicament that faces a theory which tries to
S H & S l  personal identity in terms of memory or what Lock^tht continuity
of consciousness (but see note 8).
It is interesting to note that being eager,as he was,to define 
personal identity Locke defined it is terms of memory which is but one of 
the criteria of personal identity, the criterion of bodily identity and
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even the quite general fact that persons have bodies were treated by 
him at best as contingent matters of fact. As the foregoing consider­
ations would explain, being persuaded to think of persons as essentially 
nonr-physical things, Locke remained a memory theorist in his account of 
personal identity - the latter being the logical outcome of his concept
of a person.
Hume, likewise, remains a memory theorist, though not on the same
ground. For he did not think that there is anything really to be defined,
or even described, as personal identity. After having reasoned that
everything that lasts beyond a moment is only a "bundle or collection" of
rapidly changing perceptions he concluded that the identity that we
ascribe to persons ( and to other things) is only "a fictitious one".^
That is, he was led to this position on the ground that there can be
nothing permanent in a person to account for his unity and identity.
This is brought out by attacking the notion of self. Hume argues that
if every idea has to come from an impression then there can be no idea of
the self(and hence of person). For, in the first place, there can be
no impression for the idea of the self to be derived from; since it is
that to which all our impressions are supposed to refer. Secondly, there
could be no such impression which is constant and invariable, and yet
1 o"the self is supposed to exist after that manner " From this Hume 
concludes that there can be no permanent self to continue the same so as 
to account for the unity of the mind.
Now there are two facets of Hume's argument which I will consider 
before proceeding further. For it seems to me that in both cases the 
premiss does not warrant its purported conclusion. The two facets of the 
argument are*
(1) Our impressions of objects are different at different momentsj
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so no object of one moment can be the same aa an object at 
another moment.
(2) Every Idea is derived from some impression* so as is the nature 
of the impression, so must be the nature of the object of which
the idea is an idea (whence it was supposed to follow that,
since no impression can be constant and invariable, nothing can
be constant or permanent).
As regards (1), it can be said that my impressions of a table at 
different moments may be different* but it would be absurd on this 
ground to say that the table, which my impressions and idea are 'of',is a 
different table at those different moments. And regarding (2), it can be 
said that there cannot be any impression, and hence any idea, of the 
whole worldin the sense that no one can form such an impression* but 
from this it does not follow that there is no such thing as the whole 
world. The error in these ways of reasoning lies in the fact that it is 
generally wrong to deduce anything about the nature of things from the 
nature of the impressions from which the ideas of the objects may be 
derived. The impressions which I have of my writing table may not be 
continuous and may be interrupted by some other impressions and ideas.
But does it make my writing table discontinuous and numerically different ? 
yet a psychology somewhat of this sort seems to be at work behind Hume's 
theory.
Another characteristic element of Hume's thought,which makes him 
a memory theorist,was his enormous reliance on the application of the 
«inner test«. «When I enter most intimately into what I caid myself I 
always stumble on some perception or other I never can catch myself at 
any time without a perception and never can observe anything hut percep­
tions«. 1 1 As the inner test never revealed to him anything permanent but
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only -the fleeting perceptions In him, he concluded that there was nothing 
permanent In him. M s  In turn led him to describe man (he meant nothing 
different ly "men" and "person") as a "bundle of different perceptions". 
Jtad what puzaled him was the fact that our understanding never perceltes >• 
any real connection between these different perceptions. Consequently, he
a rg a e '1 thst is nothing really belonging to these perceptions
and uniting them together into a single self or person, but that it Is 
merely a quality we attribute to them. If however, we are to talk of "same 
person", presumably for moral and practical purposes, the only criterion 
we could use Is memory. For "as memory alone acquaints us with the 
continuance and existence of this succession of perceptions it Is to be 
considered as the source of personal identity”^,
I have tried to show that the lack of any permanent Impression does
not show that nothing permanent could be there? and if I am right this 
would also weaken Hume’s dismissal of a permanent self and the consequent 
denial of personal identity. But some have also argued that Hume’s inner 
test did enable him to observe his self, or else it did not show him 
anything - not even the fact that the stumbled only upon his perceptions. 
Chisholm  ^ has argued that when Hume "stumbled'’ upon different percep­
tions, it is implied that he found himself stumbling upon these percep­
tions, and hence that it would be self-stultifying for Hume to say that 
he did not find himself. Although this sort of consideration, in a 
sense, guarantees the knowledge of oneself(in the sense in which we have 
said, see Ch 1 sec ii, that persons are self-knowers), yet one feels 
uneasy by Chisholm’s purported claim that when we know, e.g. that we 
are thinking, we know our selves to be thinking. Whatever persuasive force 
this argument may seem to have, it is utterly mistaken. It looks persuasive 
because no one could certainly deny that when he knows that he is
9
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watching cricket he also knows that he is watching cricket. Yet the 
argument seems to be mistaken for at least two reasons. Firstly, the 
alleged knowledge-claim of oneself in such cases is entirely vacuous,since 
what is known here is simpljr my watching cricket, and it will be very 
odd indeed to say that in knowing this I know two things - that I know 
the »1» in me and know that "it" is watching cricket. Secondly, the 
argument makes a fundamental confusion* between the technical sense 
of »self» in which it means a permanent substantive, immaterial something 
(which, allegedly, accounts for the unity and across- time identity of 
persons), and the ordinary sense of the word in which it is usually 
prefixed by possessive adjectives (like myself, yourself etc) and in 
which it does not have any such implication as the above. When Hume 'Or 
anyone like him denies the knowledge of himself, he is using "self" in the 
former sense and this denial is perfectly compatible with his assertion 
that he knows that he is (or that he knows himself to be) watching cricket 
or »stumbling on some perception», since the «self» in this assertion is 
used in the ordinary non-technical sense; and familiarity and naturalness 
of these ordinary assertions will not affect Hume's arguments against the 
existence of the self or soul.
However, I do not think that the knowledge of the self in the 
technical sense is necessary to explain personal identity, nor will its 
denial entail the unreality of personal identity. For if the self waa 
thought to meet the requirement of »something unchanged» to account for 
the unity and identity of persons, then we have already seen(see Ch 1 sec i) 
that it is a spurious concept; because the idea which generated a false 
need for such a concept - namely the idea that sameness and change are 
incompatible - has been shown to be mistaken. And in so far as Hume fell 
victim to this mistaken idea he was wrong and his denial of real( as opposed
* The spirit of this argument was suggested to me by Professor Swinburne.
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to 'fictitious) identity to persons, based as It was on this mistaken 
idea was misguided.
However, as we have seen, despite his theoretical position, Hume 
was willing to consider, for moral and practical purposes, the nature of 
personal identity. But whatever he had to say on this was vitiated by 
his insistence on the use of the «inner criteria«. This has led him to 
give a very unrealistic account of personal identity? for he is seen to 
ask and consider the question only about his own identity and never seems 
to be concerned with the identity of others besides himself - though it 
would hardly be disputed that the problem, as encountered in real life, 
is generally about the latter.* This limitation of Hume had two conse­
quences which contributed towards the weakness of his theory of personal 
identity. First this limitation made Hume’s account of personal identity 
uninteresting. Secondly, it was at least one of the reasons why he 
totally ignored the bodily considerations in his account of personal 
identity and became some-what of a dogmatic memory thererist. To take the 
second point first, while considering the question of one's own identity 
nothing necessarily bodily comes to the picture and all one considers is 
what actions one remembers to have performed or what experiences one 
remembers to have had in the past. Since memory thus gives us the sense 
of our identity, bodily considerations tend to be ignored and seem to be 
inessential. But this is a gross over-simplification. For when you are 
considering whether you are the same person who did such-and-such things 
yesterday, you are not only concerned with your memory and inner percept­
ion, you are also referring to your doing such-and-such, and this has an 
essential reference to your body which therefore has a role to play -
♦ This has been argued fully in Ch 1 sec 1 (see pp 7~ 8 aboveJ
however unimportant you may prove the last to be. Further, there may 
be possible situations when one may doubt who one is, and in such cases 
one has to depend on what others say. But what others will say depends, 
pre-eminently, on their judgments about one’s bodily continuity (since 
one’s memory now is put to question, even for oneself) and this is just 
what is missing in Hume’s account of personal identity. Being solely 
limited to his own identity and its inner tests, Hume is not only un­
concerned with other persons and their identity, but is in a way ruling 
out the logical possibility of their being there at all. For if there 
are othrs, Hume, by ignoring the bodily continuity criterion and insis­
ting upon the inner criterion, has no means of identifying them. But then 
and this brings us to the first consequence mentioned above - this makes 
one’s own identity pointless. As Pears pointed out1^  self - identity 
must go side by side with other-identity. Had there been no possibility 
of there being other persons, the question of one’s own identity would 
not arise,"for there would be ?! nobody for me not to be"^ Consequently 
the account of personal identity would be uninteresting.
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Section (ii) Butler and Reid: the intuitionists
The Lockean-Humean theory of personal identity had two lessons for
posteriority. The first, which was a positive lesson, was that it had
emphasised the fact that the consideration of memory is immensely important
to a theory of personal identity. But the second lesson, a negative or
indirect one, was that it revealed - by its failure - the important fact
that memory cannot be said to constitute personal identity, that it cannot
make a person the same person as an earlier person. In other words, the
limitations of their theories made it clear that personal identity cannot be
defined in terms of the continuity of memory or consciousness. These factors
are reflected in the writings of Bishop Butler and Thomas Reid on this
subject.^ Both these philosophers wrote almost during the same period and
both seem to have reacted to the Lockean-Humean theory in similar ways,
which perhaps, is why their views on the subject remains largely the same.
Both have taken memory as the most reliable evidence (Reid calls it*'the
most irresistible evidence” Ibid P205) of personal identity and both have
2claimed that personal identity cannot be defined at_ all much less in terms 
of memory. And what is something both seem to be particularly critical 
about is the theory, mostly due to Hume, that we are, at every different 
moment, a different person and so cannot be really the same at different 
times. Although Locke does not explicitly profess such a Humean theory, 
Butler and Reid argued that he is committed to it by making provisions for 
it. Butler can be seen to be making this point when he says that a person 
cannot really be the same at different times if, as the Lockean says, the 
consciousness in which personal identity consists is not the same indiv­
idual act of consciousness at different times.^ And it is not difficult 
to see that Reid would attribute such a theory to Locke, though in a more 
Por Locke allows the possibility that the substance thatindirect way.
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thinks in a person may be different at different times, 4 and for the 
sake of consistency, Locke must admit that a substance and a permson 
are the same in so far as each is defined by him to be "thinking thing"5.
Reid's critical attitude towards such a Humean theory, which in 
effect claims that the identity we ascribe to persons is only a fictitious 
identity, is given vent to , right at the beginning of his account of 
personal identity. For he starts by sayingj"the conviction which every 
man has of his identity... needs no philosophy to strength it, and no 
philosophy can weaken it without first producing some degree of insanity"? 
And Butler's simile reactions to the theory in question is expressed in 
his claim7 that "this notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain 
conviction which necessarily and every moment rises within us..,," we
i
shall In due corns, come to see that their reliance on this "conviction» 
that Is supposed to acquaint us with our identity makes them memory 
theorists with a difference. For although they take memory as the most 
reliable evidence of personal identity, they hold that the latter is some­
thing "simple and unanalysable" and that its real nature can he known only 
by means of some sort of non-sensuous in-tuition.
Butler's desertation on personal identity arose, partly at least, 
out of his criticism of Locke. Like Locke, he gave consciousness or memory 
the prime importance in his account of personal identity. He was rather 
justly of the opinion that consciousness or memory of our past actions 
and experiences gives us the very sense of our identity through time and 
assures of our identity - at least with the earlier persons who did the act­
ions and had the experiences in question.For my remembering that I did such 
and such a thing in the past carries with it the conviction that I am the 
same person as the earlier person who did that thing, and in an important 
presupposes this identity.This logical connection, which memory is said
to have with personal identity, is an undeniable fact in all standard cases 
where memory is taken in the sense of "real" memory, and this, if anything, 
is the rationale of our inclination to use memory as a criterion of 
personal identity. But if this is so, Butler argued, then it would be 
absurd to claim that personal identity consists in memory or can be defined 
in terms of it. In its familiar formulation, Butler's objection is 
expressed by saying that consciousness, or memory in the relevant sense, 
presupposes personal identity and therefore cannot constitute it. We have 
seen (sec i) the effect of this criticism on Locke's theory and something 
more will be said on this aspect of the criticism later on. What now needs 
mention is the fact that Butler's objection ha3 another aspect which has 
been given rather insufficient attention than what it deserves - though I 
think this is more effective against Locke than the other, familiar, point 
of the objection. To bring this out, I will quote the objection fully:
"But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our 
personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal 
identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say 
that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action
I
but what he can remember: indeed none but what he can reflect upon.
And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of 
personal identity presupposes and therefore cannot constitute 
personal identity; anf more than knowledge, in any other case, can 
constitute truth which it presupposes".
(Analogy p329, my emphasis)
It is easily seen that Butler's first point as expressed in the first 
sentence above, makes the Lockean theory more palpably absurd. For we 
forget many things and many memories of our own doings are buried in eternal 
forgetfulness; and on Locke’s theory we will not be the same persons as the 
persons who did these latter things. If the definiens is absent the
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definiendum must be absent as well. Further, this criticism of Butler
shows net only the Impossibility of defining personal identity in terms
of memory, but even of the latter being a necessary condition of the 
former,
Now, back to the familiar point of Butler’s objection. We have 
already seen in the previous section that Locke has no easy escape from 
this. However the efficacy of this objection has been questioned by some 
recently. Palma, 8 for example, complained, first, that Butler’s use of 
•fconsciousness”, particularly his use of "consciousness of personal identity", 
is ambiguous, and secondly, that if it is taken, as it usually has been, 
in the sense of memory then it fails to bite, since there cannot be any 
"memory" of personal identity in the strict sense. I shall say that the 
first point in this criticism, though not entirely without a ground, is 
trivial and ill-founded. For although Butler’s use of the phrase 
"consciousness of personal identity" is slightly odd, and misleading, his 
use of "consciousness of what is past" in the preceding sentence and else­
where should be enough to make that up and to make it clear that by 
"consciousness” he means memory. Moreover, we have seen while considering 
Locke that the only kind of consciousness that is relevant to an account 
of personal identity is that kind which is memory - the other kinds of 
consciousness, like self-consciousness (where it is not memory) or cons­
ciousness of something present, though of peripheral interest, are not as 
relevant as memory. Palma’s second point lays down a sound philosophical 
principle; but the principle has now use in the case in question. The 
principle is that nothing present can be properly said to be "remembered",^ 
and hence that personal identity, which is a present attribution on the 
basis of the present representation of somethings past, cannot be remembered. 
It is certainly absurd to say that I remember that I (myself at the present 
moment) am the same person who did such-and-such things. But never is
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Butler committed to saying this. All he would be claiming is that if I 
remember doing such-and-such them I am the same person who did such-and- 
such. The "consciousness” which Butler claims to be presupposing the 
identity of the subject is this consciousness that he, the subject, did 
such and such. This is the spirit of Sutlers objection which, I think, 
is fairly clear from what he says - at least in the passage quoted above. 
The trouble with what I call the Palma-type* critics seems to be that 
they want to insist that if at all. Locke and Butler (or any one of them) 
can be said to mean memory by "consciousness" then they can be said to 
mean nothing else elsewhere by that term. But this is unduly to over­
look the important fact that consciousness has various forms and that a 
fair account of Locke's and Butler's views should be that only that form 
of consciousness which is called memory is relevant to, and is said to 
have the relevant logical connection with, personal identity. Saying this 
does not commit Butler and Locke to use consciousness only in the sense of 
memory and not in any other sense anywhere else. As we have seen earlier 
in the last section : : 0 - 6 ! , . v , "consciousness", even as Locke
used it, is not ambiguous between memory, self-consciousness, consciousness 
of something present and so on; it signifies a generic psychological 
state or function of which the latter are specific forms.
Now, on the constructive side of Butler's theory of personal iden­
tity, there is the well-known distinction between the two sense of
*3y this I mean roughly those who claimed that Locke did not and 
Butler cannot, mean memory by 'consciousness' and hence bv^ 
that Locke was not a memory-theorist and that Butler c o u l d ^ ^ 11 it°n* objection without absurdity. could not use M s
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identity. Like Locke and unlike Hume,* Butler believed that W e " ,  as 
applied to persons and to other things, is applied not only to different 
subjects but also in different senses. The sense in which sameness is 
ascribed to persons in what Butler called the «'strict and philosophic- 
sense and the sense in which other things are called the same is what he 
described as the "loose and popular- sense. We have noted before (see 
Ch1, sec ii above) that it is rather misleading to say that the distinc­
tion is between two different senses of identity and that what this 
distinction should, and does, point to is the fact that there are two
--£fe-rent- for the application of the word "same" or "identical-
in the two different contexts. We also observed that although Butler's 
distinction is substantially correct, yet the ground on which he seems 
to have made this distinction is mistaken. For in saying that the iden­
tity of the ordinary material things, like trees and ships, is identity in 
the -loose and popular- sense, Butler was surely reasoning like Hume and 
was thinking that whatever is subject to change cannot really be the same. 
He gives yet another proof of his falling prey to this dogma when he says 
"But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no mode of
being, no anything can be the same with which it has indeed nothing the 
10
same."* I have nothing more to add here as regards the significance of 
the distinction Butler made than what I have already said in Ch 1 sec ii 
namely that while the identity of the ordinary material things can be, and 
often are, a matter of decision the identity of persons cannot, without
*Hume too, it may be recalled, made a distine-K™ v«+ 
identity, i.e. between what he called " f i c t i t i t w o  sense of 
identity. But this, I will say, is little iden^ t y  and "real-
even though Hume made this distinction he neveithel^Qi^ thing»
tity is applied, if applied at all, in the same Ron0fl ?X imed that iden- 
fictitious, when it is applied to persons a7“well a s ' t o ^ t W + M ^  ,
Ch 1 sec ii above). Secondly, if Hume was right hir o other things (see 
identity has no application. For wherefrom dfrt ?ense real*
from an^ impression? And if, on Hume^s^own piinoiplf1^ ' idea» ^  *ot 
be derived from some impressions, then this S f’ 7, ldeas are to
unreal and so his distinction between »real» *?al identity is
cannot work. fictitious * identity
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producing some degree of absurdity, and without making some significant 
change in the concept of a person, be said to be a matter of decision, 
and that while there can be wrong or right answers with regard to the 
questions of personal identity there is often no such things in the other 
case - in some of these cases we can say whatever we like or whatever that 
suits certain pragmatic considerations, without making any significant 
change in the concept of the things in question ( .• pp u d o w ). But
while our reason for saying this is the peculiarity of the use of the 
concept "person", Butler's reason seems to have come from the idea of 
something »»intrinsic1' in the nature of persons w  .1' : . ' "cannot
Msubsist with diversity of substance". By this I take him to mean that
despite the changes in the observable features of a person - his physical
as well as his psychological features - there is some intrinsic substance
that always remains the same in him and accounts for his identity through
time. Like Reid, he complained ‘ that though Locke suggested this fact (in
his definition of person and substance) he did not assert this (because of
his insistence that the same person is not necessarily the same substance).
It is presumably the supposed presence of this substance cr self in a
person and the absence of anything like that in an ordinary material thing
that led Butler to make the distinction he made. Since such a self cannot
be known in the way other persons (selves) and things are known, the
standard explanation is that it is known in some special way. Butler's
suggestion is that it can be known by everyone by "turning our thoughts
13upon ourselves". That means that anyone who thinks that there is such 
a self in a person and that the identity of this makes the identity of the 
person is obliged to say that this self and its identity can be known, 
if at all, by some sort of non-sensuous intuition.j Now, granted that the 
knowledge of the self and of its identity can be had in this special sense, 
it cannot be claimed that this knowledge is our criterion of making
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personal identity judgments, for the self is not observable* in the sense 
required for it to be a criterion. Nor can we say that the identity of 
the self is what we mean by saying that a later person is the same person 
as an earlier person: whatever temptation we may have for saying this in 
our own case, we cannot justifiably say this while making identity judg­
ments about other persons. But then it would be absurd to say that we 
mean this even in our own case, for this would commit us to the greater 
absurdity of saying that we mean different thin*», when we say that/later 
person, is the ‘ same-.person as an earlier person, depending on whether or 
not the person in question is oneself. In the face of this difficulty the 
substance-theorists have the only recourse of saying that the self is 
something simple and unanalyzable and that personal identity, which 
according to them is the identity of the self, is also unanalyzable. If 
what is said in the foregoing is right then, since Butler and Reid wanted 
to maintain as against Locke that selves (persons) are substances, this 
might be one of their reasons for claiming that personal identity is 
indefinable. I am not sure that this was their reason, or even one of the 
reasons, for making the above claim. For one thing at least,that as noted 
before (Ch 1 sec ii), Reid maintained that identity in general - and hence 
not merely personal identity - is simple and indefinable, though neither 
he nor Butler would want to say that the identity of ordinary material 
things (which surely is included in "identity in general") is due to any­
thing permanent and substantive, (indeed, it is because of the lack of the 
latter that they described the identity of those things to be imperfect.) 
However, an interpretation on these lines seems to be quite plausible and 
is not entirely ruled out.
*Ibr a fuller arguement see Ch1 sec ii, see also last section pp&^above.
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On the basis of the presence and absence respectively of something 
permanent and unchanging both Butler and Reid had described the identity 
of persons as "real" and "perfect”, and the identity of other things as 
"imperfect" and as "something which for convenience of speech we call 
identity". This is the most unambiguous and most explicit point of 
their thesis, and as such is more vulnerable and less defensible. For 
it postulates that the problem of identity — at any rate, what they 
called real identity - is one of finding something unchanged to account 
for the identity of persons and other thingsj but this is to misconstrue 
the problem at issue since, as we have seen, nothing needs to be unchanged 
in order that anything may be (be called) the same. However, a somewhat 
less vulnerable explanation can be given, and has in fact been given,
It is that our knowledge of personal identity, obtainable as it is in 
knowing the nature of self-identity, can be non-criterial while our 
knowledge of the identity of other material things has to depend on 
criteria. It is criterion - independence, in the described sense, that 
was supposed by Reid and Butler to make personal identity • perfect 
identity'. And the fact that the identity of other persons, like the 
identity of other material things is criterion -dependent explains why 
the paradigm case of personal identity was thought to be self-identity, 
and not other people's identity. Nevertheless, the identity of ther 
persons was not, for that matter, considered to be imperfect. One reason 
at least for this, presumably, is that the meaning of personal identity, 
being comprehensible from one's own case, could not be reasonably altered 
in its application to the case of other persons. Even if we may have to 
depend on some criteria or evidences in order to know the identity of other 
persons, yet that was not supposed to interfere with the meaning of "same 
person; • As Reid says, But still it is true that same person is perfectly
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the same, and cannot he so in part, or in some degree only".Although
certain observable phenomena - remembering in particular and similitude
in general - were accepted as evidences or criteria for making identity
judgments about other persons, scrupulous care was taken not to confuse
these criteria with the meaning of personal identity. Reid, indeed,
accused Locke of making just this confusion by insisting that personal
16identity must consist in consciousness. This distinction between the 
evidences and the meaning of personal identity was no doubt a healthy 
sign; but the merit of this insight was overshadowed by an extreme 
abhorrence to criteria, which had the effect of leading the problem 
astray. For as we have seen (Ch 1 sec i), the problem of personal iden­
tity is largely a problem of specifying the criteria for the identity 
of persons, and the theories under discussion consider the existence 
and use of any criteria to be irrelevant and even detrimental to the 
nature of real identity.
It seems that in the theories of Butler and Reid, two factors were 
responsible for this abhorrence to criteria. First, intuitionism. Being 
persuaded to think that personal identity is something intrinsic and can 
be known only by one’s being conscious of or by "intuiting" one's identity 
with a past self, these philosophers reasoned that the standard knowledge 
of such identity must not, in principle, be mediated by criteria, and 
that where our knowledge of identity of something is thus mediated the 
identity of that thing must be declared as unreal. The second factor 
that might have led to this lack of concern for criteria is these 
philosophers' concern with the meaning of personal identity. Thus nothing is 
of any interest if it does not give the meaning of personal identity.
Although Butler and Reid would grant that the observable phenomena noted
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above are our criteria of personal identity, yet they were of little
concern* For these criteria cannot constitute1^ personal identity and
, 18cannot give the meaning of it. This is true and Locke was certainly 
wrong in trying to define personal identity in terms of an evidence 
thereof. But Reid and Butler were no less wrong in so far as they 
implied that since the evidences, being evidences, cannot define 
(constitute, express the meaning of ) personal identity they must be 
worthless and even detrimental to the nature of identity. And I suspect 
that both parties were equally wrong in taking the problem as one of 
definition and this mistake in the one case was aggravated by the 
further mistake of defining personal identity in terms of what was 
only an evidence, albeit a *x criterial evidence, for it while in the 
other case the mistake was supplemented by the further mistake of 
disregarding the relevance of criteria. This obsession with meaning 
and the consequent abhorrence to criteria was expressed in Reid’s 
pungent contrast between "personal identity as that which is perfect" 
and "the natural measure of that which is imperfect"1-*. But even if 
it is the meaning of personal identity that one is looking for, then 
an important way of getting at, and understanding, its meaning is by 
considering how the words" same person" are used. And though in most 
cases these words are used on the basis of the evidences or the criteria 
we have considered, it is these criteria, dressed up in the rather 
inferior terminology of » natural measures", that is mot detested by 
our philosophers, instead, their search for the meaning of personal 
identity was "inwardly" directed to bring out the result that personal 
identity is something ultimate and unanalysable - with its explicit 
commitment to the rather dubious belief in spiritual substances.
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Section (iii). The Views of Kant and William .Tampa
If anything in connection with personal identity largely 
engaged the attention of Kant and William James it was the notorious 
problem of a spiritual substance. This substance most often passed for 
the basis of personal unity and the bearer of personal identity 
through time. It will be seen that both Kant and William James agree 
on the denial of a permanent self or soul and also on denying that the 
supposition of the latter is necessary for explaining the nature of 
personal unity and identity.
Ktot attends to this question in his chapter on the paralogisms- 1 
especially in his account of the third paralogism - where he is trying 
to expose the illusions of the national psychologist with regard to the 
nature of what are called our selves and of our identity through time.
The rational psychologists, deriving their origin from Descartes, 
are known to have held an essentially non-physical view of person, person 
is equated by them with an immaterial, thinking substance which is also 
called the soul. 2 In East's picture of him, the claims of the rational 
psychologist amount to three main contentions, that the soul is a 
substance, that it is simple and that it is numerically Identical 
throughout the different times at which the person is said to exist. 5 
In my construal of the problems, the first two can be taken as answers 
to the Unity- question and the last is more directly concerned with the 
question of «Identification of persons. It is the existence of a subst­
antive soul that was supposed to supply the answer to both the questions. 
Kanfs entire effort in the paralogisms chapter was to expose the illusion 
that might have led to such a supposltlon.lt is Indeed an undeniable fact of 
self-knowledge that I ascribe to myself various experiences and thoughts
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that occur not only at the same Instant of time but also at 
different times. All these thoughts and experiences are most naturally, 
and without any constraints whatsoever, are addressed as mine rather than 
anybody else»a. In this sense, they are a set of unified experiences 
which require "me"(or an «1 «) as the logical presupposition of their 
unity. To be aware of these experiences is to be aware of myself and, 
since some of these experiences may be non-contemporaneous, of my 
identity over time. Thus, self-identity is known, or rather expressed, 
in self-knowledge; and since the awareness of these experiences is a 
fact, self-identity is real. But, as we have seen earlier {jch 1 sec ii) , 
if this is true of me because I am a person, this is also true of every­
one else for the same reason. Thus it follows, pace Hume?that personal 
identity is real. But what makes it real, Kant would argue, is not the 
existence of a substantive self as the rationalists have held. Because 
the latter does not follow from the fact of the unity of my experiences. 
What can be said to follow from this fact is that the nIM in my consci­
ousness is a logical presupposition of what I am conscious of - 
that it is a mere "formal condition»4 of the unit of the experiences.
But from this "logical meaning" of "I" nothing follows to show that 
I encounter a real "I" - a permanent substantive soul, which may be 
said to make me a single being and a being identical at different 
times. To jump, as the rational psychologist does, to such a conclusion 
is to fall prey to that fatal confusion which Strawson discribed as the 
confusion between the unity of experiences(which is a fact) and the
experience of Unity (which is not a fact) . 5 Strawson rightly pointed out 
that this is how Kant exposed the illusion of the rational psychologists.
As a matter of fact, Kant's analysis of self-knowledge and its source,
the inner sense is fundamentally empiricistic. Bather like Hume, he argued 
that "in inner intuition there is nothing permanent«6 and that "the "1 «
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is merely the consciousness of my thought«.7 Indeed this last sentence 
was originally joined to the first by a »for« in Kant's passage and so 
Kant's intention there can be better explained by explaining the import of 
this. Aa noted earlier, Kant is willing to grant that the function of the 
«1« in self-knowledge is a logical function, it has got to be the logical 
subject of all my thoughts and experiences (Kant's word is,«representat­
ions»). In this sense, Kant calls it the »subject self", and it is this 
aspect of the self which is said to be, and which has got to be, identical
throughout the time during which the experiences and thoughts occur to me. 
Thus far, Kant is in agreement with the rationalists and is perhaps
willing to stress this point to claim, against Hume, that personal identity
is real and not fictitious. But unlike the rationalists, he does not
accept that the self has a content of its own - much less a permanent 
stuff that goes to make it. By the 'subject self* Kant means simply the
faculty of thought itself which is quite empty of content - «a quite
simple representation«.8 If what is known in inner sense is just this
subject, that is tantamount to saying that nothing in fact is known. The
same conclusion can be derived if the self is considered in its other
aspect in which Kant calls it the 'object-self. The self in this sense 
he agreed, can be known in inner intuition just as the objects of sense
are known in outer sense, but when it is thus known it is known not as the
subject but as an object - as any other object. And whatever can be known
about the nature of this object of inner sense, it cannot be anything 
permanent, as Hume had shown, and, as Kant also adds, «this self contains
a plurality of determinations.”^
Thus, as Kant saw it, the self as the subject can only be thought of 
and must be thought of as the formal condition of unity and identity of
persons, but it cannot, as such, be known as an identical abiding 
substance to account for such unity and identity.Although the first part
of this claim would be welcome to the rationalists and their sympathisers 
the second is likely to raise some amount of indignation.lt has, in fact/
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been argued (against Hume’s similar conclusion) that the very assertion
that I know my thoughts and experiences is inconsistent with the denial
of my known myself. For, so the argument goes, to know that I am thinking
or having certain experiences is to know myself as thinking or having
the experiences. We have already seen (see sec i, pp^-^above) that this
argument is mistaken, being based on a fundamental confusion between the
technical sense of the word "self" and its ordinary, non-technical sense.
And if this is so, then the ordinary assertion that someone knows himself
to be having certain experiences or doing certain things does not show the
self in him. Thus, these ordinary assertions, which involve the use of
'self* in its non-technical sense will not affect Kant's reasons for
questioning the existence and knowability of a self as the subject, and he
would still be substantially right in questioning the latter. Yet he did
not despair, as Hume did, as regards the identity of persons. We shall see
later on in this section^fuLS was because of Kant's merit, and Hume's
thefailure, to have seen importance of the fact that nothing need be changed
in order for anything to be the same. This is why, the lack of knowledge,
and even the impossibility of any proof of an unchanging soul-sub3tance
did not disturb Kant. He on the contrary, goes on to maintain that the
identity of the self as the subject of consciousness is warranted in the
very fact of this consciousness in one’s own case. He gives expression
to this by saying, "In my own consciousness ... identity of person is
11unfailingly met with." It is not difficult to see what Kant meant by 
this. We have argued in earlier sections of this chapter that so far 
as it concerns the across-time identity of persons, "consciousness" must 
be understood in the sense of remembering one's past. Then what Kant can. 
be construed as saying here is that personal identity is presupposed by 
the first person memory statements that one can make. This is the stronger 
thesis regarding the connection between memory and personal identity which
10
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I in earlier sections, have distinguished from the weaker thesis that 
one's belief in it, is expressed in the first-person memory judgments 
that one could make. The first thesis takes "memory" in the strong sense 
in whi,ch the identity of the rememberer is logically implied; the second 
thesis takes memory in the weak sense and does not imply the identity of 
the rememberer with the witness of what is remembered, yet it can be said 
that the relation between the relevant memory-judgment and judgment of 
personal identity is a logical or conceptual relation since, no matter 
whether or not I am mistaken in making a memory claim, I would be contra­
dicting myself if I said that I remember having done x and that I did not 
do x. It is this logical connection - or at any rate the necessary convic­
tion of one's identity which is expressed in one's first-person memory 
judgments - that led Kant further on to say that "we must necessarily judge 
that we are one and the same throughout the whole time of which we are 
conscious'.* •- (A364). Kant did not specify in which sense of 'memory' he
wants us to understand "my own consciousness". But it will be unfair to 
say that he was totally unaware of the by now familiar distinction between 
the two sense of "memory", perhaps it will not be unreasonable to say that 
(being quite aware of the distinction) he has made cautious provision for 
mistaken memories which are now described as "weak" or mere quasi-memory.*
For he was quick to add: "We cannot, however, claim that the judgment would 
stand
be valid from the/point of an outside observer " (A364). The observer, by 
applying the objective criteria of personal identity - whatever they are -
can show that I am misremembering and hence that I am not the same person 
(i.e. the past witness) as the person I claim to be. Bennett has rightly
#1 call it mere quasi-memory in order not to ignore the fact that in a 
sense all memories (including "strong" memory) are quasi-memories, though 
the reverse is not true. However, I need not say anything more about 
this here, though I shall return to it at a later stage.
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credited Kant with this view of the matter. But he reproached him for 
claiming that "we must necessarily judge that ...» and (for that reason 
in Bennett’s opinion) for "stubbornly insisting", in the face of an* 
evidence, that we are the same person who is remembered to have done x.
The truth, however, seems to be that Bennett’s first accusation is true 
but ineffective, and his second accusation is hardly true at all. It is 
true that Kant said that in our own consciousness (i.e. act of remembering) 
•we must necessarily judge that we are one and the same person ...» etc. 
and that in it our identity is "unfailingly met with". But in the light 
of our weaker thesis outlined above as well as in view of what Kant had 
said about the formal condition of the unity of our thoughts and exper­
iences, Kant is justified (his claim is innocuous, at any rate) in saying so 
For what this claim amounts to is simply that our assertion of first-person 
memory statements carries with it the belief in,the conviction of,our 
personal identity; and as far as I am concerned, this conviction remains 
unshaken, until at least I have been shown to be mistaken; after all the 
state of cognition in this case is qualitatively similar to that in the 
•stronger’ case. This much, to say the least, is the import of Kant's 
claim that "we must necessarily judge that ..." and that in our conscious­
ness our personal identity is "unfailingly met with". But by this Kant 
never meant, and must not be understood to have meant, that what I thus 
judge is necessarily right. It is notewrthy that Kant never said any­
thing to the effect that wemust judge that necessarily,.... .The assertion 
•we must necessarily judge that P’ is certainly equivalent to ’we cannot 
f a U  to judge that P ’, but is not equivalent to *we must judge that 
necessarily P'. From what Kant said the last does not follow - partic­
ularly if P is the proposition that I am the same person as the one who I 
claim to remember being. Far from implying the last Kant expressedly 
admits that I may be mistaken and could be shown to be so by an 
outside observer; there is also his repeated warning that we must not
-  87 -
be led astray by the fact that «in my own consciousness ... identity of 
person is unfailingly met with". Bennett says that he can "make nothing 
of" this warning;13 but it is not difficult to see that this warning, 
coupled with Kant's reference to the observer's standpoint as the standard 
of validity of personal identity judgment,* give enough evidence that it 
was not Kant's intention "to stubbornly insist" that what we judge is 
. necessarily right. However, if the P (above) is an assertion with regard 
to the identity of myself at different times, then Kant would say that we 
must, in our consciousness, judge that P and perhaps we should judge that 
necessarily P; for this, for Kant, is the formal condition of the unity 
of my thoughts and experiences. But Kant's warning referred to above and 
his similar warnings not to be misled by "the concept of personality" or 
by "the identity of consciousness of myself at different times" point/his 
consistent contention that although these concepts (which all point to the 
logical subject of my experiences) are necessary for the possibility of 
any operation of thought and although the outside observer will admit, for 
that reason, the 'I' which accompanies ... all representations at all 
times in my consciousness", (A362-3) yet none of these concepts implies 
the objective permanence of a self for the 'I' to refer to. Not only the 
outside observer cannot infer this, we ourselves are unable to prove this, 
for "we are unable to prove that this 'I', a mere thought, may not be in ' 
the same state of flux which, by means of it, are linked up with one 
another" (A364). It seems quite evident from this as well as from his 
general criticism of the paralogisms, that Kant is trying to dispel the 
idea of an unchanging substance as the explanatory factor of our unity and
♦Bennet also recognised that Kant equated "objectively valid" with-------
"acceptable to an outside observer" (See Ibid P 96). t m * ill „ 
substantiation of my contention that the problem of personal identitS*?®* 
essentially a problem about other person's identity (see pp 10-11^  *)
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identity. As noted earlier, this puts him in a better position than
many others in the sense that he is free from the dogma that "sameness'1
and "change" are incompatible. The following significant passage in
his Anthropology gives a clearer proof of this:
"The question may be asked whether, in view of the variety of 
changes of mental states ... a man be conscious of these changes 
and still say that he remains the same man (has the same soul).
The question is absurd, since consciousness of such changes is 
only possible on the supposition that he considers himself in 
his different states as one and the same subject".14
Thus according to Kant, one can consider himself the same person (which, 
needless to say, Kant used as equivalent to soul or subject) despite 
his knowledge of the changes (which is all that he can observe both 
in his outer sense and in his inner sense), and yet the subject or the 
soul is nothing permanent and abiding. Moreover, Kant is even prepared 
to entertain the hypothesis that what is called our soul is not some­
thing simple and unitary (Critique of the 2nd paralogism) but a plurality 
of souls, each soul transmitting its conscious states to its successor 
soul so that each soul could be conscious of all that had > ¡happened to 
its ancester souls, without being identical (numerically) with these 
others. This speculation comes out in a remarkable passage in the Critique:
"If ... we postulate substances such that the one communicates to 
the other representations together with the consciousness of them, 
we can conceive a whole series of substances of which the first 
transmits its state together with its consciousness to the second, 
the second its own states with that of the preceeding substance 
to the third ... The last substance would then be conscious of 
all the states of the previously changed substances as being ' 
its own states ... And yet it would not have been one and the 
same person in all those states.” (A363-4 note)
This hypothesis was to be of considerable significance to later theorists
of personal identity; and we will presently see how this insight influenced
James’ theory of personal identity. But for Kant, however, this was just
an empty speculation entertained, only for arguments sake, to discourage
the rationalists speculation of a soul-substance. And as regards the
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nature of personal identity Kant did not give any answer that is either 
clear or categorical. I can think of the following reasons for this.
He equated persons with souls. These souls, he argued, can only he 
known, if at all, in inner sense; hut the inner sense, as well as the 
outer sense, can only give us the knowledge of things not as they are 
hut as they appear to us. (This is the principle of Kant's phenomenalism). 
So, in whatever manner the soul is known in inner sense it cannot he known 
as it is in itself. (This is the inevitable agnostic off-shoot of his 
phenomenalism). This latter, incidentally, is Kant's "real” self as 
opposed to the "phenomenal" self, which can be known in inner sense. But 
the "real" self can only be an object of thought, not of knowledge.1-5 It 
followed therefore that the real nature of personal identity (being, for 
Kant, the same as the identity of the soul) cannot be known.
Nevertheless, the concept of "personality" must be retained and is
necessary "for practical employment and is sufficient for such use".(A366)
But the personality that is thus retained is still conceived in the
"internal" model and confined to the inner sense as a knowable object.
This model of thinking did not allow its author to consider the important
fact that persons, at least in the'practical employment" of the concept,
are importantly - if not entirely - objects of outer sense. It also
leads Kant to ignore the equally important fact that in our practical
employment of the concept, we have empirically applicable criteria of
personal identity, which though not the same as bodily identity, have
17"an essential reference to the human body". 1 But by giving veiy little 
consideration - almost none - to the bodily criterion, even to the very 
fact that persons have bodies, Kant fares no better than his rationalist 
adversaries. His polemics are no doubt instructive, but what he achieved 
was hardly ever so.
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Like Kant's, William James' theory of personal identity is marked 
by a conspicuously critical attitude towards the idea of a substantive 
sod* and both men seem to have derived the force of this attitude from 
Hume's argument against the idea of the soul. But whereas Kant emphat­
ically believed in the soul as the logical condition of unity and was 
hesitant about its nature, James straightforwardly rejected the idea of 
the soul as superfluous for any scientific and useful purpose and also 
on the ground that there is no reason to believe in it, but was more 
categorical and committed as to the nature of what is called the soul: 
as a matter of fact he had no hesitance to hold a view treating the 
soul as only a "bundle of Humean perceptions". One can see clear 
reflections of the basic philosophical assumptions of these philosophers 
in their respective treatment of the problem of personal unity and 
identity: in the one case, as we saw, agnosticism, in the other pragmatism.
Prom a rather more scientific point of view, James says,"One great 
use of the soul has always been to account for, and at the same time 
guarantee, the closed individuality of each personal consciousness. The 
thoughts of our soul must unite into one self, it was supposed, and must 
be eternally insulated from these of every other soul". (349)1S But 
James does not think this to be of any advantage. His immediate reason 
of course, seems to be the possibility, which he seems willing to allow, 
that "in some individuals, at least, thoughts may split away from the 
others and form separate selves." (349-50), so that, presumably, the 
individuation of personal consciousness cannot be guaranteed by the 
sameness of soul or self. But without needing to entertain this rather 
dubious hypothesis to explain such abnormal phenomena (which perhaps, 
could be better explained otherwise), it is not difficult to see James' 
point as well as of his general "anti-substantialist" attitude. For the 
"substantialist view", which springs naturally from the supposition
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discussed above, fails to explain anything. We have noted Kent's contention 
that the only sense in which a soul-substance can be justified - if at all - 
is that it can at best be taken as a »‘formal condition” of the unity 
of our thoughts and experiences. The constant talk of "I" (me) as the 
subject of my experiences and the reference to all these experiences as 
my experiences makes my identity (or the continuous presence of myself, 
as it is usually expressed) a necessary presupposition of such talks.
But this is only a verbal point* from which nothin« can be deduced about 
the nature and content of this ”1” - much less that it is a permanent 
soul-substance. This would be as absurd as saying that any word that can 
be used as a grammatical subject in a sentence must have a reference in 
order for that sentence to be meaningful. The absurdity of such supposi­
tions is fairly well-known; equally well-known is the fact that the 
substantialists have been arguing on some such basis. Moreover, after 
having thus erroneously deduced this unknown something, and giving it the 
name of ‘soul' the substantialists proceed to explain the nature of our 
mental phenomena by its means. But the nature of the soul itself being 
unknown and even unknowable, it fails to meet the requirement which its 
authors wanted it to meet. Any account of its nature is bound to be 
given - if at all - in terms of, or at least on the model of, the very 
same subjective phenomena which it was designed to explain. As Ayer has 
succinctly put it, the soul can be represented - if at all - «as a trans­
cendental stream of consciousness, duplicating the one we know”.19 James 
himself has further, more genuine explanations to show that it is 
superfluous and is not required "for expressing the actual subjective 
phenomena of consciousness as they appear”, (344) which it purports to do.
*Kant of course would not say that it is a verbal VOint 
how consistently he could deny this. P°mt, but I do: not see
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We must now turn to these explanations which rather show a novel feature 
in his approach.
James tried to present his case against the "substantialists" by his
famous theory of appropriation, which he pleads and elaborates in the
section on "The Pure Ego" in the 10th chapter of his Principles of Psycholcnv.
One very important argument for the supposition of a soul-substance has
been that experiences must have a owner. Although, the idea of an unowned
20experience is not straightforwardly self-contradictory, it was thought 
to be at least counter-intuitive since commonsense construed experiences 
as being the experiences of someone; this latter fact was supplemented by 
the almost universal fact that experiences are referred to as mine or 
youjg etc. Hence it was supposed that if there is an experience there must 
be an owner and the soul was invented to play the owner and to own the 
many different experiences that are said to belong to a person simultan­
eously and successively. The Humean traidition, in its eagerness to deny 
the idea of soul, had denied the idea of ownership altogether and had let 
loose the experiences - with 'no real bond' to bind them together. The 
effect was the unreality of personal unity and identity. James, on his 
part, though in essential agreement with the Humean tradition, tried to 
repair the "loss” by suggesting that the ownership, instead of having to 
depend on the soul, can be said to belong to the experiences themselves.
This he explains by saying that what we call our "self" might be very well 
construed as a series of momentary selves* each one of which transmits all
♦James own word was "thought" with a capital "T" To 
if not the oddity - of talking of "thought" appropriating J h S u L i T i 0^  “ 
being **3rop*iated by "thought", I have expressed James' v i L ^  F ^  d 
•self. I do not think that this practice T o L l Z Z n  any °f
or, offence to, the purport of James' theory, ana I h o n e ^ w n a t i o n  in,
would perfectly fit in. Moreover, James i T o l e a ^ U fl  Mlf
to use this word, "self" should be taken in it* „ nat he may have
substantialist implication whatever. (350). Although mv Sense w*th no
on James' behalf, cannot be popular a ^
technical term acceptable to James and designed onlv tn a T  &as his "thought". ^  nljr to ¿0 the same work
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its consciousness to its successor self which 'adopts* this consciousness
as its own and, in its turn, transmits its own consciousness together
with what it had adopted from its earlier self, and so on. The result is
that the last self is conscious not only of what happened to it alone
but also of all that had happened to its prececessor selves - both alike
being felt as its own. This process of owning or 'adopting' whatever
happened to the previous selves is what James describes as the process or
act of "appropriation”. The idea is that every self'in the series is b o m
an owner and dies owned, "transmitting whatever it realised as , self
to its own later proprietor" (330). This insight is one of several of
James' indebtedness to Kant. He writes:
"Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not only motion
but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its
motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up into 
its consciousness and passed them to a third, until the last ball 
held all that the other balls had held, and realised it as its own.
It is this trick which the nascent thought has of immediately 
taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it, which is the 
foundation of the appropriation of most of the remoter constit­
uents of the self. Who owns the last self owns the self before 
the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the ppssessed".
(339)
Now if this theory of 'appropriation' or 'adoption' of experiences 
by experiences is correct, then the doctrine of ownership is retained 
and explained without the supposition of unchanging sout-substance and the 
reality of personal identity is restored. For a person at any moment can 
be judged to be identical with the witness of whatever he is then 
conscious of since he, being the "proprietor" of those experiences, is 
conscious of them as his own. (This psychological analysis appeals at 
least more plausibly to our logical intuitions than the mataphysical theory 
of a permanent soul). And what is called the same person need not be one 
identical substance. James’ theory of personal identity, thus, seems to 
be quite similar to Hume's with the essential modification that personal 
identity is claimed to be real and not "fictitious". Hume's despair was
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due to the fact that "all our distinct perceptions are distinct 
existences and the mind never perceives any real connection among them”.22 
James' improvement upon this is that although it is true that our per- 
ceptions are distinct in the sense that they are logically independent 
of each other, it is not true that there cannot be any real connection 
among them. As Ayer expressed the point "That they (our perceptions KM) 
are separate does not entail that they are disunited.”23 What can be a 
more real connection,James would probable ask, than the fact that our 
perceptions appropriate and are appropriated by one another in the sense 
outlined? This factual connection is also expressed by saying that "within 
each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous” and that
changes from one moment to another in the quality of consciousness is never 
absolutely%brupt.”
James' theory sthus thas ve the merit of making our perceptions do 
the work for which others had to invent a separate agency. And in a sense 
his whole theory seems to depend upon this hypothesis. Unfortunately this 
is not as sound and legitimate as one would wish it to be. The greatest 
stumbling block is the concept of 'appropriation' itself. Even James 
himself conceded that it is "the only point that is obscure” (340) in his 
theory. James has two ways of explaining how this act of appropriation 
may be possible. One way is by saying that an identifying thought (a 
present self) appropriates whatever experience it feels "sensibly con­
tinuous" with itself; the second way is by saying that it appropriates 
whatever experiences are marked in its recollection with "warmth and 
intimacy” (331). It may be pointed out, in parenthesis, that in trying 
to define personal identity, or at any rate the unity of experiences, in 
terns of the act of appropriation James is committed to a 'memory-theory' 
of personal identity which is why there is little allusion to and less 
emphasis on the bodily criterion in his theory. Now, besides being a 
matter of feeling 'sensible continuity* can hardlv be a
necessary condition
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of personal identity. For if it is so taken then in the case of an 
abrupt change of memory etc, like that in amnesia for instance (compare 
the theory of Locke, section(i) above), the person after the change has 
- °. different from the person before the change. But this is surely 
counter-intuitive and to come to accept - if we must - such a conclusion 
would at least involve taking a decision. Further, that "sensible cont­
inuity" cannot be taken as a sufficient condition either is evident from 
the fact that we often ignore discontinuity, or even total loss, of 
memory and ascribe identity to persons on the basis of bodily continuity. 
James also admits this fact in a crucial passage where he says*
"... even were Thought entirely unconscious of itself in the act of thinking, those »warm* parts of its present object(which he equates with the body and what he called the central adjust­ments,(PKM) would be a firm basis" of personal identity(J4l).
Thus, in view of the above, the relation of "sensible continuity" 
can supply only a very weak explanation of 'appropriation, The feeling 
of'waxmth and intimacy" fares no better either. It reminds us of the 
•feeling of familiarity' and 'vivacity' which Bussell(at one time) and 
Hume respectively held to be constituting the distinctive feature of 
memory. But all these, being mere matters of subjective feeling, can 
never be the necessary accompaniments of personal identity _ not even of 
memory. Sometimes some objects of imagination may seem to be more 'fami­
liar* and may feel more "warm and intimate«, shall we have to say that 
we are the same persons we Imagine ourselves to be ? James could
provide no protection for his theory of appropriation against such even­
tualities. Moreover "warmth and intimacy" being inevitably subjective,
are bound to be matters of degree? and depending, as he does on these
factors, James can never escape falling into the odd way of treating per­
sonal identity as a matter only of degree.*
~ oddity of this way of talking"about personal identity has --
indicated in Oh 1 sec i. Mere will be said on this in the nSt SSptsr.
-  96 -
It follows therefore that the concept of appropriation remains an 
admittedly obscure concept and James’ theory of personal identity, 
depending heavily on this concept, remains far from satisfactory. And 
his primary emphasis on the appropriation-hypothesis committed him solely 
to the inner criteria, despite his apparent willingness (as he implied) 
in the passage last quoted above) to say that we all identify ourselves 
with our bodies as persistents.
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Chapter 3
THE CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
Prologue» A Problem of Criteria
Our analysis of the traditional theories has enabled us to 
reveal an important feature with them? namely, a dominant tendency 
to take the problem at issues* as one of definitkn.phis tendency, 
resulted, in most cases, in defining personal identity in terms of 
what only was a criterion thereof, and in a few cases, where no defini­
tion was to be found, the result was intuitionism. This tendency and the 
consequent difficulties do not as much vitiate recent writings onthe 
subject and there is a clearer tendency in the latter to keep the "meaning 
question" and the "criteria question" apart** this will be brought out 
in the subsequent sections of the present chapter as we proceed.
Now, one more thing before we pass on to the next chapter. The 
difficulties issuing from the described tendency have been demonstrated 
in the case of the psychological criteria of personal identity. Any 
attempt to define personal identity in terms of the other criterion, 
that of bodily continuity, will be equally open to similar difficulties.
A straightforward way of demonstrating this difficulty is that if 
personal identity is defined in terms of bodily continuity, then the 
continuity of the same body would logically entail the identity of the 
person. But this is grima facie absurd, since the same body does continue 
(after what we call the death of a person), at least for some time,
* I cannot pretend, though, that this is true of all ~
contemporary writings on the subject. For there is at least
see sec ui bei°“> ““ a- *. 7 *
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without there being any person to be the same person as the earlier 
person who was alive in that body. If, alternatively, it is argued that 
the person still continues to be there in a disembodied state(which is 
not logically impossible), then at least bodily continuity cannot be a 
defining characteristic - much less the definition - of the identity of 
persons. Further the logical possibility of disembodied existence of 
persons will count against a logical definition of 'same person' in terms 
of bodily continuity. Nor can the view that 'same person' can be defined 
in terms of the continuity of a living human body fare any better. For 
as is evident from a recent paper by Brian J.Smart,1 althought the same 
living human body continues from the stage of foetus to the stage of 
adulthood, say, yet there was no person in the former stage to be judged 
identical with the person of the latter stage. 'The same living human 
body' can serve to define personal identity if and only if (1) and p^ 
are both persons and (2) both and P2 have the same living body. But 
as Smart's example shows, although condition(2) is satisfied, condition 
(l) is not satisfied. This argument may not kninck down the status of 
bodily continuity as a necessary condition of personal identity, but it 
certainly would not allow the latter to be defined by bodily continuity 
(since a definition of x is the necessary and sufficient condition of x). 
To this can be added the further argument, advanced notably by Hick,^ 
that a person may (it is logically possible or conceivable)instantf^- 
neously change bodies without becoming a different person. This possibl 
phenomenon points to the possibility that there can be personal identity 
without there being a continuous living human body (see note 2 now). 
Thus it follows that any attempt to define personal identity in 
terms of the one or the other criterion thereof is bound to fall short of 
a logical definition.(That personal identity cannot be defined in term/of
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both the criteria together has been shown earlier in ch 1 see i )» I 
submit that those difficulties will not arise if similarity of memory 
(speaking very generally) and/or bodily continuity are taken as criteria 
of personal identity. This will be a fairly innocuous but useful 
approach to the problem? for as we shall see in what follows,a criterion 
does not entail the existence or occurence of wha* it is a criterion. Much 
of the difficulties noted above is due to this entailment that holds 
between the definiendum and the definiens. A criterion,by contrast.will 
be said to be something which will not entail but which,nonetheless.will 
justify the existence or occurrence of the phenomenon in question. Thus 
construed the role of memory and bodily continuity will be seen in their 
proper perspective and the problem at stake will not be led astray. What, 
then,is a criterion and what sort of phenomena will serve as criteria 
for something or some state of affairs ?. To this question we shall turn
now.
SectionCi )t Criterion*
Earlier,I had described a criterion as a state of affairs the 
existence of which necessarily is evidence for the tryth of the judgment(s) 
of which it is a criterion (see p 25 above).Although I beleive that this
*The term "criterion” is used very widely,and I shall so use it,so that 
a phenomenon or a state of affairs may be a criterion for the existence 
of another phenomenon or state of affairs. It is also used in such a 
way that a statement or a judgment may be said to be a criterion foe 
another. In the latter way of speaking,what is meant is that the state 
of affairs described by the first statement (or judgment ) is a 
criterion for the state of affairs described by the other statement (or 
judgment ).Properly speaking,nothing can be said to be a criterion for 
a statement (or a judgment} but only for the truth of a statement (or 
judgment-).
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£ gives a fair account of what a criterion is, a lot more needs to
be said to bring out the purport of this description. Of course
"criterion»' is a technical term and can be defined as one wants it
to be. But the way I want to use the term will not be very different
from how most philosophers have wanted to use it. I therefore choose
to begin by indicating the dominant features of a criterion, and then
specify the sense in which I want to use it. What this dominant feature
amounts to can be best brought out by considering some examples of
what standardly would be called criteriological relations(hereafter,
c-relations). Such relations are said to hold between pairs of
propositions like the following:
Some-one is displaying(what we call) pain-behaviour and 
he is in pain.
Someone is muttering in sleep, his face changing expressions 
as he does so and he is dreaming.
Someone gives correct answers to most questions in a 
quiz and he is intelligent
Each of the former propositions in this illustration is said 
to be a criterion for the truth of the corresponding latter proposition. 
This means that under all normal circumstances we can say that in each 
case the latter proposition is true if the former is true. The qualifi­
cation "under all normal circumstances" underlines the fact that a 
c-relation is not one of entailment, for it is fairly conceivable-
even factually possible - that in any particular case, though the 
former proposition is true the latter is nevertheless false. But
although the relation is thus not strictly logical, we are .justified
in saying that any of the latter proposition is true if the (corresponding)
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former is true, and we have no .justification for saying that the 
latter is true if the former is not true - though nevertheless the 
latter majr be true. In other words, a criterion for a given things 
being so Is something by which one is .justified in saving that the 
thing is so and in whose absence (coupled with the absence of any 
other alternative criteria ) one has no .justification whatsoever for 
saving that the thing Is (or even, is not ) so. However, the fact that 
what is called a criterion may sometimes fail to give the right result 
need be no reason for saying that it is not a criterion under all 
conditions or that something's being a criterion aa is relative to 
some conditions only. For one thing, if it fails to give the right 
result the question isi what fails to give the right result ? It is the 
criterion that fails. We do not say of an^ phenomenon but only of the 
phenomenon of what is called pain-behaviour that it gives or fails to 
give the right result, namely, that the subject is in pain. Therefore, 
if £  is a criterion of £  it is a criterion, slmpllclter. of and the 
"abnormal" conditions (under which £ naturally gives the wrong result) 
are called "abnormal" because under these conditions £  (the criterion) 
fails to give the right result. We say of a case of someone's pretending 
to be in pain that it is "abnormal" because despite the phenomenon of 
pain-behaviour, he is not in pain. The fact, therefore, is that if 
something is a criterion for some-thing else then it is always so - 
though its giving the right result or wrong result depends on whether 
the circumstances axe normal or abnormal. Moreover, the fact that we can 
make mistakes sometimes while working on the basis of a criterion 
cannot discredit the criterion or make it cease to be the criterion.
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This point can be brought out by taking an analogous illustration 
from Pollock:'* the fact that someone applies a concept (e.g."bird" ) 
to a wrong object (e.g. to a dock hunter's decoy from a distance) 
cannot show that he has not learned the meaning of the concept. That 
he has is evident from the very fact that he did apply it to something 
very much like a bird. In other words, his application of the concept 
was justified (hence his learning of its meaning accomplished), though, 
due to extraneous conditions, false or mistaken. To learn the meaning 
of a concept is hence, " to learn how to ascribe it justifiably to 
things"^ (my emphasis). Similarly, a criterion is a "justification 
condition"^ and the test of something's being a criterion of something 
else is whether we can say justifiably (even if falsely, sometimes), on 
its basis, that the latter is true.
It is important for our purpose to note that a "justification 
condition" is quite different from a defining condition and that a c- 
relation is not a relation of entailment. The fact would need no mention 
if it were not a dominant tendency among some to think otherwise, and 
to treat the c-relation very much like one of entailment. Roger. Albri­
tton, in giving one interpretation of Wittgenstein's use of "criterion"
said:
A criterion for a given thing's being so is something that 
can show that thing to be so and show by its absence that the 
thing is not so; it is something by which one may be justified in 
saying that the thing is so and by whose absence one is 
justified in saying that the thing is not so3, (The first 
two emphases mine)
In bare outline this passage makes it appear as if the c-relation 
is no different from the relation of entailment. But that this latter h 
is mistaken will be evident by considering the passage in its finer detail. 
The passage may be understood to express two theses: an amplied strong
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thesis,* that a criterion for a given thing's being so can conclusivey 
prove (or is conclusive evidence) that the thing is so and that its. 
absence can conclusively show (or is conclusive evidence) that the thing 
is not so; and an expressed weaker thesis that a criterion is a justifica­
tion (which, by no means, is conslusive proof or evidence) for saying that 
the thing is so and for saying, in its absence, that the thing is not so. 
Taken in the first sense, the passage is entirely mistaken (even as an • 
account of Wittgenstein’s view - as we shall shortly see), since, as we 
saw, not only can we think of a criterion yielding wrong results, we can 
also think of something’s being so without the relevant criterion being 
instantiated; - indeed these are facually possible. Nor is it what 
Wittgenstein would want to say. For cearly a number of evidences listed 
as criteria in the Philosophical Investigations (hereafter PI) are not 
conclusive evidences (e.g. PI pt I sec 377, also cf Pt II p 222 and pt I 
sec 56). And as Malcolm pointed out, Wittgenstein would "clearly" deny 
that a criterion is ever a conclusive evidence*. ' I shall submit further 
that Albritton’s passage, taken in the second sense as indicated above, 
though expressing what Wittgenstein might have said is at least partially 
wrong. For although we are certainly justified in saying on the basis 
of the criterion that something is so, we have no justification, in its 
absence alone, for saying that the thing is not so. Are we justified 
in saying that Smith is not in pain simply on the basis of the fact that 
he is not engaged in pain behaviour? Certainly not. As we have said, the 
truth simply/that in the absence of pain-behaviour we are not justify 
(assuming,' of course, that there are no alternative criteria which we know 
to have been satisfied and which hence point to the contrary) in saying 
that he is in pain although, as noted before, he may be in pain nonetheless,
♦For there is a sense in which "shows" means "proves" or "conclusively 
establishes" in the logical sense of the expressions.
-  104 -
but NOT that we are justified in saying (in the absence of pain behaviour 
alone) that he is not in pain, for he may as well be.
However, these shortcomings in Albritton* s interpretation are not so 
much of his own makings as they are due to Wittgenstein's unclear 
expressions of this disturbing concept (though he (Albritton) must still 
be blamed for not giving any essential guidelines to carve out a definite 
notion of "criterion" from the Wittgensteinean obscurity). Wittgenstein's 
use of "criterion" is found to be oscilating between definition and 
inductive evidence or what he distinctively called symptoms. The Blue and 
Brown Books (hereafter BB) seems to make criterion almost indistinguishable 
from "definition". This is evident from his claim that " ... to say 'A man 
has angina if this bacillus is found in him' is a tautology or .. a loose
7 •wav of stating the definition of angina", and also from the fact that 
"criterion" is often seen to have been equated with what he called 
"defining criterion" (See esp. BB p 25 paras 1 and 2). Now if this version 
is taken seriously, a criterion would have to be both necessary and 
sufficient condition for what it is a criterion of and the c-relation would 
have to be a strict logical relation of entailment. But our analysis of 
the notion, and particularly the above criticism of Albritton's interpreta­
tion, has shown that this is not the case - and this is not true of what 
most philosophers would want to call c-relations. Incidentally, I will not 
rule it out that something could be called a "defining criterion". As far 
as I can make of this, a state of affairs could be called a 'defining 
criterion' for another if and only if it can be the criterion - in the sense 
of one and only one piece of necessary evidence - for that other. But 
whereas this could be a sense of the term 'criterion' it would be a very 
strong sense indeed: such a criterion would, in effect, be indistinguishable 
from definition. For in being the only piece of necessary evidence, this 
criterion has to logically guarantee the truth of what it is the defining
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criterion of; and in this sense it will entail the latter - which is what 
a definition does. The curious fact is that Wittgenstein cannot be said 
to be committed to this. We have just noted his "negative answer" to 
such a proposition (see note6,); further, he sometimes gives way to such 
ways of talking as might draw criteria nearer to symptoms rather than to 
definitions. (Though, irritatingly, he cannot be said to have been 
committed to this either.*)
However, things are not as desperate as they look like. For there is 
something which Wittgenstein was committed to and which rightly contributes 
to a reasonably clear and useful account of criterion and this is the view, 
recently brought out by Shoemaker, that a criterion is a non-inductive 
evidence and that the c-relation is not an empirical relation. This 
explains why he was so anxious to likencriterion to definition and to keep 
it distinct from symptom. One of the unchanged part of his thesis consists 
in the following way of distinguishing a criterion from a symptom, namely 
that the evidential value of a symptom is something taught to us by exper­
ience (see BB p 25) whereas the evidential value of a criterion is some­
thing "founded on a definition" (PI sec 354, also cf BB p 25). But if a 
criterion'is thus not to be taught to us by experience and yet not to be 
equated with definition, it must enjoy a somewhat intermediary status 
between definition and symptom. Unlike a definition, a criterion is not 
to be taken as entailing the existence or occurrence of what it is a 
criterion of, but it must not, for that reason, be taken to be empirically 
(so contingently) conntected to the latter - just as a symptom is related 
to what it is a symptom of. This unchanged, and correct, intention of 
Wittgenstein was not entirely - though considerably - eclipsed by his
*To be evident from the following paragraph.
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various loose and obscure ways of talking about 'criterion*. In recent
writings, Shoemaker has very succinctly expressed it by saying that a
- 9 •criterion is a "direct and non-inductive evidence".' Thus, a criterion is
a special sort of evidence which, unlike other evidences, viz, symptoms,
is not inductively known to be an evidence. Por it is not "what we have
(experimentally) found to be evidence", but "what we have ... learned to 
10
call evidence". Criteria earn this "privileged intermediary status" from 
the essential role they play "in the way certain concepts are formed and 
in the way certain words are learned". *■ This point is very often stressed 
by Wittgenstein. Por example, if pain behaviour were not connected with 
one’s having pain in the usual way, i.e. if people did not display pain- 
behaviour when they are in pain, no one could have taught the use of the 
word "pain" to anyone else and the word would not have any meaning or, at 
best, it would have had a different meaning (cf PI sec 385). Por if the 
usual link between pain and what we call pain behaviour were otherwise, 
either people did not pain-behave at all or they "pain-behaved" under 
different situations (normally always* when they felt ticklish, for example). 
But if people did not pain-behave at all, there would be no way in which 
anyone could tell or teach anyone else what pain is (i.e. what does the 
word "pain" signify). T7e are taught the meaning of the word "pain" by 
being shown people who are in pain (or so at least they seem) and we know
l f * ®  l  i Possibility that one might display thTiame behaviour (viz 
what we call "pain behaviour") each time under a different situatio^ vlV 
I think that this would not only be abnormal but also that, there bein/nn 
particular phenomenon to go with that behaviour, even he himself -oSi 
no word to signify or qualify that behaviour; and any word (’min? d
thing else) we and he may choose to qualify the behaviour by is bound I t "  
without a fixed meaning. It is therefore a matter not of fact bnt oA° ^  
that people normally behave in similar ways in similar situations, iovthit 
is necessary m  order for the crucial word to have a meaning. n
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that people are m  pain from what they do and say. if nobody ever behaved 
as if he is in pain or said that he is, nobody could have known what pain 
is and even there would be no word called "pain". And if, alternatively, 
people usually behaved as if they are in pain (i.e. like how they now do 
behave when they are in pain) when in fact they felt some other sensation 
then "pain" would not mean what it does and would mean that other sensation. 
It is in this sense that a criterion is necessarily tied up to meaning and 
is said to be "founded on a definition", and this makes it what we called a 
neces_s_ary evidence. But this is not to say that a criterion (or even all 
criteria for a given thing) is the meaning or is the definition (cf PI sec 
299). We say of a man that he is in pain when he groans or moans, care­
fully nurses a part of his body and implores for anaesthesia and so on; 
but that is not what "being in pain" means, we say of a man that he is 
dreaming if he mutters something in his sleep and so on, but that is not 
what "dreaming" means (see Malcolm.'Dreaming12 p 6o). A criterion shows 
what pain or dreaming is, but it does not mean what they mean (and we have 
already indicated how a criterion shows it). Nor, for the reasons stated 
above, would we be right to say that the criterion is empirically (so 
contingently) related to what it is the criterion of.* And as Shoemaker 
has very rightly said, "If so-and-so’s being the case is a criterion for 
the truth of a judgment of $-identity the assertion that it is evidence in 
favour of the truth of the judgment is necessarily rather than contingently
♦Furthermore, an empirical relation in this case would hTvl T---n ---
like what holds between a symptom and what it t0 be at least
calls symptom "a phenomenon of which experience has ta^H+°m °fu Witt£enstein coincided ... with the phenomenon which tauCht us that it
If this is so, then the fact of t h e r ^ L n g  TstifT^ C1rJiterion" O  P25). 
there must be something, whic^a criterion, for it ^Jply.that
if a .criterion too has to be thus empirically related ?Cidf4.With* But 
criterion of, then it wonli, nice a symptom, riouiS aether « * 1 ®  the 
coincide with, and this, for the very same reason wm l f her criterion" to 
"criterion" to coincide with, and so on infinitelv require yet another
would ever be a criterion; equally, nothing could e v e r^e^s^ptom^^th115
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(empirically) true. We know that it is evidence, not by having observed 
correlations and discovered empirical generalisations, but by understanding 
the concept of a 4> and the meaning of the statements about the identity 
of Thus, being determined by our understanding the meaning of
the concept, a criterion is direct, and being knowable by no observed 
correlations it is non-inductive evidence.
We are now in a position to see at least two senses in which a 
phenomenon p can be said to be a criterion of another phenomenon q.
(1) That p is logically necessary and sufficient condition for q.
e.g. when p could be.what we have seen to be the "defining 
criterion" q.* ■ s
and (2) That p is a good reason or justification for q, but is not 
inductively established to be so. 4 n0T
e.g. the general but violable 'justification conditions' as 
we have called them.
Although both senses (or sorts?) of criteria above may satisfy 
Shoemaker's requirement (which we subscribe to) of being 'direct and 
non-inductive evidence' yet (1) being logically necessary and sufficient 
condition, is non-distinct from definition and has to involve entailment, 
It is for this reason we pointed out that this would be too strong a sense
for the term to be used at all. We further argued that a criterion is not 
a conclusive evidence, but a defining criterion would be an evidence that 
is conclusive. We must therefore fall back upon the second sense for a 
standardly acceptable, usable and useful account of "criterion". Jn this 
sense a criterion does not and need not logically entail the existence (or 
truth) of what it is a criterion of. We have seen that much of the 
difficulties involved in any attempt to define personal identity is due to
»There is, to be sure, a difference between definition (with which I have 
in effect equated "defining criterion") and what is/are necessaiy and 
sufficient condition. But the point is that the latter, like a corrollary 
from a definition, would entail; and it is in this last respect that I 
claim it to be indistinguishable from definition.
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this entailment that is inseparable from any theory of definition (or of 
meaning). In contending, therefore, that our problem is not one of def­
inition or meaning of personal identity but one of criteria thereof we
envisaged this second sense of the notion of criteria: the first sense
1
would be doubly disadvantageous for our purpose since it would bring
back all the difficulties that beset a theory of definition of personal 
identity with.
There is just one more thing which I would add regarding my use of the 
concept. I have wanted to say that a criterion is simply a justificatory 
evidence and that it does not and need not entail the truth of what it is 
the criterion of. In this respect it is to be contrasted not only with
a definition but also with a necessary condition. Por although a necessary 
condition usually does not and need not entail the truth of whatever it is 
a necessary condition of, yet the conjunction of necessary conditions do 
(and even ene single necessary conditien - if it is the one and only one 
such condition may) entail. Our contention, on the contrary, is that even 
if all the criteria for a thing's being so are satisfied it will not 
entai! thatjhe « £ *  (It to
suppose that a certain being looks like a man,/bit is not a taaS^eing). 
Moreover, there is a general asymmetry between the two concepts. In the 
sense of 'criterion' I have outlined, pain behaviour (understood non­
question beggingly) is a criterion of someone's being in pain, but as we 
have seen, it is not a necessary condition of the latter. On the other 
hand being a material object is a necessary condition of something's being 
a book, but it will not be a criterion for the latter. Nevertheless it 
does not follow that the two concepts are logically incompatible. Por I
think that a (not any) necessary condition of something being so can be a 
criterion for that thing being so as long as it is a justificatory evidence 
for that thing being so, i.e. as long as one is justified, on its basis, 
in saying that the thing is so. Por example, it is
a necessary condition
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for someone’s understanding the meaning of a word that, more often than 
not, he is able to use it in the appropriate context. But this very 
fact is also our justification for saying that the man has understood 
the meaning of the given word. The important thing, however, is that a 
fact’s being a criterion for something does not (logically) depend on 
its being a necessary condition for that thing. I can be justified, on 
the basis of x, in saying that y is true, and I may, perhaps, stumble 
on the fact that x happens to be a necessary condition for the truth of
y* but 1 don,t £SE£ t0 be aware of this latter fact. On the contrary, 
and this is the crucial point, x may be found not to be a necessary 
condition of y, and yet it may continue to be our justification for 
saying that y is true. Later on, we will try to make plausible the 
idea that bodily continuity( in a sense to be qualified then),which is 
a fair ground for saying that a later person is the same person as an 
earlier person, is also a necessary condition for personal identity.
But this fact will in no way restrict our use of the term ''criterion»' 
to necessary conditions only. For we will also be using the similarity 
of memory and/or character etc as another criterion of personal identity, 
since it is also equally a fair ground for saying that a later person 
is the same person as an earlier person? and it will also be seen that 
memory continuity is not a necessary condition of personal identity.
The following diagram will explain our account of criterion as 
related to necessary condition.
S « Justificatory evidences or criterion in our sense
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p «* Necessary conditions,
Q, the shaded area, represents those criteria which happen to he 
necessary conditions as well. If the argument that bodily continuity 
is a necessary condition of personal identity would be right, the 
criterion of bodily continuity will fall under this category of 
criteria.
However, our general requirement is still that a criterion 
need not be a necessary condition and must not entail. Criteria like 
bodily continuity will be best construed not as exceptions to this 
requirement but rather as a sort of additions to it* it will only 
indicate a broader view of criteria which we wish to embrace. Even 
if I grant the possibility that in some cases a criterion may thus 
coincide with a necessary condition I contend that this is no reason 
to confuse, or try to identify, the two. This confusion would be 
symptomatic of the more general confusion of criteria and definition. 
For, like the latter, this confusion would mislead us into thinking 
that in the absence of a criterion one would be justified - mx nay, 
rather logically bound - to deny the truth of what it is the criterion 
of. And this on my account of criteria, is a definite mistake. (In the 
very few cases of the described coincidence, some criteria may be "pri­
vileged" but it is important to see that not all criteria are and that 
not any need be ).
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Section (ii) Bernard ’.Villi"ms: Hnaflv
It has been seen that one enters into difficulties if one tries to 
define personal identity or wants to know what its meaning is. So the 
proper question to be asked, it was argued, is: how do we know, or what 
evidences can we have, that a later person is the same person as an 
earlier person? And our deliberations in the last section has shorn that 
the evidence(s) sought is a special kind of evidence which, under normal 
circumstances, will necessarily show that the later person and the earlier 
person are one and the same person. Such evidences, which we have iden­
tified with what technically are called criteria, are mainly (though not 
necessarily .only) two in the present case: bodily continuity and the 
continuity (strictly, similarity) of memory-claims, character, personality 
etc«* Usually, two non-contemporaneous persons are judged to be identical 
on the basis of bodily continuity and/or of memory continuity. Considera­
tions of the latter has occupied the prime place in the traditional 
theories of personal identity, so much so that the bodily considerations 
have got little or no place at all in these theories. The standard 
explanation given of this is Cartesianism. But even for those who do not 
rejoice over any form of Cartesianism or near-Cartesianism, psychological 
considerations like those of memory and personal characteristics, still 
figure primarily since persons are said to have minds (Cartesians are 
not certainly wrong in this, however wrong they may be in what they said 
about this) and are capable of what is called higher-order thinking and 
intelligence.1 It is apparently for this reason, if not for the monotony 
of a non-physical or an essentially mental picture of persons, that the 
memory-continuity criterion still retains its importance in the theories 
of personal identity. And that is why memory-continuity is advocated to
♦The latter is usually referred to as the criterion of memory continuity 
and refers to similarity of memory-claims which may or may not be 
panied by that of character and/or personality etc. may not be accom-
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be a strong and important criterion of personal identity. Many in fact 
¿o advocate that it is not only the primary criterion but also the sole
criterion of personal identity. To such theories, bodily continuity is 
at best a secondary criterion.
A very fundamental limitation of such theories, which conems the 
principle of identity itself, has been exposed in recent times by Bernard 
Williams. In a very influential article called "Personal Identity and 
Individuation*^2 Williams argued that bodily continuity is a necessary 
condition of personal identity and more particularly, that continuity 
(similarity) of memory could not be a sufficient condition of it.* This 
he tried to show by pointing out the absurdity that follows if similarity 
of memory and character etc were taken to be sufficient condition of 
personal identity. He asked us to imagine that a certain person, say 
Charles, undergoes a sudden change and acquires characteristics which are 
exactly like those of a person, say Guy Fawkes, known to have lived in the 
distant past. Charles is to be further supposed to be making sincere 
memory claims which, when checked by records, entirely fit the life of Guy 
Fawkes. This may tempt one to say that these conditions are sufficient to 
identify Charles with Fawkes. But, Williams argued, they are not. For if 
it is (logically) possible for one person, Charles, to undergo the des­
cribed change, it is also (logically) possible for another person, say 
Robert, to undergo simultaneously an exactly similar change. And if the 
conditions were sufficient to say that Charles is the same person as Fawkes 
they should as well be sufficient to say that Robert too is the same person
♦Williams has argued that memory cannot be a sufficient *
identity and that therefore bodily identity isalways a necessary condit^20*731 
The "therefore" does not seem to follow. But it follows from that 
together with the other premise that bodily identity and memor) c J n S t y  
are the only two criteria that are.there for personal identity. nulty
-  114 -
as Fawkes. But it cannot be both that Charles is identical with Fawkes 
and that Robert is. For in that case Charles and Robert,two contemporary 
(and hence different) persons,would be identical,and this is absurd. This 
absurdity could be avoided(i.e.,one could try to avoid it) by abandoning 
one or both of tbrf assertionst "Charles is Fawkes" and "Robert is Fawkes". 
Williams argued that it would be"vacuous" to assert one of these 
assertions and abandon the other, since,ex hypothesl. there would be 
nothing to choose between them; hence the natural course would be to 
abandon both. And therefore,he argued, it would be as vacuous to make 
identity judgment when Charles alone undergoes the change as it is in the 
reduplication case. It follows from this that memory-continuity (in the 
relevant sense outlined in the beginning) cannot be a sufficient condition 
of personal identity. Further, that it cannot be a criterion of identity 
in the first place is pleaded by Williams by invoking an important principle 
which a supposed criterion of identity must satisfy. The principle is 
that identity is a logically one-one relation,and so,that no principle 
can be a criterion of identity if it relies on a relation that is not 
logically one-one. (A relation is logically one-one if and only if it can 
relate an earlier £  to one and only one later £  - whatever £  may stand for). 
It is evident that the mempry criterion of personal identity does not 
satisfy this requirement. For Williams’ argument has made it clear that 
»making the same memory-claims and/or having similar character and person­
ality as» is a relation that is logically many-one,and that in this respect 
many contemporaneous persons can claim to he identical with one particular 
person at the same time.
Williams» argument has since remained a substantial setback for any
form of memory-theory; and the recent talk of "non-branching psychological 
relations" 5 seems to be only desperate attempt‘at salvaging it. The fact
is that any theory that leaves room for reduplication must be abandoned;and
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the truth is that the memory criterion does leave such room, (it will be 
argued later on that "non-branching psychological relation" theories do 
not quite succeed in ruling this out).
Besides proving the deficiency of the memory criterion (and that even 
as a criterion of identity), Williams also wanted to show (if the latter 
did not show, or was not enough to show, this) that bodily continuity (which 
he_S£ec.ified, includes spatio-temporal continuity) is a necessary condition 
of personal identity. For the principle of identity, or rather the test of 
an identity-criterion, which he formulated and which the memory-criterion 
failed to satisfy, accommodated the bodily criterion beyond any reasonable 
doubt. "Having the same body as" is a relation which is logically one-one 
and cannot,without contradition, relate more than one person (at any 
particular time) to an earlier person. Moreover, it is only in respect of 
bodily continuity that one can distinguish between identity and exact 
similarity in the case of persons. We can easily say which two (non- 
contemporaneous) persons are identical (namely, those who have the same 
body) and which persons are exactly similar, but not identical (those 
having different bodies). Yet this we could not say if similarity of 
memory-claims and of personal characteristics were our criterion of 
personal identity. For not only that one and the same person can display 
similarity of memory etc, but two (or twenty or two thousand) different 
persons can also display the same - even at the very same time - as is 
evident from Williams' case of Charles-Robert/l^wkes. The fact is that 
without spatio-temporal continuity (which cannot intelligibly apply in 
the case of memory and character in absolute exclusion of the body) the 
notion of identity or sameness is not intelligible; and if we do speak 
of same memory we can only mean "exactly similar memory" by it for that 
is what it means. But, as Williams rightly claimed, "same body" and 
"exactly similar body" really do make a difference.4 And following this,
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one can say that •same body* does point to the same person as distinct 
from an exactly similar person, whereas there can strictly be no ‘same 
memory* to point to the same person: all we are entitled in a memory 
theory,is only to talk of persons at different times that they are exactly 
similar, but of no two of whom can we have any ground or justification 
for saying that they are the same.
The conclusion we are expected to draw from these considerations i3 
that memory-continuity cannot be a sufficient condition of personal 
identity and hence that bodily continuity is a necessary condition of the 
latter. Nevertheless 7/illiams does not rule out entirely the possibility 
that a later person should be identified with an earlier person without 
reference to a body. But, he claimed, "it is a necessary condition of 
making the supposed identification on non-bodily grounds (i.e. on the basis 
solely of the memory-criterion) that at some stage identification should 
be made on bodily grounds".5 This is presumably to harp upon the well- 
known claim that the memory-criterion is only a secondary criterion of 
personal identity and is dependent on the continuity of body of the person 
whose identity is in question.* Williams' argument for this seems to be 
that if a later person claims to remember what an earlier person (_£ ) 
had done, identification can be made by checking if had done what £ 
claims to have done; and this checking is possible only by reference to 
witnesses of j^’s activities, and these witnesses must have seen jj.j's body 
the continuity of which must be relied on "in order for their accounts to 
be connected into the history of one person.’*6 What this means is perhaps 
that the witness who had observed body being involved in the remembered 
action must presume that *his body is spatio-temporally continuous with the
•The nature and force of this argument will be brought out more elaborated 
in the next section and also m  Ch 4 sec iii. ■rateiy
✓
.  117 _
body of J22 in order that the latter may be said to remember (in the strong 
sense of that word) having done the action: if that presumption is known 
to_be false (as in the case of Charles/Guy Fawkes) then jd2's memory- 
claim would turn out to be merely apparent, and judgment of identity 
withdrawn, .fhis is not to beg any question. ibr the argument here is 
not J22 ¿SBSmbera x (what ^  did), therefore ^  is the same person as £
(who did x) but rather: p2 claims to remember x, it is reasonable to 
believe that he is remembering, therefore it is reasonable to believe (or 
say) that ^  is the same person as ^  (This is all we are entitled to say, 
for a criterion never entails the truth of what it is a criterion of, sec 
last section). Speaking generally, it is only because there is such a 
thing as real memory that memory-criterion (memory-claims, not real 
remembering, see Williams Ibid p 4) is used as a criterion of personal 
identity at all, i.e.,a memory-claim creates the presumption that it may be
real remembering and so points reasonably to personal identity. But a real
remembering there can be only if the person 'remembering* an action or an 
event was physically present to do the action or to witness the event in 
question, and this latter could be checked only by observing the contin­
uity of the body (or, at least the brain, as we will argue later on) that
was involved in the remembered act or event, up to the time when the
action is remembered. If this is correct, then Williams rightly says that 
any claim that bodily considerations could be absolutely eliminated from 
the criteria of personal identity must fail.
One of the most perplexing counter-examples to the bodily identity 
theory are the putative cases of bodily interchange or bodily transfer.
Williams is found to come to grips with such alleged possibilities at
7several places. But nowhere he seems to have been as successful on this 
score as he generally has been in his attack against mcmory-claim3 being 
the sufficient condition of personal identity. As a matter of fact one 
rather gets the impression that he has given a much larger concession to
the change-of-body hypothesis in his otherwise prominent paper 'The Self 
and the Future", rather than providing any very strong argument against 
it. In general, Williams' arguments against this possibility scans to 
have been two-fold. One aspect of his argument seems to draw force from 
an appeal to our logical intuitions: although certain situations could be 
so conceived as to earn the "change of body" description up to a certain 
extent, still there are what he calls "logical limits" to the thinkability 
of such situations. A second aspect of Williams' arguments relates to 
what the original persons can expect with regard to their own future; 
though on the face of it the change-of-body hypothesis is not to be 
entirely ruled out, yet it cannot be taken for granted and that, being 
faced with a proposal to undergo such a process (of alleged change of body),
0each "original" person would perhaps like to take the "risk" of identi­
fying his future self with his present body and would accordingly choose 
all good things to happen to the person with that body (for as Williams 
took it, the theory may or may not be right). Both these arguments seem 
content to expose the supposed hypothesis as rather dubious than proving 
it to be impossible or implausible in any way. I want to suggest that 
even as such attempts they are not quite successful. We must now consider 
the arguments one after another.
The first argument allows it to be possible that two persons, an 
emperor and a peasant, say, may (or may be made to) have each other's 
memories, character and personality etc; but it finds difficulty in the 
possible display of the latter. "How could the peasant's gruff blas­
phemies be uttered in the emperor's cultivated tones?"* Williams asks.
And similar considerations go for features like facial expressions and 
characteristic smiles (see Ibid p 12). Neither the emperor's face could 
express the "morose suspiciousness" of the peasant, Williams claims, nor 
could the peasant (his face) wear the "characteristic smile" of the
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emperor. Consequently, neither could be the same sort of person as the 
other and, so it is argued, bodily interchange cannot be taken for granted. 
Now, the first thing that suggests itself is that none of these limita­
tions is "logical" in any sense. The above situations may be unthinkable 
(if it means unimaginable by some or many or most), but not (logically) 
impossible - or, perhaps they are not even unthinkable in the above sense 
(for can't many imagine them to happen?). There are cases of plastic 
surgery by which these difficulties (which, pace Williams, are merely 
empirical) could be overcome. Moreover if actings and mimicries are often 
quite accurate, to the point of being delusive, there are no logical 
difficulties as to why they cannot be perfectly so as to look as if they 
are not acting but indeed personality change (for is this not what would 
suffice for Williams)? The second thing about it is that even if Williams 
is right about the limitations one still fails to see how far they count 
against the bodily-exchange hypothesis. It rather seems plausible that 
these limitations need not disturb the proponent of the change of body 
hypothesis, since he is a memory theorist for whom the continuity of 
bodily features is utterly inessential. All that matters for him is that 
the peasant-body-person has the memories and character of the (sometime) 
emperor and vice versa; and this Williams would apparently allow to be 
possible.* And as regards the exchange of character and personality, the 
satisfaction of this requirement^ is not necessarily hindered by the lack 
of the relevant physical features. Would it not he enough, for example,
*It is evident from the fact, indicated earlier, that Williams made greater 
allowance for this in his "The Self and the Future".
¿The satisfaction of this requirement»though5is not necessary to a memory 
theory of personal identity. As noted in the beginning, similarity of  ^
memory claims may or may not be accompanied by that of character and/or 
personality etc.
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if the present emperor-body person displays a natural skill in farming 
and harvest prediction and the present peasant-body-person shows acute 
interest in politics and governance? Moreover, even to a bodily theorist, 
continuity of physical features like characteristic smiles and grimaces 
are not essential to personal identity. If I survive a fire and retain 
a badly burnt face, I cannot smile the characteristic smile I used to; 
but that does not make me a different person (i certainly do not expect 
any bodily theorist to say that). Finally, one does not (in these 
respects or in any other) have to be the same sort of person in order to 
be the same person. What one may become is a changed personality - which 
admittedly is a different matter.
The second point in Williams' argument is brought out by presenting 
two alternative descriptions of a thought experiment which is designed to 
effect a mutual transfer of memories and character etc, between two persons 
without letting any part of their bodies to be altered or exchanged.
(Hence the plea for a special device of information - transfer from their 
brains). ^  If the result of the experiment is complete reversal of the 
personal memories and characteristics with striking accuracy, as in fact 
is shown by Williams first picture of the experiment, then the "change-of- 
body" description of the situation might seem quite plausible, i.e. if the 
original persons are A and B and if after the experiment the A-body-person 
displays all the "B-ish” characters and makes memory claims that fit the 
life of B* and vice versa, then A and B might plausibly be said to have 
exchanged bodies. But, indeed, this cannot so surely be the correct 
description of the situation - particularly if one of the persons to be 
experimented upon is oneself. This Williams tried to show in his second
*It is to be understood also that this person does not display any of the 
characteristics and iremoiy-claims that formerly went with A (and vice
we have called an alter-picture of the situation. This picture, which 
native description of the thought experiment, purportedly exploits the 
incompatibility - or, at least the indeterminacy - of the relation between 
one’s expectations with regard to one’s future aufthe change-of-body 
hypothesis. The expectation considered here is that of future (bodily) 
torture or, simply, pain. Williams' purpose here is to emphasize the 
fact that if physical torture is going to be inflicted on ny present body 
then I am going to feel the pain, and nothing about my future psychological 
condition will remove or reduce my feeling of fear - not the assurance 
that I will not remember having been told about it, nor that I will not 
remember anything about my past and that, before the infliction of the 
torture I will have a completely different set of memories, nor even that 
I will acquire the "memories" of someone else who, by a similar operation, 
will have "my" memories. (The quotations in this sentence are used to 
present as neutral a description of the situation as possible, and not to 
beg any question). On the contrary, it is argued, my feeling of fear will 
be onfy compounded at the propspect of suffering from mental derangements 
and unexpected torture. It seems to follow, therefore, that despite the 
alleged prospects of a complete psychological change or even exchange 
with someone else, one still will (is likely to) be concerned over what 
is going to happen to one’s present body (or to the person with that body). 
And this means that, given this description of the situation, the bodily- 
exchange hypothesis cannot be taken any seriously, and that mental 
identity cannot be so sure a glide to personal identity as bodily identity 
is.
Thus, Williams gave two alternative descriptions of the thought 
experiment designed to effect memory-and-character exchange; and whereas 
the first description, carried in third-personal terms, pointed to the 
mental identity criterion (bodily-exchange) the second one - carried in
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first personal terms - pointed to the bodily identity criterion of
personal identity(this fact has been pinpointed by Williams on p 62 of
Problems of ¿he...Self ).But the experiment, in order that it may establish
a reliable theory, must not lead to different results - when carried upon 
others and upon me. For it is not only the case that personal identity
means the same in both cases, it is also not desirable that the criteria
of personal identity should be different depending on whether or not the 
person is oneself. It seems reasonable, therefore, that Williams should
be reluctant to accept the •change-of-body» hypothesis despite its 
seeming so plausibly to follow from his first picture. As he claimed,there 
seems to be nothing wrong with his second description of the thought exp­
eriment so that we may be persuaded to accept the first in preference to 
the second. Without in fact much bothering to argue for the acceptability 
of his second description of the experiment, a bodily theorist as he is, 
Williams gives his preference for it simply on the ground that it needs 
to be shown - what is wrong with it (jd p 63) - though admitting that 
his choice is "risky”.
Or, perhaps, he did have some arguments to substantiate his
preference. Earlier in the same paper, he had claimed that "memory is a
causal notion, and ... it seems a necessary condition of x‘s present 
knowledge of x’s earlier experiences constituting memory of these
experiences that the causal chain linking the experiences and the
knowledge should not run outside x's body".10 and, that our thought
experiment did not provide for this condition to be satisfied (of Ibid 
p 56). But without this condition being satisfied, my "new" memories” '
(induced in me by means of the experiment) can hardly count as memories j
of a different person, and I would be clumsily hovering over the boarder- !
line between being the person with that other body and being merely a 
clairvoyant, but nevertheless the same person as the one with my present
- body.Thia is the element of »risk»that is involved.And onoe againXeetion I
of identity and exact similarity would return, the new set of memories 
induced m  me may at best make me a person exactly similar (in that 
respect) to my coparticipant in the experiment; but surely the oWious 
discontinuity (non-identity) of our bodies will show that I am not him. 
And since the choice here is either that X will be the same person ITthe 
person with the other body or that I will be the same person as the person 
with my present body, it would surely be reasonable to think that the 
latter is the case, even after the experiment has been successfully 
performed. Thus the change-of-body proposal is ruled out and this would 
explain Williams* preference for the second description.
It will be said that the change-of-body proposal is not logically 
ruled out since the supposed ground of its dismissal is not logically 
necessary. In other words, it will be said that it is not a necessary 
truth that memory is a casual notion and more particularly that the casual 
chain involved in it must run through the rememberer's body. This is true 
and most widely agreed. But from what has just been said above it will 
appear that this principle, though logically contingent in itself, is in­
dispensable to the possibility and reasonableness of an important sphere 
of discourse. This is what may be called a 'transcendental argument'11 
in favour of the said principle. If the latter is not accepted as true, 
we cannot possibly tell memory from apparent memory or mere seeming memory. 
The last distinction is a conceptual distinction, and this will be oblit­
erated if the two concepts of memory and seeming memory could not be 
possibly differentiated in their application to the world. But as have 
just been seen above, without a casual explanation of the said type we will 
have no justification whatsoever for making any such differentiation 
Further, in view of the logical connection between memory and personal 
identity, memory would cease to be a criterion of the latter, since it 
could never justify anyone in saying that a later person is the same
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person as an earlier person. Jor no knowledge that people remember can 
ever be obtained. This will, thus, be too high a prioe to be paid if we 
are not to acoept the desoribed casual principle of memory. And If this 
• is so, the alleged ohange-of-body hypothesis will have a double disadvan­
tage since.the only criterion of bodily continuity being inapplicable here 
it cannot be put forward as a reasonable hypothesis of personal identity 
(or non-identity).
Now, of the two arguments Williams put forward against the ohange-of- 
body hypothesis the second, outlined in the paragraph before the last, is 
more convincing and less vulnerable than the first, and that it can be 
more reasonably substantiated to show that the change-of-body hypothesis 
is at least highly dubious. Yet for the success of this argument Williams 
seems to rely heavily on a principle which, even by some of his own 
admissions, does not seem to be so sound as one would wish it to be. The 
principle is: "my undergoing physical pain in the future is not excluded 
by any psychological state I may be in at the time" (Probiems of th* 
p 53). Were it that this was always true! Williams himself envisaged 
possible exceptions to this principle (and consequently, we should add, 
to his second picture of the experiment): Suppose A suffers from 
acrophobia and scywhen he is told that he is going to be thrown off a 
steep mountain he is horrified. But if he is told that before being thrown 
he is going to be completely cured of acrophobia then, Williams agrees, he 
will not fear the fall or at least "will not have the same grounds of fear". 
And to this he promptly adds, "physical pain ... is absolutely minimally 
dependent on character or belief. No amount of change in my character or 
my belief would seem to affect .substantially (my emphasis) the nastiness 
of torture applied to me" (p 54). But if the intensity of fear would be 
still affected to sqme._extent by the change of my character etc, why could 
it not be possible for it to be totally affected? In the above case
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acrophobia was the cause of the Tear of the fall from a mountain', and 
it was eradicated by the eradication of acrophobia. But, Williams is 
content to point out, there would still be fear - though not the same 
ground for it. But can we not think of the possibility that psychologists 
could trace fear (the general feeling) to some sort of psychological ^ 
condition so that by the eradication of that condition one could be 
completely cured of fear? That this is thinkable and, hence, logically 
possible can be a fair reason against Williams' thesis about physical 
torture and fear for that and yet a lot seems to depend on that thesis i„ 
order for Williams' second argument against the change-of-body hypothesis 
to succeed. However, the more important question, I think, is not whether 
I am going to feel the pain (that is going to be inflicted upon my 
present body in the future), but <**her the person in this body will be a 
different person if I don't. And although the answer to the former 
question may be indeterminate or possibly "no", the answer to the latter 
is quite certainly -NO«. People are often anaesthetised or they become 
mentally deranged, but for that reason they don't cease to be the persons 
they used to be nor do they become different persons. What prevents this 
latter consequence from being deduced is the continuity of their bodies; 
and therefore indeed it seems that whether or not my reaction to the 
experiment's proposal is fear (and accordingly, whether or not I think that 
I am going to feel the pain) this has very little to do - if at all - with 
the present-bodied-person's being the same person as me or a different 
one after the experiment. (Williams' long drawn argument in his second 
description of the experiment - designed to neutralise the force of a 
•change-of-body' picture made plausible by his first - seems hardly to have 
served his purpose. If he saw "nothing wrong" with his second description 
our immediately preceeding analysis should have indicated that something 
is wrong). All that is needed is a rather straightforward demonstration
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that bodily continuity la necessary condition for personal identity which 
would definitely deny the bodily interohen^ hypothesis rather than 
malting it just dubious! and I do not think Williams has ever succeeded in 
doing this. In what follows, I shall try to make such an idea plausible 
by utilising elements drawn from Williams' arguments. In this attempt,
I shall be making a slight modification in the concept of -bodily contin­
uity' which, however, I shall claim tc be quite oompatibie with Williams' 
basic commitments. Bore particularly, I shall tzy to show that the 
puzzle-situations that suggest bodily transfer (and so threaten the 
necessity of bodily identity) are either implausible or, If not, are such 
that one can always explain than in terms of bodily continuity In the 
particular sense which I shall be giving to the latter.
How there can be two* types of puzzle situations suggesting that a 
bodily transfer has taken place. The first type,which owes its tradition­
al origin to Locke12 and which In recent times has been contemplated bv 
13Quinton, among others, works upon the mere possibility of an apparent 
change-of-body evidenced by the accurate display of memory-claims and 
character etc of the first person in what used to be the second person's 
body and vice versa - "mere" possibility, because the proponent of such 
hypothesis does not say how this alleged change has taken place (let us 
call this the "naive thesis" of change-of-body). The second type of 
situations suggesting a bodily interchange does have an explanation as to 
how it has come about, namely, that the brains of the two persons have 
been inter-transplanted (let us call it the "scientific thesis" of chan-e- 
of-body). This type of cases have been advocated by Shoemaker, among 
others, in his Self. Knowledge and Self Identity (pp 23-24).
*A third can also be contemplated, but can be 
way. We shall come to that a little later. more easily got out of our
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Any proposal to ¿escribe these cases as cases of bodily transfer
carries with it the implication that jhe memory claims made by the (later)
persons concerned are genuine memories, for it is solely this presumption
that gives sense to the change-of-body hypotheses in the first place. But
we have already seen the importance of the fact that genuine memories must
satisfy a casual condition which requires that the casual chain linking
the present knowledge ("memory”) and the earlier experience (that is being
"remembered") must not run outside the body of the rememberer. But ex
toothesi, with two numerically distinct bodies in the case of each
"rememberer" and with no casual link whatsoever between these bodies, the
Lockean-Quintonian type of cases cannot satisfy this requirement for
memory claims being real memories. It is on this ground, as we saw
the *
Williams would dismiss/"naive thesis" as implausible. This condition,
however, is satisfied by what we have called the "scientific thesis”
which, only with that motive, introduced the inter-transplantation of
brains. Of course Williams will still not call them «clear cases« of
bodily transfer.14 What I shall try to suggest is that, call them by any
name you like, change-of-body or otherwise, the important fact is that the
plausibility of these alleged cases is always compatible with the necessity
of bodily continuity and, therefore, that the purported suggestion that all
these possibilities show the memory criterion to be the sole or even the
primary criterion of personal identity is just mistaken.
But before I proceed to do this I will mention a third type of 
possibility (apart from the two accepted for consideration) that may 
suggest a bodily transfer and the consequent primacy of the memory .crit­
erion. This is being mentioned not to be persued any further but simply 
to get it out of our way. This type of possibility suggests that memory 
and character may be transferred from one person to another - not by 
brain transfer nor by the transfer of any bodily part, but by means of a
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transfer of information between brains. Such a possibility was contem­
plated by Williams himself - somewhat vaguely in his "The Self and the 
Future" and quite elaborately in "Are Persona Bodies"? It is imagined 
that all the information may be taken out of and kept in a special 
storage device, and then put back into my brain (say after cleaning or 
repairing the latter): it is also imagined that instead of the informa­
tion being put back into my brain it might as well be put into someone 
else's brain with the result (it is supposed) that out of (what normally 
would be called) the other person’s lips came the memory-claims that are 
not "his" but "my" memories. (Similar operation can simultaneously be 
carried out in the reverse direction so that "his" memories would come 
out of "my" lips). Now the merit of this type of case as cases of 
alleged bodily exchange seems to be that it purports to overcome the 
difficulty concerning the casual requirement of memory discussed above. 
For, As Williams admitted "... at least we can be clear that passage of 
information via the device is not in itself incompatible with the later 
knowledge’s being memory.»15 But here again the price to be paid for this 
advantage would be too high; for there will, in that case, be no guarantee 
against the possibility that the information from the 'special device* 
may not be passed on to many different brains housed in the bodies of 
many persons, and because of this possibility of reduplication there will 
not be identity  in the first place. (This, incidentally, shows that for 
the purpose of personal identity the satisfaction of the casual condition 
of memory, though necessary, is not sufficient.) Thus, the third type of 
bodily-interchange hypothesis fares no better than the first in estab­
lishing personal identity on the basis of memory claims.
Back now to the Shoemaker-type cases, which we have called the 
'scientific thesis' and which not only satisfies the casual requirement
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of memory but also is immune from the possibility of reduplication.* For
if we agree to say in such a case that B is (or has now become) the same
person as A, we would do so on the ground that B displays the same memory-
and character etc as did A because B's body contains now the same brain
as A's body did; and further it cannot be the case that there be two
bodies (or more), each containing precisely the same brain (A's brain) at
16
the same time. In such a case, Williams says, the judgments of personal 
identity "might reasonably" go the way of the character-and-memory traits 
and if so, he adds "we would here have a divergence from bodily identity".1^ 
But, as promised earlier, I shall now try to suggest, on what I shall 
claim to be essentially Williams-type grounds, that this description of 
the case is compatible with .the necessity of the bodily identity criterion. 
To this jhrrpose, I shall approach the case with its exact way of presenta­
tion and^alysis as was originally offered by Shoemaker: Two persons, 
Robinson and Brown, have undergone a brain operation and by mistake (after 
the necessary cleaning of the skulls etc), Brown's brain has been placed 
in Robinson's skull and the latter's brain in the former's skull. One of 
them immediately dies and the other, with Brown's brain and Robinson's 
body, eventually survives; Shoemaker calls this person Brownson. Brownson 
makes all the memory claims and displays character and personality etc that 
only the late Brown could have done; he recognises the dead body as his 
body and disowns the body which, as it were, he now "inhabits". This 
case, if it could come to pass at all, has been designed to show that 
Brownson is really Brown and hence that personal identity is based on the 
mental criteria - there being nothing of bodily continuity excepting the 
continuity of (Brown*s) brain. But then, in the event of such a situation
*So it will be if/takes,” as it does, the whole brain ------- —
personal identity. In case of split-brain , to be the bearer of
reduplication would reappear, and I have f u r t h e ^ o *  the difficulty of 
latter type cases will not be reasonable cases S to Say that thenext section). Cases of change-of-body (see
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occurring, I do not see anything "absurd" (pace Shoemakerl8 ) ln saying 
that brain continuity is our criterion of personal identity here. It is 
an established fact that the brain plays the central role in the "essential 
and characteristic vital functions" of a person, and it would be only fair 
where in strange but plausible cases like this, neither the bodily con­
tinuity (continuity of the whole body) criterion nor the memory-continuity 
criterion seems satisfactory,to take the continuity of the brain as the 
"individuating neucleus". And if this explanation is right and acceptable, 
bodiiX continuity (i.e. continuity of the brain) would still be a necessary 
condition of personal identity. Shoemaker rejects this explanation as 
absurd on the following ground: if the outcome of his brain-transfer 
operation were different and if Brownson were to act and talk like Robinson 
"surely none would say that this man who looks and acts and talks- just 
like Robinson and has what has always been Robinson's body, must really be 
Brown rather than Robinson because he has Brown's brain".19 True, no one 
would or should call this new person Brown, in this changed situation? but 
why can't we call him Robinson now? For to be sure, here we have not only 
bodily continuity (in the more familiar sense) but also psychological 
continuity to our advantage! Presumably what for Shoemaker would count 
against our calling him Robinson is the lack of the close casual relation­
ship that Is supposed to hold between the state of a man's brain and his 
psychological features. But why should this be so pushing m  a puzzle 
situation like this? After all, as Shoemaker himself saw, ''whatever 
relationship there is between the state of one's brain and the state of 
one's mind (i.e. one's psychological features) Is surely casual and 
contingent, not logically necessaiy",20 and hence it is fairly conceivable 
(logically possible) for the relationship not to hold. Moreover, if It is 
conceivable (logically possible) for a man (for this man whom we propose 
to call Robinson) to display the same psychological features os he used 
to have even without his own brain and with somebody else's brain this
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would be a clear ease of the usual (casual) relationships not holding, 
After this nothing should prevent us from saying that Brownson is the 
same person as Robinson. Of course this would still leave us with the 
difficulty of explaining what, if not the brain, is then the seat of 
memory and consciousness etc under this situation. I do not know the 
answer,and perhaps nobody does, in a single case like this. But let us 
try to generalise the case and imagine that both the post-operative persons 
in Shoemaker's example survive and behave as usual" i.e. Brown (with 
Robinson's brain) as Brown and Bobinson (with Brown's brain) as Eobinson. 
let us also imagine a world where these things are of frequent occurrence 
so that they are no longer to be taken as puzzle cases in this world. 
Certainly in such a world our existing hypothesis that brain is tho seat 
of memory and other mental oapaoities (let us call them all "personal 
faculties) would be just false. Perhaps it would be reasonable to suppose 
that in such a world, the seat of the personal faculties would be somewhere 
in the human body and that the brain (anj brain) aots simply as a catalyst, 
as it were, to activate it so that onljr with a brain (and not without any) 
a person may be able to exercise his personal faculties. Admittedly, such 
a description would be upsetting to our currently accepted theories of 
mind-brain relationships and of personal identity, but why should we try 
to apply our standards in this type of a world which is not recognizably 
ours? If we are certainly entertaining the possibility of a different 
world, we should "bear in mind the notion of open texture and the 
Wittgensteinean idea that how a given ocourrence or state of affairs should 
be described depends not on the occurrence or the state but also on 
surrounding circumstances."21 Thus, if what is said in the foregoing is 
right, it is shown thatfcodily continuity as a necessary condition of 
personal identity can very well be said to obtain also in puzzle cases 
like Shoemaker's and in my amended version of it (both of which will fall 
under what we have called the "scientific thesis" of alleged change-of-body)
- 152 -
I am fully conscious that while giving my above account of bodily
continuity I have been using the latter in quite a different sense - not
particularly in the sense in which Williams wanted to make it a necessary
condition of personal identity. More particularly, I have been taking
the continuity of the brain (and for that matter, of any bodily part) -
not necessarily of the whole body* - as bodily continuity.
My plea for doing this is to strengthen Williams* arguments - to present
what I think to be a more consistent and persuasive form of Williams-type
arguments. For I think that it is the basic purpose of Williams in
arguing for the necessity of bodily continuity criterion that it (bodily
continuity) involves spatio-temporal continuity. That Williams emphasizes
spatio-temporal continuity for personal identity has been hinted at earlier
and comes out most expressedly in the following passage, where he sets
out to argue that since spatio-temporal continuity is "interfered with"
22in the case of fission, judgments of identity should be withheld in
such cases. Outlining an apparent objection (issuing from the fission
cas^ to his criterion of spatio-temporal continuity he says:
"... it may be said ... that even a criterion of identity in 
terms of spatio-temporal continuity on which I lay the weight 
for personal identity is itself not immune to . this possibility 
(of redeuplication EK2i)l23 (my emphasis).
It would seem quite plausible, therefore, that for Williams, what is 
important for personal identity is spatio-temporal continuity and that if 
for him, bodily continuity and personal identity must go hand in hand, 
this is because, under all normal circumstances, spatio-temporal continuity 
of a person can apply (or is applicable) only to the continuity of his 
body. In view of this, our modification in the concept of ’bodily
*1 have stronger arguments to show that the idea of ’whole bortv* v_
mamtamed and is not necessary to personal identitv ~ Tll th.lt 7 1section. J xnis 1X1 next
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continuity* will not impugn Williams' scheme of things, since continuity 
of the brain serves basically the same purpose which the continuity of 
the whole body was designed to serve: preserving spatio-temporal 
continuity.* This should rather be a welcome procedure, for in certain 
abnormal cases like what we have called the 'scientific thesis', where 
it might be reasonable (as Williams said it is) to say that personal 
identity should go the way of memoiy-and-character, identity can readily 
be explained in terms of bodily (brain, or any other bodily part that 
played the same causal role as the brain) continuity and not in terms 
of memory-and-character continuity - much less in terms of the latter 
solely or even primarily. If it can be so expressed, memory-continuity 
in such cases, would be the effect,not the cause,of personal identity, 
whereas bodily continuity (in our modified sense) would be the cause of 
personal identity. Or, if you like, memory continuity would be due to 
personal identity while personal identity would be due to bodily continuity 
Given this modified version of bodily continuity, a Williams-type 
theory of personal identity would run roughly as follows: spatio-temporal 
continuity of the body, or rather the part thereof which is causally 
responsible for the personal faculties' (memory, character, personality etc) 
is always a necessarycondition of personal identity; similarity of 
memory and character-traits alone and unsupported by any casual explana­
tion is not even a sufficient condition of personal identity.
This theory will have the merit of explaning all the normal cases of 
personal identity; it will also explain the abnormal cases where judgment 
of personal identity has reasonableness and the relevant causal support.
The theory will have the following consequences - consequences which
Z f l a i i r *  iS  3 ne0essary conaitlon. -o t su ffic ien t,, but of
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Williams is obliged to entertain, yet which, because of his limited 
notion of bodily continuity, Williams failed to embraces change-of-body 
will be ruled out as logically impossible. If a situation could be so 
created viz, by the physical transfer of brains, "change-of-body-minus- 
brain" would of course be the only correct description of the situation; 
but this would NOT mean a divergence from the bodily identity-criterion 
since something importantly* bodily is still continued. Nor - and more 
importantly - will it show (what the proponents of the bodily transfer 
hypothesis claimed it shows) that memory-and-character continuity is the 
onl£ or at least the primary criterion of personal identity.
Thus presented, Williams» position - and for that matter any correct 
bodily identity theory - is clear and straightforward. Yet there is one 
very recent attack against Williams which must be considered; the effect 
of considering this will, I believe.,show not only the strength of 
Williams’ position but also a successful application of the principle 
underlying our account of the bodily continuity theory. This attack 
has been levelled by Professor Vesey in his book Personal Td^nt^y.
The attack is significant not because of any merit it has but because 
of its claim to have utilised the causal aspect of memory and other 
mental capacities, which we have seen to be so important for Williams' 
theory and for our (modified) account of bodily continuity. But we shall 
see that the attack is entirely mistaken and that the idea of the causal 
(or as Vesey calls it, »physical») basis of memory etc, which Vesey 
thought would work against Williams, does indeed defeat his objection and
^ o r t a n & g "  the standpoint of personal 1 m,
of this qualification has been suggest"reas'onably^el 1 ioaale
and something more of this is said in the earlier t?*® Sectiorsection. er pa£es of the next
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expose its barrenness.* Vesey used his attack pointedly against
Williams’ argument, adduced in his famous case of Charles - Robert / Guy
Fawkes, that similarity of memory claims etc, cannot be a sufficient
condition of personal identity. After arguing that neither of the
claimants can be identical with Fawkes, Williams concludes:
"so it would be best, if anything, to say that both had 
mysteriously become like Guy Fawkes, clairvoyantly knew 
about him, or something like this."*4
And (this is the gist of his argument)
"If this would be the best description of each of the 
two, why would it not be the best description of 
Charles if Charles alone were changed?"24
Vesey's first complaint against Williams seems to be that his case is
"far-fetched" and, as such, obscures the understanding of what it proves -
though it does prove "something".25 It is far fetched because, Vesey
thinks, it has no basis in what we know about the physical basis of
memory. To make the case a little "less far fetched" Vesey imagines
cases of bisected brain transplants (originally devised by Wiggins and
Shoemaker) and applies it to Williams* case by supposing that Guy Fawkes'
brain could be bisected and preserved after his execution and, later on, 
each half could go to what used to be Charles’ and Robert’s bodies - with 
the result that out of the lips of "Charles" and "Roberts" came the 
memory claims that fit the pattern of Guy Fawkes' life.
Before going to examine what Yesey thought to be the implication of 
this modified case on Williams' argument, a word about "far fetchedness". 
If Williams' original case was far fetched, in what way Yesey's case of 
bisected brain transplant is not? After all Vesey himself was once 
obliged to describe it as "rather fanciful" (ibid^n 85)' Then is a case
♦Since it is precisely the lack of this justification or one like it that 
made Williams say what he did, and if one such justification is provided 
he would not say that; - consequently the objection would be pointless
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being "far fetched" only a matter of degree? If so, where to draw the 
line? Perhaps the brain transplant case is not as hopeless as Williams* 
case is, and this is probably because the former can be practically 
possible (if Vesey's "post script" on p 86) and would thu3 provide a 
physical basis of memory. Granted that this is so, would it provide any 
logical guarantee that the brain _is the physical basis of memory? On the 
contrary. It will be recalled that we showed earlier that the seat of 
memory might be somewhere else in the body and a brain (any brain) might 
be only instrumental in activating it - so that it is fairly possible that 
despite having Fawke's brain fitted to his body Charles may make memory 
claims that fit his own life rather than that of Guy Fawkes. But if this 
is possible, it would disprove or at least undermine the purpose of the 
claim that brain is the physical basis of memory and other mental capacitie 
and hence Vesey's case of (bisected) brain transplant would lose its 
purpose. The fact is that a case being far-fetched is never a disadvantage 
of its being an instrument of philosophical arguments. As long as it is 
logically possible, it will do the trick; and so does williams' original 
case.
ITow, about Vesey's modified version of Williams' story and what 
impact he thinks it may have on the latter's argument. Vesey thinks that 
this modification will present Williams' question as follows:
"If there were a bisected brain transplant ... it would be 
absurd to say that the two people were both Guy Fawkes since 
it is absurd to say that Guy Fawkes is in two places at once 
and absurd to say that two people were identical with each 
ether. Father, there would be no reason for saying that one. 
rather than the other, was Guy Fawkes. So if there were whol^ 
brain transplant (all of Guy Fawkes' brain going into w h a t ^  
used to be Charles' body) would it not be vacuous to say ihat 
Charles is now Guy Fawkes?"2^ y Tnat
And he asks, why should it be vacuous? ify immediate reaction is that Vesey 
here is only shooting at a Strawman. For Williams never thought to - or 
at any rate never did - apply his argument by means of such type of cases, 
and when the situation is thus altered one doubts (and we have given'
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enough reason to doubt) whether he would still like to argue in the way 
Vesey thinks he would. Particularly, I do not think that he would say 
it is ''vacuous” to say that Charles (with the whole of Guy Fawkes' brain) 
is now Guy Fawkes. For the reason why (in his original case) he said 
that it would be "quite vacuous" to say that Charles is Guy Fawkes even 
if Charles alone were changed is that there would, be no "grounls"2^ for 
such indentification; but here with the whole of Guy Fawkes' brain trans­
planted into Charles' body there would be a very strong ground for such 
identification. Moreover, as I have shown, making identification in this 
case would not impugn Williams' claim that bodily identity and personal 
identity go hand in hand since strictly preserved here is spatio-temporal 
continuity (of something bodily - the brain) of which bodily identity is a 
specific case. And as regards bisected brain transplant case, it may not 
be "vacuous” to say that both the claimants are identical with Guy Fawkes, 
but saying that will take us from frying pan to fire, for firstly it will 
do violence to a very fundamental requirement of identity (which Williams 
so much stressed), namely that it is a logically one-one relation - the 
requirement which, incidentally, would secure the claim of whole-brain as 
the bearer of personal identity. (iTo two contemporaneous persons can be
coherently said to have the whole brain of a third person). And secondly,
28as Williams would argue, this case, being a fission-like case, would 
"interfere with" spatio-temporal continuity and therefore would force us 
to answer the identity question in the negative.
Yesey's attack appears more ineffective and unattractive when he goes 
on to answer Williams' question by taking the help from Parfit's sugges­
tions. Williams had argued that identity is a logically one-one relation 
and that "similarity of character and memory claims", if taken as 
sufficient condition of personal identity, would leave room for reduplica­
tion. Parfit tried to answer to this by suggesting that psychological
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continuity (which Vesey and, dubiously, Parfit take to be indistinct 
from similarity of memory claims) can serve as a criterion of identity 
vjhen_it_ lS_qne i.e. by claiming that "non-branching»' psychological 
continuity is logically one-one.29 Taking this hint from Parfit, Vesey 
suggests an answer to Williams' question by saying that Charles is iden­
tical with Guy Fawkes, "because in the case of Charles alone being changed 
the psychological continuity is non-branching".30 This argument is
extremely unattractive because Williams never used his argument - and 
never meant to use it - against the criterion of "psychological continuity" 
but against that of similarity/character and memory claims; and these two 
are not quite the same. I shall try to explain the difference. 
"Psychological continuity", as Parfit used the expression, is a technical 
expression which is not unsupported as mere similarity of memory claims 
is. On the contrary, as far as I have tried to understand it, psycholo­
gical continuity carries with it a causal support and indeed the support 
provided by the human brain. Parfit, who invented the expression as well 
as the idea, never used it - except in few of his unguarded moments, like 
the one under reference - to mean the same thing as mere unsupported 
memory claims. (Though it is rather strange that he himself takes the 
help of this concept to reply to Williams), We have ample evidence that
he used this expression in connection with fission, fusion and brain- 
transplants, all of which preserve spatio-temporal continuity - including 
causal continuity. That he used the expression more often in connection 
with brain transplants is evident from Yesey's own illustrations of Parfifs 
standpoint (see Personal,,Identity,pp 8 8 -8 9 ). And that the expression was
used by its author to be a causal notion can be evident from the following 
remarks of Parfit:
■ 1 shak  ®ssume that> efter I ate, God will create a re-lie, 
me ... Between me and the replica what relations holds? Thi 
answer rat psychological continuity with a special cause L  
normal, pause le (we believe) the contimiitv n. W ,e
(my emphasis) ■ Drain
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Again:
"... Nor does it matter in the slightest that the psychological 
continuity tail lack_its normal cause. All that L nZtlf  „
S re-;-3ie w ' ^ p h ^ i s ) 15 reaction  see:as
All this should be enough to make it clear that Williams never meant 
to apply his argument against the supposed criterion of psychological 
continuity in the technical sense in which Barfit and,following him, Vesey 
used it. As far as I have tried to find out, Williams never even used 
the expression "psychological continuity" in that sense. His , attack was 
rightly directed against the criterion of "similarity of character and 
memory claims" which it should by now be clear, is not the same as 
"psychological continuity". Now, given the case of the whole brain 
transplant and the consequent psychological continuity, Williams, I am 
quite sure, will not ask the question he asked about his Charles/Guy Ihwkes 
case; and moreover for the reasons we have given earlier, he probably 
would - or rather should - agree to call these cases, cases of identity.
It follows, therefore, that Yesey's answer (and also Parfit's, in 
so far as it is the same) to the Williams'question is an answer to a 
question that does not exist. And added to this, Vesey is certainly wrong 
in accusing that Williams, unlike Parfit,thinks that there is more to 
personal identity than non-branching psychological continuity.32 For in 
view of the distinction we have draw between "psychological continuity" 
and "similarity of memory claims", a more just and sympathetic reading of 
Williams would be: There is certainly more to personal identity than 
mere unsupported similarity of character and memoiy claims.
140 -
Section (ii4)t Shoemaker and Vising, a preference and a qualification.
We tried in the last section to make plausible the idea of bodily 
continuity being a necessary condition(and hence a "privileged" 
criterion, see pp 110 - m  above) of personal identity. But, it 
was argued, although Williams would be substantially right in holding 
this he would be wrong to insist that bodily continuity must be 
understood only in the sense of the continuity of the whole body. It 
is because of the latter, it was pointed out, that Williams failed to 
explain consistently a puzzle situation - or rather a type of puzzle 
situations( e.g. whole brain transfer c.ses)- which he nonetheless 
felt obliged to regard as plausible and reasonable, with a view to 
making Williams' account consistent, it was suggested that the spatio- 
temporal continuity of any part of the body should be counted as bodily 
continuity, since what matters in bodily continuity is spatio-temnor.i 
cgffJ&y&E which here would be well preserved. But even by Williams' 
own admissions bodily continuity(even in his sense) is not a sufficient 
condition of personal identity, "and other considerations, of personal
characteristics and , above all, memory, must be invoked".1 it is for 
this reaon we suggested that - at least if certain plausible and reaso­
nable situations so demand- the continuity of that part of the body, the 
brain, must explain the identity of persona, which is causally responsi­
ble for the memories and other mental capacities(we have proposed, for 
the sake of brevity, to use "personal faculties" to signify all these 
capacities of persons). As we saw, such modification in the concept of 
bodily continuity would not only be in the spirit of Williams' main 
thesis, it would make a more extensive theory of personal identity and 
would explain not only all normal cases but also some abnormal cases.
No. there ^  be two grina fade objection, to our ousted account
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of personal identity which must he got out of our way before we proceed 
further. The first is that in suggesting this type of explanation we 
have deviated from the bodily continuity criterion; and the second - which 
is basically related to and issues from the first - may be that we have 
espoused a form of conventionalism in proposing (as we may seem to be) 
different types of explanations of personal identity in different 
situations.
We can approach the first difficulty by reiterating our earlier 
claim that in talcing brain continuity as our criterion of personal iden­
tity we do not essentially diverge from the bodily continuity criterion 
since the former retains the spirit of the latter by preserving spatio- 
temporal continuity which, as was shown, Williams lays weight upon for 
personal identity. It is significant to note that what brain continuity 
preserves is not spatio-temporal continuity as such (if that can mean 
anything)» but spatio-temporal continuity of something bodily and, in the 
context of personal identity, something importantly or essentially so. In 
view of the last, it would be unreasonable to insist that bodily contin­
uity must mean the continuity only of the whole body. For what would 
Williams say if I lose one or some parts of my body e.g. a hand and/or a 
leg? That the post-bodily-change-person is a different person from the 
pre-bodily-change-person? I think not. And if I am right I will be also 
right in saying that what is important is not any actual part of my body 
but an essential part (or parts) of my body - essential in the role of 
the bearer of my personal identity. And for well-known scientific reasons, 
brain is this part of a person's body. Thus, so far as the possession, if
not the exercise, of the "personal facilities" is concerned it is the
2essential part(s) of the body - not the whole body - that matters. That 
the brain is this essential part (in the relevant sense suggested above) 
of a person's body is of course a contingent fact; but what is not
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contingent is the fact that if it is the essential part then it is a 
necessary condition of personal identity. Any correct bodily criterion 
of personal identity should therefore be not only compatible »ith, but 
must necessarily include the brain continuity criterion. This is not to 
say that brain continuity is the same as the continuity of the body 
(«hole body,that is) since, as Williams rightly pointed out,3 it is 
absurd to say that the body »hich no» contains Smith’s brain is the same 
as the body „hioh earlier contained Smith’s brain. What is claimed is 
rather that, as a criterion, of personal Identit y  it is brain continuity 
which does preoisely the job that the continuity of the bodjr was supposed 
to do, (continuity of the whole body minus the causal seat of "personal 
faculties" would certainly be extremely uninteresting, if not useless, 
as an evidence of personal identity) and that indeed brain continuity is 
a form of bodily continuity in so far as it is the spatio-temporal 
continuity of something bodily.
The position we have been outlining so far and have been claiming to 
be in the line of Williams, may be described fairly by saying that sc far
as the situations continue to he normal bodily continuity (i.e. the 
continuity of the whole body) may be taken to be a necessary condition of 
personal identity, but that in certain abnormal (but plausible)situations,
i.e. if for example brain transferences are successful and are successfully 
accompanied by the transference of the "personal faculties" the continuity 
of the brain (which is still bodily continuity) may be taken to be a 
necessary condition of personal identity. It may be said here - and this 
brings us to the second difficulty mentioned above - that we are virtually 
making the criteria of personal identity a matter only of convention.
For we seem to be proposing at least two different cMteria to apply in 
two different circumstances, and in doing so we seem to be arguing,like 
Wittgenstein and Shorter,that if the facts were different, different 
"geometries"4 Bust ie called for. Perha!>s> theM u  nothlBg
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wrong with conventionalism - though it is none of my task here to show 
this; but what I shall try to show is that the position I have been 
outlining does not have to be committed to conventionalism of any sort, 
In the first place, we are not proposing different criteria in the 
different situations envisaged above; for as our arguments in the fore­
going and also in the last section would have shown, what look(s) like 
two criteria can at best be described as only two forms of the same 
criterion namely, the bodily continuity criterion. Well known examples 
from recent literature may help to substantiate the point. Material 
objects like the »Ship of Theseus» may be reidentified by virtue of the 
spatio-temporal continuity of their form (i.e, because at every moment 
of its repair there is a shi£ of more or less the same form and containing
more or less the same materials as the ship of the preceeding as well as 
of the succeeding moment),5 or, some materiel objects like a natch (that 
has been reassembled after having been disassembled) may be reldentlrted 
by virtue of the spatio-temporal continuity of their parts.6 But this is 
not to say that completely different criteria for the identity of material 
objects are being offered in different situations; the two criteria are 
only two^ o rms of the same criterion, i.e. spatio-temporal continuity.* 
Moreover, we do not, in our brain-transfer case, say anything to the 
effect that this is what »being the same person» should be called in this 
situation. If we did say that we would be meaning something essentially 
different by the phrase »»being the same person as" in this case. But I 
do not think this would be the case in view particularly of the fact that 
our criterion of 'being the same person« is essentially the same in both
*It will do well to recall in this connection that r 7 --------
we suggested in Ch 2 sec (ii) that Butler's f a m o u ^ f ^ slmllar ^sons,
the two "senses" of identity should be more a ^ ^ + diSUnCti°n betwee* kinds of 'being the same". curately read as the two
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the cases, namely, ^.continuity of that part of the Is o n ' s  
ig ^ a l l y  responsible for what we have c ^  Hthe personfl1
If what has been said in the foregoing is correct, it follows that 
a consistent theory of personal identity along the lines of bodily cont­
inuity can be maintained to account for personal identity both in normal 
situations as well as in some abnomal situations, like Shoemaker's brain- 
transfer situation. 'Ne have seen, of course, that Shoemaker intended this 
crucial example to invite our attentions precisely to the opposite of what 
our analysis of the example has pointed to. For firstly he believed - not 
with any good reason, as we saw - that it is "absurd- to say that brain- 
identity is the criterion of personal identity, and secondly he believed 
that - again mistakenly, if our analysis is correct - this example, 
plausible as it is, obliged us to diverge from the bodily identity 
criterion, and to stress, instead, on the memory-and-character continuity 
criterion. (That Shoemaker's example points to the importance of the 
memory-criterion is fairly apparent, but that it proves this is anything 
but clear. On the contrary, our analysis has shown that if, in such 
cases, we are obliged to follow the memory-and -character-traits, it is 
because of the continuity of a bodily part - the brain - on which the 
former is thus dependent.) One reason for drawing the last conclusion 
from the case in point may be the popular preoccupation with the idea that 
bodily continuity is the continuity of the whole body (and clearly this 
does not hold in the present case); but I do not think that Shoemaker 
would be preoccupied with this idea at least he would not be consistent 
if he held it as a necessary fact. For there are indications in what 
he in fact has said that brain continuity can be a form of bodily continuity. 
E.g. he remarked,7 if we said (in the case in question) that Brownson is 
Brown then "we certainly would not be using bodily identity as our
criterion of personal identity. To be sure. .. „re sunnnsm,. .........
have FART. (Shoemaker1 s emphasis here) of Broun '» b0<lv. „„„„i
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though he ruled out as absurd the suggestion that brain identity might be 
our criterion of personal identity. The remark under emphasis above has 
all the indications that Shoemaker mould not object to brain identity being 
a form of bodily identity. If this is so, what could be his reasons for 
objecting - as he expressedly did - to its being a criterion of personal 
identity? One possible reason may be - thongh I shall be very surprised 
If it »ere his reason - that even If brain is a part of a person’s body 
yet the continuity of this part is not very relevant to personal Identity. 
Tor if the continuity of this part of the body is not relevant to personal 
Identity, that of »high part Is? And to this may be added the result of 
our earlier argument In this section that the continuity of all the parts 
of the body is not necessary, nor even relevant, to the identity of a ■ 
person. Another reason, which Shoemaker in fact gives, is that if we 
accept brain continuity as cur criterion of personal identity then it would 
have the absurd consequence of insisting that Bronson must be Brown even 
if the result of the thoughnexperlment were just the reverse and Brownson 
were to have not only the body (minus his brain) of Robinson but also the 
latter's memories and character etc. We argued in the last section that 
this result would perhaps be absurd, but that It would not be a result we 
are bound to accept; we might, instead, more reasonably say that the new 
person was Robinson which, it was shown, would have pointed to the 
necessity of bodily identity anyway. What is important is the continuity 
of the causal seat of the -personal faculties" which, in the counter- 
counter-factual (if we may so put) situation^ would not be the brain but 
some other part (we may not know which)' of the body. Sure, we would in 
that case be parting company with brain continuity, but we would not part 
company with the principle behind it - the principle that lies behind our 
interpretation of the bodily continuity criterion of personal identity.
Now, whatever else might be said to have been Shoemaker's reason for
and
inventing that famous caseAfor drawing from this the conclusion he 
did draw, it will not be said that it was any preoccupation with the 
"memory theory" that prompted him to invent the case, the likes of which 
have customarily been used by 'memory theorists' to serve their purpose.
As we shall see, although he was inclined to draw from it a conclusion 
that suited the memory theories he certainly did not want to generalise 
this (see especially S&If-Knowledge and Self-Identity p 194); on the 
contrary, he has pleaded for the primacy of the bodily criterion and given 
persuasive arguments to show that while the similarity of memory-and 
character traits etc is a criterion of personal Identity, it is nonetheless 
dependent on the bodily criterion for its use. As a matter of fact, one 
of the main features of his account of personal identity is to argue 
against the supposition that the criteria of personal identity are 'non­
physical'* or mental. We shall presently see that his position last men­
tioned is generally sound; his approach, though, to his brain-transfer case 
and to the alleged cases of bodily-transfer in general - namely, his 
unhesitant concession to a purely non-physical account of personal identity 
in these cases - remains a characteristic enigma. More will be said later 
on about such cases and Shoemaker's approach to them. But now to an 
assessment of his more general position.
Shoemaker attacked the view that the criteria of personal Identity are 
"non-physical" by attacking two (more) general suppositions which might 
have contributed to the plausibility of that view. The first is the 
supposition (issuing from Descartes) that the relation between mind and 
body, and hence between the mental and the physical features of persons,
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*By saying that the criteria of personal identity are "non-physical" is
usually meant by t^proponents of that position, and I shall so use it, 
to mean that t h e c r i t e r i o n  is the sole criterion to the absolute exclusion of bodily identity.
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is purely contingent. The second supposition, due partly* to the 
writings of Reid and Butler, is that the real criteria of personal identity 
are the criteria one uses in making identity judgments about oneself or in 
making statements that imply one's own identity through time: since in 
making such judgments we apparently make no use - or at any rate don't have 
to make any use - of facts concerning our bodies, this supposition thus 
lends support to the view that the criteria of personal identity are "non­
physical". Almost the entire spirit of Shoemaker's thesis has been to try 
and show that this supposition is mistaken. But it has also been an impor­
tant part of his thesis to fight the first supposition that the relation 
between mind and body is purely contingent. We shall be presently concerned 
with his treatment of this first supposition and take up the second there­
after.
It seems an obvious enough fact that the possession of mind is what 
constitutes an essential feature of persons as distinct from other things.^ 
And if this is so, the (first) supposition that mental and bodily states 
of persons are only contingently related might lend support to the conten­
tion that the criteria of being the same person are non-physical or mental - 
or at least essentially so. (That they must be solely mental or 'non­
physical' follows from the second supposition outlined above.)
The thesis that the relation between mental and physical states of 
persons is contingent has at least two versions. The first is the weaker
♦"PARTLY", because although Reid and Butler held that the real nature of 
personal identity can be known from one's own case, they were emphatic in 
denying that there are any criteria of personal identity (See cfii 2 sec ii
above).
/j qjjj not suggesting - much less argue - that non-human animals cannot be 
said to have minds, though I have given reasons earlier (Ch 1 sec i) for 
supposing persons to be still distinct from animals by virtue of their 
having what were called "higher-order intuitions". However, the possession 
of minds by other animals is not incompatible with this feature being 
essential to persons; and in view of the said distinction between persons 
and animals the possession of minds by the former would be, so to say,
■importantly essential.
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version (let us call it the weak contingency thesis - or the WCT) that any 
particular mental state is logically independent of any particular bodily 
state, that the former could exist independently of the particular bodily 
state with which it happens to be correlated. But there is a much stronger 
version (call it the strong contingency thesis - or' the SCT) to the effect 
that although mental states happen to be correlated with physical states 
it is conceivable that any mental state could exist in absolute indepen­
dence of, or without at all being correlated with, any bodily state what­
soever.
Understandably, Shoemaker addressed himself mainly to the WCT. for if 
one succeeds in denying this that would (automatically) result in denying 
the SCT. i.e. if the relation of a particular mental state (seeing, for 
example) to the particular bodily state (the condition of the eye, or 
simply, the eye) which normally is required for the former to be effected, 
is shown not to be contingent, that would make its relation to that bodily 
state, and hence by implication to the body, logically necessary; and the 
same will go for all mental states. As we consider his arguments it will 
appear that while Shoemaker’s intention was to deny the WCT the net outcome 
of his arguments was not so much its denial as simply the demonstration of 
the (rather obvious) fact that even if iV not denied the SCT will not follow? 
And this being so, it will be said, not only did Shoemaker's arguments 
hardly serve any purpose, but the entire argument in this connection was 
to no purpose.
The WCT appears to be very plausible from the following considerations. 
To take Shoemaker's crucial example: usually it is almost an analytic 
truth that people see with their eyes. But it may be imagined that a 
person, instead of seeing things from the front of his face (i.e. with his 
eyes), could see them from behind him - that he could do this in a perfectly 
normal way (i.e. without using a mirror or any other artificial device) 
and could sincerely say, "I see a tree in front of me" while in fact the
tree is (what normally world be called) behind him. And if this happens, 
it would seem to follow that the relation of seeing (something mental) 
to the point of view, the eye, from which one sees (something bodily) is 
merely contingent. But if this happens, Shoemaker rightly points out, 
then,if it is not to be a case of clairvoyance or any other like abnormal 
ability to make true perceptual statements, it should always be possible 
to discover some point on his body wherefrom he can be said to be seeing 
and which would be the "point of view" from whic he can be said to be 
seeing. A "point of view" there has to be in order for his perceptual 
statements to be true (or for that matter, to be conceivably false). And 
this point of view will have to be on the seer's (perceiver's) tody so that 
what Shoemaker calls his "ego-centric statements" may have any sense at all 
Such statements, which indeed make our perceptual (visual) statements 
precise and informative in the way they are,' are the statements like "I 
see a tree in front of me", "I see a chair on my left" etc. If the crucial 
"ego-centric" words in these statements, like "in front of", "on the right", 
etc, have any significance at all it is because of, or in relation to, the 
position of the seer's body and more precisely of the point of view on 
his body. Thus, if seeing requires a point of view and that too on the 
seer's body, it follows that the relation between seeing and the seer's 
body cannot be contingent. This line of argument has not shown, however, 
and I don't think it can - that the relation between seeing and the point
of view from which things are seen are not contingent, i.e. that the T O
is false. But one need not show that the WCT is false, in order to
show that the SCT is false, for clearly the truth of the ?fCT is still 
compatible with the falsity of the SCT. Nevertheless, for the reasons 
given earlier, Shoemaker wanted to show the falsity of the WCT. More part­
icularly, he was anxious to show that it is logically impossible for the 
point of view to be constantly shifting its position on the seer’s body. 
Clearly, if he had succeeded in showing this he would have
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in denying the WOT and, with it, the SOT. But we shall see that his argu­
ment for this is far from convincing. And moreover, the apparent motive 
with which he tried to attack the possibility of such "shifting” indicates 
a fundamental confusion and consequently makes it unclear as to what it is 
he was trying to prove (or prove false). Tor he is found persistently to 
be claiming that if the relation between seeing and the body were contin­
gent then "it ought to be possible for the point of view from which a 
person sees to be constantly shifting its position on his bodv"^ (my 
emphasis). But one fails to see why the latter ought to be possible - 
how in particular, this is a consequence - much less an important conse­
quence - of the SCT (i.e. of the theory that the relation between seeing 
and the body is contingent); since ex hvnothesi the point of view is to 
be shifting on the body. What it is a consequence of is the WOT, and if 
Shoemaker thinks, as most palpably he does, that it is consequence, even 
an important consequence, of the SCT. then he is certainly confusing the 
two thèses of contingency which I have shown to be clearly distinct from 
each other. If it is plausible, which certainly it seems to be, that the 
point of view may be thought to shift its position constantly on the seer’s 
body, clearly no reasonable Cartesian would argue from this that the 
relation of seeing to the seer’s body is purely contingent; and if anyone 
did, he would be making an inadequate inference, and Shoemaker knows that; 
but in making the above claim expressedly and persistently he has left 
his readers wondering if he knows it well enough. Por if he did, he would 
not be spending so much of time and space in fighting the TOT. To be sure 
his success in refuting the latter would have paid him well (in refuting 
SCT). But we shall presently see that he did not quite succeed in this 
attempt.
The burden of his argument has been that if the point of view were 
allowed to shift its position constantly on the seer’s body - now on his 
face, a moment later, at the back of his skull, then on his side, and so
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on - then one would not be able to express the location or position of 
the objects one sees by means of the "ego-centric'' statements. But here 
again, two types of constant shifting should be distinguished, First, it 
may mean an infinitely rapid (Heraclitean) change of the point of view so 
that it may not in principle be possible to check upon the truth of an 
ego-centric statement like "I see a tree in front of me" since in that 
case, what is my "front" now is no longer so in the very next moment (or 
fraction of the moment). To suppose that the point of view be constantly 
shifting in this way is certainly "to make the cash value of the state­
ments, 'there is a chair directly in front of me', 'I see a chair on my 
right', and so on the same as that of the pure existential statement 
'there is at least one chair (somewhere in the universe) ; " 10 and to do 
this would be to obliterate the distinction between ego-centric statements
and other kinds of statements, and the distinction between perceptual know-
10ledge and clairvoyance. But it is difficult to see that this has to be 
the inevitable consequence of the WCT. For there could be, I suppose, a 
second type of "constant" shifting of the point of view which, if true, 
would still establish the WCT. And this is the type (or rather the sense) 
of "constant shifting" which indeed Shoemaker himself prescribed (see Ibid 
pp 179 and 182), namely that there should be certain regularity in the 
change - that between every two changes of position of the point of view, 
there should be a period long enough for the subject to be able to make a 
number of ego-centric statements all of which would be true/false with 
respect to a particular position of the point of view. Once this is 
allowed the WCT would still hold, and Shoemaker's long drawn arguments 
against it would be seen to be not only needless but also fruitless. 
Moreover, Shoemaker certainly can't specify (or legislate?) how long 
this "long enough" period must be and how "less constant"(?) the constant 
shifting should be in order for his lawlike prescription may be effected.
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It is fairly conceivable that a man could see from different "points of
view" at different moments, and that his "ego-centric" statements he
conceivably tested with respect to the particular moment of perception.
The fact that the "ego-centric" statement "I see a tree in front of me",
made at moment with respect to the point of view can* t be true at
moment m„ with respect to the point of view need not be disturbing -
need not present a logical difficulty. For after all, the statement
"There is a tree in front of me" made at time _t^  is not true when I look
aside at time t^* yet that does not rule out my looking aside. As
Strawson rightly pointed out "could not vision swivel as a lighthouse
11beam, not the light-house,does?" One is not convinced when Shoemaker
"explicitly asserts that while one could give sense to the notion of
someone’s seeing from the back of his head, it could make no sense to
suggest that the point (in one’s body) from which one sees could be
constantly shifting" fStrawson op cit. his emphasis). Moreover, as
Strawson also pointed out, it is "unduly restrictive" when Shoemaker rules
out the possibility of all round vision while giving "no argument to show
why this is any the less of a possibility of all round hearing".
Thus, it would seem, Shoemaker’s argument against the contingency of
the relation between mental and physical phenomena is unsure and rather
shaky and accordingly, his argument against the contingency of relation
between personal identity and bodily identity needs stronger support than
what he offers. The "shaky" nature of his arguments can be clearly seen
from what he says in pp 193-4 (ihicQ:
"Earlier in this chapter I said that if certain things occurred, 
we might say, without absurdity, that a person is able to see 
from some part of his body other than his eyes. But we saw that 
to admit this is not to admit that there is only a contingent 
relationship between seeing and the body, since if the latter were 
■fee case, it ought to be possible for the ’point of view' to be 
constantly shifting its position on his body. Likewise, to say 
that under certain circumstances we might say that someone had 
changed bodies is not to say that there is only a contingent 
relationship between personal identity and bodily identity, since
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if the latter were the case it should make sense to suppose 
that someone might be constantly changing bodies. ... It can 
be shown, I think, that this does not make sense".
But one is not convinced as to why it does not make sense. As we
have seen, if it makes sense to say that a person can see from the back
of his head, it also should make sense for the 'point of view' to be
constantly shifting its position on his body. And likewise, if it makes
sense (as, presumably in Shoemaker's brain-transfer case) for a person to
inhabit different bodies at different times, it should make sense to
suppose that someone might be constantly changing bodies. Perhaps the
impossibility envisaged by Shoemaker is practical or factual i.e. that it
just does not happen or even that it could not be knorm to have happened.
But if it is not logically impossible for points of view to shift constantly 
then this is sufficient to weaken Shoemaker's argument together with the
thesis it purports to establish. If facts and principle conflict, so much 
the worse for the facts.
To add to the "shakyness” of Shoemaker's arguments, notice further
that the analogy given in his passage above is not quite fitting to his 
purpose, for although the supposition of someone's changing bodies (con­
stantly or otherwise) will show that the relation between personal identity 
and bodily identity is purely contingent, the (analogous) supposition of 
one's 'point of view' constantly changing its position on one's body will 
not show that the relation between seeing and the body is only contingent. 
Yet the latter seems to be the paradigm of Shoemaker's demonstration of 
the contingency between seeing and the body.
However, my critical gesture towards Shoemaker's arguments against 
the contingency hypothesis and the consequent "non-physical" account of 
personal identity should not be taken to mean any commitment,on our part, 
to Cartesianism or to the related view that the criteria of personal 
Identity are “non-physical”. On the contrary, we are inclined to believe 
as Shoemaker is, that the latter theory is mistaken. Our only intention
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has been to point out what, in Shoemaker's arguments, seemed to be 
needless or even inadequate to show this. This being done, I shall now 
try to suggest some measures to improve a bit upon his arguments so that 
they may be seen more easily to prove his point. There are two strands in 
Shoemaker's arguments. The first is that, although in certain circumstances 
we might say that a person sees from some part of his body other than his 
eyes, that does not show that the relation between seeing and the body is 
contingent. This is true, though what still needs to be explicitly shown 
is that the point of view from which one sees must be situated in one's 
body. Following Shoemaker's lead, we suggested that this is necessary in 
order that the "ego-centric" words, which play a crucial role in the 
making and understanding of our perceptual statements, may have any deter­
minate meaning at all - although we have argued that this did not do the 
work which Shoemaker wanted it to do, namely to work against the YJCT. How, 
the second strand in Shoemaker's argument is that while in certain circum­
stances we might say that someone has changed bodies, that does not show 
that the relation between bodily identity and personal identity is only 
contingent, and that a person may be supposed to be constantly changing 
bodies. We have argued above that this is false, and that if it does make 
sense to suppose that the former is true then it should make sense to 
suppose that the latter is true as well. But, it is worth asking, what 
are the circumstances in which we might say that someones had changed 
bodies? Obviously for Shoemaker it was the whole-brain transfer cases - 
the ones we described as exemplifying what we called the "scientific thesis” 
of change-of-body (see last section). But about such cases it has been 
argued that "change-of-body" will not be the strictly correct description 
and, more particularly, that such cases will not show that the criteria of 
personal identity were solely non-physical. This will therefore not show 
that the relation between personal identity and bodily identity was purely
contingent - even if such case became of frequent occurrence. If this is 
correct, Shoemaker, once again, had no need (and in a »ay this should be 
unworrying) to fight the possibility of such cases in order to avert its 
supposed consequence that the relation between personal identity and 
bodily identity is purely contingent. But he felt the need to reason in 
the way he did simply because he was not willing to entertain the hypothecs 
that brain continuity could be our criterion of personal identity. Ue have 
seen, however, that his reluctance had no good reason.
There is one more disturbing thing about the alleged cases of bodily
transfer which we must pass over quickly. As a possible case, where we
might say that a change of body has taken place, Shoemaker would perhaps
take a Lockean-Quintonian type of case («the naive thesis«, as we called it)
as_well, where a complete interchange of the psychological features between
two persons may be displayed without there being any explanation of how
it had happened. 12 We have said earlier that this type of case can't be
plausible cases of personal identity - since they provide no means of
are
telling clairvoyance from memory“knowledge, and/open to the difficulty 
of reduplication. And if Shoemaker would still believe and argue that 
such cases are plausible and do provide any good reason for saying that 
a change of body has occurred his plea, if any, for this would be very weak 
indeed. As in his 'brain transfer' case so in this case he cannot prevent 
someone’s constantly changing bodies once he allowed a single case of this 
sort to be possible. The supposed excuse that these cases would be rare 
and would constitute exceptions rather than the rule13 would be only a 
"lame" excuse and make his case weaker still. (What is the rule anyway?
If it is theprinciple expressed in the proposition that personal identity 
and bodily continuity go hand in hand, it is certain]/ disproved. is ltnot| 
by/in this case (or in some cases) they don’t’?)
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But let us ask, are these cases possible? That is, are cases of 
this type possible cases of personal identity?* At first sight they 
certainly seem to be, but on closer examination they will turn out not 
to be. A simple but obvious rule will help us to see this: if a prop­
osition £ is logically possible then £  cannot lead to or embrace conse­
quences that are incoherent or logically awkward. Now, a "naive theory" 
like that of Williams' Charles/Guy Fawkes may seem to be quite possible; 
but if we take it as a genuine case of identity then the consequence is 
unavoidable that Guy Fawkes is identical with Charles as well as Robert 
(who might quite possibly have exactly the same identity claim as Charles 
has) at the same time and also that two different persons (Charles and 
Robert), in being identical with one and the same person, must be identical 
with each other, and this, for well known reasons, is a consequence that is 
logically incoherent. I think, therefore, that a case that allows the 
logical possibility of reduplication cannot be a plausible case of personal 
identity and hence must be abandoned. Perhaps it will be said that on 
criterio-logical grounds these type of cases will point to personal 
identity - particularly if there are no competitors but only one claimant. 
But our account of criteria together with our analysis of the memory 
criterion - which is here at stake - will make us see that this argument 
fails to do the trick. For in the first place, a criterion is a good 
reason or justification and, in the absence of any alternative criterion/ 
criteria pointing to the contrary, it will serve as our justification 
(see p10f above). Secondly^we have said earlier (and this point will |>e 
further strengthened later) that the memory criterion is used as a
*1 don't say that it is impossible for Charles to claim (in the 
described way) to be Guy Fawkes but that the suggestion or claim that 
he is Guy Ibiwkes is certainly impossible, as I argue in what follows
in the text.
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criterion of personal identity only because it is taken as evidence 
of bodily continuity*. . in yi„  of the ^  ^
psychological continuity in the present case will not be a good reason for 
thinking Charles to be identical with Guy fhwkes - even if he alone has 
the described similarity with the latter. And in sc far as bodily contin­
uity is known to be absent in the present case our first requirement above 
will leave us with no Justification (criterion) whatsoever to make the 
identity judgment in question. A Butler-Swlnburne type of theory may 
of course claim that even though we have no evidence here, Charles may 
still be the same person as Guy Ihwkes. But we are given no reason what­
soever to say that rather than saying that it is a mysterious case of 
clairvoyance (See Mackie again, Ibid p 195). As our problem is one of 
criteria, I conclude with no hesitation thq: the "naive theses" of bodily 
transfer can be no plausible cases of personal identity and hence can 
constitute no evidence for the supposition that the relation between 
personal identity and bodily identity is merely contingent or that the 
criteria of personal identity is "non-physical".
NoW, another source of the idea that the criteria of personal identity 
are "non physical" is the supposition, as we noted, that the real criteria 
of personal identity are the ones we use, not in identifying others but in 
identifying ourselves (or in making statements in the first person that 
imply one's own identity). On this supposition it is common enough to 
feel that there is an essential difference between persons and other 
material things and accordingly between personal identity and the identity 
of these other things. But the difference can hardly be brought out by 
considering the way we know the identity of persons other than ourselves,
♦See also Mackie, Problems from Lock-e, p 190. iiM m n w  „ . .
not as evidence alternatives to bodily continuity) they s e C T e ^ n f  “  
and in ordinary cases, as evidence of personal f e! in law
as they are evidence of bodily continuity". °n^Jr *n 30 ^ar
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since the way the latter is too™ is hardly any different firm the »ay 
the identity of other material things is too™. Held has been noted to 
have said that our knowledge of the identity of other material things and 
of the identity of persons other than ourselves are based much upon the 
same grounds. (The naturalness of this supposition has been discussed at 
length in Ch 1 (ii) and also in Ch 2 (ii), and so »ill he only assumed 
here in order'to avoid repetition). The real nature of personal identity and 
the criteria, if any, for it can therefore be known, it is argued, by 
considering the »ay identity Judgments are made and too™ in one's o ™
But »hen one considers ho. one comes to too» one's own identity through 
time one does not - and does not have to - consider any facts abcut one's 
body.* For if one can be said to too» one's o»n identity tiragh time, this 
is, or can be, done by the fact of one's remembering that one did certain 
things in the past or by the fact of one’s being able to make and know 
memory-statements in the first person, and it seems hardly necessary that 
one should too* things about one's body in order to be able to make and 
too» such statements. Thus, if the real nature^pSoOnaFlftotlty/^
(Keid and Butler) and if the latter is known or can be known without using 
any bodily criteria, the conclusion might naturally be drawn that the real 
criteria of personal identity are non-physical. This sort of conclusion 
seems all the more natural in vie* of the fact, which seems necessary, that 
personal identity (the paradigm case of which is thought to be self identity) 
is known in (personal) memory and is reflected in the first person memory- 
statements.
Shoemaker's major concern14 has teen to try and fight this conclusion 
and this he does by showing that the conclusion does not follow from its
♦Once again I will be very brief on this point since it h «  v at length before. ce ^  “aa been discussed
-159
supposed premiss. More particularly, he has argued that while it may 
he true that one does not use bodily identity as one's criterion of 
personal identity when one says on the basis of one's memory that one did 
such and such in the past, this does not mean that one uses something else 
(some non physical fact) as the criterion; the fact rather is that, he 
said, one uses no criteria at all in such cases. 15 This explanation of 
the situation seems fairly convincing and we have already said1^ that if 
in making first person memory statements, one does not and need not use 
bodily identity as the criterion of personal identity, one cannot be said 
to be using any other criterion either. For what the "other" criterion 
could be but memory? And if so, it was asked, do I have to remember that 
I remember that I did such and such things in the past? But does not this 
breed the further problem of how this second memory has to be evidenced 
and so on ad infinitum? Most prominently, Shoemaker has argued that if my 
memory-statements that I did such and such thing were based on a 
criterion of my identity, then it should be possible to discover, by the 
use of that criterion, that the person who did the action was not myself. 
But clearly, this is not possible. For if I remember doing a thing then 
I remember my doing the thing, 17 and nothing could show - except my 
remembering being misremembering - that the remembered act res not done 
by myself or that the doer of that act was not myself. My remembering 
could, or course, be a case of misremembering, but to show that it is, one 
would require the evidence of my bodily facts which ex hypothec is not 
in use here. In other words, in the type of cases we. are concerned with, 
we do not use the bodily criteria and cannot use anything else (viz mental 
criteria) as our criteria of identity in order to know the truth of our 
statements and consequently to know our own identity which these statements 
reflect. It follows therefore that the second supposition, even if true, 
does not inescapably lead to the conclusion that th^lbriteria of personal 
identity are "non physical".
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After having thus shown that the two popular suppositions (as 
outlined above),which see» to lead to the oonolusion that the criteria 
of personal identity are "non physical", are either mistaken or mis­
understood, Shoemaker goes on to argue that the supposed psychological 
criteria though they are criterial, can't be the sole - not even the 
primary criteria of personal identity. Two sets of such criteria have 
been suggestedi (1) similarity of character, personality, interests eto, 
and (2) similarity of memory claims.
About the first, Shoemaker says that it is neither logically necessary 
nor logically sufficient condition of personal identity. It is not 
necessary, for the character, interests and personality etc, do change 
in a person and yet we do not call him a different person for that matter. 
It can't be sufficient since it is possible for two persons (or more) to 
have exactly similar character and personality etc (e.g. Williams' example 
of Charies-Robert/Guy Pawkes). Further, from the fact that a person's 
character and personality do change it follows that there are other 
criteria of personal identity which tell us that they do. And these other 
criteria must obviously be the bodily continuity. (At this point one 
might notice an oversight - if not an error - in Shoemaker's arguments, 
sound though they are. For the other criteria by reference to which we may 
judge that a person's personality etc have changed might well be the 
memory-claims that he makes, instead of his bodily continuity being the 
'obvious' candidate. The answer to this is that while one could use a 
person's memoiy claims as ground for saying that his character and person­
ality etc have changed, yet this would eventually point to the same conclu­
sion, for Shoemaker has strong aruments in the immediately following 
section (Ibid Ch 5 sec 10) to show that the use of the memory criterion 
inevitably points to and depends on the use of the bodily criterion. This 
will be brought out in the following paragraph). Furthermore, in order 
to find out anything about a person's character, personality etc - whether
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they have changed or not - we have to observe him over a ,„ m  „  
and what we observe is how he acts, talks and behaves, a ^ r S v e ' t f  
°’,ser'ra a S . W i  the same person. But how do we do this? Hot by observing 
the similarity (or otherwise) of his character, personality etc, for that 
is what we are trying to find out about. Thus here "observing the same 
person" oould mean nothing other than "observing the same body". It 
follows therefore that the use of similarity of character and personality
etc as a criterion of personal identity at all presupposes the use of the 
bodily identity criterion.
As regards memory, Shoemaker argued that it fares no better and that 
its use as a criterion of personal identity would similarly depend on the 
bodily identity criterion at some stage or other. First, there is the 
question of determining whether a person understands, and is able to make 
correct use of the word "remember" and its cognate words. It would of 
course be an utterly boring enterprise if we start questioning the genuine­
ness (in this respect) of every or even most memory claims that are made by 
people, and very few, if any, actually do this; it is rather natural that 
people's memory claims (or what sound like ones) are taken as memory claims 
at their face value. But when it comes to the question of determining 
whether the memory criterion is the sole criterion or even a criterion 
that is logically independent of the bodily criterion of personal identity, 
the question does have its logical significance and needs to be settled.
It is true of the word "remember" (as also of any linguistic expression) 
that in order to establish whether a person understands it and its cognate 
words and uses them correctly, we need to observe his linguistic behaviour 
(involving these words) over a period of tin,«. And this requires observing 
his bodily and behavioural facts over that period, and as such presupposes 
the bodily identity criterion. In the second place there is the question 
of checking the genuineness of someone's memories as opposed to mere 
memory claims. For a person's memories may be mistaken - however sincere
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they might be. (Once again checking upon people’s memory claims is not a 
usual phenomenon, not so even in most cases: Shoemaker even went on to 
show, it is a necessary truth rather than a contingent or an inductive 
one that people's sincere memory statements are generally true. s## ibid 
Oh 6 aeon 5 and 6 . Jut the n a t i o n  of he. „  « 0 4  check „pin 
of a memory claim is nonetheless important). Yet for the purpose of this 
checking we can't use the claimant's memory as our criterion of identity. 
Nor will it do to make any other psychological facts (e.g. similarity of 
his character, personality etc) as our evidence that this person did what 
he "remembers" doing, for this, as we have Just seen, can be used as a 
criterion of personal identity only if bodily identity is a criterion, and 
this will undermine the thesis, which we are concerned with, that memory 
criterion is the sole criterion of personal identity or is logically 
independent of the bodily criterion. Moreover, if it is involved in the 
meaning of the word "remember" that the person remembering doing an action 
must be the person who did that action, the checking of a memory claim 
would consist in finding out whether the "rememberer" is the same person 
as the one who did the remembered act. And the criterion of personal 
identity which is needed hare would have to be the bodily identity criterion, 
since, as we saw, neither the similarity of memory claims can do (for that 
is what is suspect) nor that of personality and character will usefully do 
(since this points to the bodily criterion anyway). it follows therefore 
that the memory criterion (or the psychological criteria in general) cannot 
be the sole criterion of personal identity in absolute exclusion to the 
bodily identity criterion and that,being logically dependent on the bodily 
criterion/it cannot even be said to be the primary criterion. It is for 
this reason that Shoemaker would prefer the bodily criterion and regard it 
aa the more fundamental or the primary criterion. Indeed he claimed that 
"if it (bodily identity,HOi) were not a criterion, nothing else would be 
evidence of personal identity. " 18
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Shoemaker’s reasons for spying the memory continuity is nonetheless
a criterion is predominantly that the puzzle cases (which we have called
the "scientific thesis" as well as in the "Naive theses" of change of body)
so much incline us to say that change of body has occurred, or at least
19leave us in doubt as to what to say, ' but our reason for saying this would 
be slightly different from Shoemaker's, for we want to say, for the reasons 
given before, that if in certain puzzle cases (i.e. only in what we called 
the "scientific" cases) we have reason to say that a change of body (in 
the relevant sense we envisaged earlier) has occurred, then memory must 
certainly be a criterion of personal identity. But saying this, we argued, 
does not make memory the sole, or even the primary criterion, and as we 
have shown, the latter’s being a criterion can reasonably be said to be 
due to (see last section) the bodily continuity criterion. If what we 
have said is right, Shoemaker has not given any good reason for his belief 
that at least in certain cases (i.e. these puzzle cases) memory continuity 
could be the sole criterion of personal identity and personal identity 
judgment in this case is made on purely non-bodily grounds. Moreoever, 
if he is right in arguing that any psychological criterion of personal 
identity is not logically independent of the bodily identity criterion, 
then reasoning, as he did, in the puzzle cases would expose a serious 
inconsistency in his position. As I said earlier his analysis of the 
puzzle cases remains a characteristic enigma in his account of personal
identity.
Now, our discussion in the last section as well as in the present, 
and our analysis of the puzzle situations which so much captured Shoemaker's 
imagination and even his reasoning, has made us see the importance of two 
factors concerning the reidentification of persons. First, in order that 
memory continuity may serve as a criterion of personal identity, it has to 
■be understood as a causal notion; and secondly the causal chains linking
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the memories with the remembered actions or experiences must be 
spatio-temporally continuous (see last sectionppi23-4above). gut for 
this last condition to be satisfied it seems to be required that the 
capacity to remember and all other mental capacities (which together we 
have called the 'personal faculties') be seated in and carried through 
some parcel or parcels of matter; without the continuance of some such 
thing* that is spatially locatable and traceable* it seems the spatio- 
temporal requirement will not be fulfilled. This will bring us to the 
position recently advocated by Wiggins in his Identity and Spatio-Temporal 
Continuity. After showing that spatio-temporal continuity is a necessary 
condition for identity in general, he rightly argued that "spatio-temporal 
continuity" is incomplete if it is not specified what it is the spatio- 
temporal continuity of. This requirement can be described as the "cover­
ing concept requirement" of identity. Obviously the covering concept here 
person. It is thus an inescapable part of Wiggin's thesis that a
criterion for the identity of persons must be potentially analytical of
20
the concept person. It is a conceptual truth that being a person distin­
ctively involves not simply having a mind or possessing mental capacities 
but also, more particularly, being able to remember a considerable amount 
of one's past. This has been emphasized in most writings on the subject, 
from Locke to the present day. And it seems particularly true in the 
present context, because if people did not remember something at least 
of their past,* we would not now be talking of such a thing as personal 
identity. For it is by remembering some of our past deeds and experiences
*1 am not ruling out, as Locke's definition of
amnesia as logically impossible. My analysis of 'person^in W°Uld’
simply amounts to the claim that to be a person i? thl# re#Pecc
some of one's past for some period of rmp's n*„ able to remember
doing so at all moments of "one's existence. ~ * BOt ttat °ne must b*
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that we are aware of our own identity through time, and this also creates
in us the presumption that other people, who are so much like ourselves,
must be aware of their own identities infche same way.* This at least is
the kernel of the truth that personal identity and memory are logically
connected. Thus Wiggins rightly describes these capacities as the
£ilgIg 5 H r.* functioning. But if we were to understand these capacities
as something purely mental or non-physical, then we would not be able to
apply the spatio-temporal continuity criterion to them; yet it is the spatio-
temporal continuity of precisely these capacities that we are supposed to
determine when we are determining the identity of a person. It follows
therefore that if we are to specify the spatio-temporal continuity under
the concept person, we cannot take the continuity or similarity of mere
memory claims (and/or other mental capacities) unless it had or was
supposed to have a physical basis. We must therefore look for some physical
(i.e. bodily, since we are considering the identity of persons) part(s), if
any, which is responsible for a person's memory and character etc, and the
continuance of which would explain the continuity or similarity of the
latter. For well known reasons the brain can be chosen for this role, for
the brain happens, as a matter of scientific fact, to be causally responsible
for the possession, exercise and the continuity of what Wiggins has called
the "characteristic functioning" of a person. Thus he said,
"It would be better, after a conceptual analysis of the essential 
and characteristic vital functions to analyze person in such a way 
that coincidence under the concept person loeicaTETren,,«^ y 
cont nuance,i_n_one organized p a r c e lSTITl that w*a 
sufj.*cAei?t causally necessary to the continuance 
atTd characteristic functioning, no autonomously «?viff icl'rnt iul, f 
achieving autonomous and functionally separate existence. ~
Clearly Wiggins takes as the criterion of personal identity the contin-
uity of the brain, or of that bodHj, part“  (or those bodily part,) which
*That the latter is a logical precondition of the T~"in Chapter 1 section (ii). e fornier has bean argued
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plays the role of the «seat of memory and consciousness” . Because of the 
reasons we have been pursuing in the last section as well as in the present, 
this is a healthy modification in*he bodily continuity criterion and is 
quite an acceptable account of personal identity. The beauty of Wiggins» 
account is that it purports to "logically exclude" the possibility of 
reduplication which has often been thought to vitiate even the brain 
continuity criterion. For the brain could be bisected and each half be 
transplated in a different body with (it is supposed) the consequent 
transference of all the memories and character etc of the donor to each 
of the recipients, our calling the claims of each recipient person "memories" 
will be justified on exactly the same ground (i.e. the causal link) in this 
case as in the simpler case of whole brain transference. Wiggins tried to 
rule this out by insisting on the "continuance in one organised parcel 
of all (my emphases) that is causally sufficient and necessary"; and'having 
all that is causally responsible for A»s memory and character» is a 
logically one-one relation by means of which onl^ one person could be 
related to A. The same purpose can be served by taking the continuity 
of the whole brain; for »having the same (whole) brain* as ... * would be 
equally a logically one-one relation. For this reason when earlier we 
pleaded for the brain transfer cases being plausible cases of personal 
identity we meant to be, and should be, understood to mean whole brain 
transfer cases. As regards the supposed split brain transplant cases, we 
want to suggest that they will not be plausible cases of personal identity, 
in the sense outlined above (seepJ56-57>. For not only the supposition of 
such cases is embarrassed by utterly awkward consequences, it is also
*Indeed, not only saying "having the same whole brain
unnatural, but saying "having the same brain '£7  it *S ”  ls odd and 
that we are talking of the whole brain. On the naJurally suggests
possibility of split brain I n f e r e n c e  c o m e d o t it ^  the
rather more natural and accurate to talk of "having J Icture* u  «ould be 
or something like that. san,e brain part as.."
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committed to consequences that are logically incoherent. The awkwardness 
lies in the fact that there would be no "logical limits" - to borrow 
Williams' chosen phrase23 - to how far we can go on with such possibil­
ities: should we stop at bisection or go on to speculate the possibilities 
of trisection or even multi section of the brain? The decision where to 
stop is bound to be arbitrary, and as Williams has rightly warned us,24 no 
account of personal identity can be philosophically satisfactory if it has 
to depend on an arbitrary provision for its success. The more serious
difficulty with such supposed cases is that, worse thau the "naive theses" 
of bodily transfer which ve have shorn to be implausible as cases of per- 
sonal identity, these cases necessarily cry, with them the possibility ex 
hj^othesi of reduplication which, in it. turn leads to the logically inco. 
herent consequence that two different persons (the recipients of each half 
brain), if they are to be identical with the brain donor, must be one and 
the same person. Thirdly, no determinate identity question can arise in 
such cases. For as Higgins rightly pointed out, the proper form of an 
Identity question is to be in term, of . suitable covering concept (see Ibid 
esp p 56), and given that x is the brain donor and that y and r the recipients 
of each half brain, what are we to ask or Judge to be identical! X Is the 
same wtat as V and 2! He cannot be the same person as y and s, nor can he
be said to be the same persons or pair of persons as y and z.25
Thus, in the light of the foregoing Wiggins' account of personal iden-
tity seems logically sound* and it has the unique advantage of steering
«Though, unhappily, Wiggins in fact does not esnciali» 
sound suggestion to deal with the split brain tLnsill fiV* a lo8ically 
seems to suggest, though not entirely unequivocally (see ISTC^ a f t «  that there will be personal identity infeuch cases L L e® £§T£ pp 55-56), 
the brain takes and the other half destroyed if.0ne of
tedly vulnerable to Williams' warning mentioned bf,in8 nK>re P°in*
solution has the absurd
happens to someone else. I believe further that tbil f * ? what
strong objection against the current theori*.« * ,? * £rilM facie
branching" (psychological) continuity,  ^80 ca**ed "non­
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clear of the two supposedly conflicting criteria of personal identity 
which seem prima facie so much incompatible; for on this analysis, a 
correct memory criterion and correct bodily (spatio-temporal) criterion 
will necessarily coincide (as he says in p 45 of ISTC). Even Shoemaker, 
who embraced multiple criteria and believed in there being genuine cases
of conflict of criteria, was forced to see the this truth in Wiggins*
26analysis.L
However there is at least one thing that remains to be explained and
that does not come out clearly in Wiggins* account; and that is, why is
it that the ’seat of memory and consciousness has to be located in the 
body of the person. That this is always,or normally always, the case and 
that it is never known to be otherwise is perhaps a good reason (though
not conclusive reason) to suppose that this must be the case. But a 
stronger reason can be given by saying that if it were not the case, our 
first person psychological statements would not be informative in the way 
they are. One important kind of these statements are what we have seen 
to be the **ego-centricM perceptual statements (Shoemaker). We have seen 
earlier in this section that these statements - the ’’ego-centric” words, 
in particular like ’in front of', 'on my left' etc - will not ’have any 
determinate meaning if the point of view from which we see or perceive 
were not located in our bodies. Thus it would be necessary or a concep­
tual requirement for those words and statements to have meaning and meaning­
ful application that the truth of our perceptual statements (made in the 
first person) must be related to the described fact about our bodies. No« 
the second important kind of our first person psychological statements are 
the memory statements that we make in the first person. It can be shown,
I think, that the truth of these latter statements must be consequently 
related to certain facts about our bodies* For it is a logically necessary 
fact that our memory statements are related in a certain way to our 
(corresponding) perceptual statements. And if I remember at that I
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saw a tree in front of me at an earlier time tj then the statement (call 
it M) 'I saw a tree in front of me at t^' cannot be true unless the 
corresponding statement (pall it P), 'I see a tree in front of me now» made 
by me at t]_ is true. But if, as we saw, P's being true depends on certain 
fact? about my body (namely that the point of view from which I see is 
located in my body), it will follow that M's being fcrue must also depend 
upon these facts about my body. This, together with the fact that being a 
person requires being able to make a number of memory statements In the first 
person, shows that persons have to have bodies and that the causal seat of 
memory and consciousness (what we have described as the "personal faculties") 
will have to be situated on their bodies. This conclusion is further sub­
stantiated by the transcendental argument, adduced in the last section, in 
favour of the contention that the causal link involved in the memory must 
run through the person's body. If this is eo, and if the minimum that 
matters in personal identity is the continuous possession (not exercise) 
of the "personal faculties then bodily continuity, in the modified sense 
we have given to this concept, will turn out to be a necessary condition 
of personal identity. It will then be an empirical question as to what 
(what part or parts of the body) makes the continuance of the "personal 
faculties" possible and Wiggins' solution is an answer to this question 
(see also Mackie^) J but this will not make the continuance of the 
physical basis of "personal faculties" as related to personal identity a 
contingent matter of fact.
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Sectlon(iv)t Derek Farfit: memory with a difference(?)
In the last two sections I have tried to make plausible the theory 
that bodily continuity - or rather the spatio-temporal continuity of some­
thing bodily - is a necessary condition of personal identity, and to show 
that even though similarity of memory and/or other psychological features 
is also a criterion, it is due to the former kind of continuity. In any 
case, it was argued, the psychological criteria cannot be of the sole or 
even the primary consideration. Quite recently, Parfit has advocated an 
account of personal identity which, if sound, will totally dismiss our 
latter conclusion (and since it is dependent on our former contention, our 
entire position will be dismissed thereby). For his account purports to 
analyze personal identity in terms of these psychological features or of 
what he technically calls “psychological continuity", and, implicitly as 
well as explicitly, bodily considerations are ignored as irrelevant.* It 
seems to me, however, that despite the admitted novelty and ingenuity of 
its approach to the problem, the theory is largely mistaken. In order to 
show where exactly it fails to do the trick, I shall examine the theory
fully.
The theory offers two important suggestions» one on the nature of 
personal identity and the second on its Importance. The second of these 
suggestions can be seen to follow as a natural consequence of the first. 
The first suggestion is that personal identity is a matter of degree - 
that the identity of persons is not, as it is normally supposed to be, 
all-or-nothing. The second suggestion is that certain important moral 
and practical questions, which are usually supposed to presuppose personal 
identity (in 'all-or-nothing' sense), and give the latter the importance 
it has can be freed of this presupposition, and that once this is done, 
personal identity will have no importance. I shall first examine the 
first suggestion and take up the second suggestion at a later stage of
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this discussion.
Ordinarily, questions of personal identity are thought to demand all- 
or-nothing answers. We are inclined to think that, given our normal 
criteria of personal identity, a later person po Is or is not the same 
person as an earlier person £j. This we think because we believe that the 
nature of personhood is not fully constituted by all the evidence we can 
have of it. For example, I am not the same as my body since, obviously, 
my body lasts longer than I do - or at any rate, we do not last the same 
amount of time. Moreover, if I lose some parts of my body, I do not cease 
to be the person I used to be nor do I become only a part of the person 
(if that may mean anything) I used to be. Similarly, for the psychological 
features that characterise me as a person. Even if I lose a considerable 
amount of my memories and character etc. I still continue to be the person 
I used to be - though I may be said to have undergone a change of personality. 
Thus, the bodily and/or the psychological features that normally characterise 
a person are not identical with (or analytic of) the concept of a person. 
Therefore the fact of personhood does not consist in just these facts; it 
is a further fact. Accordingly, the fact of personal identity is not Just 
a matter of bodily continuity and the continuity or similarity of memory 
and character etc; it is a further, deeper fact. Because It 18 a further 
fact, personal identity is not affected by the obvious changes in the 
bodily continuity and the continuity of memory and character etc. e.g. 
amputated limbs, plastic surgery, on the one hand and loss of memory, 
change of personality on theother. It is not even affected by the dis­
covery or suggestion of such changes as ma y purport to show that nothing 
really is continuing (see Ch 1 sec ii above). And so, asking for all-or- 
nothing answers to questions of personal identity does not seem to be an 
unreasonable demand. In this sense, a person £2 at £2 an<* a Person £l 
at ti are identical with each other if they have more or less the same
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body and if they make more or less similar memory claims and display more 
or less similar character, personality etc. If not they are not identical, 
but are different persons.
But Parfit introduced a new way of talking according to which what we 
call two phases of the same person's life may not be the phases of the same 
person. A person may dissociate one part of his life from another earlier 
part. This way of thinking givesrise to a certain view about the nature of 
personal identity and a certain way of talking. He refers to the former as 
the "Complex View" and to the latter as the "proposed way of talking".*
Each is supported by the other. On this view, a man may have an attitude of 
indifference towards a part of his life; while in such a state he does not 
regard that part of his life with either pride or shame, pleasure or regret. 
He might have behaved very badly in his remote past. He may now have under­
gone some serious change of character, manners and attitude towards things. 
In such a case, he might say, "I admit that I behaved that way, but the 'I' 
who so behaved seems to me a stranger." Thus, he may have no regrets now 
for having once so behaved. This man's attitude towards his earlier self 
is what Parfit calls "non-identification". Thus it is argued that that 
man's present self can be different from - not identical with his earlier 
as well as his later (future) selves. The idea suggested is that we 
might free ourselves from the dominance of self-interest and anxiety about 
the future and the past phases of our lives by thinking that one's life is' 
not one single unit but is divided into the many lives of successive 
"selves". This can be possible by a lessening of what is called "psychol­
ogical connectedness" which is explained by substantial change in style of 
life, character or by loss of memory. The more remote Is the past 'self' 
the less is the psychological connection or connectedness between your 
present "self" and that "self", and therefore the more you are justified 
in depending (pleading?) non-identification. But, as Parfit himself sees,
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this type of non-identification cannot find much defence if the part of
past is more recent from which you want to dissociate your present self.
MIf it is only after some slight change that a man does not identify with
his earlier self, such a change would not provide much defence. But if it
3is after a great change then, I think, it would.H This anticipates 
Parfit’s theory of degrees of personal identity.
I shall shortly come to consider the theoretical basis of this view 
of personal identity. But before that, certain observations seem compelling 
at this stage. The first reaction to such a view would be that, granted 
the differences or changes in character, memories etc, which can be 
supported by facts, it is your present self that is claiming to dissociate 
from your past selfl (The «your« certainly has more than a mere rhetoric 
force. It cannot be said, either, that my emphasis on this word is tend­
entious. For the alleged attitude of «non-identification« is surely not 
of the same type as the one you have towards an earlier «self« belonging 
to the life-history of some other person. What then is this difference - 
if not thefact that the earlier self in question is yours?) So how can 
you cease to care about a period in your past? For even if you have changed^ 
your behaviour then is as much a part of your own past! As Penelhum put 
it, ’’That part from which we wish to dissociate our (present) selves is ' 
as much a part of us as that with which we identify«.^ In reply to this 
Parfit says that though the claim is, in a sense, true, it is a super­
ficial truth; «it is like the truth that all the parts of a nation’s 
history are as much parts of its history«. He says, after Hume, «what 
is most important in the histories of nations are the continuities of 
people, culture and political systems. These vary in degrees. So the 
identity of a nation over time is only in its logic all-or-nothing; in its 
nature it is a matter of degree«. And he makes similar claims about 
persons: «what is most important in the survival of a person are a number
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of psychological relations. Most of these relations hold, over time, to
varying degrees. So the identity of a person over time is only in its
logic , all-or-nothing; in its nature it is a matter of degreeH .5 It is
noteworthy that Parfit uses "survival** and "identity** interchangeably in
this passage; but this seems not to be in keeping with the general scheme
of this theory. For it has been one of his crucial claims that the language
of identity should be given up in preference to that of survival.** But,
nonetheless, he had to use these expressions in this way or else the
analogy he makes use of would lose its force, or at any rate, would fail to
bring out the desired effect. Now, assuming for the moment that the analogy
holds and also that the different phases of a person's life (what Parfit
calls different ‘selves*) are as diverse as the different phases of a
nation's history, still it is not clear how this helps one to talk of
identity of persons. Why should one claim that the "Complex View">together
with its proposed way of talking, offers an account of personal identity? 
has given us is a view
All that this view/about the nature of the identity (or otherwise) of 
•selves' (in Parfit's sense of the term) - not of persons; and if this 
view of selves is correct, then "the concept of a person must be wider than
the concept (wider than this concept) of a self".7 If, alternatively, as
8Parfit suggests, we are to substitute "single self" for "person", then of 
course it can be claimed that a view about the nature of "personal identity" 
has been given, but only at the risk of making a considerable departure 
from the ordinary usage. We have in our language enough room for "person" 
and even also for Parfitian "self" (or "single self")} as they are used 
they do certainly overlap, but they never coincide, and so cannot be 
intersubstitutable. For example we do recognise the distinction between 
someone's boyhood, manhood and old age - each signifying a single phase 
in his life history.(and hence roughly corresponding to Parfit's "single 
self"); but each phase, though a part of the person's history, is not the
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person. The person is tenselessly each of these and, indeed, all of these
together while each of the three phases (three "selves") is the person
only as applied present tensedly. In Wigginsian terminology, the
Parfitian "self"would be related to the person as a phase-sortal to a 
9substance sortal. Any attempt, therefore, to substitute "single self" 
for "person" is to blur this important distinction unreasonably.
Another reaction that suggests itself is: can we talk of 'degrees of 
identity'? - even as applied to the selves in Parfit's sense? Admittedly, 
what Parfit means ty this is that there may be greater different in respect 
of character etc between two selves x and y than between x and z, if i.e. 
y is a more remote past self and z a more recent past self compared to x, 
the present self. But all it would mean is that z is more similar in 
character etc to x than y is, and surely to say that z is more identical 
with x than y is, would be odd enough. And if it is suggested that the 
problem of personal identity is only about similarities (and not about 
numerical identity) it would be a very uninteresting suggestion indeed.
Now, let us see what gives a theoretical justification to this new 
way of talking. There is at least one view, which we explained at the 
beginning, according to which personhood and personal identity are some 
further facts, independent of the bodily and psychological connections 
involved in them. Parfit refers to this view as the "Simple View"*® as 
opposed to "his "Complex View". As I have indicated, this view is the 
generally accepted (though not by philosophers in their speculative mood) 
view which we normally have about the nature of personal identity. Parfit 
does not take this view seriously. On the contrary, he believes that 
the fact of personal identity consists in the holding of certain more 
specific facts like bodily continuity and the continuity of memory and 
character etc. he refers to the latter as "psychological continuity".
Apart from these specific facts, he does not think that there is any
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further fact that constitutes the nature of personal identity. But these 
facts are found to hold, over time, to varying degrees. So, he thinks, 
personal identity is only a matter of degrees. We have seen how he takes 
the help of Hume’s analogy to show this point. But it is noteworthy that 
the specific facts in which personal identity is said to consist is said 
to be only the «psychological continuity« and that bodily continuity is 
conspicuously ignored (another Humean feature). The psychological 
connections are so much emphasised that one almost forgets that the so- 
called non-identification is effected against the background of the same, 
continuing body. As a matter of fact, Parfit has expressedly said that the 
bodily continuity, which is involved in personal Identity, may be set aside 
as it is "morally irrelevant".11 Later on, I shall try to show that 
bodily continuity cannot be as irrelevant - not even morally - as Parfit 
thinks it is. But at this stage, even if Parfit is right about his account 
of personal identity, then the "more specific facts" which are involved 
in personal identity, and which he thinks are all that matter, include 
not only psychological continuities but also the continuity of the body, 
and it would be unjustified to make the nature of personal identity solely 
dependent on (or even determined by) the former to the total exclusion of 
the latter. It may be said in defence of Parfit that even if bodily 
continuity is included in the "more specific facts", it would not affect 
his theory - since bodily features, too, do change in degrees over a 
period of time. But even so, a theory of degrees of Identity, with its 
novel way of talking,would not give a right description of "same person" 
which will be in keeping with our normal understanding of the concept.
Then what was the need for the Complex View? What was wrong with the 
Simple View - which is nearer to our normal understanding of persons 
and personal identity? With his empiricistic bias - and with his
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distinctive Humean way of thinking* - Parfit seems to have reasoned as
follows: the only observable evidence that we have of the identity of a
person are bodily continuity and similarity of memory and character etc»
(psychological continuity); beyond these facts there is nothing that
could show that there is a further fact which the identity of the person
consists in. So the claim that personal identity is a further fact, over
and above these specific facts, is meaningless, and hence the Simple View
is unacceptable. But this in effect is verificationism^ which needs to
be supported by arguments before Parfit's reasons can give his Complex
View the status of acceptability. But although Parfit thus seems very much
to have relied on the verification principle, he has no argument in its
favour. On the other hand, it makes quite good sense - it is certainly not
incoherent - to suppose that a later person is the same person as an
earlier person even though all the evidence that we have point to the
contrary. For there is quite a gap between the Observable) evidence that
a proposition p holds and the holding of p. For example "smith is in pain"
may be true even though we have no evidence that he is, and conversely,
all evidences may have the tendency to show that Smith is in pain when,
in fact, he is not. Neither can smith himself be said to have evidence
that he is in pain when he is. For one does not know on evidence that
one has pain. One simply has it. (Is it not what Wittgenstein had in
Sec" 246
mind when he said in the Ptf: It cannot be said of me (except perhaps as a
joke) that I know that I am in pain?). The fact that we have no evidences
, for —  perhaps we have all the evidences
/ against - Smith’s being in pain has nothing to show that the claim "Smith 
is in pain” is meaningless. Thus, the fact that there can be no (obser­
vable) evidence to show that personhood and personal identity are some
*Note especially his claim: "He is one of my later selves and I am one 
of his earlier selves. There is no underlying person who we both are". 
"Personal Identity" ^R71ip 25
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further facta does not make the claim of the Simple View meaningless.
Rather this claim has a practical advantage in its favour that it is more
in keeping with the way we feel about person-hood and personal identity.
Further, the analogy of nations fail in the sense that we can refer to
people without making any reference to the nation to which they belong, 
but we cannot refer to the bodily and more particularly, psychological
continuity which is all that matters for Parfit, without making any refer­
ence to the person whose bodily and psychological features they are.
However, if Parfit is proposing to give an account of personal identity 
solely in terns of the more specific facts, nemely the (bodily and )
psychological continuity, he can be accused of making the same confusion
which most writers on the subject have been,recently,^ charged with,
namely, the confusion between the question*'»what does it mean to say 
that a person P^ at time tg is the same person as a person P^ at an
earlier time ?" and "what evidences can we have for saying that Pg at
is the sane person as P, at t, ? " 13 As I have been trying to say, the
meaning of P and the evidence for P are not the same, for if they
were, understanding the meaning of P and understanding the evidence for
P would also have been the same. But to say this would be absurd. For
understanding the evidence that some one is having toothache is under­
standing how he behaves and what he says e.g. that he holds his jaw,
carefully nurses a loose tooth, says 'oh, it hurts' and so on* but that
is not what toothache means. 14 Bodily continuity and psychological
continuity(Parfit calls the*"more specific facts" in which personal
identity consists) are our evidence of two non-contemporaneous persons 
being one and the same person; but just these evidences cannot express
the meaning of "same person". So, to say that personal identity is only
a matter of bodily continuity and/ or psychological continuity would be
to confuse evidence with meaning, (a fuller discussion of this is given
in Ch 1 sec i). It is true that for the understanding of certain concepts
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we have to take note of the grounds on which these concepts are
applied - and in the case of the mental conduct words (those signifying
'mental processes») the grounds may be all we can have or rely on.But
there is certainly more to the meaning of these concepts than Just those
grounds. This is evident from the fact that a mental conduct word (e.g. 
»»pain»») and an expression signifying all the evidences for the relevant
mental process are not intersubstitutible, nor can a sentence containing
the one be substituted by a sentence containing the other. This significant 
linguistic fact speaks faithfully about the nature of things. »»An inner
process stands in need of outward criteria'»,(Wittgenstein) but the
inner process is not Just these outward criteria. This was behind our
earlier claim (sec i: above) that a criterial relation is not a relation 
of entailment. The criteria for * do not imply x and, so cannot be confused
with it. If this is true, then a theory which asks us to mean by personal
identity nothing more than some specific facts that are involved in our
understanding of personal identity and in making Judgments about it,
cannot be the right theory; and in so far as Parfit's theory asks us to
do this, it must be mistaken.
One advantage of the Complex View is sometimes said to be that it
makes clear how to describe puzzle cases. Our normal theory of personal 
identity cannot give clear answers in the puzzle cases because it assumes
all-or-nothing answers. On occasions our usual criteria for personal
identity may fail to give any clear verdict as to whether P2 is the same
person as P^, Perhaps, if an answer is insisted upon, we may have to 
decide upon an answer. And this is a very uncomfortable position to be in.
But if we accept Parfit's way of talking, it is sometimes said, such
difficulties would not arise. For onthat theory, a later person , need
not be wholly Identical with (or different from) an earlier person; 
instead one can say that they are "exactly the same", "pretty much the
same" or "hardly at all the same" 15 Thus, in a puzzle situation the
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answer in one of these formulations would be given, depending on the 
degree of continuity of the relevant features. MThe less and less
gradual the brain and other continuities etc the more £ 2 is different from 
„15El* But it is evident how uncomfortable you would feel if you are to 
say, as you must on Parfit’s theory, that your father is almost Exactly
the same or ’pretty much the same’ or, what seems to be much worse,
•hardly at all the same’ as the person he(?) was years ago. Further, 
irritatingly enough, the element of decision has even an uglier face here. 
For on Parfit’s theory, the identity (or difference) of persons would 
depend on the extent to which there has been a lessening of psychological 
connections and the latter inescapably would depend on the decision or 
choice of the speaker* who claims non-identification. Curiously, Parfit 
is committed to this. For heotpressedly says that where lessening of 
psychological connections is to be done is left to the choice of the 
speaker.^ If this is so, it is not clear how his proposed way of 
talking fares any better in the puzzle cases than our normal way of 
talking. For if we must allow room for decision here, then it is at 
least as bad as the ’simple view' which cannot give clear answers in 
puzzle situations and may lead us to decide upon an answer. Rather the 
case of the Complex View, in this respect, se§ms to be at a greater dis­
advantage: the decision in this case is more likely to be arbitrary than 
in the other case for in the latter case who decides is not the person 
himself but others who may have full factual knowledge of what has 
happened. It will not only be said that there has been a lessening or
*This will have to be the case since, whatever objective grounds (viz 
behaviour, including verbal behaviour) we may have for saying that a 
lessening of psychological connection has occurred in a man, this is 
still compatible with the man trying to deceive - perhaps with a view 
to avoiding responsibility of a past misdeed.
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continuity of psychological connection, but also that whjr it has been so 
(and the latter will have the objective support of what has happened). 
However, one argument in favour of leaving the decision to the speaker 
himself may be the fact of the so-called 'privileged access' which one 
is said to have to one's own identity. But whereas this may be a fact 
it is not an infallible fact. There may arise certain situations in which 
a person may not know who he is - or may be mistaken about his own 
identity, and in such situations others will be required to tell him 
that. Thus, the idea that who one is may depend on what others say is 
not all that odd or absurd.
Let us now turn to consider the importance of personal identity and 
Parfit's second suggestion that concerns this. Parfit thinks that the 
question of personal identity is important because it is presupposed by 
some important moral and practical questions (questions about such matters 
as memory, survival and responsibility). But, he argued, these latter 
questions can be freed of this presupposition; and once this is done, 
personal identity would lose its importance. Now, to start with, it Is 
genuiniely doubtful as to how these two questions can be set apart, for 
with the question of personal identity losing its importance, questions 
of memory survival and moral responsibility also lose their importance.
It is not clear how can these latter questions plausibly arise independe­
nt lyr ^ of the question of personal identity.
It is an undeniable fact that genuine memory claims do presuppose 
the identity of the person who remembers. Of course "memory" can be 
interpreted in such a way as not to make this presupposition binding. 
Parfit, apparently to make the fact of memory free from such presuppos­
ition, takes the help of q-memory (memory of an experience or action 
which need not be one's own) to replace "memory". The suggestion is 
that it is possible to q-remember (not necessarily remember in the strong
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sense) an experience without implying the identity of the rememberer 
with the owner of the experience remembered. For instance (with refer­
ence to Wiggins' operationjsee note 12) the two resulting persons, in 
the split brain transplant case can q-remember experiences which had 
happened to the original person, and yet obviously they are not identical 
with the original.* Fair enough. But the fact is that in the world as it 
is, the phenomenon of q-memory cannot totally replace that of memory in 
the strong sense, and that in this world memory in the latter sense is 
the more important kind of memory which, hence, keeps the importance of 
personal identity undiminished. The fact that in our world memory in 
the strong sense is the most important kind of memory can be seen as a 
necessary (rather than contingent) fact, and it is this fact which makes 
memory a criterion or even an evidence of personal identity. I have 
argued this point elsewhere before (esp Ch 2 ii). I claimed that what 
makes memory a criterion of personal identity is the fact that "memory" 
in the strong sense means that it does, for it is this fact which creates 
in us the presuumption that any ostensive memory may be real memory and 
hence that the "rememberer" may be the same person as the person who 
witnessed (di4 experienced etc) what is "remembered". To be sure, this 
does not rule out - it rather requires it in order at least to give a 
non-circular account of the memory criterion - the fact of there being 
apparent memories or the fact of q-memories in Parfit's sense. But what
^or, Parfit nonetheless rightly argued, if they were they would h* m 0 h  , 
with each other. But they can't be, because decnn-* .l ! , be identical
so far with each other in almost every respect thev w^uld f lose sln,Ilarity 
different directions, have different memories a n d ^ x p e r i e n c e r r ^ "  f° ln 
possibly, may fail to recognise each other when
lapse of time (PR 1971 P7). y 6et after a lonS
As he also pointed out, certain moral and practical conoids«..« 
same point: If the two fight a duel and one of them dies will ?*-s^ow the 
murder or suicide? And wlli the survivor be one »«son . be
one and half a person? (cf op clt p 8 note 8) P » If a person or
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it does rule out, I think, is that the latter be the only form of 
"memories" in the world. For if it were, our understanding of the word 
♦'memory'* would be radically different from what it is; and if anything, 
it would point to the fact that a person "remembering" something is not 
the same person as the one who did that thing. In other words, it would 
teach us non-identity rather than identity of persons. Any case of 
"remembering" (q-remembering or otherwise) would then create in us the 
presumption that the present person may be different from the earlier 
person. Thus, in such a world, memory of any form would fall outside the 
criteria of personal identity and would be entirely irrelevant to it. It 
follows therefore that a world in which there will be only q-memories 
that are never memories in the strong sense will not be our world - not
even one like it.* (Yet Parfit is most anxious that his proposed way 
of talking should apply to ourselves and not merely to his imagined
beings.)17 The same argument would apply against the supposition - which 
Parfit makes but does not argue for10 - that q-memory could be the basic 
form of remembering and that what we call real memory woid only be 
q-memory of one's own experiences (op cit p 16). For one thing, even by 
parfit's own commitments the concept of q-memory is a derivative one and 
is dependent on the basic notion of (real) memory. (I refer to the rather 
dubious third condition in his definition of q-metnoryi "I am q-remembering 
an experience if ... (3) my belief is dependent upon this experience in 
the same way (whatever that is) in which a memory of an experience is 
dependent upon it", PR 1971,p 15 my emphasis). Secondly, if per 
impossible, q-memory becomes the basic form of remembering, then by our 
above arguments this memory would point to anything but the identity of 
the person who "remembers". Thus, we see that, in his extreme anxiety
*It is not surprising, therefore, that in the Parfitian scheme of thin**
identity "does not matter". n®s*
to free the memory-criterion from the charge of circularity (cf 0£cit,pl6) 
Parfit makes it cease to be a criterion at all. But if it has to be a 
criterion the strong sense of "memory** must be its basic sense and hence 
the question of memory cannot be freed of its usual presupposition about 
personal identity. Whence it follows that the importance of personal 
identity cannot be affected - even by the introduction of -memoryM.
As regards the question of survival, Parfit wants to free this 
question from its usual presupposition of personal identity by proposing 
to keep the language of survival and to give up the language of identity. 
The illustration again is Wiggins* operation. "We suggest that I survive 
as two different people without implying that I am these people**, (op clt. 
p 8). The two resulting people,by virtue of having strong psychological 
connections with the original person, can refer to him as Hmy past self** 
can claim themselves to be Mhis future selves'*. This way of talking is 
extended to imagine a world where fission is the rule rather than excep­
tion, so that in such a world the **descendant selves’* can be said to 
survive without being identical with each other. This may be possible.
But once again, the proposed scheme of thought would only apply to a world 
which is very different from ours (though, paradoxically, Farfit's 
intention has been to apply this scheme to our world). A world in which 
persons frequently undergo fission would not only be different from our 
world, but also some of our important concepts would have to undergo 
significant modifications in their application to such a world. For
consider the concepts like pride, remorse and horror, for example. As
19Shoemaker has suggested, i may not feel proud - not, at least, in the 
usual sense of the term - for a glorious deed I remember (q-remember) 
having done, since I am only one of the many offshots of the person who 
did it. Similarly, for the feeling of remorse for a cruel deed I 
remember doing. So also, I may not feel horrified - not at least in the
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usual sense - at the apprehension of horrible things to happen to my 
future selves (if» that is» I am about to undergo a fission)« Parfit 
of course» wanted to make some change in the concept of personal identity; 
but he never intended - nor would he like the idea - that most or many of 
our important concepts should also undergo such serious changes. Yet 
this, as we see, is the inevitable outcome of his proposed scheme of
thought.*
Next,the questions of moral responsibility obviously presuppose 
personal Identity (and Parfit has later shovn20 that vlth the adoptlon 
of a particular theory of personal identity, there would be a consequent 
change in our standards of morality) and it is hard to imagine how they 
can be freed of this presupposition. For persons are the bearers of 
moral responsibilities. Moral judgments are pronounced upon the conducts 
persons. It is on the merits or demerits of the persons that reward 
or punishments are given. But it would be (morally) unfair to punish (or 
even reward) a person for an action unless he is the same person who did 
that action. This is important, particularly, because there is always a 
time gap between the commission of a crime and the passing of moral judg­
ment on it, so that the possibility is not ruledout that the person being 
tried and the person who committed the crime may not be the same person. 
Hence the importance, in these doubtful cases at least, of first deter­
mining the criteria of personal identity before moral judgments could be 
pronounced, the fact of personal identity being otherwise taken for granted 
in normal circumstances. Thus Locke: «In this personal identity is founded 
all the right and justice of reward and punishment.«21 This should pretty
well convince one that as long as moral questions are considered important, 
questions of personal identity must also be important, and
*It w i H  shown in the next chapter that this sort of conceptual revi«:™ 
ism is the result of a fundamentally misguided idea that the so *
•problem cases* create a conceptual difficulty to the issue of personal
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that the former would inescapably presuppose the latter. Without a 
continuing person, ascriptions of moral responsibilities would be 
pointless. In his first article "Personal Identity" (FR,71), where he 
raises the problem, Parfit only claims that questions of moral respon­
sibility could be freed from the presupposition of the questions of 
personal identity, but he never showed how this separation could be 
effected nor has he shown how moral questions can still be raised after 
personal identity has lost its importance. However, he has suggested 
elsewhere2^ as to how this can be possible. He says, "we may, when
thinking morally, focus less upon the person, the subject of experience
22and ... more upon the experiences themselves". Now, in the first place, 
this fact of focussing less on the person does not eliminate the person 
(and so his identity) altogether. If, however, Parfit would go to the 
extent of 'focussing' solely upon the experience to the total elimination 
of the subject of experience, it would be difficult to understand why - 
if not how - moral judgements should be pronounced at all. Presumably, 
a moral judgment may be pronounced in some such way* action A is blame­
worthy, and deserves punishment, but this would be entirely pointless if 
there is no way of giving effect to the moral judgement, and it can be 
given effect to only if the wrongdoer is identifiable. Thus it becomes 
amply evident that questions of personal identity are presupposed by the 
questions of responsibility and the importance of the former remins undi­
minished as long as the latter are considered important,Perhaps it is also 
clear that questions of moral responsibility are important - that moral res­
ponsibilities are ascribed at all because there is a concept of personal 
identity. In fact, one can say that without the latter there would be 
no need of the former. But, strangely enought, Parfit's suggestion points 
to the contrary.
P A R T  - III
Chapter 4 
THE TVD CRITERIA
Prologue
^as been customary in the discussions of personal identity to talk 
of two fold criteria of personal identity: the bodily criterion and the 
memory criterion. Admittedly this is an overschematic account of the crit­
eria we use in making personal identity judgments; but in actual fact these 
are the two main criteria that are used, and any other criteria that may, in 
practice, be used can be seen only as special ramifications of, and subserv­
ient to, the one or the other. For example, besides these two criteria, we 
may justifiably work upon certain other factors like blood tests, finger 
prints and the like on the physical side, and character, personality, skill 
etc on the psychological side. As regards the former it can be seen without 
much difficulty that if criteria they are, and are used as such, that is bec­
ause more often than not they amount to, or point in the direction of, bodily 
continuity. To be sure the same blood group or similar finger prints do not 
i m ^  that the present subject is the same person as the earlier person in 
question - not even that they have the same body; but surely, if no other
alternative factor points to the contrary, the said evidence(s) will justify 
us in saying that :here we have the same body and so the same person. But for 
the usual presupposition (or rather presumption) of bodily continuity, these 
rather subsidiary criteria could not be used as independent evidence of 
personal identity, for if they were, it would point to the absurd consequence 
that a person with the same blood group or with an exactly similar shaped 
thumb as mine is the same person as myself. As regards the latter criteria 
on the mental or psychological side, an analogous straightforward reduction of 
these into the memory continuity criterion is perhaps not an easy enterprise. 
That is, it cannot be said that similarity of character, skill etc show, or 
even empirically indicate, continuity of memory. But it will be generally 
admitted that similarity in these respects would be entirely worthless as 
evidence of personal identity if id did not carry with it the general
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presumption of member memory continuity; for if, in any case, we are sure 
that a later person remembers what an earlier person did then these other 
considerations are needless,and if we are unsure of the "memories" being 
real remembering, these considerations will only serve as mere corrobor­
ative facts.(See penelhum, Survival and Disembodied Existence, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 29JO pp 60-61) Indeed, more often than not, simi­
larity of character,personality etc. go hand in hand with the continuity 
of memories; it is, if at all, a very rare coincidence that a person displays 
striking similarities in these respects while having no memory at all of
his past. In a sense, it seems inconceivable(in a weaker sense of course)
a
that this should happen. For it is^ general fact of nature that our char- 
acter and personality are largely a product of what we believe, and a 
large part of what we believe is constituted by what we remember about our 
past. e.g. a person is likely to be of a contented disposition if he reme­
mbers and believes that certain good things have happed to him. There are 
even some particular aspects of human character that are dependent on 
what they remember and believe; e.g. a person is revengeful if he 
remembers and believes that certain acts of cruelty and sheer injustice 
have been done to him or to people he loves or cares for. To be sure, this 
dependence will not be logical but only empirical or contingent, but it
is the latter, and not the former, that we have seen to be required for 
the notion of criterion. Thus any closeness of character and personality
etc. that would enter seriously into identity considerations will be of a
sort that would strongly indicate - if not "entail"(pace Penelhum, Ibid 
p 61) - a fair amount of memory continuity. It follows, therefore, from
what has been said so far that the bodily criterion and the memory
criterion are the two main or basic criteria of personal identity; and
even if anyone doubts or denies what I have said about character and 
personality etc, he will have little dispute with this conclusion about
bodily continuity and memory. He will, however,dispute the latter if he
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can show (which I suspect he can’t) that similarity of character, 
personality etc is itself as good a criterion as any of these two. More­
over, that these two are the main criteria, and not either of the subsid­
iary groups, is evident from the fact that we make fairly confident and 
reasonable judgments of personal identity on the basis of memory continuity 
with or without the similarity of character and personality etc, and that 
we make such judgments on the basis of bodily continuity without needing 
to look for blood tests and finger prints etc. It is important to note 
that the facts do not point equally in the reverse order.
With these forewords let us now attend to a reassessment of the 
nature and status of the two criteria.
Section (i): bodily continuity re-examined
The importance of bodily continuity as a justified evidence of personal 
identity is due, certainly to the fact that persons are known as embodied 
beings. We know of persons and learn the meaning of •’person” by being 
shown these flesh-and-blood beings and by coming into contact with them.
Any other idea of persons that, e.g.,they are essentially non-physical in 
nature and could be completely non-embodied and so on g will at best be 
an extension of the ordinary concept of a person (in fact we shall 
shortly be able to see that the idea of a purely non-embodied person, 
in the Cartesian sense, is not even intelligible). But the fact is 
undeniable that unless persons had bodies no one could learn, and none 
could be taught, the meaning of "person” . It is this fact about the 
crucial role of the body involved in the concept of a person that supplies 
a strong rationale for the sameness of body being criterial for personal 
identity. For as Locke and Shoemaker have pointed out, what you use as 
criteria of identity depends largely on the nature of what it is that is 
being judged.1 However, even if persons have to have bodies, it may not
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seem too obvious that they have to have the same body in order to be 
the same person. The following comparison might tend to strengthen this 
scepticisms It is essential for the concept of a parliament that there 
must be a definite minimum number of members; but, it might be argued, 
for the continuance of the parliament there need not be the continuity 
of its members; many and even all of the members may be replaced by new 
members, and yet the British Parliament is not for that matter replaced 
by some other parliament or some other thing. If this argument is sound 
it will purport to show that what is essential for something to be an x 
need not be necessarily the same in order for the x to be the same x.
But I don't think that the argument is sound For it conceals a crucial 
confusion between (a) there being members is essential to there being 
a parliament and (b) there being some particular members is essential to 
there being a parliament. The fact is that it is (a) that is being claimed 
when it is claimed that there must be a definite number of members in order 
for there to be a parliament, and the continuity of this (essential) 
feature is unhinderedly built into the criteria of parliament - identity. 
The discontinuity of particular members does not, as^is not supposed to, 
affect the last for, as we have made it clear, <b) above is not an 
essential feature of there being a parliament; all that essentially is 
required is that there must, at any moment of the parliament's history 
be the required minimum number of members. This continuity-of-members 
condition ij maintained despite the discontinuity of individual members 
and through the latter's replacement by other, new members; indeed, as we 
have already seen (Ch 1 sec i), it is in this last sense that the continuity 
through time, of the spatial things is to be understood. Now, what is 
thus true of parliament is analogously true of persons, in so far at 
least as both are spatial things. So if having a body is essential to
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being a person (in the way in which we have claimed it to be), then 
bodily continuity has got to be a criterion of personal identity. Indeed 
if having a body can be shown to be a necessary condition of being a per­
son it will accordingly have a strong tendency to make bodily continuity 
a necessary condition of personal identity. Although I am inclined to 
think that this is so and have made it considerably plausible in the 
last chapter, my concern will not be to show that it is so. For what I 
am interested in is to show only that bodily continuity is a criterion of 
personal identity which, in my view, need not be a necessary condition. 
What I claim to have showi so far is that since having a body seems 
crucial to the understanding he concept of a person, bodily continuity 
has very naturally been a criterion - and an important criterion, as I 
show later on. And as in the case of parliaments so in the case of 
persons, bodily continuity has to be analyzed in the same sense as the 
continuity of members: nothing in a body needs to remain (literally) 
unchanged in order for the body to be the same body over a period of 
time so as to account for the sameness of a person; all that is required 
is that at every moment of the person's existence there should be a body 
that is .?.V.b?£aH y .£.i & g the same its immediate neighbours. Once this 
condition is satisfied with respect to the bodies of persons that will be 
a justified evidence of personal identity. M t h  definite knowledge of 
bodily discontinuity and in the absence of any alternative criteria, 
we will have no justification for saying that any pair of non-contempor- 
aneous persons are the same.
Wfe have said before that the notion of a criterion has a unique 
intermediary logical status in the sense that although a criterio-logical 
relation cannot be equated with the logical relation of entailment, yet 
it is not for that reason an empirical or contingent relation, kfe had 
claimed that this privileged status is that of a necessary of conceptual
relation earned by «criteria« from the way certain concepts are formed 
and the way their meanings are learned, it is for this reason that we 
put pressure on the concept of a person to bring out the importance of 
bodily continuity as a criterion of personal identity. But even as 0 
criterion,bodily continuity has assumed much greater importance than its 
rival, the memory criterion. Many writers on personal identity - notably 
Williams - have underlined this fact by claiming that bodily continuity i, 
a necessary condition of personal identity. By contrast, very few in 
current philosophical circle have wanted to make similar claims about the 
memory criterion, and its status even as a sufficient condition has come 
under severe fire.5 Let us explain the naturalness and plausibility of 
this state of affairs by putting some further pressure on the concepts of 
a person and personal identity. We have indicated above the crucial role 
of the body in our coming to know persons and learning the meaning of 
«person«. We also know of persons as having certain personality and 
character and, above all, as being capable of remembering a considerable 
amount of their pasts. But it cannot be said that the latter set of 
features are equally crucial - if not more so - to the concept of a person 
as having a body. For our knowing something before us as a person is 
rarely, if ever, affected by the suggestion that he does not, or even 
cannot, remember anything of his past; at any rate,knowing that x 
remembers or can remember certain things of his past does not seem to form 
any very essential prerequisite of one's knowing that x is a person, and 
of applying the concept «person« to x. Similarly, though with less ease,
it may be suggested to us that someone, y, before us has no feeling at all 
and not any determinate attitude towards things and people« at best his 
character and personality can be described as oneof literal indifference-*
*1^ if be objected that literal indifference is still " “
and signifies a sort of personality, all T . a sort of character
saying that a blow, out flame is s u n  . fUmel ^  ' t M * is llk*
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but this »ill have little tendency to give a jolt to our knowing him to 
be a person, nor for that matter are we likely to call him a degenerated 
person. But, by contrast, if an x before us does not have a body of the 
appropriate sort we will be at a loss to call him a person despite hi.
Cor its) displaying all or most other characteristiscs of a person. (A 
person with no body of any sort wuld be even harder to understand; .e 
any rate, as we have seen, knowing that something is a bodied being forms 
an essential precondition of our knowing that he is a person.) It is this 
difference in the importance of the two sets of characteristics of persons 
that is also reflected in our normal talk of persons. We will most 
naturally say of somebody that he is a completely changed personality and/or 
he has no memories of his past . the «he« undoubtedly referring to one 
and the same person. On the contrary, in the absence of bodily continuity, 
no amount of accuracy in -remembering« the past of some person and/or no 
amount of similarity of character and personality etc will have any Just- 
ifiable tendency in us to say that this person is the same person as the
earlier person. We shall be certainly amazed by the striking accuracy and 
similarity of these psychological features and at best we would seek the
help of philosophical arguments to show that it is nonetheless a case 
of personal identity.
I am not suggesting that persons ore mere material objects - not even 
that we know them as such. Indeed, we have already distinguished persons 
from mere material objects and even from the lower animals by virtue of the 
fact that they are capable of certain -higher order» activities of conscious, 
ness. But this is not incompatible with saying thet we know them basically 
as material objects. Of course, this material object, we have been 
insisting, has to be a body of the appropriate kind - it is what we see 
as a person, and seeing it as a person, obviously Includes seeing it as 
having consciousness of a very special kind which enables us to know him 
as a person as distinct from the lower animals. But knowing persons in
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the last respect, which of course is very essential to our learning 
the meaning of «person«, requires that we have learnt to, or have
mastered the technique of, interpreting some of their bodily behaviour 
as intentional behaviour, and there is no other way in which we would be 
able to do so except by observing their bodies. Even we cannot understand 
fictitious persons,like Hamlet,as persons (even as fictitious persons) 
except as their having a minimum of bodily features. This shows the 
crucial importance - indeed the feeling of essentialness - of having a 
body to the concept of a person. And if having bodies is thus important 
to being persons then it Is but natural to insist, as we do, that the 
samness of a person must lie in the sameness of the body. It is equally 
natural, in view of the foregoing, that for this purpose the samness of 
the psychological features does not matter as much - although it does 
matter. I would suggest further that the last can be explained yet again 
by appealing to our logical or linguistic intuitions about the notions 
of sameness and continuity. For it is admittedly less natural to talk of 
the «same memory and character etc« than it is to talk of the «same body». 
(This goes also for continuity as applied to both contexts.) All we can
mean by «same memory and character« is similar or exactly similar memory 
and character, for there can be nothing continuing in this case, even in 
the usable sense of «continuity« as we have specified in the case of bodily 
continuity, to account for the ascription of sameness. It is for this 
inevitable reason that «same character« and «exactly similar character«
(the same is true of «memory«) are often used interchangeably, whereas 
«same body« and «exactly similar body« do mark a real differenced Else­
where ..earlier,- ‘ . i t  has been suggested that even if we try to
articulate a sense of «same memory« in order to spell out an analogous 
difference this can be achieved only by making this «same memory« 
explainable in terms of «same body« - which would point to the primacy of
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the bodily criterion anyway. However that will be a matter of philoso­
phical interpretation which has little to do with our linguistic intui­
tions.
We have thus seen that our logical or linguistic intiitions about the 
concept of a person and so of personal identity reveals the significance 
of the bodily criterion and its natural primacy over the memory criterion 
of personal identity. It may, of course, be said that what we know when 
we know the meaning of "person" and "personal identity" is not quite the
same thing as what constitutes the meaning of 'person* and 'personal 
identity». In a sense we have seen that this latter question is fruitless 
since not any very useful, non-trivial definition of personal identity
can be possible. But at any rate, as our discussion in this section 
would indicate,the question of how we know the meaning of a concept cannot 
be separated from the question of what that concept means. As Shoemaker 
said, "what_we_mean when we assert something to be the case cannot be 
different from what we know when we know that thing to be the case»6. (my 
emphasis). And what we know when we know that something is an x is not 
just any fact about that thing but only those facts which justify our 
applying the concept of x tn^ningfully to that thing and without which we 
will not U  able to apply the concept "x" to that sort of thing. For 
example we may know about an earlier person and a later person that both 
are white men, that both speak English or that both have short hair and 
so on, but these facts will have nothing to do with our saying that the 
two persons are the same unless they can be known to satisfy the requirement 
of bodily continuity and/or memory continuity. It is this latter fact and 
not just any (othei) facts we may happen to know about them that makes 
meaningful* application of "the same person" possible. (This is yet
*Without learning to apply the concept on the basis of these facts, it will 
not be possible to use the concept meaningfully. A child, for example , 
having heard the phrase "same person" for the first time from elders might 
keep on repeating it or even say it while pointing to a person; but that 
will not be a meaningful application of the phrase. But having so learnt to 
apply the concept, if we apply it without having these bases or anything 
like these, our application of the concept, though not meaningless, wouldbe unjustified.
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another way of explaining the close connection between criteria and 
meaning.) Thus what we know (in the described sense) when we know or 
learn the meaning of a concept is what we must know in order that meaning­
ful application of the concept can be possible in the first place and 
without knowing the former any application of the latter, though not 
necessarily meaningless, Is unjustified. From this, together with what 
I have said about learning the meaning of »person» and »personal identity», 
it is evident that bodily continuity forms an esaential criterion of 
personal identity and certainly a more fundamental criterion than memory 
continuity. Indeed, but for our inclination in some unusual circumstances 
to make personal identity judgments solely on the basis of the psycholo­
gical criteria (and des£ite bodily discontinuity), bodily continuity could 
fare well as a necessary condition of personal identity. In the last 
chapter (section ii ) we examined such unusual cases (namely the cases of 
alleged change-of-bodies) under two classifications of what we called the 
«naive theses« and the «scientific thesis«. The former, which draws upon 
the memory continuity criterion without explaining whjr at all that there is 
tfais continuity, has been seen to be implausible and open to serious logical 
difficulties. The «scientific theses«, because it explains the rmemory- 
and-character continuity In terms of the spatio-temporal continuity of 
the physical basis of memory and character etc, was allowed to be 
plausible and reasonable; but it is precisely because of this explanation
we argued that it betrays its inventor. For what it shows is not that the 
memory criterion is the sole, or even the primary criterion of personal 
identity, but rather that bodily criterion is the necessary condition of
personal identity since the memory continuity, which in this case is
reasonable guide to personal identity, is due to bodily con t inu ity . Th is
analysis has obliged us to modify the concept of bodily continuity in
terms of the spatio-temporal continuity of that part of the body which is
the physical basis of what we described as the «personal faculties«. We
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have given adequate reason to justify this modification and to abandon 
the usual rigid sense of bodily continuity. We will not therefore 
repeat these arguments hc*e except mentioning that such modification will 
readily appeal to our logical intuitions about the role of body as it 
relates to our understanding of the concept of a person. For it 
will surely be admitted in our common discourse about persons and personal 
identity that even if a person loses a hand or a leg or a kidney» he will 
still be a person and the same person as the person before this change; 
but our judgments of personal identity will be considerably affected if he 
loses his brain (and with it his »personal faculties«), plastic surgery, 
kidney transplants, or even heart transplants will not make us say that 
someone has become a different person, but a brain transplant with the 
consequent transfer of the memory and character etc will give us very 
strong reason to say that we have here a different person. This speaks 
reasonably enough for our analysis of the «Scientific Theses« and our 
modified version of the bodily continuity criterion. In what follows I 
shall try to expose the limitation of the «naive theses« from an entirely 
different point of view.
It has been made amply clear by now that our understanding of persons 
is basically as a category of spatio-temporal objects. Accordingly, 
without the spatio-temporal continuity of anything it will be impossible 
to know what personal identity is and hard to imagine what it would be 
like. This is not to say that we have to directly observe spatio-temporal 
continuity of a human body whenever we make, or are prepared to make 
personal identity judgment; but whenever we do make such judgments in 
the absence of direct observations of spatio-temporal continuity of the 
relevant kind, we presume that whatever other criteria we use in making 
these statements are evidence(s) of, are due to, such spatio-temporal 
continuity. We have seen before (see esp Ch 3 sec ii$ that if remembering 
is taken as an evidence of personal identity it is because we take the
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memory claim to be real remembering which, in turn, suggests the spatio- 
temporal continuity of the person i.e. of the living human body. Now, 
to revert once again to the question of how we learn the meaning of a 
certain concept, we are taught the meaning of «remember« by being told 
(or shown cases) that the person himself did what he now says he remembers
i.e. the person making the memory claim now is the same person as the 
earlier person who did what is being «remembered«, and without begging any 
question, the last can be explained to us only by telling (or showing) us 
that the rememberer and the doer of the action are bodily continuous. If 
this is so It becomes amply clear that identity in terms of bodily contin­
uity is our primary concept of personal identity, and if so, any other 
ides of personal identity can make sense only by depending on this primary 
sense, but not conversely. Now, if the «naive thesis»of alleged change of 
body does make sense and does seem to be plausible case of personal iden­
tity without there being bodily continuity, that is because (and that's a 
conceptual «because«) there is this primary sense of personal identity.
This conceptual dependence can be explained by the fact that if there 
were not persons who are bodily continuous with other non-contemporaneous 
persons, we would not be able to apply the concept of same person in the 
first place, and the «naive thesis« which makes use of the notion of 'same 
person* only in secondary sense derived from the primary sense, would not 
be an intelligible thesis at all. This is due to the fact that there will 
be the secondary use of "same person« only if there is the primary use of 
the concept and not conversely. This interesting distinction between the 
PrimaJ7. use and the secondary use of our concepts I owe to Professor Norman 
Malcolm through one of his unpublished(?) papers* As he put it in that 
paper, just as we can say «the doll has pain« (and that is only a secondary
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use of the concept of pain7 ) so also we can say in some unusual cases* that 
here also we have the "same person** (which, Malcolm argued, would be 
equally a secondary use of Msame person"). And he explained this by 
saying that just as we can say the former only because we have the primary 
use of "pain** in the human context (but not vice versa^  so also we can 
say the latter only because there is the primary use of »same person»in 
the normal bodily context (but not vice versal . Malcolm used this 
argument against Descartes to show that just because there is this secondary 
use in which we could still talk of the same person and so of person even 
in the known absence of a body, Descartes was misled to reason on this 
ground that person is essentially non-physical (a "thinking thing"). But 
if Descartes were right on this, it would follow that all the persons in 
the entire universe could have been non-embodied (as distinct from 
dis-embodied) thinking things, yet, as Malcolm's argument shows, this 
would make no sense since the latter, being only a secondary use of 
"person", is dependent (conceptually dependent, I claim) on the primary 
use of "person" as signifying embodied beings. This argument, which I 
think is basically sound, I also take to imply that just because we can, 
in a secondary sense, talk of "same person" in the cases of the described 
sort (see the last footnote), it does not follow that it is a genuine case 
of personal identity and that personal identity could have been only of 
this non-physical type. For the latter being only a secondary use of "same
i<The unusual cases he imagined come safely under my classifIran« I----
"naive theses". For he imagines few cases n i e  the f o U o i '
Robinson, is dead and buried; later a voice is heard by friends and 
relatives that sounds exactly like that of late RohinJL .7? .a d 
reports and "remembers" what only Robinson could have k n o w n ^ n d ^ h ™ 10* 
reported. In the face of such baffling accuracy in memory e i*? thuS. 
in view of our general reliance on memory aa a reasonable guide"« 
personal Identity, we may say that we talked to Bobinson - thus ial„o 
the concept of same person. But, Malcolm argued, this would only b^ 
a secondary use of the concept. « m y  oe
-  200
person* is conceptually dependent on, and owes its intelligibility to, 
its primary use which, if what we have said is right, goes hand in hand 
with bodily continuity and without this the secondary use of the concept 
in Itself would not make any intelligible sense. This latter will have 
to be the fate of the "naive thesis« if it claims to supply the standard 
case of personal identity with its expressed claim that memory is the 
sole criterion of personal identity and the implied contention that 
persons are essentially non-physical thinking things. I am not sure that 
Malcolm would agree to my last conclusion; but I-do not see how then he 
would consistently maintain his position against Descartes, namely that 
the Cartesian idea of pure non-embodied person is unintelligible. X want to 
maintain further that any theory that purports to stress the non-physical 
nature of persons and to establish that the criteria of personal identity 
are solely non-physical is guilty of taking the secondary use of these 
concepts seriously and of trying to give it the status of primacy. In 
so far as the «naive thesis« purports to do this, it must be mistaken.
These theories delude themselves into thinking that we are talking about 
the same thing here as we do in the normal cases presumably on the 
superficial ground that in the former case our familiar words like "person* 
and "same person" are used in their familiar configuration. It is because 
of the latter that what they say would not be straightforwardly nonsense, 
but in being committed to an entirely non-physical concept of person and 
personal identity and as such abandoning the primary sense of these
concepts, they would not be describing what is the case. Wittgenstein
a
expressed even/stronger view in his following remeark on the secondary use 
of our concepts, "... the faiiytale (in which e.g. a pot can be said to 
see, hear or even talk, PKM) only invents what is not the case» it does 
not talk nonsense". (First emphasis added).
I shall argue later on that the secondary use of «same person» In the 
»naive» form of the problem cases, gives a degenerated sense of this concept.
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However, what will not be disputed, and what will suffice for my present 
purpose, is that this type of use of our concept of personal identity 
cannot be justified. Malcolm's ground for saying that they are only 
secondary use of "person» and "same person» was that we can not use the 
bodily continuity criterion in these cases. And if my assessment so far 
of the memory criterion is correct, then in the absence, ex hypothesi.of 
bodily continuity the memory-criterion is, in principle,inapplicable 
since, as we have argued, the latter is a criterion only because bodily 
continuity is a criterion of personal identity (see Ch 3 sec ill especially).
It follows therefore that the «naive thesis«, which because of its 
apparent plausibility,inclines us to say that the criteria of personal 
identity are purely non-physical and thus purports to undermine the 
importance of the bodily criterion, is not strong enough. Through its 
inherent weakness, we have been able to see the strength of the bodily 
criterion as an essential criterion of personal identity and certainly as 
the primary criterion thereof. In the next section we will examine some 
of the main points of the claim that memory continuity is the sole or even 
primary criterion of personal identity; and by showing this claim to be 
mistaken in all its interpretations, we will establish the fact that 
memory is only a secondary, not an independent,criterion, which has to 
depend on the bodily criterion for its use.
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Section (ii) Memory: not an Independent criterion
In the last section we have gone quite some way to argue that the 
bodily criterion is the primary criterion of personal identity; we also 
argued to the effect that although in most cases bodily continuity and 
memory continuity are used to determine personal identity yet in certain 
cases bodily identity can be used, and ijs used, as the sole criterion.
By this I mean that even if in certain cases there is considerable 
discontinuity (dissimilarity) of memory, character and personality, etc, 
yet personal identity judgment can be made, and is made, if bodily iden­
tity is assured. But I suspect there is an ambiguity involved in the 
claim that a certain criterion (and this applies to the memory criterion 
as well as to the bodily criterion) is the sole criterion of personal 
identity, which I must make clear before going to consider this claim 
in respect of either or both of the criteria of personal identity. The 
ambiguity (as applied to the bodily criterion) is between this sense 
just outlined and the sense in which the claim amounts to saying that 
bodily identity is the only criterion that is used and can be used in 
determining personal identity. Similarly, the claim that memory is the 
sole* criterion of personal identity can mean either that in certain cases, 
even if bodily identity is known to be absent, identity judgments can be 
made on the basis of memory or that memory is the only criterion that is 
used and can be used to determine the identity of persons at different 
times. It seems to me that no clear distinction has been made between
★Indeed, when the nature of this claim is exposed in the two senses, as I 
have exposed it, to say that a criterion is the sole criterion in sense t 
will be a very odd thing to say. As Professor Swinburne suggests to me, 
the proper thing to say here would be “a sole criterion*. But although 
this is true and is in the spirit of my distinction, yet this description 
again would sound very unnatural and monotonous - if not odd. In view of 
this as well as in view of my intention to expose the mistakenness of the 
claim (in respect of memory), I shall continue to state the claim in its 
familiar wordings, even in its sense 1, since that is how it has been made 
although I am in no fear of being committed to the oddity mentioned above 
in view of the way I have stated the distinction between the two senses 
of the claim.
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these two senses of the claim - let us call them sense 1 and sense 2 
respectively - in most writings on the subject, although each of the 
claims that bodily identity and memory is the sole criterion has been 
quite often debated. And rather strangely, (so at least it seems to me) 
the answers given to each of the claims have been giveif\wo different 
levels (without ever realising that this has been so). For usually when 
it has been claimed that memory is the sole criterion of personal Identity 
this is claimed in sense 1 whereas when it is denied that bodily continuity 
can be the sole criterion of personal identity it is denied in sense 2.* 
This becomes clear if we consider the basis on which such claims are 
usually made (or denied) in each case. For the source of the idea that 
memory is the sole criterion of personal identity has been the plausibility 
of the so-called puzzle cases where either someone allegedly turns up with 
the memory claims and character similarity etc of another person known to 
have lived in remote past or where two contemporary persons allegedly 
come out with the memory claims and character etc of each other. It is 
argued that since, in such cases, it not only makes sense to say, but we 
are so much inclined to say, that it is a case of reincarnation or bodily 
exchange (as the case may be), memory must be the sole criterion of personal 
identity. I am pretty sure that people who argue along this line will not 
say that memory is the only criterion that we use whenever we say that a 
later person is the same person as an earlier person. And even if they
do want to argue to this effect»my argument will be to point out that
this does not follow from its purported premiss, and that their claim 
would certainly need more argument than simply pointing out what we would
say in the puale cases. But given things as they are,it will be enough
to point out that although in certain cases we may be Inclined to say
we will not say that it is the
that memory is the sole criterion of personal Identity,/ only criterion 
that we can use in making personal identity judgment; for given a 
legitimate sense of ^criterion** there are hosts of other cases where we
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do use the bodily criterion besides, and despite the absence of, the
memory criterion in making personal identity judgments. I take itjthere
fore, that the only sense in which it can be claimed, and I suspect it is
the sense in which it has usually been claimed, that memory is the sole
criterion of personal identity in the sense 1 delineated above. Now as
regards the parallel claims that bodily identity is the sole criterion of
personal identity, very rarely, if ever, it has been claimed explicity -
though its primacy and even necessity has been often argued for *,but I
have seen this claim expressedly denied. And Vhen it is denied that
bodily continuity can be the sole criterion of personal identity it is
denied in (our) sense 2, for it has been denied on the ground that there
is another criterion - the memory criterion - which Is equally a*hon-
2
inductive evidence*1 that justified us in making identity judgments on 
its basis, and that this clearly means that bodily identity can't be the 
only criterion of personal identity. I suggest that saying this is not 
incompatible with saying, as I do and as many would be willing to do, 
that bodily criterion is the sole criterion in sense 1. for as I said, 
clearly there are many occasions when we do say that a later person is 
the same person as an earlier person because they have the same body -
even if they are very different in respect of memory and character. But 
it seems to me that although many would not dispute the last description 
of the situation, they would not - at any rate did not - take this to be 
expressing the claim that bodily identity is the sole criterion of personal
identity. They would, on the contrary take this claim only in sense 2.
3 -------------
Shoemaker again. He, for example, gives an account (which he eventually
rejects) of this claim that is clearly on the lines of sense 2. and not
of sense_l. For he implies that if bodily identity were the sole criterion
and Chat It would "rest on a rtMak«. vi.«*°tS tS?n§ t K t  t U m 1« . ;  and
ha also says, quite rightly, that If this were the status of the bodily
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criterion then whenever we took a person's memory claims as evidence of 
his identity through time, we should be doing so by inductively inferring 
it as reliable evidence from facts about bodily continuity Now, although 
this is not true** and bodily identity cannot thus be the sole criterion 
of personal identity yet it is, as I have shown, the sole criterion in 
another sense (i.e. in our sense 1); for if this latter sense were not 
there it would not be possible even to claim that memory is the sole 
criterion since, as I have pointed out, this claim has been made precisely 
in this latter sense. It is important, therefore, to make the distinction, 
which we have made, between the two senses as above, otherwise we would 
be arguing somewhat at cross purposes if we argue that memory is the sole 
criterion and bodily continuity is not the sole criterion of personal 
identity. I suggest that it is this lack of explicit distinction between 
the two senses (which nevertheless is there and is at the root of the 
above line of reasoning about the two criteria) which, partly at least, 
has misled many into thinking that the memory criterion is more important 
than the bodily criterion in the way it has been thought to be. I have 
so far been able to uncover at least one such mistake that has been 
elevated to the status of a theory. And this, it seems to me, is the 
thesis suggested by T*E*Wi lk.arson in his Minds. Brains and People that 
"mental identity is sufficient (but not necessary) for personal identity; 
bodily Identity is both defeasibly sufficient and defeaslblv necessary 
for personal identity".4 My concern is over the qualification "defeasible",
*i.e. we would discover empirically, using bodilv identic ** .... 
criterion of personal Identity, that tfe sincere and confident m L nrv 
statements are generally true, and since this present case s e ^ s  ^  be 
one such case of sincere and confident claim, we would infer t h a ^ h i s  
may be a case of personal identity. ----- - 018
^This is not true because memory is used as a criteri™ „»♦. v 
of being on inductive evidence of personal Identity but’by ilrtul of“* 
a logical connection betueen the concepts of memory end personalidentity.
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for even as a sufficient condition of personal identity this qualification 
purports to endow the memory criterion with an importance which tends to 
give it a superiority over the bodily identity criterion even as a 
defeasibly necessary condition of personal identity, since the latter can 
be allegedly defeated in certain circumstances whereas the former can 
never be (so the thesis tends to claim). The reason why I think it to be 
typical of the error outlined above is the following: the thesis holds 
that the bodily criterion is defeasible because In certain circumstances 
it can be defeated by the memory criterion, and this is but an echo of 
the claim that bodily identity cannot be the sole criterion in our sense 2« 
On the other hand the thesis holds that the memory criterion is not 
defeasible in this sense, and the only reason that seems to justify the 
last claim is that under certain circumstances (i.e. the alleged cases of 
bodily exchange) memory seems to be the sole criterion and does not get 
defeated even by the known discontinuity of bodies. And this only means
that (provided that this explanation of these situations is correct and 
reasonable which, I will presently show, it is not) memory is the sole 
criterion in my sense 1. Thus, without realising that there are two 
different senses in ONE of which bodily continuity is not the sole 
criterion and in ANOTHER of which memory ij3 the sole criterion^the thesis 
under examination seems to be taking the claims that bodily identity is 
not and that memory .U the sole criterion simply at their face value, and 
on this basis gives mental identity an undue importance over bodily 
identity. It is certainly an undue importance because, for one thing, 
it cannot be held that the memory criterion is not defeasible under any 
circumstances. As an interesting first step towards seeing the falsity 
of the latter we have only to recall the fact that in most cases of day- 
to-day life memory discontinuity ¿s defeated by bodily continuity (and 
this most certainly makes memory ineligible as a necessary condition of
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personal identity), and to see that, as a sufficient condition, memory 
continuity is defeated by bodily discontinuity, we have to imagine certain 
slightly abnormal or unusual cases like Williams’ memorable example of 
Charles/Guy Fawkes which is a clear case in point. Paradoxically for him, 
and much to our delight, Wilkerson states with apparent approval** that 
”our reluctance to say that Charles and Guy Fawkes are the same person 
is due to our implicitly insisting that they must at least share the same 
body to count as the same person” (Id p 27). And if this is so memory 
is as much a defeasible sufficient condition of personal identity as 
bodily identity is, and so can’t be the sole criterion in sense 2. Yet 
because of the fact that it seems to be the sole criterion in sense 1 
(i.e. in the alleged bodily exchange cases like Mr and Master Bultilude 
case), coupled with an oversimplified view of a criterion being the sole 
criterion of personal identity, it has been mistakenly thought that memory 
is the more important criterion, and has been, consciously or unconsciously, 
kept untouched by defeasibility. Incidentally, I suspect that some more 
normal situations can be brought in to show our point that memory continuity 
is as much defeasible as bodily continuity is. Quinton considers such an 
example of a pair of absolutely identical twins^ whose characters and 
memories are totally indistinguishable and ”whose thoughts and feelings 
have been precisely the same since the first dawning of consciousness in 
them” . Much to the embarrassment of his own theory (that personal identity 
is constituted by mental identity), Quinton concedes that the later 
phases of twin No 1 would be as much continuous, in respect of memory and 
character, with the earlier phases of twin No 2 as they are with his own 
earlier phases, and that yet it would be absurd to say that they are the 
same person, and this will be absurd because they have two different 
bodies. This would be a clear case of the memory criterion being defeated 
by the bodily criterion. Quinton, however, tries to avoid this conclusion
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by explaining that here "we might ignore the duality of their mental 
states, but we should be able in principle to assert it", for, he goes 
on to say, «however alike the characters and memories of twin No 1 on 
Tuesday and twin No 2 on Wednesday, they will inevitably be less 
continuous than these of twin No 2 on these two daystf (p 405), Now, 
apart from sounding too trivial (i,e. they must be less continuous 
because they belong to different persons), this seems to be an extremely 
forced explanation and a theoretical cover-up. For, in the first place, 
knowing fully well that it is a case of two persons and so the memory 
criterion - despite its striking continuity - will not do the trick, 
Quinton seems to be content with supplying an explanation in terms of
memory-and-character continuity anyhow. And, secondly, the memory crit­
erion, as it is supposed to be used as a guide to personal identity, does
not require that all (literally all, as Quinton seems to imply*) memories 
must be preserved, but only that a later person must have more or less
the same memories as the earlier person - or that the later person must 
be able to remember a considerable amount of what happened to the earlier 
person - in order for him to be identical with that other, and therefore 
the sort of memory-and-character continuity, striking as it is in the case 
of the absolutely identical twins should be enough to enable us to 
identify a later phase of twin No 1 with an earlier phase of twin No 2 
as belonging to the same person. But the fact remains that it fails, 
and it fails because it is defeated by the known fact of bodily discon­
tinuity. (In a sense there is no need to say the last-, since and*j>^ 
both satisfy the memory criterion at the same time, the bodily criterion 
takes over).
«Perhaps, being himself persuaded to think that memory and 
is the necessary condition of personal identity, Quinton is 
to such an explanation. But we have already seen, especially in81”8 
“ L ^ d . 1-0'16 BUCh ° !tBtUS °£ th* — *» crlterlon'can*t
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Now, if what has been said in the foregoing is right then it follows
that there are certain cases in which the memory criterion too is def­
eated and hence that memory cannot be the sole criterion in sense 2 . But
can it be the sole criterion in our sense 1? As we have seen, it is the
apparent truth of this last claim which has been (partly, at least) 
responsible for the mistaken importance of the memory criterion. My own 
view is that both memory and bodily continuity are defeasible but reasonable 
guides to personal identity. (For this is what makes them criteria in 
my sense of the term). And being so, neither can be the sole criterion 
of personal identity in sense 2. But whereas bodily identity can be 
the sole criterion in sense 1 (i.e. in most, though not all, normal 
circumstances), I feel very doubtful about the parallel status of the 
memory criterion. To explain my doubts I must consider some very likely 
cases in which memory has been thought to be the sole criterion (at least 
in sense 1) of personal identity.
Admittedly, the most likely cases in which we are said t<j?Wy much 
inclined to say that memory is the sole criterion (i.e. despite bodily 
discontinuity, memory can still enable us to make personal identity 
judgments) are the alleged cases of bodily exchange.* These cases, we've 
seen, can be either the Shoemaker-type case of brain transfer (which we 
have described on the "Scientific thesis") or the Lockean-Quintonian cases 
of sudden switch of memory and character (which we called the "naive 
thesis"). For reasons already adduced with reasonable adequacy we may 
leave aside any fresh consideration of the former type of cases since they
Perhaps the ¿barles/Guy ‘Fawkes-like cases, though they are also --- 6..^
to be lending support to the same supposition, will be considered as not 
being as strong as these cases of "bodily exchange". Perhaps also, in 
view of Williams' well-known attack on the coherence of such cases, many 
recent sympathisers of the said supposition may feel indifferent towards 
these cases. However, what I will say against the plausibility of the 
alleged bodily-exchange cases will also apply against such cases; and 
for this reason I will not discuss these cases separately.
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do not show that memory, even in such cases, Is the sole or even the 
primary criterion of personal identity (See Ch 3 seclii). It is, there­
fore, the latter type of cases which, if they are reasonable cases of 
bodily exchange, would show that memory in such cases is the only 
criterion since ex hypothesl there is no part of the body which is 
exchanged along with the exchange of the psychological features. A host 
of puzzle cases have filled the pages of past as well as current litera­
ture to lend support to the plausibility of the thesis under examination. 
The following will give a schematic and neutral account of what would 
be the case if such a case occurred» to start with we have two persons 
A and B, with every idiosyncratic differences in respect of physical 
and psychological features. All of a sudden, from what originally was the
body of A there begin to emerge the memory claims and the display of 
character and personality* which originally was associated with B, and 
which even now we will have reason to attribute to B, and vice versa;and
this situation continues for a fairly long time, perhaps ever after.
In consequence we now have two "new" persons: the A-body-person with what
may be called the "B-ish" character and the B-body-person with the "A-ish"
character. There is no explanation whatsoever of how this happened - only
that it just happened. Now if such things actually occur in our world,
and if we have to say something in these circumstances, there are two
things, equally plausible but mutually inconsistent, which can be said:
that A and B have exchanged bodies or that they have switched memories
and character. But if we say the former, we will be working solely on
the memory criterion to the total exclusion of the bodily criterion, and
*The question of whether these latter "psychological" features could be 
perfectly displayed in a different and perhaps very dissimilar body is 
of course high ly debatable, since certain aspects of human character 
and personality are highly "body-specific" and could not be displayed 
without an appropriate body. But without going to that detail we can 
work upon the assumption that they can be reasonably displayed. A 
fuller, discussion of this question, however, has been given in our 
section on Williams.
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if we say the latter we will be working solely on the bodily criterion 
totally disregarding the memory criterion, Prima facie there will be no 
reasonable ground to say the one rather than the other. So, in principle 
such cases have nothing to show that either criterion is the sole criterion 
(even in our sense 1). But being thus supplied with no logical equipments 
to deal with such cases the authors of these cases have usually appealed 
to our logical intuitions, to what we would want to say if such things 
occurred. But I think that what we would want to say is a very difficult 
question - especially in extraordinary situations like thesei perhaps we 
would not be able to say anything and our concept of personal identity 
would break down, or perhaps, as looks very natural and as I shall presently 
try to show, we will be largely divided over the issue. Yet what seems 
to be disturbing is that the authors of these imaginary cases have often 
taken it for granted that it would be easily pronounced as a case of 
change-of-body. This is suggested by the fact that with perhaps very few 
exceptions, like Williams' cautious account in his "The Self and the 
Future", the authors of these cases have presented them, in not so neutral 
a manner but somewhat contentiously as cases of bodily exchange. The 
Cartesian picture of a person is often unguardedly exposed as working 
behind the formulations of such cases.^ It will appear very likely that 
being persuaded to think in these lines they have in a way assumed that 
the only reasonable thing to say in these circumstances will be that 
which will suit the'bodily exchange' hypothesis, and that the reasons 
which they usually wanted to adduce have been more suited to this purpose 
rather than having any rigorous logical force. I shall try to prove my 
point, first, by reporting what Quinton, a notable and representative 
contender of the supposed theory, says about what is reasonable to say in 
these circumstances* and secondly, by examining what he gives as reasons 
or "supports" for his thesis. After describing a (similar) case of what 
he calls a "psychophysical" exchange, he asks what it would be reasonable
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to say in this circumstance and says that it seems to him fquite clear 
that we should not say that B and C had switched character and memories”
(my emphasis), and goes on immediately to the conclusion that ”if this is 
correct (without showing any reason why this is correct PKM), it follows 
that bodily identity is not a logically complete criterion of personal 
identity” , (p 602). There is no apparent reason, and nothing is supplied 
to us yet, as to why can't we say that and why must we say that they have 
changed bodies - except for an implicit reliance on an essentially non­
physical theory of persons (as indeed he says later on that the "soul is 
what a person fundamentally is").
In the following paragraph, Quinton goes on to produce some "supports" 
for his professed theory; and the first support for this comes from the 
"rather weak" evidence (Quinton's own expression) of imaginative litera­
ture, where the author shows "not the smallest trace of hesitation" in 
calling it a case of change-of-body (Quinton here refers to the Bultitude 
case of Anstey's Vice Versa). The evidence is very weak indeed, for 
certainly "no hesitation" on the part of the author is no reason for 
showing or saying that it Is a case of bodily exchange. To make matters 
worse, it can be said that the author shows no hesitation presumably 
because, like Quinton himself, he had designed or meant this story to 
act as a persuasive case of "bodily exchange". Second, a "sol ider 
support" for the thesis comes from the consideration of how the relatives 
and friends of the victims of this psychophysical transfer will feel, 
and what they would like to say. In matters of these Quinton believes 
that it is the psychological features of persons that matter most - 
indeed, as he seems to suggest, only these things matter. "In our 
general relations with other human beings", he says, "their bodies are for 
the most part In trinsically unimportant" and are only "convenient 
recognition devices" (p 402, my emphasis). And on these grounds he
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concludes that Mthe soul, defined as a series of mental states connected 
by continuity of character and memory, is the essential constituent of 
personal identity'1 (p 403). This is still a very weak explanation. For 
easy counter-examples are readily available by appealing to the same 
logical intuitions. If I am to undergo a radical,and even disagreeable, 
change of memories and character my mother, I am pretty sure, will have 
no hesitation in treating me as her son - though of course she would not 
treat me as tenderly as she used to, but that is a different matter alto­
gether. In the event of this happening my mother will be awfully sorry 
that evil has befallen her son and my wife will curse her ill luck; but 
it seems very unlikely that they will abandon me and (still more unlikely) 
accept an imposter(?), who appears with my old memories and character etc 
claiming to be their son and husband. Even if they would be willing or 
rather forced to do something like that (perhaps in the event of my 
treating them brutally) something like a legal procedure of "abandonment" 
and "divorce" will have to be brought in, and what is more to the point, 
they would be doing so, not because they believe that I have changed my 
old body and gone to "live" in another body but because they find my 
changed character and personality etc intolerable. Further, it will not 
be unnatural to think that even after all this have been legally done, 
my mother will still angrily protest, and with genuine feeling of 
maternal love, if my "old" body is tortured or slaughtered. If all this 
is correct and equally natural and reasonable things to say, then it 
follows that Quinton has not given adequate reasons to support his thesis. 
In general the so called inclination to say in such cases that a bodily 
exchange has occurred has no logical support and even as an inclination, 
it iB not any the more natural as it has been supposed to be. Hence the 
supposed consequence of this inclination, the theory that memory is the 
sole criterion, at least in sense 1. seems to be very dubious,to say the
very least
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A more substantial criticism of the Lockean-Quintonian type of 
theories of alleged bodily exchange can be made by showing that it, being 
only a version of the general memory theory (where all we are to rely on 
is the mere unsupported memory claims), will be no less open to the 
logical difficulty of reduplication. Following Williams' lead, we can 
say not only that the A-body-person will claim to remember what only had 
happened to B and vice versa, but the following may possibly occur: another 
person C may simultaneously turn up with the "memories" and character etc 
of B, so that we would now have two persons claiming identity with one 
and the same person B; and we have no logical ground for saying that only 
one of them is, and the other is not, the same person as B. And if this 
is so, it would be as much "vacuous" - though not meaningless* - to say 
that the A-body-person is the same person as B when he alone underwent the 
described change. The same consideration will make it equally vacuous to 
say that the B-body-person is the same person as A since, simultaneously, 
a fourth person D might appear with the "A-ish" memories and character etc. 
It follows that, since relying on the memory criterion in the said type of 
cases makes any justifiable assertion (and so ascertainable theory) of 
personal identity impossible, memory would be worthless as a criterion 
(- justifacatory evidence); and this means that the very purpose of the 
alleged cases of bodily exchange (some proponents of which even wanted to 
show with their help, that memory constitutes or makes personal identity) 
has been defeated by their inherent weakness.
A further weakness of these theories comes out in Quinton's own 
admission that if the alleged cases of bodily exchange did occur we will
*It should be clear from what has already been said about the possibility 
of such cases (see especially P I56 above) that making personal identity \ 
judgment on the described ground will be logically incoherent if memory is' 
meant as an analysis of personal identity, and even as a criterion of it.
A further account of the general philosophical limitations of such theories 
with special reference to split-brain transplants, will be given in 
Appendix 2.
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have to HextendN the concept of a person and of personal identity and 
say that a person is where his memories and character are. (Saying this 
is prima facie ambiguous between 'changing the meaning' of "person" and 
'extending the application of the concept*. Quinton did not make it 
clear what exactly he meant by saying that there will, in the described 
cases, be an extension of the concept of a person - though apparently 
he seems to think that there will be a slight change in the meaning of 
the concept. Saying the last straightaway might raise certain amount 
of controversy; but what will not be disputed is that if, under these 
circumstances, we want to say that the person is where his psychological 
features are, we will be making an extended application of the concept 
of a person). This brings us back to our distinction, made in the last 
section, between the "primary" and "secondary" use of our concepts. For 
if we are thus to extend the concepts of a person and of personal identity, 
we will be allowed to talk of the same person and people will, perhaps, 
have no difficulty in understanding what we mean»but that will be a 
secondary use of "same person, and like Wittgenstein's fairy-tale it 
would,perhaps, be inventing what is not the case. l.e. we would, in that 
case, be inventing a new way of talking (meant to suit such strange cases) 
but this will not guarantee that we would be talking about what is the case. 
As we have explained in the last section, the secondary use is logically 
dependent on the primary use of the concept but not conversely; and so it
would follow frotmthis, and from what has just been said above, that the 
memory criterion (when it has the airs of being the sole criterion of 
personal identity), being subservient only to the secondary use of "same 
person", would only be a secondary criterion, at best, in relation to the 
bodily criterion, for we have seen that the latter is an essential element 
in the primary use of "person" and "personal identity". (This is, thus, 
yet another way of showing the secondary status of memory as a criterion
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of personal identity)»
Thus, the outcome of our deliberations in the present section together 
with those in the last amounts to this: both bodily continuity and memory 
are the criteria of personal identity and that each being defeasible, 
under certain circumstances, by the other it cannot be said that either is 
the sole criterion of personal identity in sense 2, i.ev being the only 
criterion that can be used to determine, personal identity. The mistaken 
claim that memory could be the sole criterion was made plausible by the 
seeming plausibility of saying that in certain cases it was the only 
criterion which we use (i.e. as the sole criterion in sense 1 as we have 
outlined above). It has been seen that this supposition is doubly 
mistaken, because firstly even^lt was reasonable to say that memory was 
the only criterion that gives correct result in those cases it would be 
the sole criterion only in sense 1 (ignoring the oddity of saying this), 
and secondly because it has been shown that it is not reasonable to make 
even this weaker claim. By contrast, it can be said that bodily continuity 
is the sole criterion in this latter sense, which is evident from the 
many normal cases where even in the (known) absence of memory continuity 
it enables us to make personal identity judgments. Fairly reasonably, 
this explans the fact that the bodily criterion is the more important and 
the primary criterion of personal identity.* It has also been shown, by 
putting pressure on the concepts of person and personal identity that the 
bodily criterion is the more fundamental criterion which is involved in 
our learning and understanding the meaning of "person" and ’'same person1*. 
Any other - i.e. non-physical - account of personal Identity, it has been 
argued, would only be intelligible as a secondary account and would hence
*It is significant to note that we have to imagine unusual 
to make plausible the claim that memory la the sole criterioi even in868 
sense, 1; and by contrast it is not only plausiblTbut also true t L I  « 
many normal cases bodily identity is the sole criterion in thil lense
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conceptually depend on the bodily or physical account of person which is 
the primary account. And since the secondary account gives an appearance 
of primacy to the memory criterion the latter must be a dependent criterion 
in its relation to the bodily criterion. It has further been argued, by 
analysing the way we come to learn the meaning of "remember'» and its 
cognatey'memory"^ that the correctness of memory-claims could only be 
tested and established by reference to the bodily history of the "remember­
er". This means that if, in most normal cases, memory (i.e.memory-claim) 
is used as a criterion of personal identity, that is because we normally 
take it as a reliable evidence, i.e. as a likely case of correct memory.
It seems to follow therefore that the use of memory as a criterion of 
personal identity implies a covert presumption of bodily continuity.
(This may be further reinforced by the obvious fact that if a "rememberer"
were known to be not sharing the same body with the past witness of what 
is "remembered", we would not say that he really remembers - or at any
ratejwe will regard it as a very doubtful case of remembering.) Of course 
we do not need to establish that a memory claim is a case of real memory
whenever we take one as such and use it as our criterion of personal
identity. We simply take it as a reliable evidence and that is because, as
Shoemaker has argued (See ch J see iii above), it is a necessary truth -
or at any rate, a general fact of nature-that people's memory claims
are generally true (which, for reasons given earlier, is the same thing
as saying that they generally correspond to facts about the past histories
of the bodies of those who make these claims). It has become quite clear 
therefore that memory is not an independent criterion and has to depend
on the bodily identity criterion in order for it to be used as a 
criterion of personal identity. Tor, as we have seen in the last section 
and as Shoemaker so rightly said, if bodily continuity were not a criter­
ion of personal identity, nothing else would be an evidence thereof.1®
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Section (iii): Disembodied Persons
In the two preceding sections we tried to show the primacy of the 
bodily criterion of personal identity and dismissed the claim, often made, 
that memory is the sole criterion of personal identity. The latter was 
shown to be decisively false if taken in our sense 2 (see sec ii) in which 
a criterion is the only one that is used, and can be used, in making and 
coming to know personal identity judgments; and it was shown to be very 
dubious and unjustified if it meant (sense 1) that, in some circumstances, 
memory could be the only criterion. The last was shown to be the case by 
examining some specimens of these circumstances (i.e. the puzzle cases) 
in which memory seemed to be the only criterion, and by showing that they 
were not as plausible as they were supposed to be. But there is yet 
another area of speculation which gives the claim a reinforced plausibility 
and this is the widespread belief in disembodied existence of persons. For 
if persons could be said to exist in disembodied states, and if this 
would be a plausible thing to say, then the only criterion for the identity 
of such persons would have to be memory, since obviously in these cases 
there is either no body or no continuity of body. Therefore in the 
interest of our account of personal identity and the criteria thereof this 
belief in disembodied existence needs consideration in some detail.
Now, basically there are two distinct moves involved in the belief 
in disembodied existence. The first, which is a rather radical move,is 
that all persons could have been bodyless and that there could quite 
conceivably have been no bodied persons at all. I will refer to this 
belief as "non-embodied existence”. The second move, which makes a 
slightly weaker and less radical claim, is that even if persons are in 
fact bodied beings, each of them could continue to live or survive in a 
disembodied state after the destruction and decomposition of his body 
which normally is called death: this state may hereafter be the perpetual
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state of the person or it may be terminated from time to time by the 
person entering into different bodies at different stages of his personal 
history. I shall use the expression "dis-embodied survival" (with special 
emphasis on 'dis') or simply "survival" to describe this second belief.
As we shall presently see, it is this second belief, more than the first, 
which is cumbersome to our account of personal identity - and much more so 
to any exclusive bodily theory - and is more difficult to tackle. (This 
is because the first belief, in non-embodied existence is more easily 
dismissed than the second belief, as we shall presentity see; see also 
p 1^9 above). For this reason, it will be given a more detailed consider­
ation than the first belief. But before going to (and in order to be able 
to) deal briefly with the first belief, it is significant and useful to 
note that this belief and the second are the natural offshoots, in the 
reverse order of statement, of the two distinct strands of the Platonic- 
Cartesian theory of persons, namely (l) that a person often (but not 
necessarily always) combines two radically distinct, contingently related, 
substances - the body or the corporeal substance and the mind or the 
incorporeal substance, and (2) that it is the second of these substances 
which is the person. Now, since the first of the above beliefs, the belief 
in non-embodied existence, is based on (2) the weakness of this belief 
would seem to be more obvious than that of the belief in dis-embodied 
survival. This can be seen in the following way: given the leastcontro- 
^ersial view of "substance", a substance is that which can exist all by 
itself without having to depend on any other substance or any other thing. 
And while persons and bodies quite obviously satisfy this requirement, it 
is highly arguable if minds even can. It seems to follow from this that 
the equation or identity of persons and minds is unwarranted. Further, 
this equation is easily seen to be counter-intuitive since it is fairly 
more natural to say that persons have minds rather than saying that they
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are minds (and most certainly, the latter does not follow from the former).
_ . . „ ,,, , „ being based uponBut if this is so, the belief in non-embodied existence*/' ' this
rather dubious equation, becomes all the more dubious and weakened.* 
However, although the above argument leans heavily on my belief that minds 
are not substances, I will not argue the point here as I do not think it 
essential to my purpose, (i shall simply content myself with the fact 
that my R elief draws considerable support from our logical intuitions, 
as indicated above, about what can and what cannot exist by itself).
Instead I shall proceed to supply some further ground to show that the 
belief in non-embodied existence is unintelligible. In the last two 
sections - especially in the first of the two - I made the distinction, 
following the hints from Malcolm and Wittgenstein, between the primary 
and secondary use of language, and showed that the latter conceptually 
depends on the former and not vice versa. Further,by analysing the way 
the concepts of person and personal identity are learned,I showed that it 
is the bodied idea of persons that constitutes the primary sense of 
£erson and that the idea of disembodied person is only a secondary idea 
which has meaning only on the assumption of there being bodied persona.
If this is so, the idea of pure non-embodied existence - which excludes 
the conceivable existence of bodied persons - is unintelligible. For if 
there were no bodied persons at all, we could not be taught, and so could 
not learn, the concept of a person and consequently there would be no 
concept of a person in the first place, and no concept of disembodied 
person either. (See sec i above, especially PPl93-94 ). The idea of non-
♦Incidentally, my apparently more 'tolerant* attitude towards th%> 
belief, the belief in disembodied survival should not be m l s m d L t o o d  
For although I do claim that this belief is less obviously weak and lets 
vulnerable (than the first belief), I do not in the leas? ^ e s i t h a t  
persons are bodies. All I have In mind, though I do not commit to 
anything here, is that a theory that seems to equate a substanee (person^ 
With a non-suhstance (mind) is more obviously vulnerable than a then™ 
that may seem to eqnate a substance (person) with a conjunction of a 
substance (body) and some properties (a series of mental stat™ perh )
221 -
embodied persons which, with fair amount of justice, can be attributed to
Descartes, was shown by Malcolm (see sec i above) to have been the result
of an illicit reasoning, since it was supposedly based on the premiss that
in certain unusual circumstances we do talk of person and same person
despite our strongly justified belief that no body whatsoever is involved.
It may be conceded, as Malcolm in fact did concede, that our talk of
person and same person in these circumstances is intelligible; for
presumably we know what we are talking about, that it is a case very much
like the (actual) case of a person talking to us and like the (actual)
case of a person remembering certain events in his past. But equally,
we certainly know what sort of "person" and "same person" we are talking
about: a somewhat "non-standard" person (and a consequent "non-standard"
case of personal identity) which we make sense of only because we know
what standard cases of person and personal identity are. But the standard
altogether dropped out of discourse, the idea of pure non-embodied existence
becomes an utterly unintelligible notion; for here we would not know what
exactly we are talking of. To compare a familiar but salutory analogy of
Eyle's, there can be false coins only if there were coins made of the
1proper materials, issued by the proper authority. Could the idea of a 
counterfeit ever make sense without this last presupposition? We shall 
talk no more of "non-embodied existence" and must now proceed to consider 
the possibility of 'disembodied survival".
It would hardly be disputed, especially in view ofwhat has been said 
above, that the belief in survival, the belief that a person, after his 
bodily death continues in a disembodied state or in different states of 
disembodied and bodied existence, owes its intelligibility - whatever it 
may have - to the concept of embodied existence, which we have seen to be 
the primary concept. And this acts as a point in its favour as distinct 
from the idea of non-embodied existence. It is for this reason that 
whenever we talk of disembodied survival,a person in this state would be
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understood properly as a disembodied person, i.e. as one who originally
had a body but now has none. But if our talk of person and same person
in this state is to have anything more than a secondary sense, the belief
in survival has to be wedded to an essential^- incorporeal theory of
persons. There are of course certain versions of survival which claim to
free themselves from such a commitment, e.g. Hick's theory of instantaneous
2change of body at death, and the rather disreputable theory that there 
may exist "nothing” - literally nothing - during the gap between death and 
and resurrection.^ And these, no less than the versions involving 
disembodied existence of the survivor at some stage or other, deserve our 
attention, in so far as they suggest, what we want to deny, that memory,in 
these circumstances at least,will be the sole (properly a sole) criterion 
of personal identity. In the space that follows, I will be concerned with 
examining what sort of possibility it will be if disembodied survival is 
possible at all. ¡/My second important concern, which will be considered 
in the section that follows the present, is to examine how far such 
possibilities can show that memory is the sole criterion of personal 
identity. In the interest of the latter, consideration of survival which, 
supposedly, do not involve disembodied existence will have to be deferred 
to that other section.
First, as to the possibility of disembodied survival. As I have just
indicated above, a theory that purports to take this possibility seriously
has two alternatives to choose: either to profess that a person is
essentially incorporeal or to confess that our talk of 'disembodied persons'
(and also of 'same person' in that context) can only have a secondary
sense. The first choice will be difficult though congenial, the second
choice will be relatively easier but embarrassing to the survivalists.
Let us see how. The first choice would be difficult "to establish.
Criticism of this Cartesian way of thinking has been as old as the theory
philosophers
itself and several serious difficulties have lately been exposed by/too
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numerous to mention. My plea for adding to these objections is to point
out a limitation which has certainly captured the imaginations of the
Cartesians but which, it seems to me, has affected the reasoning of some
anti-Cartesians too. I shall point out this limitation by
emphasising a connection, which in my view has hardly been understood in
its right perspective, namely the connection between what is the case
and what could be the case. (Although what I shall say about this
connection may be true of varieties of other cases, I will confine my
discussion to the cases of person and personal identity in so far as it
relates to what is or could be a criterion of personal identity.) For
I think that the connection between the two issues (i shall refer to them
as the "actuality-question” and the "possibility-question" respectively)
is more intimate, in fact of a conceptual nature, than has been supposed
by both Cartesians and some anti-Cartesians alike. They have generally
tended to treat this connection as one of absolute independence. In other
words, they have supposed that there is no connection between what is
the case and what could be the case, that the former has nothing to do
with the latter and vice versa. The Cartesians, for example, have argued
that although persons in fact are bodied beings this puts no limitation
that ■
whatsoever on the supposition/they can be entirely disembodied (that is 
"nori-embodied" in the way we have specified it). Some anti-Cartesians, 
on the other hand, have argued that even if persons could be completely 
disembodied, it does not follow that they are so.^ The latter argument, 
although it has effect on the orthodox version of Cartesianism (that I 
am a 'thinking thing1), still leaves untouched the basic spirit of 
Cartesianism; for a moderate reconstruction of Cartesianism could insist 
on the possibility - not actuality- that persons are disembodied spirits. 
I suggest that the unsatisfactoriness of the above reply to Cartesianism 
is due to our supposition that the two issues of 'actuality' and
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'possibility* are entirely independent of each other; and my further 
suggestion is -that a more effective way of dealing with Cartesianism is 
by challenging this supposed independence which has supplied latitude to 
Cartesian and near-Cartesian theories. An initial first move in this 
direction may be to recall the obvious point that the denial of the 
"possibility-question" implies the denial of the corresponding "actuality- 
question" i.e. if persons could not be disembodied spirits, the assertion 
that they are would lead to a straightforward contradition. (The connec­
tion between the two questions is not "independent", like, for example, 
that between leaves being colourless and gases being colourless: on the 
possibility score even if, say, it could not be that leaves are colourless 
it has nothing to do with gases being actually colourless.) I want to 
argue that the connection also holds in the opposite direction - though 
in a somewhat less stringent form, or less obviously so, at any rate.
I.e. in the context of a particular type of thing, what jLs the case has 
often a lot to do with what could be the case. If what must be involved 
in considering the two issues of actuality and possibility is one type of 
thing or concept rather than several, then what that type of thing JLs has 
a considerable role in the issue of what that thing could be. In partic­
ular, what persons actually are has a lot to do with the concept of a 
person. To recall our earlier arguments (see i above) understanding or 
learning the meaning of "person" essentially involves knowing persons as 
they are (how else could be know than?) - knowing what sort of things they 
are. Only by knowing them as they are (being embodied as well as being 
thinking subjects), we learn the meaning of person and master the technique 
of applying it in the right contexts or to the right cases. Had we been 
taught to apply this concept to entirely different kinds of things, and 
not to ourselves - which is logically possible - then "person" would have 
had a different meaning than what it does have. This shows how what 
persons are is intimately connected with the meaning of "person". If it
were not for this important fact the problem of disembodied persons 
would not be a problem for philosophers. And it is for this reason 
that the idea that persons are incorporeal thinking things strikes 
us not only as counter-intuitive but also as conceptually odd. For 
it seems almost inevitable that any other use of this concept-i.e^ 
if it applied to things and beings who are very different from 
ourselves - it would be a changed or extended use of the concept, 
whether or not it is too obvious to us. And the significant fact is 
that this extended use of the concept will have sense only because 
the original use has the sense it does, but not vice versa. Thus 
we are back again with our distinction between the primary and 
secondary use of our concepts. But the Cartesian or anyone who takes 
the idea of disembodied existence seriously, will not find this conse­
quence very palatable. He will, on the oontrary, profess that the talk 
of "person" in the two states (bodied as well as dis-embodied) has the 
same sense, - only that in the former state the idea of a body is 
added ab extra to the concept of a person. In effect he would be 
claiming that the disembodied state of the person is his "natural" 
state, and that though from time to time he may pass through several
bodied existences the latter is not his "natural" state.(significantly 
this is an exact antithesis of the Thomistic concept of a person or
C
sour). That this account of person will not be our normal concept of 
a person is clear enough. But further - more, if our analysis of the 
actuality - and possibility - questions holds, it would be difficult to 
see what meaning it may have. For even if it may have any meaning no one 
could be taught and so no one could learn the meaning of an incorporeal 
person. Since by supposition this is the primary sense of the concept 
of a person, a disembodied person ought to be independently identifiable
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(since ’’person" is a substance-concept, and a substance must be so 
indentifiable) in order that the meaning of this person could be taught 
and learned - and this seems impossible. It is no good saying that the 
learning can be made possible by identifying and observing persons in 
their bodied state since, ex hypothesi. this state is not their natural 
state, and any learning through this state could only be that of a 
»secondary* concept of a person and not of the primary concept. It 
follows therefore that an entirely incorporeal concept(non-embodied) 
of a person is unintelligible; and this is due to the Cartesians trying 
to dissociate completely the question of what persons could be from the 
question of what persons are, and unjustly disregarding the latter 
altogether while considering the former. Added to this difficulty, there 
is another crucial difficulty which an incorporealist has to face. If, 
at the risk of inconsistency, the Cartesian claims that the meaning 
of person can be learnt by observing and identifying persons in their 
bodied state the problem he has to face is* how could we know that there 
is a person (an incorporeal mind or soul) here and not something else, 
e.g. a shadowy, astral organism ? And even if this can be evaded, the 
more crucial problem still remains with us i.e. how can we know that 
there is only one person and not twenty or two hundred in a particular 
body having qualitatively indistinguishable experiences and mental 
states ? It is not clear how this question can be answered even in one’s 
own case, not to mention the case of persons other than oneself. As 
Strawson expressed this difficulty* "How would each indignant soul, 
onee this doubt has entered, persuade itself of its uniqueness f "
The Cartesian has no answer to this* but there is a simple answer to 
be offered by those who emphasis the "actuality question" in the way
I have, and the answer is* one body one person.
Here I must make a passing mention of a possible reply from
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an unconvinced sympathiser of Cartesianism. He may argue that although 
we may have no ground for saying or knowing that there is only one person 
(incorporal) in a body it does not follow from this that there is not 
one person, but several, in that body. This is a profound objection, 
but there is to this a counter-objection which is equally profound and 
equally respectable. For it is not denied that there being only one 
person is logically possible? but what is important is a principle for 
applying this hypothesis - otherwise it would not be a usable but an 
empty hypothesis. For equally possible is the rival theory that there 
are many persons in the body and one can reasonably use this to make 
the counter-move in the Kantian Style: if you are allowed to invoke a 
hypothesis(the former) without feeling obliged to elucidate the principle 
of its application, nothing should prevent me from introducing the rival 
hypothesis ( the latter), also unelucidated. 7 This line of appreach may 
strike one as destructive and negativistic? but it has great relevance 
to us both of general interest and also of a particular nature. It is 
of general interest to our proposed thesis since its professed programme 
has been to consider what are, or rather what should be, the criteria 
of personal identity and not what personal identity is; it is also 
BqEfofflJgSliZ significant to our present purpose, for since we are exam­
ining possibilities of what persons could be and how they could be 
thought to survive their death, only those possible hypotheses will be 
of any interest to us which can offer some principle of its application 
or which can be said to have some grounds at least for their assertibility.
Returning to the mainstream of our arguments, if an incorporeal view 
of persons as the primary concept cannot be consistently and intelligibly 
maintained, the Cartesian survivialist has got only the second choice we 
offered to him namely, that he has to confess that his talk of person and
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same persons can have at best a secondary sense derived only from our 
actual concept(the bodied-subject-of-consciousness concept) which we 
have seen to be the primary concept. This choice may be embarrassing 
to him, but is the only way in which he can give a justifiable content 
to this theory. This choice not only offers him a good ground for 
presenting his thesis as an intelligible theory, it saves the theory from 
the charge of unintelligibility like what infects the^effejPin what 
we described as. "nonr-embodied existence". For, as we have argued, the 
only logical ground for saying that there could be disembodied persons 
is that we have the primary use of person (which is that of bodied 
subject-of-conscieusness); but if this ground is ignored and the 
secondary concept of disembodied persons is given the status of primacy, 
then the latter would lose the appearance of sense*. And once again it 
may be noted that what, in our view, gives this hypothesis the status 
of preferability( to that of non-embodied existence) is the fact that 
this hypothesis takes proper account of what persons actually are. If 
this analysis of disembodied survival is fair , and if the second choice 
is the only choice open to the survivalists, then the following conse­
quences will followt first, the possibility of disembodied survival will 
be an odd - conceptually odd, as we saw - sort of possibility since, in 
effect, it will be reduced to saying that person (and accordingly, 
same person) will not have the same meaning here as in the embodied 
state of existence. Secondly it will reinforce our earlier claim(which 
is the basic contention of the present thesis) that bodily continuity 
is the primary criterion of personal identity and thirdly, yet again
* If a theory T is intelligible only in a secondary sense, ’ 
and if anybody( e.g. the Cartesian survivalist) claims it to 
be the primary concept of a person, then in that sense T 
cannot be intelligible. (Whence it follows that persons 
cannot be said to be essentially non-physical)
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memory can be seen to be a secondary criterion.
As regards the first of the above consequences, I claim to have 
. given a fair amount of arguments in the present section. Let us try to 
see, by considering some representative theories of survival, that 
directly or indirectly the latter are committed to this consequence«.
I take it as an important, if not an essential, element involved in 
the belief in survival that what exists or survives after the death of 
a person is a soul or some such non-physical thing. In view of this, any 
such theory must be reasonably understood - unless a theory of this type 
qualifies itself otherwise*- to believe in disembodied existence of the 
person involved at least for some time between going out of one body 
and entering into another. Quinton in his important paper "The Soul" can 
be fairly taken to be a reasoned representative of such theories, and since 
he does not make any of the described qualifications, he's committed to 
the belief in disembodied existence, i.e. he will be committed to saying 
that the soul not only goes out_of and into bodies, it also continues in 
disembodied state during the transition. And like a consistent believer 
in disembodied survival, and quite to the consistency of this theory, 
he identifies his person with this soul. For his concluding remarks 
are not only that the soul is the 'essential constituent' of personal 
identity, "it is also what a person fundamentally ie"®. like we have 
seen(last section), in the interest of consistency and intelligibility, 
Quinton is obliged to accord the disembodied person a secondary status.
In order to give plausibility to his belief in bodily transfer, he is
found to confess that he is putting the concept of person (and I hope, 
-personal identity) under "strains" of conceptual revision, or as he 
puts it himself,"extending" the concept. Whether he or anyone is justif. 
led in making this "extension", what this shows is that if in certain
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£lr.?.S15^fflces the 'kalk of person and same person becomes compelling, 
and if this talk has to have any intelligibility, this can only be 
possible by making the concept express a different sense from what 
it normally does. And admittedly this conceptual change does not and 
cannot make the new concept the primary concept nor can it show the 
incorporeal person as the fundamental concept since it was introduced 
(if not invented) by extending the normal bodily concept and as such 
could serve only as a secondary concept.
As another theory that allows the possibility of disembodied 
survival but only at the cost of a conceptual change with the consequent 
com mitment to a secondary or dependent sense of these survivor persons,
I choose the theory of Strawson in his Individuals. After outlining 
that excellent account that ¿ex-son is a primitive concept to which 
both corporeal predicates as well as mental predicates are ascribable, 
Strawson nonetheless felt obliged to do some justice to the conceivability 
of a "pure individual consciousness« that may continue to exist after 
the death of the person. Presumably since the concept of mind is a 
«derivative« concept, the continuance of a pure individual consciousness 
could not be granted the same logical status (like existing all by 
itself as an individual) as a person. Yet it is the notoriety of this 
concept that its continuance after the death of the body forces itself 
on the imagination as an irresistible logical possibility and since the 
distinctive - but, remember, not all essential -perso^facuities are 
attributed to this faculty of mind, the possibility of its continuance 
looks very much like the continuance of the person. So presumably, at 
least for the sake of the intelligibility and conceivability of the conti­
nuance of this »pure consciousness», Strawson felt obliged to give an 
account of how this idea «eta ita intelligibility. tod quite in keeping
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with his theory (primitiveness of person). he rightly attributed the 
intelligibility of this hypothesis to there being the primitive 
concept of a person which is what we actually are, namely the 
"type of entity such that both predicates describing states of 
consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics... 
are equally applicable to a single individual of that type".(id pp 115-16 
and 102). If this is so, and presumably since in the absence of the 
body the corporeal characteristics could not be truly ascribed, this 
post-mortem pure consciousness (call it disembodied person, if you like) 
can have only a secondary sense of being a person. For if it were not 
for the primary concept, as we have seen, this concept of a pure consci­
ousness would not have come to have a use in the first place. Justly 
enough, Strawson calls this a secondary concept (ibid p 102) and accords 
the individual consciousness a "logically secondary existence"( p 1 1 5).
More significantly, he insists that such a concept could only be 
intelligibly formed from "within our actual conceptual scheme"(p 115 my 
emphasis), and this lends support to our claim that the idea of pure non- 
embodied existence, without any regard for what persons actually are> 
is unintelligible. This analysis of a pure individual consciousness 
makes no secret of the fact that if such a concept is to be called a 
person (albeit disembodied) at all it will be in a different sense of 
"person" from the sense in which actual, bodied persons are called persons. 
Presumably with this intention, Strawson refers to them as "former 
persons" (lbidj> 116). Strawson's allowance for disembodied persons and, 
particularly, his talk of them as persons has been the subject of 
serious contreversies lately, and it has been generally regarded as an 
obvious inconsistency in his own theory of persons.? Flew, for example, 
is not willing to allow Strawson the "easy imaginings to assume that
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his putative disembodied beings would be persons , (op cit p 232 
my emphasis). It seems to me however that, with the exception of Cowleyfe 
criticism - which purports to rule out the logical possibility of a 
dualist*5 mind (conceived as an entity) being derived from the concept 
of a person - these criticisms are based on the assumption that 
Strawson used -person" in the same sense in both the cases of disembo­
died persons and of the normal bodied persons. And if he did so he 
could not escape the force of those objections. But as my reading of 
Strawson's position shows, there is for him a definite way of escape.
For on my showing, he used, or at any rate can be said to have used, the 
concept in two different senses in the two contexts - that whereas it 
has its primary use in the bodily context, the concept has only a ’ 
secondary, dependent use in the disembodied context. Further more, it 
lis significant to note that although he does indeed speak of disembodied 
person for a couple of times in the 3rd chapter of the Individuals 
(p 103), Strawson explores the possibility of disembodied survival by 
introducing the concept of a "pure individual consciousness- and keeps 
on using this concept more often than the concept.of (disembodied) 
personj and the few times he used the latter to refer to the survivor, 
he qualified this noun with the adjectives "former- and "disembodied" 
with a purported emphasis on the "dis". Happily, however, in his latest 
contribution in this field of the literature he has apparently given 
up the idea of disembodied person altogether.^ 0
Another theory of disembodied survival, worth considering here, is 
that of Aquinas. As I see it, Aquinas can be fairly described as the
ancient precursor to the Strawson!an position - both unv, -
disembodied survival and with regard to r#**rd tol th. concept of a person. Like Strawson, or rather unlike the Cartesian
dualists, Aquinas maintained that person is a psychophysical unity-on.
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single substance and not composed of two Individual substances like 
the mind and the body. And like Strawson again, although he allowed 
for the possibility of disembodied survival of the pure ego (the soul), 
he nonethele-ss was committed to accord the latter at best a secondary, 
dependent status! for both maintained that the requisite »Individuality« 
of the (disembodied) soul or ego Is due to the fact that It retains 
this individuality (or the natural orientation to »Inform» the body - 
Aquinas) from having been a (an embodied) person.11 (Aquinas even went 
on to make the soul dl.epositlonaljj dependent on the body in the sense 
that although the soul in its disembodied state was capable of performing 
its higher, sensitive activities, It could not exercise this capability 
without its union with the body, and so is in need of this union.12 
But while Strawson could not, at places, resist speaking of this survivor 
soul as a person, Aquinas, more carefully and consistently, had no 
hesitation, in declaring that the soul, in the state of separation from 
the body, can't be a person.15 Nor, according to Aqunas, can this disem­
bodied soul be even a distinctive, feature of person- hood, since this 
the soul can be only in its natural state or in its state of "perfection" 
which, according to Aquinas, is its state as the "form" of the body, 
and this it can be only in its union with the body, it is for this reason 
that l Aquinas holds that the disembodied state of the soul is not its 
natural state (suma Theologies W A2)| it is what he calls praeter 
naturam or the state beyond nature. All this confirms my contention that 
the idea of disembodied persons, if intelligible, is so only in a secon­
dary sense and that the concept of a person, as applied in this case, la 
applied in a substantially different sense. If our arguments in this 
section hold, then it cannot he claimed that our use of the concept
has the same sense in this case as it has in th«5 in normal case of bodied
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existence. To believe this will be to forget the fundamental 
distinction between the described primary sense and the secondary sense 
of the concept. Only with this prerequisite can a hypothesis of 
disembodied survival be intelligible and the intelligibility of any 
such hypothesis must owe allegiance to the requirement of there being 
the primary use of the concept in the normal context, for otherwise we 
would be losing the very ground for stating the supposed hypothesis as 
an intelligible theory. The truth of this will be confirmed further if 
we consider some of the arguments usually given for disembodied survival.
There are two essential requirements to be considered with regard 
to the disembodied survivor. First, he should satisfy certain minimum 
conceptual requirements of being a person and second, since ha is a 
disembodied person, enough content should be given for his identity 
through time. The second question, which concerns the criteria of 
personal identity( as applied to the disembodied case) will be conside­
red in the next section. I shall now confine myself to the first question . 
Admittedly, not all the predicates that apply to persons could be ascri­
bed to a disembodied person for the obvious reason that he does not ' 
have a body now. What is important, therefore, is whether enough could 
still be ascribed. It seems perfectly conceivable - especially if one 
imagines the disembodied person to be oneself - that most of the P-pre- 
dicates of Strawson can still be intelligibly applied, It is>also argued 
that even some of the corporeal characteristics can still be applied.
It will be recalled that it is not our intention to deny that these 
are logically possible. But what we will point out is that the appli­
cation of most of these predicates or characteristics will inevitably 
involve certain complications. And this the advocate of disembodied 
survival can't deny. For example, it is said, without a body a disembo­
died person could still be able to move himself from place to place.
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"but how can he do this. Not in the way the normal persons do this i.e.
by moving their bodies? the only way in which a disembodied persos can
do this, it is said, is by "just trying to do so". Similarly he can
lift a table for example by "just willing to do . so". Harrison could
imagine himself lifting and moving the limbs of other embodied persons
by simply exercising his will.1^  Now without needing to enter into
conceptual complications, it may be simply said that by this means we
are endowing the disembodied person with certain special, perhaps
magical powers. For will it not be a magical power if an embodied
person could do things in the described way , If this is so, it is easy
to see what sort of persons these disembodied persons would be; and
it becomes predantic to deny that we are not making a change, or at
least an extension, in the concept of a person. Let us anticipate a
possible objection to this only to get it out of our way. It may be said
that if some persons, normal persons, do possess certain special powers
like this (e.g. a group of magicians or black magicians perhaps), won*t
we still call them persons and will the concept have a different
sense in their case ? Perhaps we will not say that, but if the entire
mankind were endowed with such extraordinary powers(perhaps they would
not be called "extraordinary" then), then even if they were calledbeen
persons.that concept would not have ^the same as the concept is today. 
Perhaps, Strawson would have to stipulate a third category of predi­
cates in his analysis of person. Or, imagine all over the world from 
now on every- body is endowed with such extraordinary powers, e.g. every­
body could see anything happening anywhere, bring out changes in any 
environment and the like. In such case, persons would be very little 
different from gods. Any if there is a difference between the concept of 
and the concept of god, what would we say except that thea person
-  236 -
concept of persons has to be revised and at least extended in its 
application to us in this imagined state of affairs ? The case of the 
disembodied persons being endowed with certain special powers is 
analogus to each of our imagined cases. And thus inevitably the possibi­
lity of disembodied persons is bound to effect conceptual change. Furth­
ermore, as we have seen, the concept of person when applied to these 
cases will have a different, secondary sense. This is evident from the 
admittedly essential requirement tha t for many of the predicates to be 
applied to them, they mls-t have been acquired or "inheritted" from 
the embodied days. Since it is the possession and / or exercise of these 
powers that makes them persons (albeit disembodied person) and since 
for this they have thus to depend on their prior embodied existence, it 
follows once again that they will have to be persons(i) in a different 
sense and (ii) in a dependent sense - despite the illusory confidence 
of their authors that they are persons in the same Bense as embodied 
persons are. It follows therefore that our survivors cannot have the 
same logical status as we erajoy (consequence of (l) above) . nor, to 
the disappointment of the Cartesian survivalists, can"disembodied person“
be the primary concept of a person so that the nature of persons could 
be essentially incorporeal ( consequence of (ii) above).
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Section (iv)j More About Disembodied Persona.
In the last section, we distinguished two supposed theses, the thesis 
that the only persons that there could be are disembodied persons (this 
was described as the belief in "non-embodied existence-) and the thesis 
that there could be disembodied persons surviving their bodily death 
(described as "disembodied survival" or simply "survival"). We argued 
that the first thesis was unintelligible since although it owed its 
apparent intelligibility to our talk of person and same person (j_n a 
secondary sense) in certain circumstances, it deludes itself to the status 
of primacy - presumably by taking the fact in its face value that we use 
the words "person" (and "same person") in these cases as well as in the 
normal cases. Further, we argued that the second thesis - "disembodied 
survival" - is an intelligible hypothesis, but. only so in a secondary, 
dependent sense, since if we did not have the primary, bodily concept of 
a person, we could not give any sense to the idea of a disembodied person. 
Now, taking this thesis to be intelligible in the way it is, we must 
consider how it relates to our account of personal identity. As we have 
indicated earlier, the possibility of disembodied persons and disembodied 
survival appears to collide head on with our stated claim that memory is 
only a secondary (dependent) criterion of personal identity, and that even 
its being the sole criterion (a  sole, to be more exact) in certain 
circumstances is highly doubtful. For if there has to be such persons at 
all, the criterion of identity between a later (disembodied) person and an 
earlier (disembodied) person and that between a later (disembodied) person 
and an earlier (embodied) person will have to be memory and memory alone - 
since, obviously, there is no body in the former case and no bodily con­
tinuity in the latter.
Now, if we are right in saying that the idea of disembodied persons 
is intelligible only in a secondary sense and that the concept of a person 
as applied to this case has only a secondary sense, then it seems
perfectly reasonable to say that memory, in so far as it serves as the 
(only) criterion for the identity of these persons, is only a secondary 
criterion after all. And if from the fact that there could be disembodied 
persons it does not follow that there could be pure "non-embodied persons", 
then whatever criterial role memory might have in the former case this 
cannot be its primary criterial role in determining personal identity, 
and moreover, since the idea of pure "non-embodied existence" has been 
seen to have no clear sense, the consequent idea of memory being the sole 
criterion or even the primary criterion of personal identity - in so far 
as it draws force from this idea - can have no clear sense either.
However, let us consider the case of disembodied survival in its own 
merit, and see if the result can be otherwise with regard to the role of 
memory.
Obviously, if we are to suppose that a person could continue to exist 
after his bodily death, we have to give sufficient content to the idea 
that the "survivor" is the same person as the pre-mortem person he claims 
to be (or is claimed to be). We have also to give content to the idea 
that he at any particular point of time is the same (disembodied) person 
as any earlier (disembodied) person. For the idea of a person, being 
that of a continuant, carries with it the notion of reidentification 
through time. Clearly, the only ground for saying that the survivor is 
the same person as any earlier-pre-mortem or post-mortem - person is by 
saying that he remembas doing actions and having the experiences of that 
earlier person. Let us grant that such a person can remember and (which 
is more important) say that he remembers, i.e. can make memory claims.
In granting this, we will ignore certain obvious "difficulties of how he 
can make these claims or utter the words "I remember ... " without having 
the appropriate bodily organs.
It should not be objected here that even if the survivor cannot say
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"I remember .•• " it does not follow that he does not remember the actions 
and experiences of the earlier person. For it will be recalled that here 
we are not concerned with whether the survivor _is the person as the 
earlier person but with what criterion can we have for saying that he is, 
and whether, as is generally believed, memory is that, criterion. Farther 
when our concern is basically what criterion can be there for the iden­
tity of these persons, we are bound to consider this possibility in the 
third person, for even though the case of disembodied survival seems much 
stronger when considered or contemplated in the first person - indeed it 
is this way of looking at the matter that gives a basic source of 
intelligibility to the supposed thesis - yet the question of criteria is 
irrelevant in this case, for as we have said before and as will be generally 
agreed,"* neither the knowledge of self-identity (one's own identity) has 
to be based on criteria nor _do we use any criteria in making first person 
memory-judgments which imply that identity. It is imperative, therefore, 
that any discussion of the criteria of personal identity (and so of 
personal identity, since the former consideration is indispensable to it) 
must include a closer analysis of what is true of others when they are 
said to be identical with any earlier or later persons. And assuming, 
as we do, that bodily continuity and memory are the only two fundamental 
criteria of personal identity, the consideration of what is, or that 
anything is, the criterion of disembodied persons requires that they be 
able to make memory claims. In a solipsistic world of the disembodied 
person,^ where no other disembodied person can be heard or listened to, 
and indeed nothing can be known as to whether they can remember or even 
whether they are there at all, the suggestion that memory or anything is 
the criterion of identity has no clear sense.
So, let us ignore the difficulties and grant that a disembodied 
person can make memory claims in whatever attenuated sense the authors 
of this hypothesis may content themselves with. I shall, however, main-
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tain that this will hardly show that our "survivor« remembers what he 
may thus claim to remember, . much less that memory is an independent 
criterion of personal identity. For we have already argued, 3 the use of 
memory as a criterion of personal identity presupposes (and so depends 
upon) the fact of bodily continuity. This dependence, it has been made 
clear, is explained not by saying that whenever we make personal identity 
judgments on the basis of memory we do so by checking the genuineness of 
the latter with reference to bodily continuity, but by saying that in 
particular doubtful cases the possibility of this checking must be avail­
able to us. Moreover since the distinction between ostensive memory and 
real memory is a conceptual matter, and since memory being a criterion 
counts on the possibility and probability of any of the former being a 
case of the latter,* the described dependence on bodily continuity • 
is an essential element in the claim that memory is a criterion at 
all of personal identity. And it will soon be clear that this fact of 
the described dependence stands out as an additional destructive factor 
in the case of disembodied persons. For in the absence of bodily contin­
uity, the possibility of checking on the genuineness of memory and also 
of the correct use of memory-words (for this also requires the continued 
presence of the body, see pp 16 1-2 above) would be ruled out, and yet the 
possibility of a disembodied person's being mistaken in these respects 
cannot be ruled out, (unless, of course, we are prepared to stipulate 
that a disembodied person simply can't be thus mistaken!) Further, as 
we noted above, it is the availability of bodily tests which, in the 
face of reasonable doubt, would help to set the doubt to rest - and which
*I.e. what makes any particular memory claim a justificatory evidence of
personal identity is the presumption that this may be a c a ^  of real
remembering. I have argued that memory in this weak sense s h o t *
stood to be a criterion of personal identity if no question 1^ + ?  J ^ r -
But if this is so, and if what has just been said in t h ^ t L t  a b o u t V ^ ^
an ostensive memory to be real memory is correct thPn +v^ ”  * knowinS
implicit dependence on the bodily criterion i<= r* + eU this criterion'sjr -XX oenon is far too obvious.
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thus underwrites, as it were, the role of memory as a criterion of 
personal identity; hut with the lack of availability 0f this test in the 
disembodied case, memory's role as a criterion would be extremely suspect. 
It is therefore only to be expected that even some devout preponents of 
disembodied survival (and also some of these who would subscribe to it 
in some way or other) should have been obliged to concede that memory 
could not be a criterion of identity for disembodied persons or that, 
even if we may talk of there being the"same person" in many such alleged 
cases, there are nonetheless no criteria of identity here on which this 
talk is based. As a clear example of the former I take Harrison (in his 
paper on "Embodiment of Mind", P£S 1974), and as a probable case of the 
latter one can cite Malcolm (in his unpublished paper on Cartesianism 
referred to before). For largely because of the reasons we have given 
above for the dependence of the memory criterion on the bodily criterion 
Harrison "agreed" that "there must be something other than which
determined whether I was identical with the person I seem to remember I 
once was, " 4 and even went on to imply that memory was an "impossible 
criterion" of personal identity. 5 And if he is right, there may be some 
other which, obviously, is not bodily) criterion of identity for the
f f s F S S t  us fo r the moment i s  * * *  — « t
aim here is to make an even weaker claim that the possibility/intelligib- 
ility of disembodied survival does not show, as is usually believed, that 
memory is the sole criterion of personal identity. Malcolm, on his part, 
appears to believe that our talk of a "person" and of his being "the same 
person" as the earlier, Robinson, whom we have known to have been dead and 
buried, is intelligible only in a secondary sense, and that, part of the 
reason for this is that^in the absence of the body and bodily continuity, 
there is no criterion of personal identity here.6 Although I do not 
incline to share unambiguously the view that memory is an "impossible"
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criterion of personal identity or that we have no criterion in the 
disembodied case, I can certainly see the basic force of one's arguing 
to this effect in the disembodied case. For if memory is a dependent 
criterion and if what it depends on is dropped out in principle, then 
inevitably it will look pedantic not to say that the "memory" cannot 
be used as a criterion in this case; and equally, assuming, as we do, 
that bodily continuity and memory are the only two criteria* that can be 
used to determine personal identity, it would look compelling to say that 
we use no criteria in this (disembodied) case. And I would largely agree 
with this conclusion, especially since it is in effect my basic claim 
that we will have no justification to suppose that there are disembodied 
persons and that each of them is the same person as some earlier embodied 
person. But this must not be taken to imply - as it might be7 - that the 
idea of persistence through time of disembodied beings is unintelligible 
and logically impossible. However, I have already explained (last section) 
what sort of "possibility" it will be and what sort of intelligibility it 
will have (and our way of explaining the notion of disembodied survival 
can now be seen to have yet another ground, namely that our normal 
criteria of personal identity cannot be applied here), and accordingly I 
do not see any £rima facie difficulty in saying that we do have some 
criterion of identity for disembodied persons - but only in an equally 
attenuated and secondary sense. In a sense the specification of some
*The possible suggestion that there could be a non-physical causal 
connection to explain the identity of persons (cf Harrison on m + n ^  
will not detain us here, since all we are interested S  is’t S t ^  49) 
notion of disembodied survival can't show that memory is - +
ion, and that is coneeded I by this suggestion. Besides if 1 riter" 
such a connection (and I take it that this would be the’criterion 
bodily context as well as in the disembodied), it would, li£e ¿he Ooul 
be something unobservable and private, and so csmnt ui*
ion; it might (which we do not deny straightaway) contribute to 
that personal identity is something unanalysable, but that L ! ?  ^a different matter. J e’ Dut that certainly is
criterion seems imperative, for although there being disembodied 
survival (i.e. the idea being possible or intelligible) does not require 
that there should be some criteria for identity, yet saying that there 
are (i.e. that a supposed disembodied survivor is the same person as an 
earlier embodied person) - as Malcolm agreed that we do say this - 
certainly does. So I suggest (because I am also prepared to believe that 
in certain strange but compelling situations we do say this) that the 
criterion for saying that a later disembodied person is the same person 
as an earlier bodied person is memory - but with an important difference. 
For although, like the nojmal cases of embodied persons, we will rely 
here on the memory claims, yet, unlike those cases, we could not possibly 
check upon the genuineness of any of these claims. Thus, in the disem­
bodied case, we could never know if ever a memory claim was true, conse­
quently we could never know if any disembodied person was identical with 
any earlier person or with the pre-mortem person he may claim to be.
We have said that it is the fact of there being such things as real 
memories that makes memory (memory claim or ostensive memory) a criterion 
of personal identity, indeed it is not just this fact, but the fact that 
there are known (at least, can be known to be) such memories that makes 
memory a criterion at all. This condition is easily satisfied in the 
case of normal bodied persons; but in the case of disembodied persons 
this condition could never be satisfied. It would be no longer any good 
saying (or relying on the fact) that people’s memory claims are generally 
true; for the fact of these claims being generally true is not anything 
in the nature of these claims themselves (or in the utterance of the 
words "I remember ...") but in the nature of who makes these claims. And 
once there is a radical change - as there obviously is in the disembodied 
case - in the nature of who makes the claims, that rule (of general 
reliability) will not do, or, at least, it will come under fresh review 
(for more about this see pp.249-51 below). But no way of any such
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review or test is open to us. Nor will it do to say that, since the 
disembqdied persons are each of them the same persons as some embodied 
person who have only suffered bodily death, the general reliability of 
their memory claims should not be suspect, for presumably, not only 
the learning of the memory-words and their correct use but also the 
general ability to make "true" memory-claims will have been "inherited” 
from their fomner state of embodied existence. 8 This will not do, 
since what is at stake is whether at all any of them is the same person 
as any pre-mortem person. It follows, therefore, that in the context of 
disembodied survival, the point of saying that memory is a criterion of 
personal identity will have lost its original purport and force. However, 
if nonetheless the idea of disembodied survival is intelligible and if, 
therefore, it is intelligible to say that a particular disembodied person 
(y.g. Malcolm's disembodied Robinson) is the same person as a previous 
embodied person, then the only point of saying this would be that he 
"remembers" (makes memory claims, or what looks like memory claims) what 
that earlier person had done or felt. . My suggestion is that since this 
is what we would do, or would be inclined to do anyway, in certain strange 
but compelling circumstances, and since we would be doing this on the 
basis of what may look like memory claims, it will look pedantic not to 
say that we are using a criterion and that this criterion is memory.
But I shall also claim that the "memory" that we thus use as our criterion 
for identity of disembodied persons is only a pseudo-crlteWnn with no 
possibility of its ever being able to play the proper criterial role. For 
as a criterion of personal identity, we have just underlined the vital 
difference in the role of memory in the disembodied context. Indeed, if 
our above analysis is correct, its role as a criterion of personal 
identity here is only a degenerated one - "degenerated" because it does 
not have its usual crit_eri_al function, but only the appearance of one.
For a criterion is on^hat justifies us in saying that something (0f which
-  245 -
it is supposed to be a criterion) is the case; but "memoiy" in the 
disembodied case, though it looks like such a justification and inclines 
us to say that a supposed disembodied person is the same person as an 
earlier embodied (or disembodied) person, can hardly be said to be a 
justification in the strict sense - for the simple reason that no osten- 
sive memory in this case can ever be known to be real remembering, and 
so no disembodied person can ever be known to be the same person as an 
earlier embodied person (or, indeed, as any earlier person - embodied or 
disembodied). The conclusion to which this leads us is that the memory 
criterion in the disembodied case has come under the strains of a double 
disadvantage: earlier, its only weakness was seen to be that it is a 
dependent criterion - dependent, as it was, on the bodily criterion - 
and it is in this sense that it has been usually called a "secondary" 
criterion, but now, in the context of disembodied survival, the secondary 
status which we were willing to accord to it makes it appear much worse; 
for what we would be counting on, if we did count on "memory" as the 
criterion in this case, is not "memory" in its usual sense, nor even a 
memory claim,* but something that only looks like memory claims with no 
possibility whatsoever of these claims being known to be real remembering. 
Interestingly, what these memory-like claims lead us to - if they do lead 
us to anything - is a similar world of appearance, with no possibility of 
its ever being known to be real; and the supposed world of disembodied 
survivors is nothing but such a world. Clearly, the intelligibility of 
such a world cannot be denied nor can it be denied that there may be such 
a world: but what is not clear is whether by believing in such a world we 
are not inventing what is not the case. However, what follows from the
*For in the normal case, a memory claim is taken justifiably to be a 
reliable guide to personal identic, which the claim in the,present case
is not.
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foregoing discussions is this: that the possibility of disembodied 
survival cannot show that memory is the ¿ole criterion of personal 
identity - certainly not in the sense of being the only criterion that 
is used and can be used (our sense 2 above) for the purpose of reidentifying 
persons, and even if it may seem to be the only criterion in certain 
oases (our sense 1, of 'being the sole criterion") viz, in the ease of 
disembodied persons, it would do so only as a degenerate criterion. For, 
a closer analysis of the situation reveals that, except for taking the 
memory criterion in the last sense, there would be no point in saying 
that memory is a criterion at all in determining the identity of the 
disembodied persons. Having acheived this so far, let us now examine a 
slightly different area of "survival" the possibility of which may be 
yet another source of the idea that memory is the sole criterion of 
personal identity.
As we noted m  the last section this area supposedly includes the 
possibility of survival without any commitment to the disembodied existence 
of the alleged survivor at any stage. The hypotheses that purport to 
give content to this sort of possibility are (l) that of instantaneous 
change of bodies by the person and (2) the hypothesis that between 'death' 
and 'resurrection' or 'reincarnation' - even if a long temporal gap is 
involved - there is to exist "nothing". In both these hypotheses, if 
anything is to count as the criterion of personal identity, it is to be 
memory since apparently the bodily continuity is disturbed by the fact of 
death (bodily death) of the person who immediately or later on is to come 
to exist in a different body. I shall assume that it will be a different 
body despite the general belief (e.g. of the Christian resurrectionists) 
and even the insistence (e.g. St Thomas Aquinas9) that the pre-mortem body 
and the post-mortem body are the same; for I can see no good reason to 
say that the resurrection body is the same body rather than a different
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one or even an exactly similar one. IMrthermore I shall so assume - and 
it won't be unnatural to so assume - since some major religious traditions, 
like Hinduism, explicitly believe in personal survival (reincarnation 
or rebirth) in numerically different bodies, and even according to 
ancient Buddhism these subsequent bodies need not be human bodies but 
may be those of animals or birds etc. (I suspect that this belief in 
metempsychosis is not limited to this religious tradition alone.*)
Added to this, the hypothesis of instantaneous change of bodies, as 
it was proposed by Hick, assumes the two bodies not only to be numer­
ically different ones but also to be existing in numerically different 
spaces altogether which may not be spatially related to each other. 10 
Thus, with the assumption of different bodies being made explicit, the 
aforesaid hypotheses (l) and (2) will point to the memory criterion as ' 
being the sole criterion of personal identity. Of these, (2) is only the 
general theory of reaurrection and reincarnation with the belief in 
disembodied existence of the resurrectee during the transition dropped 
out. But if, as (2) expressedly assumes, there is to be nothing existing 
during the transitional period, and so the person simply goes out of 
existence at 'death* and again comes into existence at 'resurrection', 
then clearly it will not be a case of personal identity in the first 
place. As Locke had said, "... that which had a different beginning in 
time and place ... is not the same, but diverse" . 11 And nevertheless 
the fundamental problem of how to check the verldicality 0r reality of 
the memory claims of the alleged survivor would still remain - if our 
arguments above are right. For with the original person and the subse-
■»Obviously the idea of metempsychosis would i n 1—  ------------
and implausibilities; but we need not go into these ^ o r ^ f  c°®plicati°ns 
to point out that whatever difficulties will be fmm* su^lce
idea of resurrection (in human bodies)will ^
idea of metempsychosis and such like. dently affect the
quent person having different bodies, there will be no possibility 0f 
checking* this. Therefore, whatever intelligibility and intuitive 
appeal this theory may have, we will have no grounds whatsoever for 
saying or supposing that the "survivor" is a survivor - that he is the 
same person as the pre-mortem person in question. But then if a 
criterion is a ^ justificatory evidence for saying that something is the 
case, it follows that the supposed possibility of bodily resurrection and 
reincarnation - even in the qualified f o m  as (2) above - will not show 
memory to be the criterion of personal identity and that it will even 
undermine its claim even as a criterion. Indeed, as has been shown in 
the case of disembodied survival, (similar reasoning will show that) our 
belief in, and talk of this kind of survival as (2) too will at best show 
that memory is a degenerated criterion. Now since this consequence 
follows from the lack of possibility of checking particular memory claims 
in the absence of bodily continuity, some might try to avoid this 
difficulty by suggesting either that there is a possibility of checking 
the memory claims of a survivor or that no checking is necessary, the 
latter suggestion drawing support from the fact that people's memory 
claims are generally true. Both these suggestions have in fact been 
made explicitly by G.C.Nayak in support of disembodied survival and 
bodily reincarnation respectively. I shall show, by considering than, 
in the way they have been made and (by implication) also in the way they 
.9 ? he made* that these suggestions will not do the trick, since while 
the former is irrelevant the latter is a gross over-simplification.
Nayak makes the first suggestion in order to show how a memory-claim
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*Nor will it do to say that a memory claim of such a survive v-  
checked by its being found to be true that someone had donl i w V ®  
thus remembered; for the real test of x's memory clai^ is n o t ^  
that someone did what x claims to remember but that hi difl it ^ Vl/  
this is not possible la the described context. ~  did
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about the supposed former life of a disembodied person could be checked 
(and I also take it to be the procedure by which the memory-claims of 
an embodied survivor might be thought to be checked)} and he appeals 
to a kind of "verification procedure" 13 which the person himself may 
take resort to. It is significant that the supposed procedure has been 
conceived in the first person (and, as will be evident, in the case of 
disembodied persons this procedure can only be conceived in the first
person). The procedure is this: I may "remember" that in my previous
embodied state I kept some valuables in a secret place and I may verify
this by visiting the place and finding the treausre. Thus, it is argued,
I shall be "convinced" - presumably, of my identity with the previous
person. This may be true, but very uninterestingly so. For what we are
concerned with is what the criterion/criteria of personal identity is,
and it has been seen before that first person judgments implying self-
identity can't show us any. The really interesting and relevant question
is: whether I would be "convinced" that someone else is the same person
as a previous embodied person if he carried out this verification procedure
But this question can have no definite answer from Kayak's suggested
procedure. Por admittedly, I would not know if he (another disembodied
person) carried out this procedure. The procedure may, of course, seem
to have some plausibility if it were carried on by an embodied survivor
(though Hayak does not use his argument in this way); but that will not
show that the survivor is really remembering and, so that he is the same ’
person as the previous person. However, more about'the last objection
will be brought out by examining Kayak's second suggestion, namely that
no checking is necessary for any of the survivor*s nemory claims.
(Kayak is there concerned with the embodied survivor who claims to be a
reincarnation of an earlier embodied person). Por, he argues, there are
"good reasons for believing the memory claims that are made with sincerity
and conviction to be veridical more often than not »14
’ and he "fai]fo) to
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see why this should not be true also of those few memoxy claims of 
earlier lives that are made with sincerity and conviction" . 14 I submit 
that whereas Nayak is certainly right about the first part of this claim, 
he is guilty of oversimplifying the matter with regard to the second part, 
To see this, let us understand carefully what the first part of the claim 
amounts to. Surely, there are good reasons for believing that sincere 
and confident memory-claims are generally true. Indeed, as we had seen, 
this can be taken even to be a necessary truth. Shoemaker who made this 
claim explicitly, reasoned that this is one of those "general facts of 
nature" which must be assumed in order for our concepts to have signifi­
cance. 5 In particular, if it were not a "general fact of nature" that 
sincere and confident memory claims are generally true, no one could 
possibly make and none could be understood to make memory statements at 
all. Now, given this 'general fact', a sincere memory claim of any 
particular person is not to be doubted unless there was reasonable ground 
for such doubt and checking. But certainly, this is no reason for saying 
that the sincere and confident memory-claims of his past life by an 
alleged reincarnate is not to be doubted and not to be checked. For 
firstly, we must remember that the truth of the sincere and confident 
memory-claims is a .general fact of nature, and secondly, this general 
fact is compatible with there being reasonable grounds for doubting any 
particular memory claim. And it will hardly be denied that the case of 
an alleged reincarnated survivor (or a "resurrectee") recounting events 
and actions of "his" past life is not a general fact of nature. How, 
then, can a general fact explain or account for a phenomenon that is 
not so general and admittedly "few"? Further, I believe that the 
"general facts of nature" which Wittgensten16 refers to,and which subse­
quently Shoemaker appeals to, are closely connected with what may be called 
a semantic feature of our language. This can be explained by saying that, 
for example, in order that certain statements may be made and understood
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as memory-statements, certain semantic conditions must be satisfied,
‘ that thS W°rdS 1,1 remember be uttered by persons and that
the utterance of these words must be correlated with certain happenings
in their pasts and so on. And what is, perhaps, equally important is 
the fact that these correlations must be known to hold in most cases, 
for otherwise, not only the use of memory-language could not be taught 
and learned, but the general reliability of the memoiy claims can never 
be .guaranteed. Now, in the case of the alleged resurrectees of rein­
carnated persons, what are the semantic conditions that might give 
content to their '‘remembering1' their earlier lives? In the absence 
ex.hypothesi of bodily continuity, none of the "remembered" actions of 
a previous life done by any previous person in that life (if such could 
be known) could be reasonably said to be happenings in their pasts - 
much less,Jcnown to be so. It follows, therefore, that not only are the 
cases of resurrection and reincarnation not general facts of Nature, they 
also supply a reasonable ground for doubting the alleged memory claims 
in these cases and call for the need to check at least some of these 
claims. Besides, this reasonable ground becomes a strong ground in view 
of the fact that such cases are not only admittedly "few" but are 
certainly abnormal. And as Wittgensten said "It is only in normal cases 
that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, we are in no 
doubt, what to say in this or that case.* The more abnormal the case the 
more,„doubtful it becomes what we are to say. " 17 it follows, therefore, 
that in the cases in question checking of memory claims is needed and 
that the normal rule of general reliability will not apply to the memory- 
claims about some supposed "past lives" (Nayak, in so far as he argued 
to the contrary in his second suggestion, was making the mistake of treating 
the normal case of our actual life on_a._i,par with the evidently abnormal 
case of reincarnation). But since, in the absence of bodily continuity
there is no possibility of such checks, there would ^^ a» in such cases, be
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no ground for saying that a person is really remembering things and
events in his past life rather than showing an excellent feat of
retrocognitive clairvoyance. Penelhun has argued that it would only
be a matter of option as to what to say in these cases and that the
identification simply on the basis of these memory-like claims doe3 not 
13have to be made, to which we add that it will be unreasonable to make 
such identification. Incidentally, the proposed "verification-procedure" 
discussed above may seem to be more plausible if known to be performed 
by an embodied survivor. A Charles in the 20th century may claim to 
remember what a Guy Fawkes in the 16th century had hidden in a secret 
place, and may also be able to visit the place and find the treasure.
Yet this will not show that Charles really remembered. For what is 
required is not simply that what he "remembered” be found to be true, but 
(since it is a case of personal memory) also that it is he who had hidden 
the thing. In the unavailability of bodily continuity, all necessity for 
saying this is lost and no justification for saying this is forthcoming. 
If this is so, and if our analysis of the criterial role of memory is 
sound, then it follows once again that the alleged cases of resurrection 
and reincarnation, being themselves dubious cases of personal identity, 
fail to show that memory is the sole criterion of personal identity in
any sense.
Now, a close look at hypotheses (1) and (2), and how the foregoing 
has revealed them. It has now become pretty clear that nothing really 
has been gained by dropping the idea of the intermediate disembodied 
existence (2) nor, indeed, by stipulating the idea of instantaneous 
change of bodies (l). For admittedly, both in the theory of instant­
aneous change and in the theory that "nothing" exists between death and 
resurrection, different bodies are involved. And inevitably, despite 
their obvious advantages concerning identification (individuation) of
persons and their memory-claims, they would still fail to supply a
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definite answer to the fundamental question of whether they really 
remember and so are the same persons as the pre-mortem persons. We have 
just said that, in the absence of bodily continuity, the answer to this 
question can at best be given in either way. And so the possibility of 
such survival would not show memory to be the sole (or, as we have 
argued, even a sole) criterion of personal identity: by a similar line 
of reasoning as the above, what it may show is either that memory is not 
a criterion in these type of cases or that, if it is, it is a criterion 
in a degenerated sense. And here again, since the plausibility of 
these hypotheses depend, as it does, on this degenerate criterion, the 
talk of «same person" and even of "person" in these cases will have 
suffered similar degeneration. This is more particularly true of the 
second hypothesis referred to above. For by making the plea that there 
may exist "nothing" during the gap between'the pre-mortem and post-mortem 
existence, it not only suggests a different account of the concept of 
personal identity, it also appeals in effect to an entirely different 
concept of a person - as that of a gap-inclusive entity - something like 
television serials or orchestras, and the like, which exist by instal­
ments, 19 as it were. This obviously, will not be the normal concept of 
a person which is the concept of a continuant, since this will be the 
concept of an entity which would be said to be continuing (identical 
with its(?) earlier "instalments") without being continuous. No doubt, 
therefore, this will mean a major conceptual change or revision; though, 
it will be argued in the next section, such change is neither justified 
nor necessary. Further, since, in actual life, persons often do suffer 
from loss of memories, it should also be possible that in each (or at 
least in some of these) different "instalments" (person-stages, as they 
can also be described) there might occur such loss of memory, in other 
words, one ‘instalment* or person-stage might not contain any memory 
of it.(i) previous instalments. In the normal oase no such possibility
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of memory-loss obstructs reidentification of persons; for there is, in 
that case, the other criterion of bodily continuity to ensure who some­
one is. But with the essential absence of this, in the supposed cases, 
the described loss of memory would make identification impossible; and 
if it is impossible to say who ?2 is, it is pointless to sunnose that 
he may be the same person as rather than • In other words, since 
the gap-inclusive concept of a person must make it intelligible for the 
described loss of memory to be possible, and yet subscribe to the view 
that there is no other criterion except memory, it would be committed to 
saying that there may, in these cases, eventually be no criterion of 
personal identity.* And a theory which, thus, in effect amounts to saying 
that there may be personal survival without there being any criteria of 
identity, can only give us not only a secondary use of the concept of 
personal identity, but also a degenerate concept (in the same sense in 
which memory, in these casa^ has been shown to be a degenerate criterion). 
In view of the basic agreement in their claims and contents, the last 
conclusion will apply as well to hypothesis (l) as it does to (2). And if 
the theory that memory is the sole criterion of personal identity leans,
as it often does, on survival theories of these types, so much the worse 
for that theory.
«Moreover, even „hen a sabse^u,l lu-Ulmenl-person "remembers" .rar 
earlier instalment-person did, this „ill not shoo that he u  r e a u f  
remembering! for, as is possible in actual cases, he a l J h t h J T t r  v 
ing the activities of an entirely different instalment1 Ana 4-remember- 
only remedy for such eventualities is the nosslbn?*!! ‘„4. , Since the 
independent check of the memory-claims, the unavailabilityS' ;,0' ^
that anything - let alone memory - ¡s l
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Chapter 5
CONCLUDING ESTIMATE
Section (i): Conflict of Criteria
And the Relevance of Puzzle Cases
So far, in the preceding chapters, we have analysed the nature of 
the problem of personal identity and made a comprehensive survey of the 
problem as it has been understood and dealt with by various traditional 
as well as contemporary philosophers. In the course of this enterprise, 
two major claims of consequence have emerged and have been consistently 
maintained. The first is that the problem of personal identity is not, 
as it has appeared to most traditional philosophers, a problem of 
defining personal identity, but is one of criteria. Once the right 
criteria are specified for making identity judgments about persons, we 
will have done all that there is to it; and the question of what is 
personal identity and how it can be defined, being itself unanswerable, 
should better be left unanswered, for it has been shown that no non­
trivial definition of personal identity is possible and hence that no 
definition of it would be philosophically useful. In view of this, most 
traditional theories (and even some contemporary ones) have been seen to 
be fundamentally mistaken, since they were trying to define personal 
identity in some way or other while what, indeed, they were giving, in 
the guise of definitions, were only the criteria for saying that a later 
person is the same person as an earlier person, (it has also been 
noticed that although some traditional philosophers, e.g. Butler and 
Reid, rightly realised that personal identity cannot be defined in terms 
of what is only a criterial evidence thereof, they were still mistaken 
in so far as they reasoned, on that ground, that consideration of such 
evidence, viz, memory, is unimportant or worthless, see Ch 2 sec ii.)
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Our second claim has been that, of the two main criteria of personal 
identity, the bodily continuity criterion is the more fundamental one 
and that the memory criterion is only a secondary criterion in as much
as it has to depend on the former in order that it may be used as a 
criterion at all.
In view of our above two claims, and particularly of the second, it 
can be seen that the possibility or the fact of conflict between the 
two criteria should not be worrying as it generally has appeared to be. 
For, on our analysis, any such conflict will either decide the matter 
in favour of the bodily criterion or would make the question of identity- 
if not a matter of arbitrary decision - amenable to a secondary and some­
what degenerate sense. To see the obviousness of the former, we have 
only to recall the familiar fact that in most (almost all) normal cases, 
even if there is little or no continuity of memory and character etc, 
we do make identity-judgments about (non-contemporaneous) persons provided 
bodily continuity is assured and that we are generally right (and others 
agree with us) about it. To put it in another way, if the two criteria 
point in opposite directions, as in the case of amnesiaor permanent loss 
of memory, it does not even occur to us that the person after the psychol­
ogical change might be different from the person we see before the change. 
Moreover, the rationale of the «'who has suffered the change?" question 
supplies the logical foundation to our saying that "they" are one and 
the same person. It is, perhaps, significant that normally there is 
thought to be no "problem" in the described cases. Why then should there 
be any "problem" if the criteria seem to conflict in the reverse order,
i.e. if, in spite of bodily jUscontinuity, continuity of memory and 
character is displayed with considerable accuracy? Can't these cases 
few and rare as they are, be explained as cases of what has been described 
as retrocognition, clairvoyance or some such para-noimal experience? (if
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it is not too strong* a way of putting it, we may also describe such 
cases as rare pieces of coincidence, i.e. of x's seeming to remember 
doing a and it being the case that a was done in the past.) With the 
availability of these sorts of explanations which supply a clear 
analogue to amnesia and such like in the "unproblematic” cases, the conclu­
sion that persons do survive their bodily death (and sooner or later become 
resurrected or reincarnated), and hence that memory is the sole criterion 
of personal identity, does not seem to be clearly mandatory. Moreover, we 
have already seen that, in the absence of bodily continuity, such conclu­
sion would be unwarranted and also that, for the same reason, even if we 
talked of "same person" in such unusual circumstances, this would only have 
a secondary, degenerated sense. However our suggested treatment of the 
conflicts of criteria would seem too simplistic unless we said something 
fully and specifically as to how the so-called "puzzle cases''^ are to be 
dealt with and what, if any, relevance these cases can have to the problem
*0ne reason why it would be too strong to call ----- 7-----
that such cases may keep repeating. But if some+M c4 ncidence ®i£ht be 
things) repeats itself L e  of t S  tiSs, that ft“ ?? ^  ^  tyP® °f 
any better than a coincidence* e.ff i? L m A n l  doea not make
(or several people on several occasions) said that averts! °caafions 
going to happen and it did happen, we will not grant that he ( o ^ f h ^  
knew it - not, especially, if there is a v + he °r they)
and "lucky guess" («hich .. take to be no different"'from”o™ n 5 denfef 
In our language, we make room for what are called »exceptions? l l  
rare cases of these types can have this one explanation?oToo^te £ *  
things of this sort keep repeating acre often than not, our iffunatifn 
may be to regard them as cases of knowledge simply on the ba*?*Tr It 
of their success and accuracy; but this will mea/a^onSideratle^ 
of our conceptual system - with "knowledge" assigned a differ™? ^ eJkd°wa 
role from its usual one. As Wittgenstein expresKd this^ if thin^s^^ + 
happen as they normally do and if exceptions became the J
exceptions, then we would not be olavinp1 the -lonn-nno. u f, anct rules 
It would at best, be a different game or no g a m e ^ n ! " 5 ^  ”  d° Pl^ ‘
^1 would like to call all cases of critola-conflict "rni'yyio „ „
the rather unproblematic cases like amnesia and paramnesia ?!??? S° that
under that description, and so would the supposed phenomena
tion and reincarnation. However, for convenience of Wrec'
I shall reserve the label to mean those "problematic" reference,
transfer", brain-transplant and spHt-brarSanfpUnts
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of personal identity. Ibr one thing, it is these eases which have been 
devised and stressed to demonstrate the conflict of criteria by showing 
how the Joint application of the criteria leads us to pussies. And for 
another thing, it might be said that in the cases which we've Just con­
sidered above (as cases of criteri«co„flict) the criteria do not really 
conflict but only that one of the criteria (memory, i„ the case of 
amnesia etc and bodily continuity in the case of survival) is ln-applio- 
able.( Although, if what we've said in the last two sections is right,
■ the ilOTpUcability of the bodily criterion will discredit the case of
reincarnation and such like cases).
Now then, without needing to repeat the list of the "puzzle cases" 
it can be said without much disagreement that these cases have been 
usually invented to suggest one of the two following things: (1) that 
in such cases there is no right answer to the question of who is who, 
and (2) that these cases show that memory is the sole criterion of 
personal identity. (Keeping the meaning of "sole criterion" as ambiguous 
and unclear as we have shown it to be, see sec ii of the last chapter.)
Now, to take suggestion (2) first. Although this has been the 
purported suggestion, explicit or implicit,in all traditional and most 
contemporary interpretations of the "puzzle cases", we have already seen 
that this suggestion is unwarranted. For what these cases are capable 
of showing, it has been argued, is either that the continuity of memory 
(and character etc) is due to the continuity of a bodily part, e.g. the 
brain (see Ch 3 sec ii ) or that the memory-like claims in such cases 
being real remembering is highly dubious and as such its role as 
criteria is questionable (see last section). This applies to the 
standard type of "puzzle cases" like the Lockean-Quintonian cases of 
"bodily transfer" and to the Shoemaker-type cases of "change-of-body" 
caused by brain transfer. (And as our accoount of survival and dis­
embodied existence would have made clear, this would also apply to the
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alleged cases of resurrection and reincarnation as well as to the 
possibility of "life-prolonging" process by means of recurring brain 
transplants). But this will also apply to the other type of puzzle cases 
e.g. the Dr Jekyll/Mr Hyde type of cases where one body is supposedly 
inhabited by different persons. For although the memories in such cases 
will not be questioned as in the other cases, these cases will still not 
show clearly that there are two persons rather than two different person- 
alities being displayed in the same persoh. (And the fact of there being 
two different persons being thus in question, it will not have been shown 
that memory is the sole criterion of personal identity in any sense.)
Indeed, as will be argued shortly, the different (or conflicting) streams 
of memories might be due to the one and the same person having had different 
(or conflicting) series of experiences in his past. Wittgenstein, in 
exploring the possibility of a similar "puzzle case", asks us to imagine 
”... a man whose memories in the even days of his life comprise 
the events of all these days, skipping entirely what happened on 
the odd days. On the other hand, he remembers on an odd day what 
happened on the previous odd days, but his memory then skips the 
even days without a feeling of discontinuity," 
and contends that it would be neither right nor wrong to say that there 
are two different persons rather than two different personalities in the 
same person (id-P 62), and, by implication, that "we could say whichever 
we like" (cf P 62, few earlier). Besides falling straightforwardly
into a rather odd view of persons and personal identity (namely, that 
the question is a matter of decision*), Wittgenstein's view here seems to 
be based on an inadequate analysis of the imagined situation. For on one
*We shall argue xa^er tnajt-wxTlV adequate quaUUeh UCftS/ TOg^dditT n P  such a view could be avoided. * e 0CLdity of
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interpretation at ieast it „ill appear that, not only are re not "bound 
to say" that there are two persona in this case, but also that it would 
be wrens to say that, and this for the following reason, Unless we 
assume that personal identity is to be defined in terms of memory, what
the present case shows is that the memories of the person comprised of
two different series . one   r__ a,------ * one concerning the events and actions
'■ thoso of
of the odd days of his life and the other concerning the even days of
his life; and the apparent alienation between the two series of 
memories (one series containing no element at all of the other and Vice 
versa) might possibly be explained to be due to the person’s having had 
(being subjected to) alienating experiences on the odd and even days of 
his life. The last point may be made out by imagining the following 
thought experiment. Eight from the dawn of consciousness in him, a 
child is brought up altematingly in two entirely different surroundings 
with entirely different people and things around him. Let us suppose 
that on every odd day of his life he is in surrounding A and that on 
every even day he is in surrounding B; let us also suppose that at the 
end of each day he lapses into a short coma during which he is shifted 
quickly from the one surrounding to the other. As a result of this, let 
us further suppose, the person displays two entirely different sets of 
memories, character and personality etc, like Wittgenstein described in 
his imaginary case. In this case, I believe, it will be certainly wrong 
to say that there are two persons living in one body, for saying this 
would imply the absurdity of saying that we could, as it were, "manu­
facture” two (or any number of) persons out of one original person by 
subjecting him to our described procedure. And since our case is, in 
principle, no different from Wittgenstein’s, it follows that in the 
latter too it will be wrong to say that there are two different persons 
inhabiting one and the same body. Thus, far from showing the primacy of
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the memory criterion, this -puzzle case” has all the potencies - which 
Wittgenstein did not quite realise - of pointing against it. As we have 
already seen, the temptation (to say that the puzzle cases show the 
primacy of the memory criterion) is more obviously mistaken 1„ the case 
of what we c a l m  the -scientific thesis" of change-of-hody; in particular 
it has been seen that memory continuity which, in these cases, would seem 
to asoertain personal identity would he due_to hodily continuity - either 
m  the form of brain continuity or, if we like, in the form of a brain 
being merely a oatalystio factor in the exercise of memory and conscious­
ness in the human body. The same will also hold, mutatls mntans,. ln 
the much more complicated case of split brain transplant which - if at 
all it shows identity - will not show the primacy of the memory
criterion. (The last case has been discussed fully in Ch 3 seciv and
also in Appendix 2).
We have thus seen that, of the two supposed implications of the 
"puzzle cases" (2) above is definitely false. Does it follow from this 
that (1) is true? Does it mean, i.e. that we have no right answer in 
such cases? This has been the general attitude of several contemporary 
writers2 towards the puzzle cases, although some also have wanted to 
resist saying this. 3 In view especially of this difference of opinion, 
this suggestion has to be qualified and understood in its possible 
perspectives before being accepted or rejected. The suggestion that 
there is, in the puzzle cases, no right answer might be understood in 
a rather extreme sense to mean that it would be meaningless to say one 
way or the other (since, presumably it could be equally right or wrong 
to say the one thing rather than the other). This, we have seen, might 
be the intention of Parfit when he said, in the split-brain transplant case, 
that we cannot say that one of the ’products' was the same person as the 
original person (the brain donor) . 4 We have argued that unless meaning 
and verification were taken to be the same, and even meaning and criteria
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were the same, this will not be the right thing to say. For even if 
nothing would -show«, or no criteria could be there for saying, that 
only one of them is the same person as the original person, the latter 
might be true nonetheless. We have also seen, in our analysis of 
reincarnation and resurrection, that the alleged survivor might 
intelligibly be said to be the same person as the "deceased” he claimed 
to be, though this would be said only in a secondary sense. In the 
similar vein, it will not be straightforwardly unintelligible (much less 
self-contradictory) to say that the prince/cobbler case or the Bultitude 
case are cases of bodily exchange. However, what we have said, and the 
least we want to maintain, is that we have no justification in making 
identity-judgments in any of these cases. And this may be a second 
sense in which the suggestion in question can be interpreted, namely 
that in the puzzle cases there is no.justified answer to 1he question 
of who is who. If our analysis of the puzzle cases here and elsewhere 
before is correct, then tnis seems to be the right solution (though our 
analysis has also revealed the logical balance swinging in favour of 
bodily continuity and, so, of non-identity and no change-of-body). With 
no ground to say in either way, you could say "whichever we like”, and 
this is true not only in the Dr Jekyll/Mr Hyde-type cases, but also in 
the alleged cases of bodily exchange or bodily transfer. However, 
saying this has certain other implications which need careful discerning. 
Saying this means that, in these cases, the question of who is who is 
«a matter of decision" which must be distinguished from two awkward 
implications: (i) that it must be an arbitrary decision and (ii) that it 
must be a verbal decision so as to have the effect of changing our 
concepts of a person and personal identity. (People who wanted to resist 
saying that there is no right answer in the puzzle cases were apparently 
(partly at least) trying to avoid these last implications. ) 5
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On the lines in which we have outlined our account of personal 
identity, it is possible to say that there is no right (justified) 
answer in the »puzzle cases» without committing ourselves to these 
last implications. For we have argued that bodily continuity and 
memory are the criteria of personal identity and given our definition 
of »criterion» (See Ch 3 sec .i ) the puzzle cases pose no real diff­
iculties for our account of personal identity. They only show - quite 
in keeping with our view - that in certain cases, abnormal as they are, 
the criteria fail to give us any clear result. The puzzle cases are 
puzzle cases, and what makes the element of »puzzle» plausible is the 
(natural) fact that our criteria fail to guide us in these cases. It 
is but natural, therefore, that judgments of identity/non-identity must 
be withheld, or kept under suspense, in these cases as any such judgment 
will have no criterial basis and so no justification. However, if in 
these cases we have to say one way or the other, the issue would depend 
on a decision; but the decision will not have to be an arbitrary one, 
since reasons can be given for settling the identity-question one way 
rather than the other: reasons like what the law-courts would decree, 
or what the family, friends and people associated with the victims would 
say, and so on - reasons, that is, which are more or less of an objective 
nature. It is important here to note that what these considerations 
point to is what it would be best to say in the case, which is quite 
another thing from what actually is the case - and even from what 
justifiably can be said to be the case. Therefore, this type of solution 
to our puzzle situations will only be a matter of expediency rather than 
any real solution worth the name. This underlines the significance of 
our saying that there is no right answer in these cases. However, even 
if we are willing to allow the issue to be thus a matter of decision, the 
decision need not be a »verbal decision» as to how the words »same 
person» are to be used. In the latter case, we will have to change the
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concept of personal Identity by reusing or re-defining the concept! 
and those »ho wanted to do this were anxions to do this in order to 
accommodate the puzzle cases in their general account (definition) of 
personal identity. They have wanted to say that a correct account of 
personal identity must not only apply to the ordinary cases but also 
to the puzzle cases, sc that the assertion of personal identity in these 
cases may have the same logical status as it has in the ordinary cases. 
And this is because they wanted to define personal identity! and a 
definition that suited the puzzle cases was adopted - even if it 
embarrassed the ordinary notion of personal identity, even if it threat­
ened to change the ordinary concepts of a person and personal identity. 
Thus, locke defined personal identity in terms of memory (his word was 
"consciousness”) because "should the soul of a prince carrying with it 
the consciousness of the prince’s past life enter and inform the body 
of a cobbler ...» etc, the latter will be the same person as the prince 
and vice_versa; (and we have seen what oddity it creates for our normal 
concept of personal identity as it is related to the issue of moral 
responsibility, see Oh 2 seo i ). And Thrfit has offered an entirely 
new concept of personal identity which even required us to give up the 
language of identity because this concept, and not the normal one, 
applies to the puzzle cases (fission and fusion and split-brain trans­
plants which most interested him). But what they were defining personal 
identity in terms of was only a criterion and not, as we've seen, even 
a necessary condition. Since we have also seen that the concept of 
personal identity cannot be defined, the futility of such attempts as 
the above need not be over-emphasised. On the contrary, our analysis of 
the fuzzle oases" above should have shown that these cases createno 
conceptual difficulties as these theorists seem to have thought! and 
therefore that there is no need to change or even extend our ,...i
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concept of personal identity in accordance with what we may say in these 
cases. For as will be pointed out shortly (and see also the last section), 
contrary to the apparent assumption of these theorists, assertion of 
personal identity - if made in these cases - will not have the same 
logical status as it has in the normal cases; and if so, these assertions 
fall far short of supplying a jegradlfla for the general application of 
»same person". But before going into this, it will be worthwhile here to 
point out (in a rather general way of theorising) that the difficulty 
the problem cases create can at best be said to be a criterial difficulty 
which cannot be a conceptual difficulty, unless criteria and meaning 
were the same (which we have argued not to be). If the normal criteria
do not apply (or be of help) in some odd cases this cannot change the 
general meaning of “same person" - nor even can it discredit thè normal 
criteria or make them cease to be the criteria. The existence of "puM i, 
oases" could not threaten our normal concept of personal identity and 
the criteria thereof any more than the existence of clones and amoebae 
threaten leibuis's la» . 6 It can at best pretend to call for the adoption 
of ne» or modified criteria only to suit these oases J  (Ho.ever. our 
reservations,- „hich follo» shortly, to this suggestion must be noted 
carefully.) But *e will not be obliged to change (or even extend) the 
meaning of "same person” simply on this ground. Ibr firstly, as is 
consequent upon what we have said above, change of criteria does not 
necessarily mean a change in the meaning of the relevant concept. And 
secondly, as we have argued in the lastchapter- (see especially p 242,244-5 ) 
these so-called "new" criteria will fall far short of their criteria! 
role. They will not certainly be criteria if the puzzle case is one 
that belongs to what we have described as the "naive thesis" of alleged 
change-of-bodies. For there, in the absence in principio 0f any 
independent bodily check, the "memory claim", which we are told should
-  266 -
be the criterion of identity, could never be known to be real
remembering and as such would only be an apology for a criterion: it
would, at best, be a memory-like-claim, but never a memory-claim.
Thus, in effect, our making of personal identity judgments in such
cases would be based on no criterion (but only on what looks like one).
This, incidentally, would explain our contention that the meaning of
’same person” in these cases, as in the alleged case of disembodied
survival will have to be different from our normal understanding of
this concept: we might be having a person in the normal sense of the
term; but the idea/claim that he is the same person as some earlier
person (he might claim to be), being based on a degenerate criterion
as above, will have to be degenerate itself. Nor can it be said to
follow that the new or modified criteria are the standard criteria any
more than that the new concept - if one is innovated - would be the
standard concept of person and same person.*
It can be said, further, not only that we are not obliged to change
our normal concept of "same person” in view of the odd nature of the
puzzle cases, but that, because of the very nature of the identity-
assertions in these cases, it would be wrong to do so. For as has been
and
argued in the last two sections of the previous chapter,/reiterated in 
the above paragraph, with no possibility of checking the genuineness of 
memory-claims, the assertion of identity on the basis of mere memory- 
like-claims alone gives "identity” only a secondary, degenerate sense. 
And since this is precisely what we do in the puzzle cases (except 
perhaps, in the cases of brain-transplant and fission and fusion, which 
have their own peculiar qualifications and difficulties^), our talk in
★This argument belongs to the family of arguments by which we have shown 
that the concept of dis-embodied persons can't be the standard concept 
of persons so as to make the Cartesian hypothesis of non-embodied  ^
existence intelligible.
S^ee Ch 3 sec
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these cases, of "same person" would have a secondary, degenerate sense.
We can't therefore, replace our normal concept hy this concept. For, 
as was shown, the secondary use of a concept is intelligible only 
because of the existence of the primary use (which is our normal use 
of "same person"); but with this use giving place to the secondary use
suitable to the puzzle cases, no intelligible sense can be given to the 
latter.
Further, that the talk of "same person" in the puzzle cases would 
not be of the same logical status as our talk of the same in the normal 
cases will be shown by the fact that this will not have any justification
whatsoever whereas our talk of "same person" in the normal cases is 
sufficiently justified by the satisfaction of the criteria of bodily 
continuity and/or memory. If there is any difference between speaking 
with justification and speaking without any, then the assertion of 
identity in the puzzle cases would be of a very odd sort indeed. More­
over, we are not forced to choose between the two answers - in terms of 
identity or non-identity - in the puzzle cases. We could, in fact, say 
neither and, taking all the facts into consideration, there is nothing 
absurd in starting with a "new" person - a Brownson for example.* This 
person remembers what Brown did because he has Brown's brain; he looks 
like and has most, if not all, physical features of Robinson because he 
has the latter's (brainless) body. But that is all; henceforth he will 
have different experiences which neither Brown nor Robinson had antic­
ipated, will remember doing all sorts of actions which neither of than 
had done, and so on. Given this reasonable choice, our talk of identity 
in these cases would seem to be all the more peculiar and so of a very
*With appropriate wordings and qualifications, a similar "third" person 
description will not be difficult in the prince/cobbler or Bultitude case.
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different nature from our talk of this in the normal cases.
I conclude, therefore, that the puzzle cases pose no conceptual 
difficulty to the issue of personal identity, and, therefore, that even 
if we may have to choose between one or the other of the answers as to 
whether or not the earlier and the latter persons involved in these 
cases are the same, it does not necessitate nor justify any change or 
extension in the concept of "same person». They would pose a conceptual
difficulty if the problem were a problem of meaning ox definition which, 
we maintained, it is not.
Finally, non what relevance the pussle cases have to the problem 
of personal identity? After outlining the way, we have, as to how 
these cases are to be dealt with, it would lock very natural to claim 
that these oases have no relevance to the problem. In view of the 
reasons given above, I am inclined to believe that the spirit of this 
claim is essentially true - though its letter needs seme clarifications 
so as to avoid misunderstanding. By our claim that toe puttie oases are 
not relevant to the issue of personal identity is to be understood no 
more and no less than the following two claims! (1) that they do not 
justify any change or extension in the meaning of "person" and "same 
person» and (2) that they do not justify change or extension even in 
our present criteria of personal identity. ('.That they may, of course, 
lead us to do is to adopt some new or modified concepts like »retro- 
cognition” (of. Penelhum) or some new or modified criteria» (Shoemaker) 
in order for us to be able to describe - if we must - these situations 
in identity terms. This, in effect, will be a sort of "conceptual 
innovation” , 8 but an innovation only to suit, these oases, and what is 
more to the point, those new concepts or criteria will be as vague and
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unclear as the situations they would be meant to describe. Moreover, 
since we have shorn! that we are not obliged to describe these cases in 
terms of ldentity/non-identity (with any earlier person) the described 
conceptual innovation will not be necessary. And even if we are forced 
to take resort to this, by certain pragmatic considerations or some such 
thing, that will leave everything as it is; nothing will happen t0 our 
current practice - neither the concept of personal identity nor the 
criteria thereof will be touched. Nevertheless, the importance of the 
puzzle cases can hardly be undermined. It will not be denied that it is 
the eristence/possibility of puzzle oases that makes personal Identity 
a philosophical problem,. And this it does by seeming to disprove what 
ordinarily is believed to be true, namely that bodily identity plays at 
least the central role in the assertion of personal identity. But 
seaming to disprove something is one thing and disproving that thing ie 
quite another. And although, as we've shown, the puzzle oases do not 
disprove what their authors wished them to, they are still of philo­
sophical interest and will remain so, in so far as they make us study 
carefully the concept we have of person and of same person. In th9 face 
of these oases (or in anticipation of their possibility) we ere made to 
analyse end articulate the knowledge we have of persons and personal 
identity, and to uncover and tighten the principles that are Implicit 
in our judgments of personal identity (it needs a philosopher to 
explicate the law of non-contradiction - though the common knowledge 
of it is reflected in our ordinary talks and acts. But then, the phil­
osopher "leaves everything as it is", he does not change matters but 
"only in the end describes them" (Wittgenstein)). This process of 
articulation and analysis could have shown our current practice to be 
mistaken! but in the present case, as we have aeon, contrary to the 
expressed intention of most authors of the puzzle cases, the analysis
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has pointed rather in the opposite direction. It has supplied our 
knowledge, which perhaps unreflectingly used to pass as such, with a 
theoretical basis. It has, for example, clarified (so far, at least, as 
we reckoned it) that the familiar central role of the bodily criterion 
should be understood, not as a defining condition, nor even as a 
necessary condition, but as a criterion of personal identity - al belt 
an independent and the primary criterion in the sense we've given to "it 
If not for this, it is in initiating the discussion of these various 
alternative perspectives of our common knowledge that the main philo­
sophical importance of the "puzzle cases" must lie. In view of this, 
the problem of personal identity would hardly be a philosophical problem 
without the occurrence/speculation of these cases. But, as we have said 
while this is one thing, the truth of what the puzzle cases purport to 
show is quite another.
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seotion(ii)! Be to Jns,,,er? - ^  o.<-
We have seen that it is mainly because of the possibility of 
Mproblem cases« that a fresh review of the nature of personal identity 
as well as its importance is called for. And I have suggested that all 
this review amounts to is an analysis of the concepts of person and 
personal identity - and not a revision, thereof, as most writers seem to 
have thought. For, it has been argued, the possibility of these cases 
and even the adoption of new concepts and/or criteria to suit these 
cases - is perfectly compatible with our normal concepts of person and 
personal identity remaining as it is. To recall the conclusion of the 
last section, "problem cases" do not create any conceptual difficulty 
to the issue of personal identity (so as to call for a conceptual 
revision). If this is so, there are two remaining questions which we 
will have to consider by way of final analysis: first, why do we demand 
an answer, - an all-or-nothing answer, - to the identity questions 
about persons; and secondly, why - as is suggested by many analyses of 
the problem cases - is it that such answers are not always possible.* 
(Roughly speaking, the first question concerns the nature of personal 
identity and the second is more concerned with the issue of criteria 
thereof.)
When we say that a later person is the same person as an earlier 
person, we mean that the two persons are identical slmrllciter. And we 
say this and mean this even if the grounds on which we say this are (and 
are known to be) only imperfect indicators1 of identity. Accordingly,
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when we axe faced with two non-contemporaneous persons and the question 
of their identity is at stake, we naturally expect a yes-or-no: answer 
to this question. Usually, there axe thought to be two reasons* one is 
a belief about the nature of personhood and personal identity, and the 
other is what is thought to be the importance of personal identity.
The first belief is that personhood and personal identity is a deeper 
fact - that it is something more than the bodily and psychological facta 
which it inevitably involves, so that despite the variant nature of 
these latter facts we do not feel obliged to think or talk of personal 
identity holding to varying degrees - even though our making of 
personal-identity Judgments is grounded on thse facts. Historically, 
the most explicit theoretical expression of this belife (the "Simple 
View", as Parfit calls it ) is to be found in the writings of Reid
and Butler who described personal identity as "perfect identity" 
despite the (bodily and psychological) evidences thereof being admittedly 
"imperfect". What this "something more", according to these philoso­
phers, is unanalysable and can only be revealed to us through some sort 
of intellectual intuition. Perhaps, like its nearest kin, the Cartesian 
"privileged access" theory of personhood, this formulation of the belief 
in the special nature of personal identity is in a sense indefensible.2
But what I want to suggest is that the weakness of this formulation 
of the belief does not rule out its plausibility in any other formulation, 
and does not necessarily yield place to anything like a Parfitian 
theory of degrees of identity, (it must be recalled here that although 
I do not agree with this Cartesian theory of personhood nor explicitly 
with the intuitioniat theory of personal identity, yet I do specify the 
sense in which the nature of personhood and personal identity has a
speciality of its own as distinct from that of . other material objects;
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•M  <h 1 sec ii.) Presently, I sill try to bring out the plausibility 
Of the “Simple Tie»“ by expressing it in a different but acceptable »ay 
and sho» the importance of demanding all-or-nothing answers to personal 
identity questions. But let us mention, in passing, the second reason 
for demanding such answers. This reason consists of the belief that 
personal identity is presupposed by certain other important questions 
like memory, survival and moral responsibility, 3 and that since these 
latter questions usually demand all-or-nothing answers so does the 
question of personal identity, let us now leave this belief to be
discussed and defended later on after we have given a plausible analysis 
of the first belief.
Perhaps it is slightly misleading to state the "Simple View" by 
saying that personhood and personal identity is a deeper fact, for as 
indicated above, with this metaphysical undertone (especially with its 
family resemblance to Cartesian mentalism) the theory may more easily 
appear to be indefensible. But it is not necessary to throw away the 
baby along with the bath water. I suggest that the truth of the matter 
lies in the way we speak of persons and personal identity; and so a 
proper linguistic analysis of these concepts and their application-rules 
will reveal the truth more accurately than any supposition of what we 
may believe about their nature. As we use the word "person" (i.e. as 
we apply the word to whatever thing or being we do) the word has what 
may be called a unita^r function. That means that, by virtue of whatever 
qualities or properties the word is applied, a person - once hs is s0 
called - is as much a (fully-fledged) person as any other person, i.e. as 
any other being who is so called. 4 Each person stands for a single unit 
no matter whatever is the extent or degree of the qualities he/she may
be judged to have - and this applies even to those qualities that may be 
central or essential to one’s being a person. A more rational man is
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said to be as much a person as any other man who may be much less 
rational. Centuries after Aristotle defined man as a rational animal,# 
no one has ever thought of such things as a »half man» or a »double per- 
son' (as distinct from double personality), not to mention "mini-person" 
or "maxi-person" and the like,because of, and despite, the familiar fact 
that people are more or less rational. Consequently, whatever it is - 
call it 0 - that makes someone a person can never affect his personhoofl 
tough its own imperfections. In other words, if x's are persons by 
virtue of their having (or being) 0, no x is more a person than another (x, 
even if he has (or is) more 0 than that other x. x, and x2 will be two 
persons (unless of course they are identical) even if x, has (is) double 
(if that can be measured) the 0 than x2; and x., as well as xg will have 
one single vote if they are asked to exercise their franchise. Inciden­
tally, those who reason and act according to this principle need not be 
and seldom are, guided by any consideration like personhood being a 
deeper fact, but they are simply guided by the way we speak°/and "pick out" 
persons and the way we use the word "person". Thus, in our linguistic 
practice, we have learnt to use "person" as an all-or-nothing word; any 
x either is or Is.not a person, and if he is he is as much a (fully- 
fledged) person as any other x who is a person. And for this purpose, 
no two x»s need to be similar (much less exactly similar) in respect of 
bodily and/or psychological features, even if these features are essential 
to an x's being a person. It is, I think, in this sense that personhood 
is, in its logic, all-or-nothing. By similar consideration of our usage 
of "same person" we reach the same conclusion about personal identity:
#It will not do violence to the spirit of the present argument to ignore 
the rather dubious Lockean distinction between person and man, and to 
take 'man' and 'person* as synonymous or interchangeable. Aristotle, 
apparently, did not use "man" as distinct from "person" in his definition, 
and so I will use them interchangeably here. (For a reasoned rejection of 
the Lockean distinction see Wiggins "Stream of Consciousness" in 
Philosophy, April 197& P 142, note 23J
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two non-contemporaneous persona either are or axe not the same person
as each other, and if they axe, they are so despite there being nothing
unchanged between them and irrespective of their bodily and psychological
continuities(which may be all that matters for personal identity - but
more of this, later) being minimal or maximal. Anyone who has not been 
introduced to the idea of a "something deeper" about the nature of
person-hood can be taught and can quite easily master the technique of
using "person" and "personal identity" as efficiently as anybody else.
For it will be enough for him to know and observe that this is the w J
the words are used. The idea of "something deeper" is thus not only
an unnecessary appendage to the understanding of these concepts, it can
also be a misleading factor in this understanding as the history of the 
subject may testify.0 And I think, it is this misleading feature of
the idea that Parfit, consciously or unconsciously, utilised in his
capaign against the "Simple View».) The suposaition of "something 
deeper" can only multiply entities beyond necessity, and in as much as
the "Simple View" is wedded to this supposition it must have its failings.
But we can see from the foregoing, the "Simple View" can be freed of
this supposition and yet have its say. If this is so, there is no need
to hasten to make a revisionary proposal as to how we ought to use our 
concepts of ,'person* and 'personal identity» in order to replace
the "Simple View«.5 In all three of his papers on the subject6 Parfit
has attacked the "Simple View" basically and expressedly, though not only, 
on the grounds of the "something deeper»supposition. And in view at least'
of the superfluity of this alleged supposition (as we have shown above), 
his criticism must be ill - founded.
We have just indicated above how the logic of the words "person"
and "personal identity" requires all-or-nothing treatment of personhood 
and personal identity. This means that, if we know the use of these
words well enough, we will not think that there can be more and less
to the nature of persons and personal identity. Of course, a person 
can be «ore or lgss_something (viz intelligent, strong, capable of
remembering and so on) but as a person he can't more or less. And
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similarly, there may be more bodily and/or psychological continuity
between P1 and P2 than between and *P2? but for that matter P2 is
not more identical with ^  than *P2 is with *?y  it is the oddity of 
the expressions "more identical« and «less identical« - something that
concerns the logic of these words -which rules out, as likewise odd, 
the nature of personal identity being a matter of degree. Since the*
last analysis of the nature of personal identity(and person-hood)
conflicts with the logic of these words, our analysis above suggests
that this must be mistaken - that something must have gone wrong with the
Parfitian analysis. And indeed something has gone wrong — this in the 
following way* It is one thing to say (a) that what matters in <Jl is ^ and
quite another thing to say (b) that $ is just a matter off. A very famil­
iar illustration may be the distinction between saying, as we might,
(a ) that what matters in (knowing that some—one is in ) pain is that
people generally should display what is called pain-behaviour and saying
(b^ ) that pain is just a matter of pain-behaviour. It needs no great
philosophical ingenuity to see that (b1) does not follow( i.e. pain 
pain-behaviour), even if (a1) is true. But the «even if« is of
particular significance when the reasoning from (a) to (b) - fallacious
as it is - is applied in the way Parfit would want to apply to the case
of personal identity. For I shall categorically question thé truth of 
step (a) in his reasoning. But now we see that, granting the truth of
(a) in his reasoning (namely, that what matters in personal identity
is/are bodily and/or psychological continuities), the (b) in his reasoning
(namely, that personal identity is only a matter of degree) does not 
follow. It has been argued (see Ch 3 sec iv) that Parfit runs into this
fallacious conclusion through the doubly mistaken procedure of supposing
that the problem of personal identity is a problem of definition and of 
trying to define it in terms of what only are the evidences thereof.
But furthermore, granting that (a) what matters in personal identity is
the described continuities, how can be articulate(a)- what, i.e.,do we
mean by (a)? One way in which it can be interpreted is by saying, as
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we have said, that these continuities are what make uo apply the word«
••same person»(this will concern the logic of personal identity, since 
what concerns the rules of usage of a word/words must concern its/their
logic - but yet we do not say, nor does Parfit, that personal identity
is, in its logic , a matter of degree^). Another way in which (a) can
be interpreted is by saying that this is what we know when we know pairs
of persons to„be the same as each other (i.e. we know personal <,w.<+T
by knowing that these continuities hold between these persons). This is 
what naturally will be thought to concern the nature of personal identity
since this relates to the way we come to know what personal identity
isL. Parfit's conclusion about the nature of personal identity is certiu
inly based on this way of articulating (a).? But if this is his ground,
it is not clear how the conclusion that he wants to draw , follows, how,
that is, the nature of personal identity is a matter of degree. For one
thing, although it is true that we know cases of personal identity by 
knowing these continuities, it does not follow that personal identity
is what these continuities are - even if it were true that we cannot know
anything else apart from these continuities in knowing personal identity.
Consider the following. All we know* when we acquire the knowledge of
a table is simply that side ( or those sides) of the table which faces 
us, and it is impossible that we can know the other side (s) of the
table or indeed anything else about it at the very moment when v» w  lt
inevita^_from_one side of it. Yet from this it does not follow that 
the (nature of the ) table is only its facing side. If the phenomenalist
claims to acquaint us with the nature of . physical objects by 
means of his sense-data analysis, the way of phenomenalism must be
mistaken. There is certainly__more to the nature of the table than just 
the facing side of it or what we know or observe about it. And saying
this does not commit one to anything metaphysical or mysterious about
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the nature of the table. Similarly, the "Simple View" would be 
certainly right in holding that there is more to the nature of personal 
identity than simply the bodily/psychological continuities which it 
involves or which we know when we know personal identity - and in 
holding this, it will not be committed to any metaphysical or 
mysterious implications about the nature of personal identity (as 
Parfit’s purported emphasis on "something deeper" seems to suggest).
It follows therefore that Parfit needs further arguments to justify the 
alleged separation between the logic and the nature of personal identity, 8 
since the point of. this separation is not sufficiently clear from what 
he provides. Moreover, the truth that the nature of personal identity 
is not to be analysed in terms of the described continuities - even If 
itwere.true.that the nature of J  consists .in how we k n ™  <f - ia evident 
from the fact that knowing these continuities is not the onl^ m y  of 
knowing (the nature of) personal identity. For self-identity (personal 
identity of one's own) is not known in this way (See Ch 1 sec ii and Ch 2 
sec ii), and it has been argued before that self-identity is what, in a 
more important sense, acquaints us with the real nature of personal 
identity and that the knowledge of this identity can be, and often is, 
non-criterial. So that the continuities, in an important sense,become 
fairly dispensable to the nature of personal identity.
Now, we are led straight on to consider, for whatever it is worth, 
the (a) in Parfit’s reasoning. How far is it true to say that what 
matters in personal identity is the described continuities? Our last 
consideration, namely that concerning the nature of the knowledge of 
self-identity makes this claim rather dubious; and at any rate, our 
above analysis of the nature of personal identity as related to how we 
know it, has shown that these continuities are not all that matters - even 
though they do matter a great deal - for understanding the nature of
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personal identity. Therefore, a one-to-one correspondence in the 
relation between these continuities and the nature of personal identity 
(viz, since the former is a matter of degree, so must be the latter) 
is out of the question. Furthermore, Parfit's own statement of, and 
belief in, the nature of the claim (a) makes it all the more dubious 
and farther from truth. For as we have already noted, he believes, 
and claims more emphatically, that what matters in personal identity 
is only »psychological continuity» and bodily continuity is totally 
and unjustly ignored. 9 But it is not true that what matters in 
personal identity is only psychological continuity; indeed, if what 
has been said in the previous chapter is correct, bodily continuity 
plays a more fundamental role in knowing and making judgments about 
personal identity. What then were the grounds for thinking that 
psychological continuity is all that matters or even mostly that 
matters in personal identity? One stock argument which Parfit makes 
use of is that psychological continuity is morally important - important, 
that is, for ascribing moral responsibility10 (and‘therefore that 
personal identity which is presupposed by the question of moral respon­
sibility must be analysed in terns of this continuity). We have little
more to add here than what we have said before . about the weakness and 
fateful consequence of thistheory which, like its traditional ancestor, the Lockean theory of 
«consciousness of guilt», is »morally repugnant»,11 to say the very 
least. What I wish to add here is that even if we ascribe moral 
responsibility solely on the basis of psychological continuity, that 
will not make personal identity a matter only of psychological continuity. 
And even if it is undoubtedly true that beliefs about the nature of 
personal identity are relevant to the ascription of moral responsibility,12 
the converse does not hold. For even if we accept the "complex view» 
and excuse a person on grounds of (apparent) psychological discontinuity
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("marked change" in character, style cf H f e  and loss of memory etc) 
that »ill net show that he is a different person from the accused, 
for one thing at least, he is excused because it is he who has changed 
in the described respects*. Yet curiously, Parfit eminently in his 
first two papers secs to rely on this reverse reasoning (from ho. „  
ascribe moral responsibility to what is the nature of personal identity) 
in order to establish his "Complex We»". As a second strand of argu­
ment for his favoured claim, Parfit cites the examples of (1 ) .hat we do 
say and (2) what we might say about our earlier (as well as latter) 
selves. On the first score, he quotes from Proust13 and Solahensltsyn14 
to show that we already have a use for the distinction between "successive 
selves", which is made on the basis of lessening of psychological 
connection. (But surely, as It is evident from Parfit's illustration 
of this, this use is a figurative use or poetic use; and no argument 
has been supplied to show thatthis is, or should be, the right or proper 
use.) But as Smart has rightly shown, 15 what this talk, If taken 
seriously, will show is hot that a person is a series of selves (so that 
they would be different selves connected only by psychological continuity), 
but that the person is (in the sense of identity, and expressed tense- 
lessly) each of these selves: these "different" selves are only the 
phase-restrictions on one and the same person, and as such, are 
identical with each other, and cannot be different from each other. Thus 
even if we do say (and say seriously) the above about the successive 
selves, it will be simply mistaken to say, on that ground, that psychol­
ogical continuity is all that matters in personal identity. On the second
*And note, in this connection, Mackie: "Why should we not also say, »He 
did it, but he does not remember doing it’ rather than ’He does not 
remember, so it was not he that did it’". (Problems from LockPT p 196)
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score, (2) above,i.e. on what we might say about our so-called earlier 
and later selves, Parfit says,
"When, for instance, we have undergone any marked change 
in character, conviction, or style of life, we might say, 
'It was not _I who did that but an earlier self"'''®
and apparently takes this as a ground for shoring the importance of 
psychological continuity. How, besides being subject to the same 
objection as his claim about what we do say, there is a sense in which
this second claim can be said to b. false. For it can be argued that 
if someone said this, it does not show that he has undergone any »marked 
change" of character etc, but rather quite to the contrary. Especially, 
if it is responsibility for an evil deed that is at stake, and a person 
says what Parfit suggests he might say, then that will more likely 
indicate that his vicious character has not changed and that being 
still prompted by this nature he is only trying to avoid responsibility. 
(Is it not what in fact is happening in most criminal proceedings?)
Thus this suggestion that we might "non-identify our present self 
from an earlier self can't show these "selves" to be different from
each other, nor that psychological continuity is all that matters in 
personal identity.
Let me now summarise my conclusions of the present section, and 
then we proceed. These conclusions are (1) that it is our usage of 
the words "person" and "personal identity" - the logic of these concepts 
- thatmakes us believe in the all-or-nothing nature of personhood and 
personal identity, and demand all-or-nothing answers to the identity 
questions about persons. And (2) since what matters - if that matters - 
in personal identity, namely, psychological continuity,has little to 
do with the nature .of personal identity, it is mistaken and needless 
to try to prize apart the nature of personal identity from its logic 
and to describe the former, in terras of that continuity, as a matter
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only of degree. However, (3) the alleged Importance of psychological 
continuity is not only ill-founded* tat also entirely mistaken/ and 
therefore the nature of this continuity being a matter of degree has 
got nothing to impair the importance of and the all-or-nothing nature 
of personal identity; consequently we are not obliged nor Justified to 
change to the "Complex View” which, being based on this mistaken 
.assumption, is mistaken itself.
To these conclusions, and particularly to the last, we will also 
add the conclusion of an earlier chapter (Ch 3 seciv) about the 
inffiortance of personal identity. (And here we come specifically to the 
second reason as mentioned above for the belief in the all-or-nothing 
nature of personal identity.) For after proposing his •‘Complex View«
Parfit had questioned the importance of personal identity on another 
ground. He had argued that personal identity is considered important 
because it is presupposed by certain other important questions like 
those of memory, survivial and moral responsibility, but, he argued, 
these latter questions can be freed of this presupposition and personal 
identity can thus be made to lose its importance. Vie have shown the 
futility of such a proposal by arguing that with personal identity 
losing importance, these questions of memory, survival and responsibility - 
will be of no importance themselves. Since the latter will be an 
unacceptable consequence, the importance of personal identity must remain 
beyond question. Indeed, for a proper understanding and use of the 
concepts of memory, survival and responsibility as well as for a just and 
coherent theory of moral repponsibility, the importance of personal identity
♦Evident from my contrary suggestion as to why we might "non-identify" 
from sn earlier self» (See ^ ast page i) •
TTNi"?rEvident from Smart's phase-sortal analysis of the successive selves. (See last page).
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is an essential pre-requisite. Hence the importance of all-or-nothing 
answers to personal identity questions. This conclusion may he 
reinforced by means of yet another procedure. This procedure is to 
restore the primary importance of identity by bringing the importance 
' b3Ck fr°m the n°ti0n °f "s^ a l « .  m  ordinary USQge the noUon Qf 
survival is almost inseparable from the notion of identity and the 
latter is often articulated in terms of survival and persistence 
conditions. 17 But F a r m ' s  proposal is to dstaoh ths two notions of 
personal Identity and survival and to place the primary importance on 
the latter. But as Smart has argued, 18 it is not clear and no argument 
has been supplied as to why this is so? It is not clear from „hat point 
of view "survival'' is so important, and "„hat, precisely, i3  s„ppost!d t0  
survive?" let us, on our part, try to make it clear by considering 
different possible senses in which "survival" can be effected. Smart 
suggests two. the first is „hat he calls "personal survival" and the 
second, "survival of something personal" (ep. cit p 25). oan expreS3 
this by saying that survival can be of (i) me and of (ii) gj, p0lrers 
(like my memory, my character, my projects and so on). Although (i) 
is the ordinary notion of »survival», Parfit opted for (ii) by 
throwing light on the fact that even if I do not survive, the survival 
of my powers and projects can be still important to me. Indeed, to 
take Smart's example, a composer might regard the survival of his 
powers to be more important than his own survival: »'his brain might be 
duplicated and someone else could write the music that the original 
composer would have written were he able to survive»' (gp cit p 25).
Thus, Smart concedes, connected/^farantees the survival of my powers. 
However, it does not seem to be a very satisfactory notion. For it 
is not made sufficiently clear whether a surviving power will be mine 
rather than someone else's power that is exactly like mine. It is
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conceivable that after I cease to exist, someone else might come up 
with exactly similar abilities as mine to compose exactly the same kind 
of music as I used to Compose and would have composed. In view of this 
possibility, I shall add a third sense in which the notion of survival 
may be articulated, namely (iii) the survival of powers like mine.*
And since in the mere event of the emergence of certain powers, there 
is nothing to tell the distinction between (ii) and (iii), we will 
have no reasonable ground to say that (it) has happened rather than (iii), 
and the prospeot of survival in terms of (ii), though important, and 
attractive to some, will not be to much purpose. Por the person himself 
can't have reasonable ground to rejoice over such a prospeot, and this 
for the following reason. As Williams has shown, the result of brain- 
duplication, information-transfer etc - even where they are carried out - 
is highly dubious as to whether it is going to be me who survives. 15 
By a slight stretch of Williams' arguments, the same can be said about 
the question of whether it is going to he H  powers. Por even if the 
success of a brain-cuplicaticn would guarantee the survival of my powers, 
it cannot be said or expected with reasonable certainty that it will be 
a success, that what happens after the operation is the result of the 
success of the operation rather than that,by a perfect coincidence, 
some entirely new powers (though they are exactly like mine) which belonged 
to someone else have come to survive in this new braln/body complex. If 
the fact or rather the possibility is as 1 have described, then the 
only reasonable way to articulate and anticipate survival is in the 
form of (i) i.e. the survival of me. But this is inseparable from
»There will be nothing, in the nature of the "surviving" powers, to 
miarantee the form of survival as (ii). And my basic purpose in intro­
ducing the third form of survival is to diminish the import of (ii) by 
•ns that there would be no reasonable ground, even in the event of 
brain**»plications and the like, to tell the difference between (ii) happening and (iii) happening.
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the idea of my personal identity. Therefore the ^
of "survival" is that which makes "survival" and "identity" interchange­
able. And since F a r m ' s  project purports to reject this (only) 
reasonable sense of "survival", the project must be rejected. Thus, 
if the above analysis is right, then what is of primary importance L  
personal identity, and hence the Importance of all-or-nothing answers.
finally, we can now return briefly to our original second question 
of why it is that such answers do not always seem to be possible. We 
have argued that personal identity is, both in its logic and in its 
nature, all-or-nothing. Consequently, whenever an answer in identity- 
terms is possible, it must be in the form of a Yes or a No. The trouble 
seems to arise,however, in the "problem oases”. But what exactly happens 
in these cases? The most that can be said about these oases is that 
there seems to be no right answer since any answer either way will have 
no justification. We have suggested in the last section that, in view 
of the extreme abnormality of some snoh oases, we are not obliged to 
give an answer in terms of identity or non-identity, that we can talk 
of a "third" person beginning to exist anew. But even if we are 
obliged, because of certain practical considerations and the like, to 
say whether or not the person after the change in the same person as 
the person before the change, we will only be judging that they are 
complete^  identical or completely different. Whatever considerations 
incline us to say that looke's cobbler-bodied person is the same person 
as the prince and vice versa, we will say that they are identical 
fll.mplici.ter, i.e. in the all-or-nothing sense. Any suggestion that, 
in these cases (or in some very complicated ones), identity should be 
ascribed in terms of degrees, has been shown to he unwarranted and 
needless. And the corresponding suggestion that our concept of personal 
identity should be redefined to admit of degrees is to be rejected.
"Problem cases" are j>roblem cases and cannot creat conceptual difficul­
ties to the issue of personal identity. Nevertheless, under some very 
compelling circumstances and/or because of equally compelling consider­
ations we may be obliged or inclined to adopt a modified criterion or 
at least to modify the modus operandi of our present criteria (e.g. to 
make identity judgment solely or primarily on the basis of memory*).
But this will only show that our criteria are not suited to give the 
right result in all possible cases. And in view of our account of the 
nature and function of criteria, this difficulty is absolutely unworrying. 
For criteria are justificatory evidences, and no definitions, nor even 
necessarily necessary conditions; and if they (or their normal conjunction) 
fail to guide us in certain circumstances, it is only to be expected.
To be sure, our understanding and use of concepts depends a great deal, 
often essentially, upon what we use as criteria for their application.
And although criteria and meaning are not the same, yet any change in 
the criterion is likely to affect the nature of the concepts; for we 
may pick out the wrong object, or may not even know what to pick out, if 
the criteria for the application of the concept are changed or absent.
It is in this sense that meaning and criteria are closely connected.
Yet it will be unreasonable to expect that our criterion should be able 
to guide us in all possible circumstances. For, as Wittgenstein said,
"We do not use language according to strict rules - it has not been 
taught to us by means of strict rules, either."20 If it were, and if 
criteria were able to guide us in all possible cases they would not be
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♦Though we have argued already that such a nroe^,,™ J
lead to a secondary and degenerate use of the concen+^H inevitablY 
personal identity. And this at any rate is an 3 Person and
- intelligible and plausible in whatever sense thev thSt’ these Cases 
a .sianflaai for defining or describing the concept if p L ' c ^ i d e E ^ ®
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criteria (but defining conditions and would necessarily entail,which a 
criterion need not do, see Ch 3 sec i. above). Similarly, understanding 
the use of our concepts is to be able to use them in all normal circum­
stances; but this is not to expect that we will be able to apply the 
concept (and answer questions concerning; its application) confidently 
in all possible cases. On the contrary. To understand a concept is 
not only to be able to answer questions concerning its application in 
all normal circumstances and to answer them correctly in most of these 
cases, but also to be doubtful in the cases which are doubtful. 21 This 
is particularly true of our problem cases where, knowing all the facts 
as we do or can, we still may not know what to say. But once again, 
this is entirely unworrying and can neither affect our normal concepts 
of person and personal identity nor the criteria thereof.
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Appendix 1
0 jn M J.A U  NATURE OP PERSONAL IDENTITY 
AND THE IDEA OP "PRIVILEGED ACCESS”
11 A very central part of my thes!s, as advanced In the foregoing 
hae been that persona have a special way of knowing their identity through 
time and that this accounts for the special nature of the problem of 
personal identity as distinct from that of identity «  other things. And 
this speciality, it has been argued, lies in the fact that every person 
can have non-orlterial knowledge of his own identity whereas his knowledge 
of the identity of other things has to be grounded on criteria. In 
expounding this contention, 1 do indeed speak of a "privileged access" 
that persons have to the knowledge of their own identities. But this 
should not be misunderstood. In particular, my position does not commit 
me to entertain any form of spiritualism or Cartesian mentalism. For 
this belief in the "privileged access" to the knowledge of 0„eself led 
the Cartesians to a peculiar belief about the nature of persons . i.e. that 
they are essentially minds or non-physical entities, whereas my analysis 
of the "privileged access" Is confined only to the nature of the 
knowledge of personal identity, to the feet that personal identity is (or 
can be) known In the way it is. And this fact has no (any special) 
consequence on the nature of persons. My position osn be vindicated on 
the following ground! side by side claiming that the knowledge of personal 
identity can be non-oriterisl I have also maintained that there are 
empirically applicable criteria for the across-time identity of persons.
Indeed this latter fonts the life-blood of my treatment of the problem 
of personal Identity (namely, that it Is a problem of criteria). And 
as, I hope, is more than implicit in my thesis, the link between 
criterion-independent self-kn“ wled|8Por' f»i“bJot-1'ientity 
practice" severed, 1 though in a logical analysis of the nature of
- 26?  -
self-knowledge I have claimed It to be. For I have, In the thesla, made
adequate provision for the fact that, even in one’s own case, it la 
imaginable that one may be unsure, or even mistaken, of one's identity 
and so be prepared to accept correction from others who inevitably have 
to use criteria for telling him who he is. It is with this important 
pre-requisite (i.e. the linkage with the empirical criteria of identity) 
that self-ascriptive utterances or judgments can refer to the person 
(the sublet of these ascriptions). But if forest this and emphasis, 
only on the non-criteria! nature of self-knowledge, we fall into the 
Cartesian illusion of supposing that the subject of our self-ascriptive 
utterances is a purely inner, immaterial substance (cf Strawson, Bounds 
of. Sgn.se, pp 165-66). As Strawson rightly pointed out, this delusive 
notion of the person (or the ”1 ") is the result of severing its 
connection with the empirical concept of the subject of experience 
(cf I<i p 166). As we have taken due note of the criteria of personal 
identity and are basically concerned with them, we are doing nothing
of this sort. The "privileged access" we speak of is a logical privilege 
concerned with the analysis of the nature of self-knowledge, rather than an 
Ontological privilege regarding the nature of persons. It is in view of 
this that when, for instance, we said, in vindicating the Reid-Butler view, 
that (the knowledge of) personal identity is not vitiated by the "imperfec­
tions" of criteria (see pp 45 and 80 above) nothing like a sense of 
piety or profundity need be attached to this. It only points to the brute 
facts that this knowledge is acquired in the way it is.
12  Given this account of the “privileged access", it puts the person 
himself in a better position to say or too* »ho he is, but it does not 
make him infallible.“ (Kor is it necessarily the case that the only things
♦Compare Rylei'the superiority of the speaker's — -- - ,
doing over that of the listener does not indicate that h! ^  hQ ^
Access to facts of a type inevitably inaccessible to the PrivileS®d
only that he is in a very good posits to know what tht *6ner' but
often in a very poor position to know (my emnhae-i^ tener 1 «Penguine 1973 P 171 ^  emphasis). The Concept ^  m
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that can he known non-criterially are the so-called private experiences. 
For I can know, without using any criteria, that I am writing an appendix 
to my thesis, and this latter fact is never a private event inaccessible 
to anybody else.2) As I have said, in certain circumstances, others 
may have a better say on this. Yet if, in certain peculiar situations, 
others cannot clearly agree as to who a person is (as in Shoemaker's 
Brownson case) the person himself may be given the last word on this 
(see the end of sec ii of Ch 1 above) in as much as what others say 
stands-the risk of being falsified by what he says. And what he says 
will depend surely on what he remembers, since, by supposition, there 
is no bodily continuity here; and this may have the pretensions of 
making memory the sole criterion of personal identity. But as our 
treatment of the problem cases (see esp Ch 5 sec i) would have made 
clear, even if, m  the case in question, we grant the last word to the 
person himself the above result will not follow. For (i) the supposed 
case is not a normal case, so what we may be forced to say in this case 
will not affect our normal concept of a person and of personal identity, 
and what we may be using as our ground for making identity judgment 
about this person will not affect our normal criteria; and secondly 
(ii) only if we were interested in defining personal identity then 
saying what we say in this case would oblige us to define personal 
identity in terms of memory - but this clearly is not our concern and 
so we are in no fear of being wedded to a memory theory in the described
way.
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Append!* P
«¿juAi-jaiuLUJi TRANSPLANTS AND 
MEANINGFULNESS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY JUDGMENTS
So far as the issue of personal identity is concerned, the poss­
ibility of bisected brain transplants will have three alternative 
explanations. For if such transplants succeed and are successfully 
accompanied by an apparent continuity of memory and character etc in the 
two "products" of the transplant, then we may say (1) that both the 
products are identical with the original person (the brain donor), or 
(2) that only one of them is or (3) that none of them is. As in my 
treatment of the general possibility of reduplication (e.g. the
Charies/Robert-Guy Fawkes type cases) so in this case, I am inclined 
to accept (3) and reject (,) and (2). The explanation (1) i s  unaccept-
*ble Slnoe ea<:h *•«<»». supposedly toeing the same person as
the original one, has to toe the same person as the other resulting person, 
and this, for »ell-tonoan logical reasons, is an incoherent consequence 
(see pp 156-57 for my argument for this) - unless, like Psrfit, .a are 
prepared to say that identity does not matter (see Ch 3 sac v for the 
unacceptability of the latter suggestion). The second alternative sill 
have two variations: (2-a) that one of tha resulting persons is identical 
with the original parson If the other does not survive or is not allowed 
to survive the operstion (i.e. if, for example, one of the half-brains 
does not take1), and that (2-b) even if both the resulting persons 
continue to exist and are found to be similar In all observable respects 
(viz, in respect of memory, character, personality etc), yet only one 
of them is or may be identical aith the original by virtue of his W i n g  
some additional features which we may not or cannot observe? Now (2-a) can 
be easily dismissed on the ground that this would boll down to tha absurd 
implication that who one ia depends on what happens to someone else!
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(That is, if I am the product of a bisected brain transplant, then I 
am the same person as the brain donor if my "competitor” does not 
exist or is prevented from coming into being, but I am not if he does.) 
Now with (l) and (2-a) being thus dismissed, (2-b) seems to be the only 
plausible explanation. It is plausible because although we cannot 
observe any additional feature which one of the products may have, it 
does not follow that there ¿s no such additional feature, and so it does 
not follow that one of the resulting persons is not or cannot be 
identical with the original person. To say that the last follows is 
to insist, as Parfit apparently did (discussed in Ch 3 section iv), that 
one of the "products” must differ in respect of some observable features 
in order for him to be identical with the original person. And it may be 
said, as indeed it has been,^ that this is to rely on the verification 
theory of meaning, that unless a statement is confirmable with reference 
to some observation (observation-statement(s), to be precise), it must 
be meaningless. If this is so then (2-b) can be definitively dismissed 
provided the verification theory is established on strong grounds. I 
have no intention of defending this theory as I do not think that any 
very good reasons can be adduced in its favour. I am, however, inclined 
to believe that (2-b) cannot be a satisfactory solution to our problem. 
For one thing, to say that only one of the "products” is identical with 
the original person would at least be vacuous - if not meainingless.
It will be vacuous in the sense that an identity-judgment cannot be 
.justifiably made to this effect. This is particularly significant for 
our purpose, since we have maintained that the problem of personal 
identity is one of criterion (which, in our account, is a justificatory 
evidence), and hence no solution to this problem will be satisfactory if 
it does not, and cannot, specify any criterion for making personal 
identity judgments. In view of this, it may be perfectly meaningful and
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coherent to suppose that only one of the resulting persons is identical 
with the original person (i.e. by virtue of some supposed additional 
feature which he may have), but it will not be a helpful supposition to 
make and will not throw any light on what grounds can we have to say 
that a later person is the same person as an earlier - much less on 
what it is on which personal identity consists in, if that is what 
concerns some people. (And since these are the only two ways in which 
the problem of personal identity can be raised, a solution on the model 
of (2-b) will be no solution.) Further, as is evident from the fore­
going, the supposition expressed by (2-b) may be true, but the trouble 
with it is that it cannot be known to be true. On the contrary, there 
would be overwhelming empirical evidence that it is not true. For, 
ex hypothesi?each half-brain carries with it the same memory and character 
etc, in fact, all that is supposedly necessary and sufficient for its 
recipient to be the same person as the brain donor; and this is what 
supposedly makes the resulting persons exactly similar^ (and also it is 
this supposition that gives the present problem the sort of perplexing 
form it has - i.e. whether each is, or none is, or only one is the 
same person as the original person). It will be, therefore, most 
unlikely that any one of the resulting persons will have an additional 
feature which will make him, and not the other, the same as the original.
My position, then, is fairly clear. I do not want to say, nor am 
I committed to say that since there is nothing observably special about 
the one person rather than the other, (2-b) must be meaningless; and thus 
I am not committed to any form of verificationism (though, as I said, I 
should be happy with the success of the latter). But I do maintain that 
(2-b) will be unsatisfactory: saying that one of the resulting persons may 
have some additional features (which we know not what) and as such may 
be the same person as the original person will not say anything significant
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or useful - neither about the nature of personal identity nor about the 
grounds on which identity-judgments may be made about persons.
Incidentally, this type of explanation will not be of any help to 
defend Parfit’s position from the similar charge of verificationism.
For he seems to be implicitly committed to the latter, and that for the 
following reasons: I have pointed out, while dealing with his theory of 
personal identity and elsewhere, that Parfit takes the problem as one 
of the meaning of personal identity, and is concerned with what personal
a
identity is or in what does it consist. And his answer to this question 
is that it consists in nothing but the observable evidences that we have 
that a later person is the same person as an earlier person. For he 
insists that the fact of personal identity consists in the holding of 
certain more specific facts which, presumably, are the facts like bodily 
continuity and the continuity or similarity of memory and character etc. 
(He refers to the latter as ’’psychological continuity” and unreasonably 
insists on this alone - to the total exclusion of bodily continuity - as 
constituting personal identity). Apart from these "specific facts" he 
does not believe in any further fact that may constitute personal identity. 
But if the ndture of personal identity is thus to consist in these 
specific facts then, in the absence of these facts a later person cannot 
be the same person as an earlier person. Farther these specific facts 
are what we can observe to hold between persons at different times; 
and if the meaning of personal identity is to consist in these and 
nothing else then his commitment to verificationism becomes fairly 
apparent. The inescapable outcome of such a theory would be that in the 
absence of these observable facts there can be no personal identity and 
any claim that there is or may be is meaningless. The additional feature 
»which (2-b) alludes to and which, we have seen, may be there (at least 
it is not unreasonable to suppose so) in one of the "products" of a
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bisected brain-transplant, will not be an observable feature (for if 
it were, we'll know it); it will, therefore, not be these "specific 
facts", not even anything like them. It would follow, therefore, that 
on Parfit's account, the supposition (2—b) is meaningless. As we have 
said, this is verificationism which Parfit must defend before his 
theory can attain the status of acceptability.
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NOTES TO THE TEXT
Chapter - 1i Section(i).
1. T.Penelhum "Hume on Personal identity" in Philosophical Review 
(hereafter PR) 1955» reprinted in David Hume ed V.C.Chapell,
pp 213 (Macmillan, London 1968)
2. See G.Vesey, Personal identity (Macmillan, London 1974)
3. This other area involves the rather trivial issue of something’s 
being identical with itself. The question of such identity axe 
discussed non-trivially when the thing in question comes under 
different descriptions even at the same instant of time, e.g. when 
we say that the flash of lighting which I saw iB the same flash
of lightning which you saw, or the more philosophically interesting 
issue that the 'Morning Star' is the same star as the 'Evening Star'. 
It will be agreed that since there is no specific question of 
reidentification of things at different times our present problem 
will not be concerned with this. For the same reason also, I will 
not be discussing "identity acros^kinds" like the question of 
whether mental states are(the same as) the brain states.
4. E. g.A.J.Ayer, The Concept of A Person and Other Essays $1 acmillan, 
London 2963) Ch 1 and also his The Problem of Knowledge (Pellican 
paper backs >1956) Ch v secs i and ii. See also Vesey Personal 
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Wittgenstein (Allen and Unwin, London 1973) P»35»
6. Thomas Reid, Essays in the Intellectual powers of Man(hereafter 
Essays) ed A.D. Woozley, (Macmillan, London 2941)» P 200.
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edition (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Lond 1967 paperback 1973) 
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8. By a definition being non-trivial I mean that it should not be 
trivial for those who already know what the definiendum means.
In this sense what I have given as examples of trivial definitions
are trivial to us, to those, that is, who are fairly well-versed
in the language containing the words "same" and "different#.
These definitions, though, may be quite illuminating (hence not
trivial) to a foreigner or to children, to those, i.e. who are
beginners in the learning of the language.The last, however, is
a different matter,
9. See Locke.An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (hereafter Essay), 
BK II Ch 27 sec,9.
10. Essays p 202
11. The example and the argument has been taken from Penelhum. See 
his "Personal Identity" in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy ed.
P Edwards Vol VI, and also his "Hume on Personal Identity".
12. See esp P.T. Geach, Reference and Generality (Cornell University 
Press Ithaca N.Y. 1962) Sections 31-34 and ch six; and also
D Wiggins, Identity and Spatio- Temporal Continuity (ISTC hereafter) 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1967).
13. Cf Wittgenstein, e.g. in his Blue Book (Blackwell paperback 1972) 
esp. p 6 1.
14. Swinburne op cit pp 231-2.
15* This has been notably argued by Bernard Williams in his "Personal 
Identity and Individuation" PAS 1956» reprinted in his Problems 
of the Self (Cambridge University Press 1973)*
16. See Swinburne op cit esp p 234 ff»
17» See Swinburne, op cit p 241
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18. Bishop Butler, "Of Personal Identity” in his The Analogy of
Religion (hereafter Analogy) (George Bell 4 Sons London 1902) 
p 2J8; Reid, Essays p 202.
19» J.L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1976) 
esp pp 192-5.
20. Syndney Shoemaker, Self- Knowledge and Self-Identity (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. 1963) P 5«
21. Ibid p 3.
Chapter - 1: Sec (ii)
1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (hereafter, Treatise)
Everyman’s Library, London 1911» Vol I p 245»
2. ”Hume on Personal Identity", in David Hume p 231
3 Essays ,p 205.
4 Wittgenstein once remarked that if a lion could talk we will 
not understand him. (cf. Philosophical Investigations, Basil 
Black well, London, Part I se© 223» also sees 19 and 23)*
5. This, in fact, is a fallacy which is similar to what Perry
had called the fallacy of "initial predication" and attributed to 
the idealist philosophers. (See Perry R.B. and others.The New 
Realism, Macmillan, N.Y. 1925» PP 15ir 16).
6. Strawson said that certain predicates like "is in the drawing room'!, 
"was hit by a stone" etc, might mean one thing when applied to
material objects and another when applied to persons. P.P.
Strawson, Individuals (University Paper back, Nethuen, London 
1964) P 105.
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material things are the physical properties which imply that ve
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both have bodies; the things which are ascribed to ourselves and
could not be ascribed to material things are what may be called
the psychological features ( a futher distinction between persons 
and some animals in this respect follows shortly in the text) which
imply that only persons have minds. And nothing at all seems to
follow from saying this to the effect that persons may or can
have no bodies much less that persons are minds.
8. Essays p 201.
9. Essay Bk II Ch 27 sec 9«
10. Cf Philosophical Investigations.
11. See William James, Principles of Psychology,(Macmillan, London 
1962) Yol I Ch.X .
12. Harry Frankfurt brings out this distinctive feature of persons, 
more convincingly, in terms of what he calls the higher order 
intuitions" which only persons can, and no animals can, be said to 
have. See M s  article "Freedom of will and The Concept of A 
person", in Jp 1971*
15. Spatio-Temporal continuity, however, is of much wider extension, 
and spatio-temporal continuity of what should be taken as the 
criterion of identity - where it is a criterion - is a further, 
often debatable, issue. But what will not be debated is that the 
answer to this question depends largely on the nature of the thing 
(the concept which the thing comes under) that is being judged. 
Depending on what the thing essentially is (what the concept 
necessarily involves in order to have a use or application) the 
spatio-temporal continuity of the thing is stage determined and 
identity ascribed. Some types of thing i.e. ships, would require 
continuity under a common form as the criterion for their identity, x
while some other type of objects, e.g. watches, would require the
spatio-temporal continuity of parts as their identity criterion 
(for a fuller discussion of this see Brian J.Smart "How to Reidentify 
the ship of Theseus" Analysis, 1971-72 anci'The Ship of Theseus,
The Parthenon and Disassembled Objects" Analysis 1975-74)» However, 
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purpose here is simply to point out that since spatio-temporal 
continuity (of some sort or other) is normally used as the criterion 
of identity for both material things and of persons, this might, in 
all probabilities, have led some to say that our knowledge of identity 
in both cases was based on the same ground.
14. Williams, for example, who champions the case of spatio-temporal
continuity (of the human body) to be always a necessary condition of 
personal identity, admits that it is not a sufficient condition 
(See "Personal Identity and Individuation" Problems of the Self pi)
15» See Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity,Ch 6 secs 5-7*
16. Ibid fCh 4 and elsewhere.
17» Ibid, pp 54-5
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-19» Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, p 58*
20. Essays pp 201-2. It is very surprising that Shoemaker should have 
overlooked this and given an erroneous interpretation of Reid. For 
even he himself has said (see Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity»p 36 
para 1) that these philosophers "have held that the concept of 
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\ .
Philosophical sense of Identity'^in Perception And Personal Identity
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N.S. Care and R.H. Grimm (Caso Western Reserve, Cleveland 1969)
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ship as the original ship, since although 'identity of parts' could 
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form" criterion) that continues throughout the described process of 
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our acceptance of the psychological criteria to the exclusion of the 
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-  302 -
27. Shoemaker attacks on the rather trivial ground that "since what 
counts as the same <J> is always determined, at least in part, by 
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Chapter 2 t Section (i)
1. See A.M. Qunton "On Punishmentn Analysis Vol 14 (1953-4)
2# Especially sec 16,"Consciousness makes the same person" (my emphasis) 
and sec 19;"This may show wherein personal identity consists"
(my emphasews). Also see secs 9» 10, 23 and 29.
3* Ibid , II 27 Section 9 (emphasis mine)
4. A.G.N. Flew, "Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity",
Philosophy, 1951»
5 . Analogy, p 329.
6 * See Williams "Personal Identity and Individuation" in problems of 
the Self.
7» See Reid, Essays,pp 213-14.
8 • It might be thought that the awkwardness of this consequence can be 
avoided by the Gricean-Quntonian theory of continuity according 
to which though all the experiences in a personal history cannot 
be remembered continuously, it would be enough if memory serves to 
form a continuous series of interconnected experiences. As it was 
expressed, it would be enough if each phase of experience is
-  393 -
directly connected to its proximate phase ( in virtue of containing 
memory of the latter) and, through it, indirectly connected to the 
more remote phases. Mackie gives a similar explanation in terms of 
what he calls "memory bridges" which, connecting the unconscious 
phases of our lives to our conscious ones, might constitute "the sort 
of continuity that is appropriate to persons" (Problems from Locke, pp 
180-1). It will, however, be borne in mind that this sort of theory is 
a revision of Locke's theory of personal identity and is indeed a 
better and more plausible account of it. But the really interesting 
thing is that Locke never intended to say what this theory says about 
personal identity, and in fact he was committed explicitly to a different 
view (See Mackie Ibid, p 181). He would even go on to invoke the 
distinction between "same person" and "same man" to explain the school 
boy/ officer / general paradox by saying that although the general is the 
same man as the school boy, he is not the same person (cf Essay, II Ch 
27 sec 20). He would embrace this counter- intuitive, if not absurd, 
position just because he wanted to define personal identity in terms of 
(direct) continuity of memory or consciousness, and no such definition 
could cope with a situation like the described one. Now, the revised 
version of Locke's theory might be able to cope with the situation 
satisfactorily, but this it can do only because it is not an analysis
of personal identity in terms of continuity of consciousness (As Mackie 
admits "openly" in his book, see pp 192 and 196), but presumably as 
a factual analysis - which is nearer to my criterio-logical analysis.
9. See Treatise ;Vol 1 p 245.
10. Ibid,P 251 *
11. Ibid.p 252.
12. Ibid;p 262.
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13, Chisholm, "On the observability of the Self", Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, '69-70.
14« D.F. Pears, "Hume on Personal Identity" in David Hume, - 
A Symposium ed. himself, (Macmillan, London 1963)«
15, op cit, p 53
Chapter 2: Section (ii).
1 ♦ Bishop Butler, Analogy.
Thomas Reid, Essays.
2. See Ch 1 sec i above.
3. See Analogy p 332.
The Lockeans, Butler argued there, cannot consistently be claiming 
that persons are really the same, since consciousness which they 
say constitutes personal identity, is not the same individual 
act at all times. And he goes on to add, "The bare unfolding 
this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems to be 
the best confutation to it".
4. Essay ^Bk II,Ch 27 secs 11 and 12.
5. See Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. . , p.46 and 
also Reid, Essays pp 212-13.
6 - Essays , , p 200.
7. Analogy, p 332.
B. “Memory and Personal Identity1^ AJP 19&4.
9 . op cit.
10. Analogy P.33& :
11. Ibid p 330.
— ■ "■ ■ r -
12. Ibid.p 330 (the following paragraph)
Ihia . P 332.13.
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14* Of course, speaking without justification is not to speak
without meaning. But why do we say that a soul continues in a 
person ? Surely, to invent something to meet the requirement of 
"something unchanged" to account for our identity through time, 
and this we have seen to be an unnecessary requirement. It follows, 
therefore that the making of personal identity judgments in terms 
of (or by supposing) the continuity of a soul is not only unjust­
ified but also needless.
15- E.g. by Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.Ch I and 
also pp 254-58.
16. Reid, Essays p 214
17- Butler.Analogy p 329
18* Evident from: "But to say that my remembrance that I did such a 
thing or my consciousness makes me the person who did it is .... 
an absurdity too gross to be entertained by any man who attends 
to the meaning of it" (my emphasis) Reid Essays p 214.
19. Ibid.P 204.
Chapter 2‘.Section (iii),
1. Critique of Pure Reason, trans, by E.K.Smith (Macmillan, London
1923). The numbered references hereafter in this section preceded 
by A and B are to the page numbers of the first and the second 
editions of the Critique respectively.
2 . The conclusion of the third paralogism was that the Soul is "a 
person" (A 3^1). About this conclusion,at least>Kant has no 
disagreement with his relationist adversaries, though where he 
differs is about the explanation of the identity of persons.
3, I shall leave out the claim of the 4th paralogism and Kant’s
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comment on it as I do not think it comes under the scope of our 
discussion here.
4- A 363.
5- The Bounds of Sense (Methuen, London 1966), p 162.
6* B 413* Compare Hume: "When I enter most intimately into what I 
call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception of 
other ... I never catch myself at any time without a perception, 
and can never observe anything but perceptions" (Treatise I.Pt IV 
Ch 6 ).
7. B 413.
8» Kant quoted from his Anthropology by W.H. Walsh in his Reason and 
Experience (The Clarendon Press Oxford 1947)>P 196.
9. Ibid.In the same passage from Kant.
10. See Chisholm, "On the Observability of the Self".
11- A 362 .
12- J Bennet, Kant13 Dialectic (The University Press Cambridge 1974)j
V 100.
13- I b i d 95.
14. Quotated by Walsh, Reason and Experience, p 18.
15. For a fuller discussion on this point, see Walsh.Ibid .Ch 9»
16* Kant even admits this at one stage, though very obscurely,
(see e.g. B415).
17* Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, p 164.
18. The bracketed numbers here and hereafter in this section refer to 
the page number of James Principles of Psychology (Macmillan, 
London 1902),Vol I Ch x,Sec on "Pure Ego".
19. A.J.Ayer, Origins of Pragmatism (Macmillan London, 1968^ p 265.
20. That it is not self-contradictory is pleaded, among others, by 
Strawson. See his Individuals Ch 3»
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21* James had acknowledged in his Pragmatism that the idea of his 
pragmatism and even the word "pragmatism" was suggested to him 
by the Critiques of Kant.
22. Treatise, Appendix.
23. Origins of Pragmatism p 266
Chapter 3 see (i).
1. "How can persons be ascribed M-predicates ?",Mind, January,1977.
An earlier z* version of this paper was presented at the staff 
and Post-graduate seminar of the Keele University Philosophy 
Department.
2. J.H.Hick,"Theology and verification",partially reprinted in
Flew(ed), Body, Mind and Death (Collier-Macmillan,London,1964).
3. J.L.Pollock, "Criteria and Our Knowledge of the Material World"
PR Vol 76 (1967), P 32.
4. W.G. Lycan, "Hon-inductive Evidences Recent Works on Wittgenstein’s 
Criterion", American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ .hereafter)
(April 1971).
5. "Wittgenstein's Use of the Term 'Criterion'" in Wittgenstein 
ed G. Pitcher (Papermac, Macmillan, London 1968)jpp 243-4»
6. See Horman Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty (Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963), "Do the propositions that describe 
the criterion of his being in pain logically imply the prepo­
sition, 'He is in pain'? Wittgenstein's answer is clearly in the 
negative" (p 113)» And Malcolm goes on to say. "A criterion is 
satisfied only in certain circumstances" (P 113)» and "the 
expressions of pain are a criterion of pain in certain surrou­
ndings, not in others", (p 1 1 4)»
The last remark of Malcolm may be slightly misleading and so 
may seem Wittgenstein's views since the latter did say some-
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thing to that effect, Cf PI,pt I see 584)? for it has the apparent effect 
of claiming that a criterion is a criterion only in certain situations 
and not, presumably, in all. But in my view this rather hazardous 
way of expressing the matter has been taken resort to only to bring 
home the point that the c-relation is not one of entailment. A more 
correct reading of Wittgenstein may be approached by taking the 
"certain surroundings" and "other surroundings" as analogous to 
"normal circumstances" and "abnormal circumstances" which we have 
been discussing. The fact is that, it is the satisfaction of the 
criterion - not the criterion itself - which is said to depend on 
these circumstances. As our earlier analysis would have shown (so I 
hope), the truth rather is that it is the circumstances - whether or 
not they are to be called "normal" - that depend on or are relative to 
the criterion, and not the other way round.
7. The Blue and Brown Books (Basil Blackwell 1958)^ 25. (my emphasis )
8. See esp.Ibid ,p 25, where he * says that no strict line can be drawn 
between criteria and symptoms, and also PI, Pt I sec 354» where ± he 
speaks of "fluctuations between criteria and symptoms".
9. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity,p 3» This notion is elaborated 
and consistently applied in the book.
10 Lycan.op cit ,p 110
11 Cf.op cit. p 110 two paragraphs earlier,
12 Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1959.
13 Self Knowledge and Self Identity,p 4
Chapter 3 sec (ii)
1. More has been said about this distinctive feature of persons and the 
consequent speciality of the problem of personal identity in Ch 1 sec ii.
2. Originally published in the PAS 1956 and reprinted in his Problems
of the s e l f . Hereafter the page references to th is  a r t ic le  as well as
309 -
to the others included in this hook will he to the hook.
3. Such theories have been suggested by Shoemaker and Parfit,among 
others. We will have occasion to consider them later on.
4. Ibid.p 10
5. Ihid.p 11. The plausibility and force of this argument seems to 
lie on the fact that the satisfaction of the memory- criterion 
does not show that bodily continuity is not there but merely that 
we do not have any direct evidence that it is. On the contrary,if 
the two persons in question were known to have different bodies, 
then despite the impressiveness of their psychological similarities 
judgment of identity will be fairly suspect - if not withdrawn.
6. Problems of the Self.p 10.
7. In his "Are Persons Bodies "?, "The Self and the Future" as well as 
"Personal Identity and Individuation"; all are reprinted in the 
book referred to above.
8. See "The Self and the Future", Ibld.p 63
9. Cf, op cit» p 47 and also "Are Persons Bodies ?", Ibid.P 79.
10. "The Self and The Future1^  Ibid jp 47*
11. See Bon Locke, Memory (Macmillan, London 1971 ),PP 135-37»where 
he has adduced such an argument for the reliability of memory.
12. Essay Bk II,Ch 27 sec 16.
13« A.M. Quinton "The Soul" JP.1962
14. See especially "Are Persons Bodies?" Problem of the Self .p 77
15. IbldjP 79.
16. Ibid j> 78 also p 77.
17. Ibid .p 77.
18. Self Knowledge and Self-Identity^p 2^»
19. Ibid . p 24
20. Ibid. pp 24-25*
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21. J.M.Shorter "More About Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity", 
Analysis 196l-62j,p 81
22. "Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity", Problems of the Self,p24.
23. Ibid ,p 23.
24* "Personal Identity and Individuation" Ibid.pp 8-9
25. See Personal Identity, p 81.
26. Ibid,p 86
27» See "Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity" Problems of the Self,
p 20.
29. Ibid „ p 24-
29. "Personal Identity? PR 1971,P 13 (For a fuller account of 
Parfit" theory see sec iv below).
30 Personal Identity, p 90 *
31. "On the Importance of Self Identity", JP 1971» P 689.
32. See Personal Identity 90
Chapter 3isec (iii).
1. "Personal Identity and Individuation", Problems of the Self.p 1.
2. Compare Brian J.Smart, "Personal Identity in an Organized 
Parcel", Philosophical Studies .1973.P 422" ... being an actual 
part (Which in the present context is the whole body-minus-brain, 
PKM) does not entail being an essential part."
3. "Are Persons Bodies?", Problems of the Self.p 77
4. See Wittgenstein, Blue Book.p 61* see also J.M. Shorter,
" More about Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity".Analysis 
1961-62, pf6l-62 and 81.
5. See, particularly, Wiggins ISTC .p 37. See also Brian J.Smart,
"How to Reidentify the Ship of Theseus", Analysis Vol.32 (1971-72).
6. See Brian J Smart "The Ship of Theseus,the Parthenon and 
Disassembled Objects", Analysis Vol 34 (73-74),p 25.
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7. Self Knowledge and Self-Identity»p 24 
(emphasis added in the following quotation)
8. See Ibid,esp pp 174-5«
9. Ibid.p 194, also p 182 *
10. Ibld.pp 181-2
11. His review of Shoemaker's Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity in 
Philosophical Quarterly 19653P 79
12. That Shoemaker was committed to this position as well is evident 
from his earlier paper "Personal Identity and Memory" (JP 1959)j 
where he discussed this type of case as possible cases of "bodily 
exchange."
13« op cit .p 871.
14. Ibid ,and also "Personal Identity and Memory", JP 1959*
15. Self-Knowledge and Self-IdentityvCh 4 secs 1 and 5 and elsewhere; 
also in "Personal Identity and Memory", op cit esp p 873.
16. Ch 1 sec (ii ) above.
17« Cf Shoemaker, "Personal Identity and Memory", op cit p 875*
18. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.p 243 Cf also "Personal Identity 
and Memory," op cit p 878.
19. See Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity.esp pp 246 and 245« Also 
"Personal Identity and Memory", op cit,p 879«
20. Thus he says, "By a criterion of identity for fs I mean something 
logically constutive of the identity of fs and potentially 
analytical of what it is to e an f", ISTC.p 45«
21. Ibid.p 55.
22. It has been pointed out in the last section that the brain being 
the bodily part that plays the role of the seat of memory and 
consciousness is only a contingent fact and that any other part 
or parts of the body could be imagined to play this role.Wiggins
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gives vent to this idea especially in Ibid,p55 (few lines earlier to 
the quoted passage).
23. Cf. "Personal Identity and Individuation".Problems of the Self,p 12.
24. Cf. "Bodiljr Continuity and Personal Identity".Ibid,p 21.
25« Cf. B.J.Smart,"How to Reidentify the Ship of Theseus".Analysis,
April 1972,p147«
26. "Wiggins on Identity",PR 1970»esp P 543»
27. Problems from Locke.see esp p 200.
Chapter 3: section (iv).
1 . This theory has been put forward in his "Personal Identity"(PR 1971)»
"On'The Importance of Self-Identity111 fJP 1971) and his "Later Selves 
and Moral Principles" in Alan Montefoire ed. Philosophy and Personal 
Relations(Routledge and Kegan Paul,London 1973)»The thesis was also gen- 
s .erally defended in a radio talk with Professor Vesey (the talk is
printed in the latter's ed Philosophy in the Open (The Open University 
Press ,1974.)
2 . "On 'The Importance of Self-Identity'",(JP 1971)»
3 . o£ cit.p 685.
4 « Terence Penelhum,"The Importance of Self-Identity",JP 1971 P 671.
5 • "On 'The Importance of Self-Identity'",op cit.pp 684-5»
6 • See his "Personal Identity",PR 1971.
7 . Penelhum,"The Importance o£ Self-Identity",JP 1971 p675*
8 . See his "On 'The Importance of Self-Identity'",JP 1971 P 688.
9 . See ISTC.esp p 7 .
10. "Later Selves...".Philosophy and Personal Relations,p 138.
11. Cf. Ibid.p 139.
12. The suggestion that Parfit relies on the Verification Principle I got 
from Swinburne's paper "Personal Identity"(PAS 1974).! am not,however,
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comfortable with the passage Swinburne quotes from Parfit to show
this. In this passage Parfit considers Wiggin's example of a man's 
brain
/being split into two halves and each half being transplanted into 
a different (brainless) body. He rejects the suggestion that only 
one of the resulting persons may be the same person as the brain 
doner on the ground that "each half of my brain is exactly similar, 
and,so,to start with,is each resulting person,So how can I survive 
as only one of the two people ? What can make me one of them rather 
than the other ?" (PR 1971»P 5)» The assumption that one of them 
must differ from the other in some observable respect in order that 
he be the same person as the original person may be implicit here; 
but there seems to be no assumption - implicit or explicit - to the 
effect that the suggestion is meaningless.On the contrary,one sees 
Parfit saying (in the same page,few lines later) that the suggestion 
is "highly implausible" (which by no means is the same as "meaningless") 
and that it is one of the three"possible descriptions" of what can 
be said about Wiggin's operation.
Nevertheless it is quite evident that Parfit was working on 
some such assumption as that of the Verifi cation Principle,as I 
bring out in the text.
13» See Swinburne,op cit,p 231.
14» Cf. Malcolm,Dreaming (Routledge and Kegan Paul,London 1959)»P 60, 
for similar arguments to show that criteria and meaning are not 
the same.
13. Swinburne,"Personal Identity",op cit,p 242.
16. See JP 1971*P 686. See also PR 1971>P 25* "Since this connectedness
distinctionsis a matter of degree,the drawing of the/can be left to the choice 
andof the speaker/be allowed to vary from context to context".
17. Cf. PR 1971»P 25.
V
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18» That Parfit has not shown this and yet has to show this is alleged 
by Vesey in his Personal Identity?p 63
19. "Persons and Their Pasts" APO 1970.,p 284.
20. "Later Selves ... ", Philosophy and Personal Relations.
21. Essay Bk II Ch 27 sec 18.
22. "Later Selves ..."
Chapter 4: Section (i).
1. Locke Essay, Bk II Ch 27 sec 7.
Shoemaker, Self- Knowledge and Self Identity, p 4.
2. See Ch 1 sec i, for a fuller account of this.
3. More familiarily, in Williams1 arguments in his "Personal 
Identity and Individuation", problems of the Self.
4. See Williams, Ibid, p 10
5. Self- Knowledge and Self-Identity, p 1.
6. Read at the Keele University philosophy Society on 12.2.76.
7. Cf Wittgenstein, PI,Pt I sec 282.
8. PI, pt I sec 282.
Chapter 4 section (ii).
1. See, for example, Shoemaker, "personal Identity and Memory",JP 
1959» P 878} also Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ch 6 section 8.
2. Cf Shoemaker, Ibid, Ch 6 sec 8.
3. cf Ibid, esp pp 244-5»
4. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1974 (emphasis and brackets added).
5. That it is a case of approval is evident from his remark
(few lines earlier, on p 26) that Williams' is "a more concise 
and coherent argument" and that "formally it is no better or worse 
than the Bultitude argument in that it consists in a straightforward
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appeal to our logical intuitions to what we should or should 
not want to say in certain circumstances."
6. A.M. Quinton, "The Soul", JP 1?62jpp 404-5«
7. Cf Locke, "should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the 
consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body 
of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees 
he would be the same person as the prince ..."(Essay, II 27 15)> 
ajid Quinton, "the soul ... is the essential constituent of personal 
identity" and "it is also what a person fundamentally is"("The 
Soul" JP 1962,p 403)* my emphasis in both the quotations.
8. op cit, p 403«
9. Cf PIj. sec 282.
10. Cf ’Personal Identity and Memory*,jp 1959, P 878«
Chapter 4: Section (iii).
1. Cf Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Tamer Lectures, The University Press, 
Cambridge 1954), P 95«
2. See "Theology and Verification" in Flew (ed)?Pody.Mind and Death.
3. Penelhum, among others, considers such a possibility in his 
"Personal Identity, Memory and Survival," JP 1959« My reasons 
for disapproval of this theory follows in due course.
4. See e.g. Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, p 19-
5. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Tehologica, Q 79 A2.
6. "Self, Mind and Body" in his Freedom and Resentmentfp 174«
Strawson here is concerned with the person/ soul relation,
whereas I have utilised the spirit of the argument to the 
analogous case of the bodied being/person relation.
7. Cf Kan, Critique of Pure Reason (ch on the paralogisms)A363-4>
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footnote. Kant here was dealing with the hypothesis that it is
the sameness of the soul substance or Pure Ego which constitutes
the sameness of the person. His famous retort to this hypothesis
is| "whenever you say there is one continuous soul-substance, I say 
there is a whole series of them each of which transmits its states,
and the consciousness of them, to its successor, as motion might
be transmitted from one to another of a whole series of elastic
balls'’. ) (Strawson's paraphrase of Kant, Ibid, p 233)
8. JP/I962, p 403*
9. See Lewis and Flew, symposium on "Survival" PAS (suppl) 1974-751 
and also G.Englebretsen, Speaking of Persons (Lalhousie Univ.
Press,Halifax, Hova Scotia, 1975),Ch 5» See also F. Cowley,"The 
Identity of a Person and His Body"^jp 1971.
10. "Self, Mind and Body", Freedom and Resentment.
11. See Copleston, Aquinas (Pelican original, Penguin 1955)» P 170 and 
Strawson, Individuals, p 103*
12. See Copleston, Ibid  ^Ch 4 esp pp 163 and 168.CF Aquinas,
Summa Theologica.la, 89, i.
13. See Copleston Ibid, esp pp 160 and 167.
14» J.Harrison "Embodiment of Mind •• n PAS 1974# Penelhum also
concedes such possibilities presumably to make the idea of 
disembodied existence plausible enough; Survival and Disembodied 
Existence, chs 2 and 3»
Chapter 4: Section (iv).
1. This we have made clear in the first chapter (section ii).
Arguments to show that knowledge of self-identity (as distinct from
personal identity) not only can be, but is, non-criterlal have been 
adduced by Shoemaker (especially, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity)
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and also by Strawson (Bounds of Sense fpp 164-5).
2. The suggestion, in view of the essential imperceptibility of the 
disembodied persons, that the latter has to live in a solipistic 
world has appealed to many as irrisitible (see, for example,Penelhura, 
Survival and Disembodied Existence)* and some even have wanted to 
draw this conclusion on conceptual grounds (Cf also Penelhum, Ibid} 
this is also implicit in Shoemaker’s book referred to above, esp­
ecially in his attempt therein to show that the relation between 
a person’s seeing and his having the 'point of view' on his body 
is not contingent, id, Ch 4 secs 3-6), Somewhat similarly implicit 
arguments can also be found in Puccetti’s Persons(Macmillan,London 
1968 , Ch 1^ However, as I do not intend to argue that the idea 
of disembodied survival is logically impossible or straight­
forwardly nonsense, I will leave the last word on this to the 
proponents of the thesis and allow that the disembodied persons 
could be said to make memory claims.
5» See pp P256-7 and 217 above.
4. PAS 1974, PP 48-49 (my emphasis).
5. op clt, p 49 (few lines later).
6. This point.became explicit in course of Malcolm’s discussion
of his paper mentioned above.
7. See, for example, Penelhum, Survival and Disembodied Existence, 
esp P 77» Though, on my showing, Penelhum would be right in 
saying this about "non-embodied” persons.
8. Indeed, this fact of "inheriting" the understanding of the P- 
predicates has been thought to be an essential requirement of the 
disembodied persons being able to make statements containing 
P-predicates or even for our making such statement about them, 
(See, for example, Penelhum, Ibid, p 22)
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9. While the Roman Catholic tradition generally believes that the 
pre-mortem body and the resurrection body are one and the same, 
Aquinas, in particular, lays special emphasis on their being 
the same so much so that, according to him" ... if it be not
the same body it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming 
of a new body" (Summa Tehologlca, III Q 79 Al). Also cf Ibid,Q79 
A2, where it is claimed that resurrection will be effected only 
by "the self-same soul being united with the self-same body", 
since, presumably, (as Aquinas did belive, see last section) 
the soul by itself cannot constitute a human person but can do 
so only in its -union with a body. (So that if = P^,taking *s
for a soul, B for a body and P for a person, then even if + Bg
may make up a person, it cannot make the same person). But here 
again, except for a pious hope that the soul will rise together 
with the same body ( i.e, perhaps, God will recreate or reconsti­
tute the resurrection body out of the persisting spatio-. 
temporally continuous elements of the original pre-mortem body), 
no reasonable guarantee is provided so that this body will not be 
just an exactly similar body rather than the same body.
10. "Theology and Verification", especially in his third picture of 
instantaneous change of bodies.
11. Essay, II Ch 27 sec 1.
12. "Survival, Reincarnation and the Problem of Personal Identity", 
Journal of the Indian Philosophical Association, July-Deeember,1968.
13. op clt, p 138.
1 4. op cit, p 139.
15. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, pp 239-41» (cf also Wittgenstein 
PI pt II p 56 bottom line).
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16. cf PI,pt II p 56.
1 7 . Ibid, pt I sec 142.
18. Survival and Bisembofiied Existence, see chs 9 and 10,and esp p97.
19. Ibid.p 95.Also see his "Personal Identity »Memory and Survival",
JP 1959 pp 900-901. Penelhum’s account of such a person and personal 
identity should be entertained only as a reductio as,in fact,he 
intended to use this. But one enigmatic feature of his analysis is 
that he seems to allow that persons could (particularly in the 
Hick-type cases referred to in the text earlier) be coherently and 
intelligibly construed as gap-inclusive entities in the described 
way. For an unqualified commitment to this will not only be unaccept­
able to us,but will expose an inherent inconsistency in his own 
position. He cannot,i.e,,have it both ways: that bodily continuity 
is necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity( seeld,p 67 ) 
and that persons could be thus construed.
Our qualification with regard to this will be,as it has been 
with regard to disembodied survival,that though our talk in such cases 
of "same person" is intelligible,it succeeds in being so only in a 
secondary sense.
20. See ch 2 sec iii,where it has been argued that,on a purely "stream of 
consciousness" account,no guarantee would be there that a "soul-phase" 
may not fall into the wrong stream.
Chapter 5: section (i).
1. Cf Wittgenstein: "We are not forced to talk of a double personality 
(by which he means "two persona" .PKM)".The Blue Book,p 62.
2. See J.M.Shorter,"Personal Identity»Personal Relations and Criteria",
PAS 1970-71»and esp Wittgenstein.The Blue Book.pp 61 and 62. It is 
also explicit in J.F.M.Hunter,"Personal Identity" in Essays After 
Wittgenstein.esp p 4 1,
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3. E.g. Wiggins,ISTE.pp 52 and 53»
4, This view of Parfit has been fully discussed and dismissed in ch 3 
sec iv (and also in Appendix 2), For an explicit exposition of this 
interpretation of Parfit see Swinburne,"Personal Identity",PAS 1974» 
p 243 and note 9 to that paper,
5. Cf Wiggins ISTC.pp 52-53.
6. To borrow a fitting example from Wiggins,cf Ibid,p 55»
7, As Shoemaker,for example,had wanted to say in his famous.Brownson 
case (Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity,pp30 and 246), However,if
our modification in the concept of bodily conyinuity (see ch 3 secs ii 
and iii) is justified,Shoemaker's plea will amount only to a changed 
or modified version of our normal criterion (i.e.»bodily continuity) - 
and not to a change or modification of the criterion itself,
8, Penelhum, Survival and Disembodied Existences  83.
9« Cf Ibid,p 85. We have explicated the unclarity of these situations 
by showing them to be worthy,at best,of a secondary,degenerate desc­
ription - besides being dubious.
Chapter 5: section (ii).
1, In the sense in which they have been analysed in earlier chapters, 
especially ch 1,
2, The weakness of such a theory,in so far as it purports to lead to an 
entirely non-physical account of personhood and personal identity, 
has been discussed at some length in chapter 1sec ii and ch 2 sec ii. 
In view of the extreme familiarity of this weakness,I do not 
intend to defend the "Simple View" in this obvious formulation - 
although I do defend another formulation of the theory which I think 
is correct,
. See Parfit,"Personal Identity"(PR 1971) and "On 'The Inportance of3
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Self-Identity* "(JP 1971); and see also Lockf Essay, II Ch 27 
sec 18,
4, By contrast, there are certain other words which have a non- 
unitary role; for example, 'intelligence', 'strength', 'reasona­
bleness' and the like. It normally makes no sense to talk of a
unit of intelligence or even of strength (except on the technical 
sense in which a minute is called a unit of time), and accordingly 
people may be quite sensibly be said to be more or less intelli­
gent, strong etc. It may at times be more sensible to regard a 
stronger man as equal to two or more men who are less strong; 
but the former is still as much a person as any of the latter two
5, As Parfit, in particular, has suggested. (See Ch 4 sec v above; 
see also note 6 below),
6, Parfit PR 1971, JP 1971 and "Later Selves ..." (in philosophy 
and Personal Relations.ed Montefoire).
7« Note his emphatic claim that "... in its nature - in what it 
involves - personal identity is a matter of degree",
8. For yet another recent attack on this dubious separation, see 
Brian J Smart, "Diachronous and Synchronous Selves" (see iv), in 
the Canadian Journal of Philosophy (CJP , hereafter) March 1976,
9. See Ch 3 sec v for fuller arguments against this,
10. See especially his "Later Selves ..." in Montefoire.
11. As Geach has rightly remarked about the Lockean theory of personal 
identity see his God and the Soul, p 4»
12. As Parfit rightly pointed out, see his "Later Selves ...".Montefoire 
P 157.
13. See PR 1971» P 25 and Montefoire, p 141.
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14. See Montefoire, p 141%
15. See CJP March 1976.
16. "Later Selves ... 7 Montefoire, p 111*
17. See, for example, Wiggins, "On Being in the Same Place at the
Same Time", PR 19^8jP 91»
18. CJP March 1976, pp 24-25.
19. See Williams "The Self and the Future", and also his "Are
Persons Bodies ?". See also Swinburne ("Personal Identity” 
PAS 74 p 244) for the importance of the survivor being me.
20. The Blue Book, p 25-
21. CP JIM. Hunter "Personal Identity" in Essays after Wittgenstein . 
pp 41-42.
Appendix - 1.
1. See Strawson, The Bounds of Sense pp 164-67» fo* niore on this. 
The argument that the belief in criterion-less self-knowledge 
does not imply the non-physical nature of the subject of 
experience or of self-knowledge (i.e. person) is fairly 
implicit in his Individuals, Ch 3 sec 6.
2, Cf Strawson, Individuals, p 111,
Appendix - 2.
1. This suggestion is expressedly made by Wiggins (ISTC , p 55,
para 2) and, as I take it, implicitly by Parfit in the 
doctrine that "non-branching psychological continuity" can 
guarantee personal identity. (Cf "Personal Identity", PR 1971).
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2. I owe the formulation of this suggestion directly to Professor
Swinburne. He himself is strongly in favour of this suggestion 
as is also implicit in his theory of unanalysability of personal 
identity (See his "Personal Identity" PAS 1974,esp p 241)»
3. See Swinburne op cit, p 243«
For our argument to the same effect see Ch 3 sec v above.
4. Those who would think that the result of the operation may be 
otherwise and that the two halves of the brain may be hetroge- 
neous in the relevant respects, and so may be the resulting 
persons, would not be making any mistake; they would rather be
*
pointing to what actually is the case rather than what might be 
possible. But in that case, the problem of whether one or each 
"product" is the same person as the original person will not trouble 
us any more. For in that case our argument would take a different 
line to show that none of the resulting persons can be identical 
with the original person, by casting doubts on the proposition that 
any of them is a person in the first place. This can be argued by 
drawing attention to what Thomas Nagel calls the "functional 
duality of the cerebral cortex" (See his "Brain Bisection and the 
Unity of Consciousness", in Synthese 1972) together with the 
unitary concept of a person. On the basis of his findings, Nagel’s 
own conclusion is that there would be no whole number of individual 
minds that the patients (of bisected brain transplants) can be said 
to have (See, op cit, pp 402 and 409), though they could still be 
said to engage in mental activities (op cit, p 402). My further
conclusion from this would be that if the idea of any (countable 
number of ) individual minds goes, the idea of person or persons.
-  324 -
goes too. The idea behind the last conclusion is that
unless all that is necessary and sufficient for the concept
o f  a  p e rs o n  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d ,  th e n  th e  id e a  o f  a  p e rs o n  b re a k s
down; and on the assumption that the two halves are hetro-
0
geneous ( that the two halves must co-operate in the contro­
lling of the personal capacities) we will not be transferring 
all that is necessary and stifficient for the concept of a
person,
